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The Nexperia Incident: A Mirror of China–Europe Tensions

Manya Koetse

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Dear Reader,


On the evening of October 12, while the Netherlands vs. Finland World Cup qualifier became a hot topic on Weibo (#荷兰4比0芬兰#), something else entirely made headlines — not about goals, but about chips.

Chinese company Wingtech Technology (闻泰科技) issued a statement saying that the Dutch government, citing national security concerns, had imposed global operational restrictions on Nexperia (安世半导体), a Dutch semiconductor company based in Nijmegen that has been wholly owned by the Chinese Wingtech conglomerate since 2019.

The Dutch government reportedly ordered a one-year freeze on strategic and governance changes across Nexperia on September 30, but the news only went trending on Chinese social media after Wingtech revealed the suspension (the topic became no 1 on Toutiao on Sunday).

Wingtech said that Nexperia’s Chinese CEO, Zhang Xuezheng (张学政), was also suspended, and that an independent, non-Chinese director was appointed who can legally represent the company.

That was ordered by a Dutch court following internal upheaval — Nexperia’s Dutch and German executives, including Legal Chief Ruben Lichtenberg, CFO Stefan Tilger, and COO Achim Kempe, filed a petition with the Dutch Enterprise Chamber requesting emergency measures to suspend Zhang and place the company’s shares under temporary court management. The court agreed (also see the Pekingnology newsletter by Zichen Wang, who was among the first to report on this issue).

The next day, on October 13, Dutch newspapers reported on the freeze, describing it as a rare move. NRC called it “an emergency measure intended to prevent chip-related intellectual property from leaving the country,” adding that, according to insiders, “there were indications that Nexperia was planning to transfer chip know-how to China.”

The Dutch government later clarified that the so-called Goods Availability Act (Wet Beschikbaarheid Goederen) was applied “following recent and acute signals of serious governance shortcomings and actions within Nexperia,” to protect Dutch and European economic security and safeguard crucial technological knowledge.

That specific law dates back to the Cold War era of 1952 and, according to Pim Jansen, professor of economic administrative law at Erasmus University Rotterdam, has never been invoked before. (Due to the unique situation, Jansen almost wanted to dub it the “Nexperia law.”)

🇳🇱 Nexperia (安世半导体) is a spin-off from chipmaker NXP, which in turn originated from Royal Philips. The company produces basic semiconductors that are used everywhere, from phones to cars. Since becoming independent in 2017, its headquarters in Nijmegen has expanded from about 150 to nearly 500 employees. Across its production sites in Germany, the UK, and Asia, Nexperia employs more than 10,000 people.

🇨🇳 Wingtech Technology (闻泰科技) is a major Chinese tech conglomerate listed on the A-share market and based in Jiaxing, combining two core businesses: semiconductors and electronics manufacturing. The company started in 2005 as a smartphone design and assembly firm (ODM) serving brands such as Xiaomi, Samsung, and Lenovo, and has since become one of the world’s largest mobile device manufacturers.

The recent developments are a big blow to Wingtech, as it basically means won’t be able to control day-to-day decisions at its most valuable subsidiary.

According to Wingtech, the suspension is politically motivated rather than fact-based and constitutes a serious violation of the market economy principles, fair competition, and international trade rules that the EU itself advocates.

The Wider Tech War Context  

The Nexperia news is not an isolated case – it comes at a time when many things are happening at once.

🧩 On October 1, Dutch media reported that, due to tightening export rules announced by the United States, no American parts or software can be sold to Nexperia without a US license anymore because Nexperia’s Chinese parent company, Wingtech, is already on the American “Entity List,” and all of the company’s subsidiaries now also fall under the extended US export restrictions that took effect on September 29.

🧩 According to a Dutch media report on October 2, Nexperia said it strongly disagreed with the new export restrictions and was working on measures to limit their impact on its operations.

🧩 Barely two weeks prior, on September 18, China banned its tech companies from buying Nvidia AI chips from the American Nvidia, citing antitrust and national security reasons.

🧩 As of October, China also added several prominent Western companies to its Unreliable Entity List, including the Canadian-based research firm TechInsights.

🧩 And, as if that all wasn’t enough, China dramatically expanded its rare earth export controls on Thursday, expected to have a direct impact on the global semiconductor supply chain, while President Trump announced 100% tariffs on all Chinese imports and new export controls on “any and all critical software.”

👉 Regardless of how directly all these events are connected to what has happened in the Netherlands, one thing is clear: the global tech war is intensifying, with control over the semiconductor ecosystem now a top strategic priority.

And whatever the exact reasons or details behind the freeze of Nexperia’s strategic operations, on Chinese social media the move is being framed within a broader narrative — that of Western containment aimed at curbing China’s rapid rise as a global technological power.

Chinese Social Media Responses  

On Chinese social media, commentators are denouncing the Netherlands.

One finance-focused Weibo blogger (@董指导挤出俩酒窝) wrote:

💬✍️ “By 2024, Nexperia contributed 14.7 billion RMB (2 billion U.S. dollars) in revenue and nearly 40% gross profit margin [to the Dutch economy]. According to Wingtech’s data, it also paid 130 million euros in corporate income tax to the Netherlands (..) This should have been a textbook case of mutual success – Chinese capital brought markets and vitality; the Netherlands benefited from taxes and employment; technology continued to grow in value within the global supply chain. Yet the Netherlands, showing its “pirate spirit”, destroyed this successful example with its own hands..”

That sentiment — that the Netherlands is treating China unfairly despite Chinese contributions to the Dutch economy and business — was echoed across social media. On the Q&A platform Zhihu, some users called it “a dramatic story”:

💬✍️ “Wingtech spent hundreds of billions of yuan to acquire a long-established European semiconductor company, thinking it had finally gained access to core global technology. But before long, others pulled the rug out from under them, right in front of the whole world.”

Commenter Yan Yaofei (晏耀飞) said:

💬✍️ “It’s like you bought a cow and keep it in someone else’s barn — you tell them how to feed and use it, and they have no right to interfere. Then suddenly, they lock you out of the barn entirely. It basically can be classified as robbery, openly and shamelessly.”

Another Weibo commenter (@就是赵老哥) wrote:

💬✍️ “It feels like the Netherlands is making a fuss. Back then, they sold us a loss-making company and now they’re backing out. This will have a big impact on the semiconductor sector. Foreign companies are unreliable, even when you buy their companies, they’re still unreliable. Domestic substitution is the only way forward.”

Alongside mistrust toward the West and perceptions that the Netherlands has treated China unfairly, even betraying it, many online discussions also frame the move as part of a broader political provocation. At the same time, a recurring theme on social media is the belief that China must strengthen its domestic semiconductor industry.

Finance blogger Tengteng’s Dad (@腾腾爸) wrote:

💬✍️ “The Dutch government’s freezing of the shares of Wingtech Technology’s Dutch subsidiary reminds me of the Ping An–Fortis incident years ago. Europe hasn’t changed, it’s still the same shameless Europe. It’s just that my fellow countrymen have thought too highly of them, thanks to all those “public intellectuals” who have spent years diligently promoting their Western masters. Now, more and more Chinese people are opening their eyes. In the future, all that Western talk about democracy, rule of law, and freedom will completely lose its appeal in China.”

Chinese Narratives of Europe  

The online reactions to the Nexperia incident echo broader Chinese narratives about Europe that have been circulating in the digital sphere for the past decade.

Last Thursday, the topic of Chinese narratives of Europe happened to be the main theme of a panel I joined during the ReConnect China Conference in The Hague, hosted by the Clingendael China Centre (event page).

In preparation for this event, I focused mostly on the social media angle of these narratives. I looked at hundreds of trending topics related to Europe from different Chinese platforms—from Kuaishou to Weibo—with a dataset of nearly 100 pages filled with hashtags that went viral over the past twelve months (October 2024–October 2025), to see what themes dominate discussions about Europe in China’s online sphere.

Excluding sports-related topics (which account for about 35–40% of all high-ranking posts about Europe; sports apparently are the best diplomacy tools, after all), the top 250 non-sports topics reveal a clear image of how Europe is perceived in Chinese digital discourse today.

A brief overview:

🟧 1. Energy, Russia, Sanctions, War, Security (≈ 38%)

🔍 Main Focus: Russia–Ukraine war, Europe’s energy crisis, loss of autonomy, European geopolitical vulnerability and dependence on the United States

💡 Main Theme: Europe is often portrayed as lacking strategic autonomy and bearing the heavy costs of decisions driven by Washington’s agenda. It is viewed as vulnerable and “losing out” (吃亏), strategically outmaneuvered & excluded from major geopolitical decision-making.

🟧 2. Economy, Trade, Technology (≈ 21%)

🔍 Main Focus: ASML, tensions over electric vehicles (EVs) and protectionism, supply chains, trade deficits, and deindustrialization

💡 Main Theme: Europe’s trade frictions with China are portrayed as symptoms of Western decline and hypocrisy. The main story is that Europe’s economy is stagnating partly due to being overly protectionist and dependent on the US, while China emerges as a more dynamic and vital global player. Europe is losing competitiveness while China rises as a tech innovator.

🟧 3. EU Politics and Governance (≈ 13%)

🔍 Main Focus: Internal EU divisions, populism, leadership crises, and Europe’s political rightward shift (右倾)

💡 Main Theme: The EU is depicted as disunited and inefficient, struggling to respond to global challenges. The focus is on its inability to achieve strong, unified leadership amid political instability and ideological fragmentation.

🟧 4. Society, Migration, Crime (≈ 11%)

🔍 Main Focus: Social instability, migration, public safety, and racial or cultural tension

💡 Main Theme: Europe is seen as unsafe, chaotic, and socially divided. This is often contrasted with China’s image of order and security.

🟧 5. Culture, History, Sino-European Relations (≈ 10 %)

🔍 Main Focus: Cultural comparisons, debates on values, and reflections on historical ties

💡 Main Theme: While Europe is respected for its rich cultural heritage and moral legacy, it is also mocked for its perceived sense of moral superiority. Europe stands for the past glory of civilization, not its future.

🟧 6. Lifestyle, Tourism, Memes (≈ 7 %)

🔍 Main Focus: Chinese tourism in Europe, theft incidents, travel diaries, humorous cross-cultural comparisons, and the growing sentiment of being “suddenly disillusioned with Europe” (对欧洲祛魅了)

💡 Main Theme: Europe remains a popular travel destination, but the online tone has shifted from overwhelming admiration to a more pragmatic and critical perspective. The image of Europe is now more “de-romanticized,” with some even suggesting that “getting robbed is part of the experience” [of traveling in Europe] (I previously wrote about that here).

From Chips to Goals  

So what does this all tell us?

Beyond the idea that Europe—caught between Washington and Moscow—lacks the agency to handle external crises while also struggling with internal division and decline, the dominant Chinese narrative about Europe is actually not about Europe at all.

‘Europe’ is all about China. Representations of Europe—from “democratic disillusion” to danger, disorder, and dependency—serve as both a mirror and a warning against which Chinese social, political, and national narratives are contrasted: chaos vs. order, fragmentation vs. unity, vulnerable dependency vs. strategic autonomy, decline vs. rise, etc. etc.

Something that the hashtags don’t tell us as much, but is still very much alive as well, is that Europe is also still seen as a major market of opportunities and a crucial soft power frontier for China.

Europe’s future, therefore (and for other reasons), matters to China—not as a model to follow, but as a stage for Chinese cultural and economic influence, where Chinese products, culture, and ideas can shape global appeal.

Perhaps that’s also what gives the Nexperia incident its extra weight: it ties together multiple narratives. Europe is seen as overly protectionist, biased against China, and driven by Washington’s agenda — and the fact that former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, now NATO Secretary-General, once called US President Trump “daddy” fits into that perception. As some Weibo commenters joked: “Did their daddy make them do it?”

In the end, the takeaway for many commenters is that the incident serves as another “wake-up call for China”: a stark reminder of the need for technological self-reliance. And so, the discussion unfolds in such a way that, once again, it becomes more about China than about Europe — about China’s international strategies, its global rise, and the lessons to be learned, with the Netherlands as the current antagonist.

Thankfully, there was something to celebrate as well: the Netherlands won 4-0 in the popular match against Finland. Amidst all the talk about trade and tech, one popular sports blogger on Weibo vividly wrote about how the Dutch attack was in full force, about how all-time top scorer Memphis Depay led the offense brilliantly, how he helped the team secure a victory, and how the Netherlands “took control of their own destiny in the race to top the group.”

Whatever the future holds for Nexperia and the geopolitical drama surrounding it, at least we can count on the unifying power of football — where, even if only for 90 minutes, chips sit on the bench and netizens far apart in politics cheer for each other’s countries.

I’m not even an avid football fan, but suddenly, the 2026 World Cup (still months away) can’t come soon enough.

Best,

Manya


What’s Trending

The watercooler talking point


It’s a bit like a Succession-style corporate drama 🍿.

Over the past few years, I’ve written about Chinese beverage giant Wahaha several times — and with good reason. Since the death of its much-beloved founder Zong Qinghou (宗庆后) in March 2024, the company has been caught in waves of internal turmoil.

Some context: Wahaha is regarded as a patriotic brand in China — not only because it’s the country’s equivalent of Coca-Cola or PepsiCo (they even launched their own cola in 1998 called “Future Cola” 非常可乐, with the slogan “The future will be better” 未来会更好), but also because its iconic drinks are tied to the childhood memories of millions. There’s also the famous 2006 story when Zong Qinghou refused a buyout offer from Danone. Although the details of that deal are complex, the rejection was widely seen as Zong’s defense of a Chinese brand against foreign takeover, contributing to his status as a national business hero.

After the death of Zong, his daughter Zong Fuli, also known as Kelly Zong (宗馥莉), took over.

🔹 But Zong Fuli soon faced controversy after controversy, including revelations that Wahaha had outsourced production of some bottled water lines to cheaper contractors (link).

🔹 There was also a high-profile family inheritance dispute involving three illegitimate children of Zong Qinghou, now living in the US, who sued Zong Fuli in Hong Kong courts, claiming they were each entitled to multi-million-dollar trust funds and assets.

🔹 More legal trouble arrived when regulators and other shareholders objected to Zong Fuli using the “Wahaha” mark through subsidiaries and for new products outside officially approved channels (the company has 46% state ownership).

⚡ The trending news of the moment is that Zong Fuli has officially resigned from all positions at Wahaha Group as chairman, legal representative, and director. She reportedly resigned on September 12, after which she started her own brand named “Wa Xiao Zong” (娃小宗). One related hashtag received over 320 million views on Weibo (#宗馥莉已经辞职#). Wahaha’s board confirmed the move on October 10, appointing Xu Simin (许思敏) as the new General Manager. Zong remains Wahaha’s second-largest shareholder.

🔹 To complicate matters further, Zong’s uncle, Zong Wei (宗伟), has now launched a rival brand — Hu Xiao Wa (沪小娃) — with product lines and distribution networks nearly identical to Wahaha’s.

As explained by Weibo blogger Tusiji (兔撕鸡大老爷), under Zong Qinghou, Wahaha relied on a family-run “feudal” system with various family-controlled factories. Zong Fuli allegedly tried to dismantle this system to centralize power, fracturing the Wahaha brand and angering both relatives and state investors.

Others also claim that Zong had already been engaged in a major “De-Wahaha-ization” (去娃哈哈化) campaign long before her resignation.

While Chinese netizens are watching this family brand war unfold, many are rooting for Zong after everything she has gone through – they feel her father left her in a complicated mess after his death. At the same time, others believe she tried to run Wahaha in a modern “Western” way and blame her for that.

For the brand image of Wahaha, the whole ordeal is a huge blow. Many people are now vowing not to buy the brand again. As for Zong’s new brand, we’ll have to wait for the next episode in this family company drama to see how it unfolds.


What’s Popular

Small trends, big impact


Now that China’s combined National Day and Mid-Autumn Festival holiday (国庆 + 中秋) has ended, social media has seen a surge in discussions about major 2025 travel trends. According to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, a lucky total of 888 million domestic trips were made during the eight-day holiday.

While many Chinese cities and regions focused on offering innovative experiences — from lantern festivals to street performances — to attract travelers, there was also a grassroots trend that stood out.

Especially among the 18-35 age group, more Chinese are now choosing tents over hotels. On October 10, Business Times China (财经时报) featured an article about how ‘tents’ are putting a ‘dent’ into China’s hotel industry (title: “Did Tents Defeat the Hotel Industry during the National Day Holiday? 这个十一假期,打败酒店行业的是帐篷”).

Over recent years, as domestic travel has boomed, hotel prices in China have skyrocketed during holiday periods, with rates often doubling or tripling. For many—particularly younger travelers—this has made trips less affordable and less worthwhile. (Average nightly prices for mid- to high-end hotels in major cities exceeded 800 RMB / $112 this season.)

So what are we seeing now?

🔸 People are looking for alternative overnight stays, even though some hotels have lowered their prices in light of disappointing bookings.

🔸 Bathhouses are one example: many bathhouses or spas in China have become all-in-one leisure complexes combining hot springs, saunas, massages, dining, entertainment, and overnight lodging—becoming a new competitor for hotels (dubbed 洗浴旅游, “bathhouse tourism”).

🔸 Tents are growing in popularity. The outdoor equipment industry is seeing explosive growth in China, and Business Times China connects this growth to consumer backlash against unreasonable prices and poor service in Chinese hotels, seeing a future for more luxury camping models.

🔸 But it’s not just luxury camping. Many netizens across China have shared videos of travelers setting up tents and sleeping outdoors by roadsides or in scenic spots. Not only are people enthusiastic about outdoor camping and the experience itself, they also see it as a “consumption awakening” (消费觉醒), where younger generations are not willing to blindly pay ten times more for one night in a hotel than the purchase of a tent.

🔸 Another term that has been popping up more frequently is “Tangping Travel” (躺平式旅游). Tangping means “lying flat,” a phrase often used by young Chinese who “lie flat” as a way to cope with social pressure and competitive stress (read more). Unlike previous travel trends, where “special forces travelers” would rush to clock in at as many destinations as possible in a short time, tangping travel — whether in bathhouses, hotels, or tents — is about doing as little as possible, reflecting a shift away from hectic travel schedules.

🔚


This is an emailed and on-site version of the Weibo Watch newsletter by What’s on Weibo. Missed the last newsletter? Find it here. If you are already subscribed to What’s on Weibo but are not yet receiving this newsletter in your inbox, please contact us directly to let us know. No longer wish to receive these newsletters? You can unsubscribe at any time while remaining a premium member.

Manya is the founder and editor-in-chief of What's on Weibo, offering independent analysis of social trends, online media, and digital culture in China for over a decade. Subscribe to gain access to content, including the Weibo Watch newsletter, which provides deeper insights into the China trends that matter. More about Manya at manyakoetse.com or follow on X.

China Trend Watch

Raising Lobsters, 6G Coming, and China’s DIY Deity Trend

Chinese netizens “raising lobsters,” farmer pensions emerging as a key Two Sessions talking point, and humanoid robots running through Beijing — what you need to know about Chinese social media discussions this week.

Manya Koetse

Published

on

🔥 China Trend Watch (week 11 | 2026) Part of Eye on Digital China by Manya Koetse, China Trend Watch is an overview of what’s trending and being discussed on Chinese social media. The previous newsletters covered last week’s main talking points & a chapter dive into the Chinese online discourse surrounding the Iran war. This edition was sent to paid subscribers — subscribe to receive the next issue in your inbox.

“It became a memorable moment in China’s meme culture recently: the popular fictional online character “Purple Potato Spirit” (紫薯精) has an emotional breakdown and is offered food for comfort by her male co-worker, who says: “If the whole world condemns you, I’ll take you to eat Liu Wenxiang” (如果全世界都指责你,我就带你去吃刘文祥).

The scene, from a short-video series by Douyin creator Zhou Xiaonao (周小闹), unexpectedly made the Chinese restaurant chain Liu Wenxiang (刘文祥) go viral, turning it into an internet hit as the trend resonated with overworked young workers who enjoyed the mix of cathartic online meme culture & affordable comfort food.

The viral moment caused immediate chaos. Liu Wenxiang stores across the country were overwhelmed by two-hour queues, ingredients sold out, and the “order explosions” (爆单) forced some locations to temporarily suspend operations altogether.

Who could have expected a Douyin comedy creator to catapult a long-standing Chinese brand back into the spotlight so suddenly — not through its own marketing, not through a brand collaboration, but because a fictional online persona is obsessing over its malatang (spicy skewer soup)? It’s very much China’s online culture.

While I’m writing this newsletter, however, China’s 3.15 Consumer Rights Day is dominating Chinese social media. Earlier tonight, the 36th edition of China’s annual consumer rights show (3·15晚会) aired — a joint production by CCTV and government agencies that aims to educate the public on consumer rights while exposing violations and holding companies accountable.

Tonight, Liu Wenxiang suddenly saw its image crumble as the show exposed that multiple franchise locations across the country had been substituting duck meat for the advertised beef and pork in various menu items. According to the report, staff knowingly misled customers even when they knew beef or lamb was not actually being delivered — a practice reportedly involving thousands of orders per location each month.

The price gap helps explain why: pure beef rolls cost ¥28 (about US$4) per 500 grams, while duck rolls cost just ¥7 (about US$1) — a fourfold difference.

Public opinion is currently in full swing, rapidly turning against the brand that people had embraced so enthusiastically over the past few weeks.

And that, too, is a sign of this social media age. Unofficial sources can make you go viral in a minute, but when you’re officially exposed for essentially scamming customers, it becomes very difficult to recover. I wonder whether “Purple Potato Spirit” will still be treated to Liu Wenxiang malatang after this scandal.

(For more on China’s consumer day show, see last year’s post here.)

Let’s dive into the other trends that were widely discussed on Chinese social media this week.

(Short note: if you’re reading this and appreciate the newsletter but are not yet a paying subscriber, please consider supporting it. Eye on Digital China is fully independent and reader-funded. Your subscription helps keep this work going.)

Quick Scroll

    • 🏎️ F1 Fever All eyes were on the F1 Chinese Grand Prix in Shanghai this weekend, especially given the cancellation of the Bahrain and Saudi Arabian races. The race was completely sold out, and Chinese media noted a marked increase in Chinese F1 fans, especially among women, with China’s current F1 fanbase exceeding 150 million.
    • 🥢Swallowed Chopstick A 46-year-old man named Wang from Dalian gained attention after visiting the doctor for a sore throat, and it was found that a 12-centimeter metal chopstick had been lodged in his pharynx for eight years. Wang told the doctors he had accidentally swallowed it during a meal but was too afraid of surgery to seek treatment. The chopstick has now been removed, and Wang is fine — the chopstick remains intact as well.
    • 📚 Iron Rice Bowl This weekend, 5.87 million people took the provincial civil service exams, known as the  Shěngkǎo (省考), across 23 provinces, competing for 126,000 positions in provincial and local government offices — an average of 47 applicants per job (with some desirable positions attracting as many as 1,900 applicants for a single post!).
    • 🚆 Boarding for Pyongyang Earlier this week, a train from China arrived in North Korea. As of March 12, the China–North Korea international passenger train operates four times a week between Beijing and Pyongyang. The train service, which remains highly restricted for ordinary travelers, had been suspended for years during and after the pandemic.
    • 🏛️ Mao Under Construction From this week until the end of August, the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall (毛主席纪念堂) at Tiananmen Square, which houses the embalmed body of Mao Zedong, will undergo internal renovation and construction work and will be closed to the public. The site, opened in 1977, draws millions of domestic visitors each year.
    • 🇨🇳🇺🇸 US–China Talks High-level US–China talks commenced in Paris on March 15. The discussions, led by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng (何立峰), carry added significance because of their timing: right after the Two Sessions concluded and China’s 15th Five-Year Plan was approved, and before Trump’s anticipated China visit from March 31 to April 2 (although Beijing has not yet officially confirmed it).
    • 🌹 Steel Roses Victory China’s women’s national football team, officially nicknamed the Steel Roses (钢铁玫瑰), became one of the most-discussed sports topics on Chinese social media this week after the team secured their spot at the 2026 FIFA Women’s World Cup in Brazil, defeating Chinese Taipei in the AFC Women’s Asian Cup. The celebration in football balanced the online disappointment over the elimination of China’s table tennis champion Wang Chuqin (王楚钦) from the World Table Tennis (WTT) Champions Chongqing tournament after losing 2–4 to 18-year-old Japanese player Matsushima Teraku.

What Really Stood Out This Week

Why Everyone in China Is Talking About “Raising Lobsters”

[#养龙虾为什么爆火#]

This week, everyone is talking about raising lobsters.

“Raising lobsters” in Chinese is yǎng lóngxiā (养龙虾), and it’s now widely used as a term for deploying AI agents. The reference to the lobster comes from the lobster-like creature that serves as the logo of the AI agent OpenClaw, formerly known as Clawdbot, developed by Austrian computer programmer Peter Steinberger and released in November 2025.

OpenClaw describes itself as a “Personal AI Assistant” or “the AI that actually does things,” such as sorting out your inbox, sending emails, managing your calendar, checking in for flights – all through the chat apps you already use.

So why is the open-source AI tool such a major success in China, going well beyond developer niche communities? One of the reasons so many people are talking about and using OpenClaw is that installing it has become a niche profession in itself.

Caiwei Chen at MIT Technology Review recently described how small companies and independent entrepreneurs in China, such as the young Chinese developer Feng Qingyang (冯庆阳), have directly contributed to the tool’s success by helping others install it. Feng began offering “OpenClaw installation support” in late January this year, and what started as a side gig has now grown into a full-fledged professional operation with more than 100 employees.

While in Western countries the comments by analyst firm Gartner, which described OpenClaw as an “unacceptable cybersecurity risk” last month, were still resonating, the AI tool’s popularity in China has surged in recent weeks. Companies like Feng’s have mushroomed across the country, with unofficial OpenClaw installation events drawing crowds in many cities. Larger corporate events are also attracting attention, such as a recent installation event at Tencent’s headquarters in Shenzhen that drew hundreds of participants.

By now, virtually all of China’s major tech companies have jumped on the hype. From ByteDance to JD.com, companies are offering a range of OpenClaw products and services.

Success stories quickly went viral, including a claim that an OpenClaw agent completed three weeks’ worth of work for six employees in just 24 hours. But the hype has also brought concerns, with online rumors circulating about people’s credit cards being charged unexpectedly or local files and emails being deleted.

Chinese authorities have now restricted state-run enterprises and government agencies from running OpenClaw AI apps on office computers, while official cybersecurity agencies have warned about potential security risks.

In the RealTime Mandarin newsletter, Andrew Methven explained the rise of the online phrase “one lobster, three ways” (龙虾三吃), a play on the name of a popular Chinese dish. With the latest security concerns, Chinese business-oriented programmers are spotting yet more money-making opportunities; In addition to OpenClaw installation services, some now also offer “uninstallation services.” In other words, people are now making lobster money in three ways with OpenClaw: installing the AI, training people how to use it, and uninstalling it when things go wrong.

Viral Weibo commentary from one blogger (@菜刀曦曦) neatly captured the hype cycle:

How fast the world changes these days. Yesterday I was scrolling Weibo and everyone was raising lobsters, paying to get it installed, and honestly I was tempted too. Today what I’m seeing is that the lobster is basically a Trojan horse, and now people are paying to uninstall it. Install: 500 yuan [US$72]. Uninstall: 299 yuan [US$43]. Those of us who didn’t follow the trend have effectively saved 799 yuan [US$115].”

From 6G Dreams to Pension Debates: The Viral Topics of the Two Sessions

[#6G网要来了#] [#两会声音##] [#微观两会# ​]

In last week’s newsletter, I already discussed some of the main social media trends coming out of the Two Sessions. In the final days of China’s annual parliamentary meetings, which ended on March 12, several more noteworthy topics went trending.

📍 “6G Is Coming” (#6G网要来了#) became a hot-search phrase, as 6G was explicitly included both in this year’s Government Work Report and in the 15th Five-Year Plan, which lays out China’s strategic vision for the period from 2026 to 2030.

The report stated that China would nurture future industries, including 6G, quantum technology, and embodied AI, positioning itself as a global leader in 6G development. In November 2025, news emerged that China had completed its first real-world testing trial of 6G applications. Being roughly 100 times faster than 5G (you’ll be able to download a 4K movie in just one second), 6G is expected to become the future mobile standard, with commercial use in China planned for around 2030.

Beyond what was mentioned in the official reports or what happened in the corridors, it was mostly the policy suggestions and proposals from NPC delegates and CPPCC members that trended in public online debates.

📍 NPC delegate Tang Lijun (唐利军) proposed a “nighttime silence” for short video platforms, calling for a mandatory break from scrolling during 1 AM-5 AM to protect both children and adults from “unhealthy” social media use.

Although I believe it’s unlikely that such a measure would be enforced for everyone (for one, it could harm China’s digital economy), it might suggest that China’s current social media rules for children could be further tightened or even expanded to include individuals over 18.

📍 Overall, it’s clear that rest was a recurring theme during the Two Sessions. As discussed last week, there were discussions about adjusting Chinese public holidays and working fewer hours. NPC delegate and Xiaomi CEO Lei Jun (雷军) triggered all kind of discussions, one of them related to a comment he made during an interview with China News Weekly (中国新闻周刊), where he suggested that in the AI era people might no longer need to work eight hours a day or five days a week, and could perhaps work three days a week, two hours a day—dramatically improving quality of life.

Another proposal came from NPC delegate Zhong Baoshen (钟宝申), who suggested reducing the standard workday from 8 hours to 7 hours while significantly increasing overtime pay standards. This idea was not necessarily applauded online; many commenters argued that an extra day off would make more sense and expressed skepticism about whether shorter hours would actually happen, given that the current eight-hour day already often results in overwork.

📍Then there were the welfare-related proposals that went viral. Delegate Zheng Gongcheng (郑功成), also president of the China Social Security Society (中国社会保障学会), called for establishing a “Mother’s Pension System” (母亲养老金制度).

The proposal suggests that during child-rearing years, mothers would continue to accrue pension benefits for old age without reductions for time spent away from work.

This proposal resonated with many female netizens. One popular comment said:

Having children, raising them, caring for them… we spend countless sleepless nights and give up many work opportunities and personal time for it. Most of a lifetime’s energy ends up devoted to family and children. (…) Giving women who have given birth an additional pension subsidy is not an extra privilege; it is a recognition of the many years of sacrifice and effort we have made.

📍Other popular proposals were not about the gender pension gap, but about the rural–urban pension gap. At least nine proposals focused on how China’s farmers contributed enormously to the country’s development over the decades—submitting grain to the state even when hungry during the Mao years, or performing obligatory labor (义务工) building railways, reservoirs, and other infrastructure through the commune system.

Despite these contributions, many argue that rural residents have historically not been treated fairly under China’s national welfare system, and that their contributions mean the state now owes them a decent safety net in old age.

These proposals received waves of support online. China Digital Times archived one post from WeChat public account “Reflections on the Past” (往事随想录) by author Peng Yuanwen (彭远文), who called China’s rural pension dilemma “the hottest issue at this year’s Two Sessions,” one that “overshadowed everything else, almost giving the impression that this year’s Two Sessions had only one real topic.” He added: “In my twenty years of observation, this is unprecedented.”

Although the pension was raised by only 20 yuan (about US$2.90) this year, there is now a growing wave of voices—from politics, academia, and the media- calling for substantial increases to bring pensions for urban and rural residents closer to the lower level of the urban employee pension.

Peng sees this as the clearest signal that change may be coming:

Look around—the fields are already lush and green. Friends, can the autumn harvest still be far away?

On the Feed

DIY Deities

A traditional Fujianese folk ritual in which deity figures are paraded through the streets, accompanied by music, drums, crowds, and incense smoke, has been popping up on Chinese feeds in unexpected ways.

Recently (still ongoing today), dozens of netizens have gone viral on Douyin by jokingly recreating the Fujian “deity parade” (福建游神) ritual at home, at their workplace, or even in parking lots, using DIY deities and creative ways of throwing the “divination cups” (for example, tossing slippers instead).

From Sichuan to Henan, these creative netizens joke that “you don’t need to go to Fujian to see the deity procession.”

This year, a controversy over the selection of a spirit medium at a Mazu goddess procession—which I also covered in a previous newsletter—pushed these kinds of deity processions further into the mainstream than ever before. Suddenly, millions of people who had never paid close attention to these rituals were reading about divination cups, spirit possession, and the rules surrounding sacred selection.

Although that incident likely helped spark the current playful DIY deity trend, other figures appearing in these rural parades—also called “tagu” (塔骨)—had already gone viral before. One example is Zhang Shizi (张世子), a handsome figure in a rural deity procession who gained a sizable online fanbase, along with the subordinate “divine generals” (神将) that appear before and after the main deity, swaying and swinging their arms with attitude, and sometimes even bumping into spectators.

Going even further back is the trend of the “Electric-Techno Neon Gods” (电音三太子), which began years ago when Taiwanese temple youth groups started mixing sacred imagery with pop culture. They used the Nezha figure (哪吒, the Third Prince, 三太子) with a giant head, dancing to techno and house music instead of traditional percussion.

These current memes similarly blend religious ritual with pop culture, gamifying old customs in the social media age by treating participation in the folk ritual trend as a “cultivation path toward godhood.” Although it is all very tongue-in-cheek, there is also a clear appreciation of folk ritual aesthetics and spiritual customs behind it.

See videos here.


One More Thing

Humanoid Robots Spotted Running in Beijing Streets

Some Beijingers who were up and about early this weekend witnessed a surreal scene: humanoid robots walking through the streets of Beijing. From the evening of March 14 to the early morning of March 15, the humanoid robot half marathon held its first test run.

The robots will participate in the 2026 Beijing Yizhuang Half Marathon, scheduled for April 19 in Beijing’s Yizhuang Economic Development Zone. The race features a “human-robot co-run” (人机共跑) format: human athletes and humanoid robots will start together on the same route, with robots running in a separate designated lane.

See video of the early morning practice here.


 

That’s a wrap.

See you next edition!

Best,

Manya

 

Eye on Digital China, by Manya Koetse, is co-published on Substack and What’s on Weibo. Both feature the same new content — so you can read and subscribe wherever you prefer. Substack offers community features, while What’s on Weibo provides full archive access. If you’re already subscribed and want to switch platforms, just get in touch for help. If you no longer wish to receive these newsletters, or are receiving duplicate editions, you can unsubscribe at any time.

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China Memes & Viral

Two Sessions, a Celebrity Meltdown, and the Rise of China’s “Forget It” Mindset

Inside this week’s trends: Two Sessions talking points, a massive celebrity meltdown, and a pet gym in Shanghai charging $275 a month.

Manya Koetse

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🔥 China Trend Watch (week 10 | 2026) Part of Eye on Digital China by Manya Koetse, China Trend Watch is an overview of what’s trending and being discussed on Chinese social media. The previous newsletter was a chapter dive into the Chinese online discourse surrounding the Iran war. This edition was sent to paid subscribers — subscribe to receive the next issue in your inbox.

“Taiwan never was, is not, and never will become a country,” China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) said during the annual press conference this Sunday on the sidelines of the Two Sessions, China’s most important political gathering of the year.

Besides Taiwan, Wang Yi spoke about the Iran war (“should not have happened”), Palestine (“two-state solution”), Sino-American relations (“mutual respect”), and more. Although there are undoubtedly many things to disagree on, one thing Wang mentioned more than once is just how turbulent the world we live in today has become – I think we all agree about that.

If you missed Wednesday’s newsletter about China’s online discourse on the Iran war, you can find it here. In this edition, let’s dive into other trending topics beyond that conflict, which dominated much of the discussion this week.

Quick Scroll

    • 🌸 Women’s Day, March 8, falls on a Sunday in 2026, which ironically means women are not entitled to their usual half-day off under China’s national holiday regulations this time.
    • 🤖 China has released its first national standards framework for humanoid robots and embodied AI, unveiled at an industry conference in Beijing. The move signals Beijing’s push to accelerate commercialization and large-scale production as China positions itself as a global leader in humanoid robotics.
    • 🎬 Zhang Yimou’s latest crime thriller Scare Out (惊蛰无声), about national security officers battling enemy spies and produced under the guidance of China’s Ministry of State Security, has become the highest-grossing crime film of the Spring Festival season at the Chinese box office.
    • 🚗 A Chinese Lynk & Co Z20 car owner recently crashed into a road divider at night after asking the car’s voice assistant to turn off all reading lights, but the system mistakenly turned off the headlights instead. When he tried to turn them back on, the AI assistant replied, “I can’t do that yet.” The company has since apologized, but the incident has sparked criticism of automakers putting smart features ahead of safety.
    • 🐶 A pet gym in Shanghai charging around 2,000 yuan ($275) for a monthly membership shows just how hot China’s pet economy is becoming. At the upscale gym, dogs can walk on treadmills, swim, get massages, and receive one-on-one training.
    • 🍑 The latest costume drama Pursuit of Jade (逐玉), which premiered on iQIYI and Tencent Video on March 6, has become a breakout success during its opening weekend, setting a record for the fastest-rising drama on Weibo, driven by a massive fandom known as the “Peach Blossom Chasers” (桃花逐理人).
    • 🚆 A Chinese student suffered cardiac arrest after traveling 31 hours in a hard-seat train back to school after Spring Festival. She survived, with doctors diagnosing ‘economy-class syndrome’ (经济舱综合征): blood clots caused by prolonged immobile sitting.
    • 📱 The Chinese Honor brand came out with the world’s thinnest Android tablet this week. The MagicPad 4 measures just 4.8mm thick, making it thinner than the iPad Pro or Samsung Galaxy Tab. As it also debuted OpenClaw collaboration technology, becoming the first commercial device to officially support running open-source AI agents, the device became a much-discussed ‘wannahave.’

What Really Stood Out This Week

Holiday Debt, Bride Prices, and Meme CEOs: What’s Trending from China’s Two Sessions

[#全国两会#]

The annual Two Sessions—China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) plenary and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—are convening from March 4 to March 11. As usual, they’ve become a major topic of discussion on Chinese social media this week, alongside the ongoing developments in Iran.

This year, topics such as pensions, holidays, healthcare, tech, and AI have been receiving special attention. Here are three talking points that have generated considerable online discussion.

📍 One issue that netizens especially seemed to care about is the phenomenon of China’s “compensatory working day” system (调休 tiáoxiū), which allows people longer holiday blocks (such as seven days for the National Day holiday, or nine days for the recent Spring Festival) but requires people to make up for some of those days by working weekend days on either side of the holiday.

NPC delegate Tian Xuan (田轩) has proposed reducing or avoiding the use of these “make-up days,” and instead increasing the number of public holidays. The proposal is receiving strong support from workers who have long been frustrated by this system of “borrowing” free days, which creates a sense of being in holiday “debt.”

📍 Another proposal that went viral concerns child safety and stricter punishment for sex offenders. Female NPC delegate Fang Yan (方燕) suggested that convicted sex offenders against minors should be banned from professions involving close contact with children, prohibited from entering kindergartens and schools, and subjected to mandatory electronic location monitoring after serving their sentence.

📍 NPC delegate Zhang Qiang (张强) put forward another proposal that generated online discussions, focusing on the topic of China’s bride prices (彩礼 cǎilǐ), payments made by the groom’s family to the bride’s family. The issue has been widely debated for years as bride prices have been skyrocketing in rural China, where there are more men of marriageable age than women.

Zhang proposes that, in line with village rules, bride prices should be capped at no more than 20,000 yuan (US$ 2,900). Zhang spoke from experiences from his own village, where some bride prices rose to a staggering 188,000 yuan (US$27,260) – which allegedly almost made the marriage fall apart before it even started. Although many agree that there should be measures to break the cycle that puts rural families in debt, others think that the government shouldn’t intervene in private family customs.

📍 The most discussed NPC delegates are Xiaomi CEO Lei Jun (雷军) and Zhou Yunjie (周云杰), top executive at the Haier Group. Xiaomi is one of China’s leading smartphone and electronics makers, while Haier is one of the country’s largest home-appliance groups. The two delegates already appeared together at the Two Sessions last year, when their contrasting roles drew attention: one representing China’s younger, fast-moving digital companies, the other the face of China’s older, traditional manufacturing industry.

This year, the two appearing together has become a source of memes, often portraying Lei Jun as the more playful, younger figure leading Zhou Yunjie into the world of social media. The stark difference between the two business leaders is what strikes a chord—Zhou is seen as the more serious, traditional senior business leader. The pair is affectionately called the “HaiMi Brothers” (海米兄弟) by netizens.

Many netizens hope that beyond the Two Sessions, Lei and Zhou will continue to hang out and collaborate more by combining their strengths and expertise.

 

The Celebrity Drama Taking Over Chinese Social Media

[#谢娜喊话薛之谦#] [#李雨桐实名报案薛之谦重婚罪#] [#段曦发长文#]

Earlier this week, I promised to update you on the juicy celebrity story that almost managed to rival the Iran war as one of the most talked-about topics of the week—despite being entirely insignificant in comparison (which, of course, is exactly what makes it so irresistible🍿).

At the heart of the story is a decade-old celebrity feud involving singer Joker Xue (薛之谦 Xue Zhiqian) that was reignited by his messy former girlfriend Li Yutong (李雨桐). On March 2, she posted a chaotic online rant filled with grievances against Xue, who left her in 2017 before reconciling with his ex-wife. Apparently, there is still a lot of unprocessed grief from those days, because there is no other obvious reason to explain why Li decided to share her since-deleted meltdown with millions of Chinese netizens earlier this week.

In more than 20 posts of threats and dirty laundry—from “I will expose everything” to accusing Xue of forcing her into an abortion and filing a public police report against him for bigamy—Li dragged her ex down while also mentioning details about Xue being nasty toward celebrity colleagues. Among them, she referenced mean remarks about Chinese pop star Zhang Jie (张杰), also known as Jason Zhang. With more than 81 million Weibo followers and record-breaking ticket sales for 12 consecutive concerts at Beijing’s National Stadium, he is about as famous as you can get. His wife, Xie Na (谢娜), is arguably the most recognizable female television host in China.

The situation then spiraled into a much bigger controversy when fans began linking Li’s claims about Joker Xue’s remarks to a 2017 comedy roast program (吐槽大会 Tǔcáo Dàhuì). Soon after, Xie Na published an open letter on her personal Weibo directly addressing Joker Xue and demanding a formal apology to her husband Zhang Jie for the remarks—essentially accusing him of belittling Zhang’s supposedly “low-class” singing style.

As if that wasn’t enough, another ex-girlfriend entered the scene with a Weibo post. Duan Xi (段曦), seemingly triggered by Xie Na’s intervention, asked: if people are publicly demanding apologies now—“can I have one too?” In a lengthy message, she recounted how she fell into loneliness and depression after Xie Na entered the life she had shared with Zhang Jie more than two decades ago, suggesting that their past behavior might not have been entirely clean either.

Should we care about this story? Not at all. But it contains all the elements of a soap drama. Former lovers seeking revenge, bitter jealousy, and long-standing feuds. Reality, in this case, is hardly less dramatic than a scripted series. Above all, it offers a glimpse into the lives of China’s rich and famous. Although they often seem far removed from ordinary netizens, these occasional meltdown moments reveal something much more familiar: fragile egos, messy relationships, and very public outbursts.

There is also a commercial side to it. Besides other celebrities jumping in to boost their own online visibility and renew their relevance, the entire spectacle is lucrative for Weibo, once the central stage of China’s celebrity culture. Even though regulators have spent years trying to curb celebrity gossip and “vulgar” online content on platforms like Weibo, it remains exactly the kind of content that generates the most traffic and clicks.

In between news about the war in Iran and China’s Two Sessions, it is stories like these that keep people returning to social media—not for foreign news or state media narratives, but for drama.

 

On the Feed

The Little “Coal Mining” Panda

One little panda cub born last summer at a conservation base in Sichuan has recently gone viral for its muddy black appearance, with some joking that it’s “cosplaying” a black bear and others calling it the “coal mining bear” (挖煤小熊). The cub, now often referred to as the “Su Jin cub” (苏锦崽) since giant panda Su Jin is its mother, has quickly become a crowd favorite. Although there has been a lot of speculation about its color, the explanation is simple: even though staff wipe it down every day, little Su Jin just loves rolling through the mud.

 


Word of the Week

“算了型人格” (suànle xíng rénge — “forget-it personality type”)

The “forget-it personality” can be seen as a kind of coping strategy for younger generations navigating modern life, where they face information overload and decision fatigue. In that sense, it can be added to the list of other self-labeling terms we’ve seen in Chinese youth culture before, from “lying flat” (躺平 tǎng píng) to “rat people” (老鼠人 lǎoshǔrén).

The “forget-it personality,” however, is somewhat more pragmatic: it reflects a day-to-day attitude in which someone decides it’s simply not worth the trouble to fuss over something. You say “forget it” because you already have enough on your plate.

One thing these terms have in common is a sense of emotional exhaustion, yet adopting such an attitude is not necessarily about giving up; for some people it has even become something to aspire to.

One Douyin user wrote:

I like browsing online, but sometimes comments make me so angry that I want to reply. Then I think about how many words I’d have to type and how much I’d have to think about the response, and suddenly I’m too lazy to comment. My temper is bad, but I also hate hassle.

 


That’s a wrap.

See you next edition.

Best,

Manya

 

Eye on Digital China, by Manya Koetse, is co-published on Substack and What’s on Weibo. Both feature the same new content — so you can read and subscribe wherever you prefer. Substack offers community features, while What’s on Weibo provides full archive access. If you’re already subscribed and want to switch platforms, just get in touch for help. If you no longer wish to receive these newsletters, or are receiving duplicate editions, you can unsubscribe at any time.

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