🔥 China Trend Watch (week 6/7 | 2026) Part of Eye on Digital China by Manya Koetse, China Trend Watch is an overview of what’s trending and being discussed on Chinese social media. The previous newsletter was a chapter dive into the Becoming Chinese and Kill Line phenomena. This edition was sent to paid subscribers — subscribe to receive the next issue in your inbox.

In the first weeks of 2026, our news feeds have felt unusually heavy. From war, protests, and heightening geopolitical tensions, to the Epstein files and the sentencing of Jimmy Lai, there is so much competing for scroll space on our phones these days. The Winter Olympics and the start of the Chinese New Year travel season bring some light to otherwise darker feeds, but still add to the endless stream of TikTok trends and Temu/Tmall temptations that quickly move beneath our thumbs just before we switch off the screen and dim the nightlight for sleep.

It is hardly surprising that the mental health of many internet users is increasingly affected by media overload, closely tied to today’s never-ending news delivery & social media ecosystems accompanying us in busy lives, where our minds are also occupied with our own daily worries and pressures.

Lately, this became a topic of discussion in a digital group chat I share with my friends in Amsterdam. They found a practical way to distance themselves from the feeds on their phones: the Tap Out, an app blocker designed by two Dutch guys that only lets them access distracting apps by physically tapping a small “Tap Out Point,” a compact NFC-enabled puck available in different colors with fancy names like Sundried Limestone and Marbled Moon. By placing the puck in another room, or even leaving it at home while at work, a physical barrier prevents them from getting trapped in mindless doomscrolling and addictive swiping habits.

I found the sudden popularity of the tool somewhat bewildering, and vowed not to let anyone talk me into such a nonsensical hype. It made me uneasy that we have apparently reached a stage where we would pay $60 for a device to control something we should be able to control ourselves. We’re turning to a quick technological fix for a deeper problem created by technology, we’re buying a digital product to live less digitally, and we’re paying to escape social media through a device sold to us via targeted advertising on the very platforms we are trying to escape.

In China, superapps combine payment, utility, social, news, and e-commerce functions under one umbrella, making the Dutch “Tap Out” a product that would make little sense for the Chinese market — blocking yourself from WeChat would effectively mean locking yourself out of your phone and your wallet. Yet so-called temporary “mobile self-control tools” (手机自律神器) are still quite popular on Taobao these days, typically in the form of phone lockboxes with time-lock codes, mostly to help teenagers and students focus on their studies.

My friends in Beijing, however, were not discussing those tools. Earlier this month, instead, a photo of a fluffy toy with a cute face appeared in our WeChat group. Now that the success of Labubu is cooling down, the Pop Mart company has introduced another collectible blind-box toy: the “Pucky Tap Tap” series (PUCKY敲敲系列), also dubbed diànzǐ mùyú (电子木鱼), literally meaning “electronic wooden fish.”

A toy within the Pucky Tap Tap series.

The toy has nothing to do with actual fish, nor is it made from wood. A mùyú (木鱼) is a traditional percussion instrument, often carved from a single piece of wood and shaped like a fish. It is used in Buddhism during chanting, sutra recitation, or meditation to maintain rhythm, stay focused, and calm the mind.

The traditional muyu sold on Taobao and Amazon.

Although the Pucky Tap Tap series is inspired by the mùyú, it is essentially a battery-powered plush keychain that makes a soothing sound when you tap its head. The Pucky Tap Tap has become hugely popular as a stress-relief tool among young Chinese consumers who believe the sound can quickly ease anxiety.

On apps like Xiaohongshu, videos show people frantically tapping the toy’s head, while an official Pop Mart ad features a young woman whispering a small prayer before tapping for good luck. Another video shows a girl shutting her laptop to take a breather and tap her toy.

Video promoting the Pucky Tap Tap on Tiktok by Popmart US shop.

Some consider the toy tacky, but by now the keychain has become so wanted that resellers are asking more than double the original price, even helping to lift Pop Mart’s stock.

Another nonsensical hype, perhaps — tempting consumers to buy things they do not need by creating the illusion that peace of mind and happiness are products you can buy. A peaceful mind cannot be bought, though. It comes from within, and will not be attained through a $60 limestone “Tap Out,” nor a $25 Pop Mart “Pucky Tap Tap.” Since when did we all become so silly?

The only reason I ended up purchasing the Pucky Tap Tap is simple: it looks cute. And I am researching these trends for my work, am I not? Don’t mind me if I occasionally tap its head — just for fun. Or perhaps because it feels good to tap something other than a screen. And who knows, while I’m at it, it might bring me some good luck too. It is very different from “tapping out,” right?

Right?

Let’s dive into some of the other trends that have been especially noteworthy.

What Really Stood Out This Week

Takaichi’s Win Seen from China: “A More Dangerous Japan”

[#高市早苗赌赢后彻底不装了#] [#日本彻底失控#]

Cartoon “Japan’s right wing on the rise” by Jin Ding 金鼎, China Daily. Feb 10, 2026.

After winning the Liberal Democratic Party leadership election in October, conservative politician and Shinzo Abe protégé Sanae Takaichi (高市早苗, in Chinese: Gāoshì Zǎomiáo) went on to secure a decisive victory in Japan’s lower house elections on Sunday, winning more than two-thirds of the seats in the snap election she called in January.

Sino-Japanese relations were a central theme in the campaign, as Takaichi’s leadership since October has already triggered one of the sharpest deteriorations in bilateral ties in recent years. This is not only due to her hardline stance on sensitive issues such as wartime history, but also because of her remarks in November on the possibility of military intervention in Taiwan-related matters. Those comments have had far-reaching consequences, ranging from import bans to Japanese performers seeing their China shows canceled.

Rather than weakening Takaichi, China’s pressure campaign appears to have boosted her popularity at home. She is not only the country’s first female prime minister, but it is also the first time the LDP — or any party in Japan, for that matter — has won such a large majority of the vote.

In China, the official response stressed that “the election is Japan’s internal affair” (“日本内政”), but reactions in state media and on social media told a different story. One general view on Takaichi’s win on Chinese social media is that it aligns with an overall decline of the center-left and a growing populism in Western societies.

Takaichi’s victory has been widely framed as a risky gamble, and her post-election comments about a possible visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, where Japan’s war dead (including Class-A war criminals) are honored, further fueled online discussions portraying her not only as a threat to Sino-Japanese relations but also as a danger to Japan itself.

A political cartoon published by China Daily, in both its Chinese and international editions, depicts Takaichi rising above a field of graves belonging to war criminals, emphasizing how important wartime memory is in China’s official framing of her election win (see featured image).

From China’s perspective, Japan is a country that has never really reflected on its wartime aggressions, and Takaichi is viewed as particularly problematic in this regard for her previous remarks not just on Yasukuni, but also on other war-related topics, including denial of the comfort women issue and skepticism regarding the death toll of the Nanjing Massacre.

According to Niu Tanqin (牛弹琴), a Chinese veteran media commentator who posted on Zhihu, there are multiple risks associated with Takaichi’s win. Niu writes:

“Japan is no longer the Japan of the past. With an absolute two-thirds majority in the lower house, Takaichi has crossed the threshold required for constitutional revision. It cannot be ruled out that she may push to amend the pacifist constitution, transform the Self-Defense Forces into a “national defense army,” and accelerate Japan’s so-called “national normalization.””

“There are hidden dangers behind this path towards “normalization” for a country that has not fully reckoned with its history. Large-scale military expansion, sharply increased defense spending, and pursuit of offensive weapons may follow. It cannot be ruled out that Japan could abandon its “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” and seek to acquire nuclear weapons. On the Taiwan issue, Japan may become more provocative, and China–Japan relations will become more turbulent. What we face is a more dangerous (凶险) Japan.”

An Unfortunate Olympic Bump Between a Dutch and Chinese Athlete

[#廉子文向对手致歉反遭挥打#] [#廉子文跟重赛对手说对不起#] [#廉子文并非有意阻碍荷兰选手#] [#廉子文不解裁判判罚#]

The Winter Olympics have been a major topic of discussion this week, with many emotional moments being highlighted in the Chinese media.

One notable example that resonated with netizens is the interview given by the 32-year-old Chinese short track speed skater Fan Kexin (范可新). Coming from an impoverished background and dedicating years of her life to succeed in skating, now competing in her fourth Winter Olympics, Fan had an breakdown moment during an interview that suggested the end of two decades of competition when she tearfully said: “Everyone can see my hair is turning white, I’ve endured until the very end” (“大家看到我的头发已经白了，我已经熬到头了”).

Fan Kexin in her tearful interview with CCTV.

Another emotional incident specifically stood out. It was the dramatic moment during Wednesday’s men’s 1000 meter involving Dutch skater Joep Wennemars and China’s Lian Ziwen (廉子文). During the final lane change, Lian tangled with Wennemars even though the Dutch athlete, coming from the outside lane, had right of way during the exchange. The collision effectively ruined Wennemars’ medal chances. After reviewing the incident, officials disqualified the Chinese skater. Wennemars was given a re-skate thirty minutes later, but the fatigued and frustrated skater only recorded the ninth fastest time.

Lian Ziwen apologized to Joep Wennemars after the incident, according to his coach Jan Bos, who spoke to the Dutch press. Ziwen was reportedly devastated after his mistake and, according to Bos, “just cried” following his disqualification.

The topic became a major subject of discussion on Chinese social media and ranked number one on Kuaishou’s trending lists. What stands out in Chinese online reactions is that, although almost everyone seems to agree there was no intent involved, opinions clearly fall into three camps.

The first camp (most dominant) defends Lian and focuses mainly on the actions of an angry Wennemars after the finish, as the Dutch skater could be seen shouting at Lian and lashing out in his direction. In these reactions, Wennemars is insulted as an “uncivilized Dutch milk cow” or a “white pig” (or “Dutch pig”, which also means “guinea pig” in Chinese), and his reaction is framed as “anti-Chinese,” with the Nexperia affair being frequently mentioned. In these discussions, the Olympic moment takes on a clear nationalist tone and becomes symbolic of Dutch-Chinese relations at large.

The second camp views the situation primarily from an Olympic and sporting perspective and shows more understanding for Wennemars’ intense emotions. They consider Lian’s apology logical and Joep’s anger understandable. Some Douyin commenters wrote: “If you do something wrong, you should apologize. That the other person does not forgive you is perfectly normal,” and: “Whether intentional or not, four years of preparation were destroyed in an instant.” Some draw comparisons to a well-known Olympic incident in 1992, when Chinese skater Ye Qiaobo (叶乔波) also missed out on gold after being hindered by a Soviet skater during a lane change.

The third camp, a smaller but notable group, uses the discussion as a moment of reflection on Chinese social media itself, particularly on cyber-nationalism and the double standards of some internet users. As one Douyin comment put it: “When a foreigner commits a foul, people immediately start cursing. But when our own athlete makes a mistake, the foreigner gets blamed instead. That is how distorted it can be.”

An interesting detail: on Weibo, comment sections under some news posts about this incident appear to be heavily filtered. Possibly, too much geopolitics was beginning to overshadow the Olympic mood.

On the Feed

Draco Malfoy as the Lucky Chinese New Year Charm

While American TikTok users find themselves in a “very Chinese time” of their lives, Chinese netizens are fixated on the American “kill line.” Beyond the apparent digital divide, both trends reflect shared anxieties and shifting power dynamics between the US and China.

In the first month of 2026, two noteworthy social-media trends, both telling of the times we live in, went viral in the US and China: a China-focused trend in the US and an America-focused one in China.

In the US, TikTok videos and Instagram posts showing young people cheerfully portraying themselves as “Chinamaxxing,” or being “in a very Chinese time” of their lives, began popping up across social media.

Meanwhile, in China, posts about the darker side of American society and its so-called “kill line” (斩杀线) dominated trending lists.

In this week’s chapter dive, I’ll explain the stories behind both of these trends and why, despite their very different implications, the dynamics driving them are strikingly similar.

Converting to “Chinese Baddies”

Over the past week, the phrase “Becoming Chinese” (成为中国人 chéngwéi Zhōngguórén) has been gaining traction on Chinese social media. On January 30, the headline “Why ‘Becoming Chinese’ Videos Are Going Viral’ even made it to the number one most popular topic on Chinese platform Toutiao (“成为中国人视频为什么火了”).

Before reaching China’s social media, the trend had been gaining momentum on TikTok and Instagram for months, with viral videos showing foreigners humorously flaunting their supposedly deep connection to China by doing things like drinking a nice cup of hot water (the solution to everything), using traditional Chinese medicine, sitting in a squatting position while smoking Chinese cigarettes and holding Tsingtao beer, eating noodles or dim sum—all while wearing that popular Adidas “Chinese jacket.”

This is all referred to as “Chinamaxxing” or “Chinesemaxxing”: optimizing life by living in a Chinese-coded way.

Various “very Chinese time” examples (TikTok/Instagram).

The build-up to this moment has actually been underway for several years. In the post-Covid era, China’s global pop culture influence has grown noticeably, driven both by increasingly outward-facing efforts from Chinese companies and state actors, and by a broader shift among younger audiences in the US toward Asia.

As part of this broader shift, several notable online moments have emerged over the past few years, including the viral success of a Chinese pop song in 2022; the 2024 breakout of Black Myth: Wukong; the 2025 “TikTok refugee” phenomenon; Chinese rapper SKAI ISYOURGOD becoming a staple on TikTok; and the widely watched March 2025 China tour of American YouTuber IShowSpeed, followed by a less impactful but still meaningful China visit by American influencer Hasan Piker.

The now-famous line “You met me at a very Chinese time in my life”—inspired by the quote “You met me at a very strange time in my life” from the final scene of Fight Club—first surfaced on X in April 2025. The X account “Perfect Angel” (@girl__virus) then posted the phrase in a tweet that since has gathered over 950,000 views.¹

The X post of April 5, screenshotted Jan 30, 2026.

The trend snowballed from there, especially in October 2025. When creator Myles Marchant posted a video of himself eating dumplings while using the phrase, it received nearly 200k likes. Afterward, all kinds of internet users, but particularly American content creators, started using the phrase in videos to show off just how “Chinese” they were.

Myles Marchant and McMungo in their videos.

As the meme went viral, from October 2025 through January 2026, it continued to evolve. What began with cigarette smoking and playful performances of “Chinese” behavior has, for many TikTok users, grown into something more. Drawing on Chinese food philosophies and wellness practices, they now present “Becoming Chinese” as a lifestyle trend focused on better energy, health, and skincare.

Chinamaxxing, Chinese Baddies, Becoming Chinese, A Very Chinese Time of My Life: Trends on Tiktok.

TikTok creator Missmazz, for example, introduced her morning routine “since recently converting to Chinese”: wearing slippers in the house, doing small jumps to “activate” lymph nodes, and drinking warm water and herbal tea. Creator Ohplsnatagain also shared her “first day of being Chinese,” drinking ginger tea, boiling apples, wearing red, and avoiding cold drinks.

“Chinease” morning and night routines, shared on TikTok by Tallow Twins.

Besides those aspiring to become Chinese, some Chinese creators have expressed their joy about the trend others emerged as online guides to these newly adopted identities and lifestyles. Creators like Emma Peng made a video telling people, “my culture can be your culture,” while others, like Sherry, actively encourage people to become Chinese: “It’s gonna be so fun!”

They have now formed an online community of self-labeled “Chinese baddies,” sharing recipes, morning routines, and tips for being as ‘Chinese’ as possible. On Chinese social media, netizens are humored by the overseas trend, and see it as a sign of just how powerful Chinese cultural confidence has become (“藏在烟火气里的文化自信才最有感染力”).

America’s “Kill Line”

While American social media users have been busy Chinamaxxing, Chinese social media have been feverishly discussing America’s so-called “kill line” (also translated as “execution line,” 斩杀 zhǎnshāxiàn).

The term first went trending in late 2025 after it was coined by the Northern Chinese livestreamer Squishy King (斯奎奇大王), better known by his nickname “Lao-A” (牢A), who is particularly active on Bilibili, the Chinese platform known for its strong anime and gaming subculture.

Lao-A has been livestreaming since 2024 without ever showing his face on camera. Through pure voice narration over images, he became known for casually chatting in livestreams—sometimes lasting over five hours—about a wide range of topics, especially those connected to American society. Lao-A claimed he was a Chinese biomedical student in Seattle who worked part-time as a forensic assistant, handling unclaimed bodies and preparing them for medical education or research.

Profile image of “Lao A”, who never shows his face on streams.

On November 1, 2025, during a stormy Halloween Friday night, Lao-A hosted another one of his five-plus-hour live-chatting streams, in which he spoke about the bad weather and homelessness in the US.

He mentioned how people living on the streets could easily die from a cold or Covid that turns into pneumonia without proper treatment, and how dreadful he felt about the freezing conditions—knowing that on Monday he would see the bodies of people who had died on the streets that very weekend.

According to Lao-A, the unidentified bodies of homeless people would be brought by the police to his school, where they could still generate some value. Drawing comparisons to “harvesting in harsh winter,” he introduced the concept of the “kill line,” borrowing the term from multiplayer/role-playing games such as Hades or League of Legends.

In gaming, a “kill line” refers to the health-point (HP) threshold below which a character can be instantly killed, with no possibility of recovery. Lao-A suggested that the situation of marginalized and homeless people during Seattle’s winter was similarly bleak: their deaths are treated as almost inevitable, even though basic medical care—such as antibiotics—might prevent them.

The way Lao-A spoke about his work and the darker sides of American society spread rapidly through Bilibili’s comment culture and then into wider Chinese social media, especially as he expanded on the topic in other livestreams, where he further discussed poverty in America, from the healthcare system to food assistance programs.

Visuals accompanying a report about Lao-A on the 163.com website.

Lao-A particularly focused on medical bills as a key component of America’s “kill line.” He described how people suffer first and then seek care, only to be further burdened by crushing costs—arguing that the American system drains people at their most vulnerable. An unexpected event such as illness, job loss, or a car breakdown can suddenly disrupt a family’s cash flow, leading to unpaid bills and a collapse in credit scores. Bad credit, in turn, makes it harder to rent housing, pass background checks, or secure affordable insurance, while debts pile up. This downward spiral, he suggested, eventually pushes people past a final execution threshold: too broke, too sick, too depressed, and too far gone to recover, ending in homelessness or addiction and shortening life spans.

Lao-A framed this as a systemic trap created by capitalism: a game mechanic in which the rules are rigged so that once someone falls below the threshold, the system itself kills them. Besides the “kill line,” he introduced other gaming-inspired terms, such as using “Gundam” (高达, after the Japanese model kits) to refer to the bodies he handled, or “slimes” (史莱姆) for decomposed bodies found in sewers.

In some ways, Lao-A’s “kill line” resembles the concept of ALICE (“Asset Limited, Income Constrained, Employed”), a demographic category created by the nonprofit United For ALICE to describe American households that earn above the federal poverty line but still cannot afford basic necessities such as housing, childcare, healthcare, or groceries.

By mid-December 2025, the term and the stories surrounding it had entered the mainstream and began hitting trending lists on Weibo, Toutiao, and Kuaishou.

Cartoon by Chinese state media outlet CRI Online about the killing line. Top texts say: “Thriving economy, America first, America great again.” On the staircase, it says: “Unemployment, unexpected costs, illness.”

As the “kill line” quickly entered China’s online lexicon, it was also embraced and boosted by official media. After earlier coverage, Qiushi (qstheory), the Chinese Communist Party’s most authoritative theoretical journal, published a January 4 commentary arguing that the “kill line” reflects a widespread condition in which Americans’ capacity to withstand risk has been pushed to its limits, while Trump’s MAGA movement fails to work towards a solution as it focuses on cultural identity rather than addressing the economic challenges faced by millions of Americans.

Something that also caused a stir online, is how American media began reporting on the Chinese “kill line” concept. First Newsweek on December 26, followed by The Economist and later The New York Times. The phrase even surfaced at the World Economic Forum in Davos, when a Chinese state-media reporter asked US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent about the phenomenon.

All of this placed a considerable spotlight on Lao-A himself, whose real identity and personal backstory began to be questioned by internet users. After he was identified as the possibly 30-year-old “Alex Kong 孔” from Daqing, who attended a community college in Seattle, more of his details were leaked online. Lao-A said he feared for his safety and returned to China.

This supposed “escape from America” became a major story on Chinese social media, with Lao-A repeatedly topping trending charts from January 17 onward. Attention peaked around January 22–23, after he joined Weibo and participated in joint livestreams with Chinese professor and prominent nationalist commentator Shen Yi (沈逸), and again around February 1, when he streamed with foreign-policy commentator Gao Zhikai (高志凯). During this period, Lao-A and the dystopian “kill line” narrative completely dominated Chinese online discussions.

Throughout his solo livestreams and collaborative appearances, Lao-A has continued to paint an especially dark picture of American society, describing graphic gang violence, failures in the education system, murky organ-transplant systems and black markets for organ harvesting (claiming that healthy Chinese students who have not used drugs are “very valuable”), and Chinese female students abroad as “ideal hunting targets” for white men—explicitly warning Chinese parents not to send their daughters to study overseas.

By now, “kill line” is a term that pops up all over Chinese social media and is applied to all kinds of news coming from America, from the Epstein files to the Alex Pretti shooting.

Where the “Kill Line” Meets “Chinamaxxing”

On the famous Know your Meme website, the phrase “You Met Me At A Very Chinese Time In My Life” is described as “ultimately meaningless and purposefully absurd.” But it’s actually not.

Both the “Becoming Chinese” trend and the discourse surrounding the “kill line” are shaped by our current media moment and reflect broader, shifting narratives about China, the United States, and global power.

While China’s rise has been a major media theme for years, a lot of Chinese influence had felt invisible for younger generations in the West, even if they were already living, wearing, and consuming “made in China.” More recently, however, China’s soft power narratives have become more visible, with popular culture emerging as a powerful tool.

The changing attitudes toward “made in China,” alongside a growing interest in Chinese tradition and elements of ancient culture, took shape in the late 2010s as China’s domestic cultural confidence increased. This development was partly supported by China’s flourishing livestreaming economy & homegrown e-commerce platforms, as well as more assertive official messaging around the idea of products being “proudly made in China.”

Wang Yibo poses with Anta’s “China” t-shirt in 2021, the year that “made in China” had become cool again.

Younger Chinese consumers in particular—those born after 1995 or 2000—began showing more interest in domestic brands than earlier generations. This trend reflected not just consumer preference, but a stronger identification with Chinese culture and national identity. By 2021, a Global Times survey indicated that most Chinese consumers believed Western brands could be replaced by Chinese ones (75% of respondents agreed that “national products could fully or partially replace Western products“).

By 2025, pop-culture products emerging from this renewed focus on domestically produced goods—often incorporating traditional Chinese aesthetics—began reaching audiences beyond China, finding traction in Western markets as well.

At the same time, the United States experienced significant societal divisions in the aftermath of the 2024 elections, while its global image and cultural influence were affected by the dismantling of traditional US soft power channels.

Together, these developments shaped broader changes in global public opinion, tilting toward a more favorable view of China as “the world’s leading power,” and fueling conversations about a future increasingly framed through a Chinese lens.

This wider geopolitical context forms the backdrop against which the two viral trends discussed here took shape.

–Why these trends took off

🔹 The Decay of the American Dream and Insecurities about China’s Dream

Geopolitical power shifts alone are not enough to explain the virality of both “Becoming Chinese” and the “kill line” discourse. Current socio-cultural dynamics also play a major role.

In both the US and China, people’s sense of security, future, and identity is shifting, and other countries are increasingly used as mirrors, escape routes, or coping mechanisms to process that change. Young working-class Americans under Trump and middle-class Chinese facing “involution” (nèijuǎn 内卷, a seemingly never-ending societal rat race) are questioning their systems, but arrive at opposite conclusions by using each other as contrasts.

🇺🇸 “A projection of what Americans believe their own country has lost”

In a recent article for Wired,”Why Everyone Is Suddenly in a ‘Very Chinese Time’ in Their Lives,” the authors argue that the “very Chinese time” meme is “not really about China or actual Chinese people,” but instead functions as a projection of what Americans believe their own country has lost.²

Rather than offering an accurate depiction of China, the trend relies on stereotyped markers of “Chineseness” to express frustration with US infrastructure erosion, political instability, polarization and, as PhD researcher Tianyu Fang puts it, “the decay of the American dream.”

In this context, China appears as an aspirational contrast—”less as a real place than an abstraction”—through which Americans critique their own realities.

🇨🇳 “Why China is suddenly obsessed with American poverty”

Similarly, in a The New York Times article titled “Why China Is Suddenly Obsessed With American Poverty,” author Li Yuan argues that the “kill line” narrative offers emotional relief to Chinese netizens while also helping to deflect criticism of domestic leadership. As she writes, “the worse things look across the Pacific (…), the more tolerable present struggles become.”³

A related conclusion is reached in an article by The Economist,⁴ which suggests that the surge in discussion about America’s failures says less about the realities of life in the US than about China’s own anxieties over slowing growth and the fragility of domestic political discourse.

While the “Chinese Dream,” which prioritizes collective effort and national strength, is promoted as part of state ideology, everyday life tells a more sobering story, in which climbing the social ladder seems increasingly out of reach for millions of Chinese facing economic slowdown, high youth unemployment, and a constrained space for criticism.⁵

Yet as narratives about the perceived failure of the “American Dream” flood Chinese social media, China itself begins to look like the better place—even with all of its own challenges.

Ultimately, both the “Becoming Chinese” and “kill line” phenomena are embedded in collective anxieties about vulnerability and decline, fueling a growing hunger for counter-narratives.

–The stories told

🔹Fantasizing about “the Other”

Those counter-narratives do not need to be realistic. To fulfill their role in channeling perspectives, insecurities, and even a sense of cathartic relief about the present and future, they can’t actually be nuanced. Simplification, exaggeration, and symbolic contrast are precisely what make them effective.

🇺🇸 “Chinese cultural identity as a disposable trend”

In the case of “Becoming Chinese,” the trend is comically fairy-tale–like, suggesting that people of all backgrounds can “turn Chinese” in the blink of an eye. One popular meme even implies that there is no need to “kiss the frog” to meet the prince: simply looking at the frog would already make you Chinese.

Beyond fairy tales, there is also a gaming logic at play in other “Becoming Chinese” memes, with different levels of “Chineseness” to unlock to reach that final mythical state of Being Chinese.

Although this is all tongue-in-cheek, it is also what has made the trend a focal point of criticism recently. Chinese cultural identity is turned into a game, a disposable trend for non-Chinese users. Some Chinese and Chinese-American creators have taken offense at how casually Chinese identity is treated—particularly after being a target of discrimination during the Covid era, only to now become a source of social-media hype.

Others argue that it feels more like appropriation than appreciation, suggesting that “Becoming Chinese” reflects a form of Orientalism: a simplified fantasy of an “exotic” China that mirrors Western desires, anxieties, and power relations rather than the lived realities of Chinese people.

Similar critiques have surfaced on Weibo, especially targeting Chinese-American social-media users. Some commenters accused them of seeking Western validation, framing their participation in the trend as an expression of unresolved insecurities about their own identity.

When confronted with such criticisms, some TikTok users respond defensively. One critical creator shot back at the “dumb comments” in his feed, saying: “Forget meeting you at a very Chinese time in your life—when am I going to meet you at a very intellectual time in your life?”

🇨🇳 “American society as a dystopian game”

The success of Lao-A’s descriptions of America’s dark sides and its “kill line” also lies in how he gamifies social stratification and marginalization. He does not just borrow terms from gaming, but frames society itself as a dystopian game, where reaching certain thresholds means it is simply game over.

While the “kill line” concept has been embraced by netizens and official media alike, the persona of Lao-A has grown increasingly controversial. As criticism mounted over inconsistencies and falsehoods in his stories about America, including his education and alleged “escape,” netizens began questioning how much was factual and how much was Hollywood-inspired: from slimy corpses in Seattle sewers to thriving black markets for organs, cannibalism or gangs beheading victims and hanging their skinned heads like “candied apples” (糖霜苹果).

In a recent livestream, Lao-A finally admitted that around “40 percent” of what he had told was not based on his own experience, with part drawn from borrowed accounts and part outright fabricated.

In a way, the popularization of Lao-A’s stories about the US resembles the wave of reporting about China’s “social credit score” in Western media between 2018 and 2020, when even reputable outlets claimed that the Chinese government was assigning all of its 1.4 billion citizens a personal score based on their behavior, linked to what they buy, watch, and say online. In many ways, those stories fed into Western fears about AI, privacy, and these developments becoming reality in Western societies themselves.

There was some truth in reports about the nascent social credit system in China, but much of the coverage was exaggerated or simply false—much like Lao-A’s stories, which mix real structural problems with a heavy dramatization and elements of fiction. In the end, that distinction matters less than you might expect. Lao-A has by now almost become a myth himself, praised by many not for the falsehoods he spread, but for consolidating a strong image of a dystopian America, one that balances the dark portrayal of China so often encountered in US media.

–Dynamics behind the trends

🔹Platform Politics

Both “Becoming Chinese” and the “kill line” are not just products of broader geopolitical shifts, US–China relations, and growing social insecurities. They are also inherently shaped by the platforms they emerged from and, in many ways, are products of those platforms themselves.

🇺🇸 “Chinese baddies building their TikTok success on Chinamaxxing”

In the West, “Becoming Chinese” trends are primarily created and shared on TikTok, an entertainment-focused platform built around endlessly scrolling short-form videos that are algorithmically recommended based on user behavior (particularly what people watch, engage with, or quickly scroll past). Although TikTok is originally Chinese—its parent company is ByteDance—it is separated from the app’s Chinese version (Douyin) and is only used outside China. TikTok has been popular in the US ever since its 2017 launch and is now used by some 200 million people there, with daily life, comedy, fashion & beauty and pop culture being among some of the popular content categories.

Since 2020, there have been repeated discussions about banning TikTok in the US over concerns about national security and the power of its algorithm due to its Chinese ownership—a prospect that proved widely unpopular among American TikTok creators. (As of this month, TikTok has finally reached a deal that allows the app to continue operating in the US, with its algorithm trained only on US data.)

As a result of this resistance against a potential ban, and against any policies changing the app’s dynamics, large numbers of users previously “fled” to the Chinese social media app Xiaohongshu, and began expressing overtly pro-China sentiments as a playful form of protest against what they saw as the anti-Chinese undertones of the proposed ban.

This background, along with the fact that TikTok is a platform generally focused on humor and relatability, has made it a place that is rather positive when it comes to China-related content. Earlier research confirms that, in sharp contrast to traditional US media, popular content on the app tends to frame China in a largely non-political and positive way.⁶

This has led to the current dynamics of the “Becoming Chinese” trend as a way for creators to profit. By creating these positive, entertaining, and short videos, they can aim for likes, build community, and grow their accounts. For a few “Chinese baddies,” their entire success was built on “Chinamaxxing.”

🇨🇳 “How to score on Bilibili”

In China’s social media environment, stories about the darker side of American society have always been a consistent part of online circles discussing US–China relations, and this holds especially true for Bilibili.

Although Bilibili originally started as a platform focused on ACG (anime, cartoons, games), it has evolved over the years along with its user base, which consists largely of college students and young professionals. It is now home to many creators producing political and geopolitical analytical content in a way that encourages interaction and aligns with Bilibili’s rather unpolished, humorous style.

Different from TikTok in America, popular Western-related content on China’s Bilibili platform is often framed through a strongly pro-Chinese lens and frequently carries anti-Western narratives. There are also foreign creators on the platform whose credibility is boosted when they produce what is considered pro-China or party-conforming content.⁷

Lao-A succeeded on Bilibili precisely because he tapped into what its users are most drawn to: using gaming slang and imagery to cast a dark light on American society on a platform whose users are increasingly politically engaged. At the same time, he claimed to be located in America itself, deep within the grim reality he described—further boosting his credibility.

In doing so, Lao-A showed that he understands how to “score” on Bilibili and has ultimately made an irreversible impact. The fact that he fabricated some of his stories does not seem to bother many people, who claim that being more nuanced would have simply led viewers to swipe away. These tactics have helped make him one of the most prominent “America watchers” on China’s social media in 2026.

🌀 Utopian Borrowing and Dystopian Pointing

Put side by side, “Becoming Chinese” and the “kill line” appear to be opposites: one romanticizes China, the other condemns America; one is playful and humorous, the other dark and serious; one thrives on Western social media, the other emerged from Chinese platforms; one is entertainment-driven, the other overtly political.

Yet both are built on similar foundations. Each taps into underlying anxieties and frustrations about the present, responds to broader global shifts, and relies on gamified language, stereotypes, or selective details that easily resonate with online audiences and encourage them to engage. In doing so, both trends are perfectly adapted to the platform dynamics and social media environments in which they flourish, and from which they benefit.

What these trends ultimately reveal is not a definitive truth about either country, but the power of digital discourse to seize on existing discontent to shape or influence perceptions of the United States and China. One becomes a utopia to borrow from, the other a dystopia to point at. Perhaps the most important takeaway is not how different these trends are, but how similar the underlying impulses behind these narratives actually are, revealing deeper ideas about American and Chinese internet users having so much more in common than meets the eye.

Meanwhile, Lao-A has already begun to move on a bit. His focus for now has shifted, at least partly, from America’s “kill line” to Japanese society. On TikTok, many of the creators who “discovered” they were “Chinese” in early January have also pivoted and are now posting about Pilates, reviewing Thai food, or booking holidays to Spain. Even “Perfect Angel,” who was the first to tweet that “Very Chinese time” phrase in 2025, just tweeted that “being Canadian is in this year.”

Who knows what we’ll become tomorrow? Maybe it really is time for that cup of hot water now.

By Manya Koetse
(follow on X, LinkedIn, or Instagram)

¹ See: Elle Jones. 2026. “Why Everyone Is Now Chinese.” Substack, January 11. https://substack.com/home/post/p-184141480 [January 30, 2026].

² See: Zeyi Yang and Louise Matsakis. 2026. “Why Everyone Is Suddenly in a ‘Very Chinese Time’ in Their Lives.” WIRED, January 16 https://www.wired.com/story/made-in-china-chinese-time-of-my-life/ [January 30, 2026].

³ See: Li Yuan. 2026. “Why China Is Suddenly Obsessed With American Poverty.” The New York Times, January 13 https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/13/business/china-american-poverty.html [February 1, 2026].

⁴ See: The Economist. 2026. “China Obsesses over America’s “Kill Line.”” The Economist, January 12 https://www.economist.com/china/2026/01/12/china-obsesses-over-americas-kill-line [February 1, 2026].

⁵ See: Ma Junjie. 2025. “A ‘Loser’s Nation’ and the Abandoned Chinese Dream.” The Diplomat, September 4. https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/a-losers-nation-and-the-abandoned-chinese-dream/ [February 3, 2026].

⁶ See: Cole Henry Highhouse. 2022. “China Content on TikTok: The Influence of Social Media Videos on National Image.” Online Media and Global Communication 1 (4): 697–722.

⁶ See: Florian Schneider. 2021. “China’s Viral Villages: Digital Nationalism and the COVID-19 Crisis on Online Video-Sharing Platform Bilibili.” Communication And The Public 6 (1-4): 48-66.

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