Chapter Dive

Evil Unbound (731): How a Chinese Anti-Japanese War Film Backfired

731 was China’s most anticipated war movie of the year — how could it fail so miserably to live up to public expectations?

Published

6 months ago

September 24, 2025

Manya Koetse

🔥 This is premium content and also appeared in the Weibo Watch newsletter. Subscribe to stay in the loop.

How did Evil Unbound (731), one of the most anticipated Chinese war movies of 2025, go from patriotic hype to online backlash? A deep dive into the official narrative, the audience reception, and everything that’s particular about this movie.

731 and 918, those were the numbers dominating Chinese social media over the past week. Both numbers carry heavy historical weight, but the recent discussions surrounding them reveal two parallel worlds of the official narrative vs the audience experience of a controversial new World War II film.

It was “9.18” on Thursday, when China commemorated the 94th anniversary of the September 18th Incident (九一八事变). On that day in 1931, a small explosion on a Japanese-owned railway near Shenyang (Mukden) was used as a pretext to invade Manchuria.

While many older Chinese were taught in school that the war began in 1937, recent state-led campaigns increasingly emphasize 1931 as the true beginning of China’s “14-year-long war” (1931–1945). Over the past decade, the 918 commemorations have become more prominent online, shaping public memory through nationalistic messaging.

This year, the commemoration had an extra dimension, as it wove the release of Evil Unbound (English title), also known as 731, into the patriotic media narratives around 918.

Patriotic film poster putting 918 and 731 together.

The much-anticipated war movie 731 depicts the atrocities of Japan’s Unit 731 (731部队), notorious for conducting horrific biological warfare experiments in Harbin during World War II under Major General Shiro Ishii (石井四郎), a former army surgeon and biologist with a particular interest in historical plagues. Under his command, Japan’s biological warfare and human experimentation in China were carried out on a larger scale than anywhere else between the 1930s and 1940s.

After the war, because the US felt his knowledge on bioweapons was of great value, Ishii was granted political immunity deal and was never brought to trial.

Together with the Nanjing Massacre, Unit 731 has come to symbolize the peak horrors of Japan’s wartime atrocities. Public attention for this history has grown in recent years, especially since the 2015 opening of the Harbin-based Museum of Evidence of War Crimes by Unit 731.

It was around that same time, about a decade ago, when Chinese director Zhao Linshan (赵林山) started working on the movie Evil Unbound (731), produced by Changchun Film Group in collaboration with the Propaganda Departments of Shandong, Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Harbin.

It finally premiered nationwide on Thursday, ‘9.18’ at exactly 9:18 and shattered 10 box office records on its opening day. Screened 258,000 times in a single day, it rapidly surpassed 200 million yuan (US$28 million) in ticket sales. After three days, the box office exceeded 1 billion yuan (US$140 million).

The film focuses on Unit 731 in the final days before Japan’s defeat in 1945, portraying how local salesman Wang Yongzhang (王永章, played by Jiang Wu 姜武) is imprisoned together with other civilians. They are promised freedom in exchange for “health checks and epidemic prevention cooperation,” and are subjected to frostbite experiments, poison gas, and vivisections.

Official film posters for Evil Unbound/731.

“What we made is not a movie — it is historical evidence,” director Zhao said about the film.

A state-orchestrated hashtag ecosystem is currently amplifying the film’s ‘success.’ Similar to previous viral war film hits such as The Battle at Lake Changjin (长津湖) and Nanjing Photo Studio (Dead to Rights 南京照相馆), the media campaigns highlight the film’s commercial performance, its educational and historical value, the ‘authenticity’ of its production process, and its emotional reception and overseas recognition.

Recent trending hashtags, from Kuaishou to Weibo and beyond, include:

电影731票房再创新高 – “Film 731 sets another box office record”
没有人能在看731时不流泪 – “No one can watch 731 without crying”
观众掩面哭泣 / 哭到没法接受采访 – “Audiences cover faces in tears” or “Audiences too moved to be interviewed”
观众自发起立唱国歌 – “Audience spontaneously stand up to sing national anthem”
海外观众看731不停抹泪 – “Overseas audiences weeping when seeing 731”
9岁小孩看完731后泪奔 – “9-year-old child burst into tears after watching 731”
日本观众看完电影731后情绪崩溃 – “Japanese audiences having emotional breakdown after watching 731”
让731这段历史不再沉默 – “The history of 731 can no longer be silenced”

There are hundreds of other hashtags contributing to this official narrative, that portrays Evil Unbound as an absolute patriotic and commercial triumph.

From Anticipation to Backlash: 731 Between Shawshank and Squid Game

Outside of this official narrative, however, audiences are telling a very different story. Despite months of anticipation, the film has been met with overwhelmingly negative reviews.

On Weibo, the hashtag “731 Film Review” (#731影评#) was pulled offline. On Douban, the movie’s ratings meter was switched off entirely (“暂无评分”). On IMDb, the film is currently rated 3.1.

Usually, criticism of patriotic films is a slippery slope. People have been censored, blocked, or even detained for criticizing war films. But criticism of this film is so widespread, and so ubiquitous across social media platforms, that it is barely containable.

Many viewers called the movie “trash,” while others said they felt “defrauded”.[1] One commenter suggested the director tried to make The Shawshank Redemption but ended up with Squid Game.[2] Others called it “bizarre”[3], or concluded: “The short review section doesn’t even allow enough characters to describe how unbearable this movie is.”[4]

Viewing the film, I must admit I also felt confused – the movie is nothing like you would expect after the state-led promotion of the film.

The opening minutes quickly set a messy historical context, leaping from the 1925 Geneva Protocol to China’s 1943 counteroffensives, to Iwo Jima, and to Japan’s “Operation PX” plan (Operation Cherry Blossoms at Night), a scheme to attack the United States with biological weapons—before landing in Harbin and Unit 731 in the year 1945.

About ten minutes in, the movie seems to switch tracks and take inspiration from Squid Game, the 2021 South Korean survival drama.

Some details appear almost one-to-one from the Netflix show: the cold speaker voice, characters labeled by numbers, stylized lighting (including the Japanese flag’s red dot turned into menacing red spotlight), and eerily sterile sets that create a cold, clinical atmosphere stripped of humanity.

Scenes from 731.

Narrative elements also echo Squid Game’s deadly competitions, including an actual life-or-death rope pulling game. In 731, “winners” are promised freedom (but actually sent for experiments) and “losers” surviving slightly longer, until even these rules seemingly disappear, leaving viewers just as lost as the characters.

Beyond these echoes of Squid Game and The Shawshank Redemption (with their themes of prison break, brotherhood, and hope), where horror meets drama and occasionally even comedy, I also thought I saw traces of The Green Mile (there’s even a befriended mouse), The Shining, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, and even Kill Bill.

If this all sounds like a fever dream, that’s about right.

While the film undoubtedly has artistic value in its visual references and symbolism, at times it seems more intent on presenting itself as an arthouse production than on telling a coherent historical war story.

731 scene showing Japanese flags with red lasers/spotlights one the left. Some of the movie’s camera angle points, color use, narrative elements and settings show some similarities with Squid Game (image on right).

731 (left), Squid Game (right)

Scene from 731, which I thought sometimes had some echoes from The Shining.

Another reference to Stanley Kubrick? 731 on the left, Clockwork Orange on the right.

Prison mouse friend. 731 (left) and The Green Mile (right).

And that is also what most of the online critique is about – people feel that while the movie is supposed to be about creating awareness of a particularly horrific part of Chinese war history, the actual factual history seems to have ended up in the background.

One commenter from Harbin wrote:[5]

💬 “For Harbin, 731 is the most painful chapter of history. This movie uses a mass of absurd visuals and music to tell a story that has almost nothing to do with real history. All the information that truly should have been shown is brushed over in passing words, and in the end it just tells audiences ‘never forget history’? This tramples on the history of 731. Stupid and vulgar.”

Others are also upset over historical inaccuracies in the film — from the makeup to the sets, the props, and the biological experiments. Even the toilet paper used by the prisoners isn’t very realistic, with some commenters saying these kinds of details ‘drove them crazy’:

💬 “I’m born after 1990, and even I grew up with worse toilet paper than what the aggressors in those years apparently gave to their prisoners. Theirs was so high-quality you could fold it into bows and baby shoes. Must have been strong, durable, and waterproof.”[6]

One other reviewer on Douban wrote:

💬 “As a prison break film it’s not exciting, as a historical film it’s too careless, and as a drama it’s too fragmented.”[7]

Douban reviewer Qingyun (青云) noted that it jumps from relatively calm scenes to intense emotional outbursts or extreme cruelty without any buildup — instead of moving viewers to tears, it alienates them from the story and its characters.

He adds:

💬 “The film wants to exploit history’s seriousness to entertain the public, but also fears the theme is too depressing and will affect the box office, so it stuffs in commercial gimmicks (jokes, fantasy, spectacle). This opportunism sacrifices the solemnity that is rewired for the historical topic, while also failing to provide as qualified entertainment. The result: it offends history and disappoints audiences.”[8]

Most of these disappointed reviewers argued that the chance to tell the story of Unit 731 was wasted by a director and script that offered little context to the subject, with some even suggesting that another, 37-year-old film (Men Behind the Sun, 黑太阳731, 1988) did a better job of conveying the history of Japan’s biological warfare in China.

A ‘Masterful Cult Film,’ But a ‘Total Failure’ as a War Movie

Despite the wave of strongly negative feedback, there are also those who did find the film moving, giving it five-star reviews — some from those who stress the film’s value as a reminder to “never forget national humiliation,” while others genuinely appreciate its creative vision.

Douban commenter ‘Bat Lord’ (蝙蝠君) called it a “masterful cult film” with the film’s aesthetics being “built on a foundation of Western stereotypical Orientalism of Japan and layered with Christian martyrdom.”[9]

As an example, Bat Lord describes a recurring scene in which prisoners are taken from their cells toward “freedom,” only to be taken to lethal human experiments. They are escorted by Japanese guards in traditional kimonos with samurai swords, led by a geisha carrying a bright red umbrella and wearing impossibly high okobo clogs, followed by Edo-period guards with topknots and white kimono. Bat Lord calls it “Orientalist punk seen through a Western gaze” (“有一种西方视角的东方主义朋克的味道”).

The reviewer also interprets the main characters, the Chinese prisoners, as representations of Christian martyrdom. Cross symbols are indeed everywhere in the film, with prisoner No. 017 constantly drawing crosses on the wall, and an ingenious escape plan hidden in a dictionary as a series of crosses.

At the climax, after battling guards in kimonos with wooden swords, the prisoners flee toward a crematorium resembling a cathedral of light, where crosses formed from pure white beams symbolize freedom. But behind the cross loom the Japanese executioners. After a bloody massacre, the survivors are captured and executed — tied to crosses arranged around a pit, with fleas dropped on them from above as Japanese officers watch from a grandstand.

Cross symbols appear throughout the film.

💬 “It’s clearly a direct homage to Christian martyrs who were sacrificed in the Colosseum during the ancient Roman Empire. In the end, all the protagonists die martyrs’ deaths,” Bat Lord writes.[10]

He concludes that the film is “4/5 as an art house film, but zero points as a war movie”:

💬 “As a mainstream patriotic commercial blockbuster, it is a complete and utter failure (..) But as a niche cult prank film, it actually has some positive points (…) – built on exaggerated Orientalist visions of Japan, it feels strangely authentic. This kind of deconstruction of Japanese culture isn’t something the Japanese themselves could do — only the West or China, as seen in works like The Last Samurai, Ghost of Tsushima, and Shogun.” [11]

He adds:

💬 “The biggest problem is the subject matter. Using 731 — such a solemn, tragic history — only to hollow out its pain, exploit national emotions, and repackage it as a cult prank film disguised as a patriotic blockbuster, inevitably backfires. If it had been framed as a semi-fictional low-budget black comedy, the backlash wouldn’t be so severe.”[12]

“No Japanese in Heaven”: Over-‘Othering’ the Enemy

How could 731 have failed so miserably to live up to public expectations?

In recent years, Chinese museums, books, and popular culture have made many attempts to revitalize the history of war and make it more relevant to younger generations. In many cases, this has been successful, from popular war dramas to blockbuster films.

But Unit 731 is perhaps an especially difficult subject to adapt into a commercially successful film for a broad audience, especially since it chose to leave out the kind of contextualization that Oppenheimer provided in exploring the history, process, and character development that led to the atomic bomb.

Like the gas chambers of Auschwitz or Mengele’s brutal experiments, its history is so gruesome that there is little to focus on beyond the suffering of the victims and the cruelty of the perpetrators. (The film had already been postponed once, as it allegedly failed to pass official screenings due to its graphic scenes.)

War films in China are expected to reflect — or help shape — national identity. In 731, this means boosting national unity by focusing on Japan as the ultimate “Other,” the ‘constructed outsider’ against which the own national identity is defined.

The entire nation is cast as an enemy, depicted through exaggerated cultural symbols — geishas, kimonos, samurai, and cherry blossoms — regardless of whether they belonged in the actual prison setting. Japan’s national colors and imagery are fused with scenes of bloody and barbaric slaughter, turning Japanese cultural identity itself into a target.

References to Japanese cultural symbols in the film.

In doing so, the film not only holds Japan as a whole responsible for its wartime aggression, but also strengthens Chinese identity by defining it in opposition to Japan, visually contrasting “good” versus “evil” through opposing characters, colors, and symbols.

Clear visual symbols: dead Chinese bodies covered in white dust. With the red circle of blood, the scene resembles a Japanese flag.

This contrast is also made explicit in dialogue: at the beginning of the film, for instance, a young boy enters the stark white prison halls and asks, “Master, are we in heaven?” to which the older Chinese man replies, “Nonsense, how could there be Japanese in heaven?”

In promoting the film, director Zhao Linshan (赵林山) reinforced the image of Japan as the eternal “Other” by explaining that he had insisted none of the Japanese roles could have possibly played by Chinese actors, suggesting they would not be able to convey their evilness. Despite the difficulty of bringing over more than 80 Japanese actors during China’s ‘zero Covid’ era, when 731 was largely filmed, Zhao maintained that “only the Japanese can play this dual nature.”

While Chinese social media is often filled with anti-Japanese sentiment, many viewers criticized the depiction of “Japan” and the Unit 731 staff — not because of the anti-Japanese angle, but because they felt it trivialized history. They argued that Unit 731 was already so horrific that it needed no added gimmicks, tropes, or exaggerated villains to make it look bad.

As Douban reviewer Qingyun wrote:

💬 “Portraying devils as clowns diminishes their true guilt. The real criminals were rational, organized, and intelligent, embodying the will of Japanese militarism as a systematic project. Making them idiots (..) greatly underestimates the danger and organization of militarism, and is a severe simplification of history.”[13]

This critique goes further, suggesting the film both weakens its warning value (“the true terror is that advanced civilization and barbarism can coexist”) and cheapens the victims’ suffering (“if the enemy is so stupid, the tragedy seems less grave”).

On Weibo, one commenter criticized this one-sided approach:

💬 “I saw an auntie in Hangzhou who, after watching the movie 731, said she hated the Japanese devils so much — that she would hate them for her entire life. But this elderly woman, brainwashed by hatred education for a lifetime, doesn’t stop to think that (..) so many other brutal slaughters happened throughout Chinese history. If you only speak of hate, can your hate keep up with all of them? Shouldn’t we instead explore and reflect more deeply on the underlying causes of these events? Better to talk less of hate and more of love — because only the most genuine love from the depths of the human heart can ultimately prevent such tragedies from happening again.”[14]

Some viewers who appreciated the film, however, disagreed. One Weibo user wrote: “I watched the film with my husband and on our way home we scolded the Japanese, wishing we could throw two more atomic bombs on them. It was a good film.”

Between the history and the hate, the official narrative, the polarized audience reactions, and disagreements over the film’s message, 731 has brought more controversy than clarity.

But beyond the debate and confusion, one message remains clear. As one viewer wrote:

“The film wasn’t what I expected, but I’m not sure what I even expected? A good story? More like a documentary? There’s one thing I can say for sure: this movie is just a shell — the history itself is the soul.”[15]

By Manya Koetse

Spotted a mistake or want to add something? Please let us know in comments below or email us. First-time commenters, please be patient – we will have to manually approve your comment before it appears.

References

“看完有种被诈骗的感觉” (source: Douban).
“一句话评价《731》，导演按照《肖申克的救赎》拍出了《鱿鱼游戏》” (source: Xiaohongshu).
“令人非常迷惑” (source: Douban).
“短评骂的字数不够了实在是忍不了了” (source: Douban).
“作为一个哈尔滨人，去过至少三次纪念馆，731对于哈尔滨就是最沉痛的一段历史，这个电影用大量极其荒诞的镜头和音乐，讲述一个基本跟真实历史毫无关系的故事，所有真正需要拍出来的信息全部是文字一笔带过，最后却告诉观众勿忘历史？这是对731这段历史的践踏。弱智且下流” (Source: comment section Sina).
“作为一个90后，我出生的那个年代卫生纸质量都达不到侵略者给实验体使用的，纸的质量太好了，又是编蝴蝶结，又是编鞋子的，我猜应该是坚韧又耐用，透水都不断的那种吧” (Source: Douban long reviews).
“或许是删减太多或许是各种局限，当做越狱不精彩，当做历史片太随意，当做剧情片太碎片”(Source: Douban).
“影片既想利用沉重历史的严肃性作为宣传噱头，又担心题材过于压抑影响票房，于是强行注入商业娱乐元素（搞笑、幻想、刺激场面）。这种“既要…又要…”的投机心态导致影片既失去了历史题材必需的敬畏感，又未能提供合格的娱乐体验。最终，它既冒犯了历史，也辜负了观众”(Source Douban, review by Qingyun (青云).
“西方刻板印象东方主义日本与基督殉难的碰撞，cult片的杰出之作”(Source: Douban, review by ‘Bat Lord’ (蝙蝠君).
“很明显也在致敬古罗马帝国时期殉道在斗兽场的圣徒们。最终主角团全员殉道，无一幸免。”
“这个片作为主流主旋律商业大片是完全的，彻头彻尾的失败，彷佛那纯纯的依托！甚至从预告片开始这电影就没有任何一丝一毫的符合历史，我从一开始就完全没有抱任何期望的去看，结果发现这片作为小众邪典整蛊片却颇有可取之处（。。）当你不认为这片是正常电影之后，这片表达出的那股子真的是超正宗的外国视角下的刻板印象东方主义日本美学、东方朋克味，这种对日本文化的魔怔向的解构其实我个人还真感觉挺不错的。这种解构日本人是搞不出来的，目前只有欧美和中国能搞出来，代表作就是《最后的武士》、《对马岛》、《幕府将军》之类的作品，里面的日本文化，日本武士道精神一个赛一个魔怔，欧美是往骑士幻想的那个路子去走的，我们是往黑暗邪典的路子去走的“
“所以这片的最大问题还是选择了731这个严肃题材，完全在消解历史的悲痛，消费民族的情感，拍了个小众邪典整蛊片后，还按照主流商业片来包装和宣发，如果他拍成半架空的超小成本黑色喜剧我觉得反噬恐怕不会有这么大”(Source: Douban).
“它美化了真正的邪恶：将恶魔塑造成小丑，实际上减轻了他们的罪责。真实的731部队不是一群疯癫的傻瓜，而是清醒的、有组织的、高智商的罪犯。他们的行为是日本军国主义国家意志的体现，是一个系统性的工程。把他们拍得弱智，仿佛这场悲剧只是一群笨蛋造成的意外，这极大地低估了军国主义的危害性和组织性，是对历史的严重简化”(source: Douban).
“看到一位杭州阿姨看完电影731后讲太恨日本鬼子了，要一辈子一辈子的恨。这个被仇恨教育洗脑一辈子的老太太，您也不思考一下，嘉定三屠，江东六十四屯，南京大屠杀等等一系列的野蛮屠杀事件在中国历史上发生的太多了，光讲恨您恨的过来吗？不应该是更多的探究和反省发生这些事的深层原因嘛！还是少谈恨多讲爱吧，只有发自心底人类最真实的爱才能最后解决这些惨案在人类世界的发生吧”(Source: Weibo).
Weibo user “红屋顶上的猫”: “我不知道该怎么评。首先在这个忙乱的日子里安排自己去看这个电影，我也说不清楚我是想铭记那段历史，还是想比较小时候看过的《荒原城堡731》，还有那部《黑太阳》。其次我也不知道电影从越狱视角切入，写实和魔幻风格交替，是好还是不好？但它和我想象的不一样，可我也不知道自己想看到的到底是什么样？甚至我也说不清我对这场电影的期待是什么？讲好故事？还是拍成纪录片？我只能确定，电影只是个壳子，那段历史才是灵魂。”

Follow What’s on Weibo on

Up Next

China’s National Day Holiday Hit: Jingdezhen’s “Chicken Chop Bro”

Don't Miss

China’s Prefab Storm Explained: Luo Yonghao vs. Xibei & the Great Yùzhìcài Debate

Manya Koetse

Manya is the founder and editor-in-chief of What's on Weibo, offering independent analysis of social trends, online media, and digital culture in China for over a decade. Subscribe to gain access to content, including the Weibo Watch newsletter, which provides deeper insights into the China trends that matter. More about Manya at manyakoetse.com or follow on X.

Click to comment

Chapter Dive

Inside the Great Chinese Debate Over the Iran War

From official reactions and armchair generals to women’s rights defenders: China’s online discourse surrounding the war in Iran.

Published

4 weeks ago

March 4, 2026

Manya Koetse

This is a deep dive into how the latest developments in Iran are being discussed and reflected on in China, focusing on four aspects: (1) China’s official response, (2) key dynamics within the online discourse, (3) clashing views among key opinion leaders, and (4) polarized reactions within grassroots online communities.

“We’re witnessing history.” That was one sentiment seemingly shared by almost everyone across Chinese social media as news broke of a joint US-Israeli strike on Iran on February 28. Over the past few days, military operations in Iran, Iran’s retaliatory strikes against US military bases across the Middle East, and the death of Supreme Leader Khamenei (哈梅内伊) have been top trending topics across virtually all Chinese social media platforms, from Kuaishou to Douyin and beyond.

Even with the Two Sessions about to start, roughly one in every five posts on Weibo’s main feed have been about Iran in the four days since the attack. Some hashtags there, such as “Khamanei Killed” (#哈梅内伊遇害#), have accumulated over a billion views in less than three days. News of a Chinese civilian killed in the attack reached over 250 million views in a day (#伊朗一名中国公民遇难#).

China’s online responses to the developments in Iran cannot be captured in a few sentences. Interpretations vary among netizens, online commentators, and official actors.

At the same time, sentiments have shifted in response to ongoing strikes and emerging reports, ranging from geopolitical and economic concerns to questions about what this war means for ordinary Chinese citizens.

● China’s Official Response and State Media Coverage

One element that has not changed over the past few days—and was to be expected—is China’s official disapproval of the US-Israeli strikes on Iran.

China-Iran relations have deepened since 1979, and the two countries have been economic and military allies for decades. China is Iran’s largest trading partner, and the Sino-Iranian partnership is strategically important to China, especially in light of the Belt and Road Initiative.

On Saturday, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded, stating that China was “highly concerned” about the military operations, calling for an immediate halt to attacks, urging against further escalation, and advocating a return to diplomatic negotiations. A day later, Beijing described the killing of Iran’s highest leader as a “severe violation of Iran’s sovereignty and security” and a trampling of the principles of the UN Charter.

In a phone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) called the attack “unacceptable” (‘不可接受”) and outlined China’s three-point position:

– Immediately cease military operations.

– Return to dialogue and negotiations as soon as possible.

– Jointly oppose these actions that ignore the rules-based order.

What’s particularly noticeable in the official Chinese hashtags surrounding developments in Iran is that they closely align with the perspective of Iranian media reports rather than Western coverage.

Beyond voicing China’s official expression of concern about the war and highlighting the safety and evacuation of Chinese citizens abroad, the majority of official media hashtags fall into four main categories. Although the reporting tone is relatively neutral, the selection of hashtags—and, because this is social media, the discussions they generate—reveals a clear editorial direction in how the US-Israel war on Iran is framed.

📢 1. Iranian Regime Shock: Continuity Over Collapse

State-media-backed narratives on Chinese social media frame the military attack on Iran as a systemic shock to the regime. While focusing on the leadership crisis, presented as directly caused by the US and indirectly fueled by “internal betrayal,” these stories ultimately prioritize themes of Iranian institutional continuity and the preservation of order, with no attention to popular resistance or potential grassroots power shifts.

Hashtag Examples:

CCTV: “How Will Iran’s New Supreme Leader Arise?” #伊朗新的最高领袖如何产生#
China News Service: “Iran Interim Leadership Committee Begins Work” #伊朗临时领导委员会开始工作#
Global Times: “Internal Traitors Are Iran’s Deadly Danger” #伊朗的致命隐患是内奸#
China News Service: “Iran’s Foreign Minister Says the US and Israel Cannot Overthrow the Iranian Regime” #伊外长称美以不可能推翻伊朗政权#

📢 2. Iran Fights Back: Agency & Retaliation

There is another set of hashtags that mainly focus on Tehran’s retaliation, military actions, and refusal to negotiate with the United States. These hashtags promote narratives about the agency and strength of Iran’s leadership, and its successful resistance to US-Israeli attacks.

Hashtag Examples:

Global Times: “Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Promises Further Retaliation Against US and Israel” #伊朗最高领袖顾问承诺进一步报复美以#
CCTV: “Iranian President Says Enemies Will Be Driven to Despair” #伊朗总统称将让敌人绝望#
CCTV: “Iranian Missiles Break Through Israel’s Defense System” #伊朗导弹突破以色列防御系统#
Global Times: “Iran Says It Won’t Talk to US” #伊朗称不会与美国进行谈判#
CCTV: “Iran Says It’s Preparing for a Long-Term War” #伊朗称已准备好长期战争#
China Blue News: “Iranian Foreign Minister Says: Though the Leader Was Killed, Iran Will Not Fall” #伊朗外长称领袖虽遇难但伊朗不会倒下#

📢 3. Focus on Iranian Suffering and Human Impact

A third overarching narrative seen in the hashtags is a moral one that highlights death & destruction brought by US–Israeli strikes in Iran and beyond, and their impact on civilians. Especially on Saturday, this perspective became prominent through many hashtags emphasizing how a girls’ elementary school in Minab, southern Iran, was reportedly hit by missiles during the military operation, resulting in around 150 deaths, according to Iranian media.

Hashtag examples:

CCTV: “US–Israeli Attack Kills 555 People” #美以袭击致伊朗555人死亡#
China Blue News: “Hospital Bombed: Iranian Medics Rescue Baby from Incubator” #医院被炸伊朗医护抢出保温箱内婴儿#
Dazhong News: “Iranian People Do Their Best to Escort Chinese to Safety” #伊朗人民拼全力护送中国人安全离开#

📢 4. US–Israeli Actions as Global Destabilization

Another trend in Chinese media headlines over the past few days portrays US and Israeli actions as not only illegitimate and irresponsible but also as the trigger for wider global ripple effects. One post by People’s Daily claimed that the US and Israel are “undermining the foundations of peace established after World War II,” and a provocative AI video posted by China Daily, titled “The Bloody Arsenal,” suggested that the US only engages in bloody warfare for profit and power.

Hashtag examples:

China News Service: “US-Israel Strike May Lead to a Global Food Crisis” #美以袭击伊朗或引发全球粮食危机#
CCTV International: “America and Israel Can’t Attack Iran and then Walk Away” #美以不可能打了伊朗就一走了之#
The Paper: “U.S. Strikes Iran Without Congressional Authorization” #美国未经国会授权空袭伊朗#
Xinhua: “Iran Will Not Allow a Single Drop of Oil to Flow Out” #伊朗不允许一滴石油流出#
CCTV: “Protests in US Capital Against US–Israel Strikes on Iran” #美首都集会抗议美以对伊朗动武#

“The Bloody Arsenal” AI video cover, by China Daily. Editor-in-charge, He Si (何思)

Notably, none of the approximately 450 Chinese media hashtags I have gathered and analyzed from Feb 28-March 4 portray Iranians as welcoming American intervention or celebrating Khamenei’s death. Nor do they express any pro-US or pro-Israeli sentiment, directly or indirectly.

Besides Iranian women appearing as victims of strikes, there are also no trending headlines highlighting Iranian women’s voices or women’s rights in this context.

Another viewpoint missing from these official media talking points is how the conflict is directly affecting China, diplomatically or economically, and how China’s own interests are being harmed in this war.

● Beyond the Headlines: Debate, Skepticism, and China-Focused Concerns

Although the main online narratives surrounding the war in Iran are led by Chinese media outlets (mainly CCTV, Xinhua, and China News Service), a lot is happening in the comment sections of state media social posts.

I find three things particularly noteworthy about these comment sections in general:

📌 There is room for relatively open discussion, but within a geopolitical frame

There is room for discussion. For many major international events, especially when China itself is involved, comment sections are often limited or completely closed. Content surrounding the Iranian conflict, however, has become one of the biggest drivers of engagement on Chinese social media in recent days.

In the past, some Iran-related news was heavily censored in China. For example, in 2022, the death of Mahsa Amini—the young woman who died after being detained and beaten by Tehran police for not properly wearing a hijab—made international headlines. The incident sparked outrage and protests worldwide. In China, however, coverage was limited, and there were no hashtags about Mahsa Amini on Chinese social media.

This time, reporting on developments in Iran focuses mainly on geopolitical aspects. By omitting certain grassroots elements (anti-regime demonstrations, pro-American sentiments), the Iranian war becomes less sensitive for China.

At the same time, the story is shaped and amplified in ways that reinforce Chinese narratives portraying the United States and Israel as irresponsible, unreliable aggressors driven by hegemony, while positioning China as a stable and trustworthy great power calling for peace in a multipolar world order.

📌 Netizens push back against state media narratives and are critical of Iran’s regime

Another noteworthy aspect is the overall tone of the comments. Especially in the first two days after the attacks began, I’ve seen far less overwhelming anti-Americanism than one might expect. Compared to other major international news moments, such as the US military operation in Venezuela, there appears to be not only less overt anti-American sentiment but also more skepticism toward Chinese state media reporting on the war, with many comments going against state media narratives.

When initial reports confirmed Khamanei’s death and the Israeli military claimed it had also killed other top Iranian regime officials, state media emphasized official condemnation and mourning, yet waves of Douyin users responded with thumbs-up and applause emojis.

On Kuaishou, some highly upvoted comments under videos of missile attacks, such as the Minab schoolgirl airstrike, questioned the authenticity of the reported facts. Others simply concluded that “war is always cruel.”

Some social media users also called out the algorithms of these short video platforms (Douyin & Kuaishou) for excessively pushing and amplifying Iranian military claims. Some joked that if they believed what their feeds were showing them, not only had the USS Abraham Lincoln already been sunk by Iran, but the United States itself had already been destroyed.

Sarcastic Weibo post: “On Douyin, the USS Lincoln aircraft carrier is about to be sunk by Iran,” responding to fake viral war footage circulating on the platform..

Other videos posted by state media outlets, such as Beijing Times, showing Iranian state media footage of people mourning the death of Khamenei, received top comments such as: “Why cry? Stand up and revolt,” or “They must have hired these people to cry, right?”

Following reports on the death of former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, popular comments praised the US-Israeli intelligence system for its strength and efficiency, while also expressing surprise at the perceived fragility of Iran’s regime following the decapitation of its senior leadership.

The fact that public sentiment is not uniformly condemning the US—and that many comments openly push back against official narratives—does not necessarily indicate a decline in anti-American sentiment on Chinese social media. Rather, it reflects clear negative sentiment toward the Iranian regime, making public responses to recent developments more complex and less monolithic than in previous international crises.

📌 Chinese netizens want to know what the Iran war means for China

Although official media reports and hashtags avoid focusing on how the Iranian conflict directly affects China, the war’s direct consequences are top of mind for netizens – not only do they want to know what it means for China, but also how it could affect them personally.

Perhaps as part of a broader simmering economic anxiety, people immediately began discussing commodity prices and personal financial planning after the attacks were reported.

Besides oil prices and crypto crashes, there’s been a special focus on gold buying. China is seeing a “gold rush” among Chinese consumers. Gold jewelry prices (金饰克价) have soared to 1,600 yuan (US$232) per gram, a historic milestone widely discussed on Chinese social media. Silver and crude oil prices have also risen sharply, while the cryptocurrency market has suffered a major decline, much to the dismay of those who admitted they had just invested.

In response to a video posted on Douyin by Chinese journalist Li Rui (李睿) showing Iranians weeping over Khamenei’s death, people in the comment sections joked:

💬 “I’m also weeping. My gold investment hadn’t recovered yet, and now I’ve lost money on it all over again 😭😭😭” (9300+likes)

💬 “I’m crying more. I just bought oil😭”

💬 “I also wanna cry. I just went all in on tech stocks on Friday.”

Footage shared by journalist Li Rui on Douyin showing Iranians mourning the loss of their Supreme Leader, while many reactions joked that they were also weeping due to rising prices and dropping stocks. Some even joked they found the carpet pretty, and where to get it.

Another popular talking point in this context is energy vulnerability and how the Iranian military locked down the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global energy.

The Strait of Hormuz is important to China because of its reliance on energy imports. In 2025, over 80% of Iran’s shipped oil went to China. Although this represents only about 13.4% of China’s total oil imports, China’s dependence on imported crude oil exceeds 70%, and roughly 40% of its total oil imports pass through Hormuz.

One widely shared Sina Finance article by “Wangye Talks Finance” (王爷说财经讯) predicted “severe turbulence” for the global energy market, leading to dramatic price jumps, not just in China’s domestic fuel windows, but also in driving costs and logistics, adding that “even courier fees and vegetable prices may climb.”

Other sources (Phoenix News, now offline) also covered other risks of supply disruptions, including how the war affects China’s chemical industry. (Iran is the world’s second-largest methanol producer, and over 60% of China’s methanol imports reportedly come from Iran.)

At the same time, there are also voices (such as blogger 枫冷慕诗, with 640k+ followers) who argue that Iran is not nearly as important to China as many believe, and that its role is often overestimated while its relationship with China is misunderstood.

Pointing to Iran’s inconsistent foreign policy, its relative weakness, and China’s limited economic ties with Iran (as well as its diversified energy imports), they argue that China likely anticipated the conflict and would not suffer catastrophic damage, even under the most extreme circumstances.

● Competing Narratives Among China’s Online Commentators

The complexity of US–Israeli military operations in Iran—and what they could mean for China and the rest of the world—is also reflected in the responses of China’s online key opinion leaders (KOLs). Rather than presenting a single narrative, many prominent commentators have offered sharply differing interpretations of the conflict, at times sparking heated debates among their followers.

🗣️ “The only one who can beat Hu Xijin is the Hu Xijin of the next day”

▪️Hu Xijin (胡锡进, former Global Times editor-in-chief, 24.9 million followers) immediately took to Weibo after the first reports came out about strikes on Iran. In one post, he called it “Iran’s tragedy” (“伊朗的悲剧”) that its people have to pay a heavy price for ambitions that exceed its actual strength and for confronting powers much greater than itself. He also proposed that it would be better for Israel to “move to Mars to find a place of peace there,” as the nation is “bound to fight one party after the other in the Middle East.”

But his focus shifted with the news of Khamenei’s death, moving from military escalation to the possible political outcomes in Iran. He described it as a historic turning point and leadership transition that could push the country either toward a harder anti-US/anti-Israel stance to preserve regime unity and deter domestic revolt, or toward a more conciliatory, American-friendly approach.

At the same time, Hu became a target of online jokes. When the first rumors of Khamenei’s death surfaced, he suggested the Iranian leader was probably keeping a low profile and preparing a public address that would be a major blow to the US and Israel, only to acknowledge the next day that Khamenei had indeed died. Later, Hu predicted that Iran’s new leader would be swiftly elected. As none of his predictions seem to be aging well, some netizens joked: “The only one who can beat Hu Xijin is the Hu Xijin of the next day” (“能打败胡锡进的是第二天的胡锡进”).

🗣️ “This is warfare with warmth and humanity, a new realm of the art of war”

▪️Zhu Zhiyong (朱智勇, blogger / formerly an author at the now-defunct China Elections and Governance academic website, 中国选举与治理, 210k followers) also shared a controversial opinion on March 1. He initially suggested that “Iran has taken the wrong path and made the wrong choices, it’s time to correct course,” and then praised the US-Israeli strategy.

💬 “Khamenei was precisely targeted and killed. Israel and the United States are writing a new era in the history of warfare: targeted elimination with minimal civilian and military casualties – this is warfare with warmth and humanity, a new realm of the art of war.”

The framing drew sharp pushback in comments from users who pointed to the bombing of the elementary school and called Zhu’s comments a rationalization of political assassination under international law.

His comments seem to have been deleted at the time of writing.

🗣️ “Iran should concentrate more missiles on striking Israel”

Other key opinion leaders and influencers took a completely different stance. Instead of praising the US and Israel, they praised Iranian counterattacks and promoted anti-American and anti-Israeli aggression.

▪️Sima Pinbang (司马平邦, military blogger, 7 million followers) suggested that Iran should focus more on missiles aimed specifically at Israel, and speculated that confiscated Starlink (星链) devices could give Iran a more useful targeting capability.

▪️Korolev (科罗廖夫, military affairs blogger, 6 million followers) made a bold post suggesting that Iran had only “one single move” left to counter both America and Israel, which would be a full-blown attack on Israel’s city centers, writing:

💬 “Iran should (..) exhaust all means to strike Israel’s population centers and civilian infrastructure. It should strike airports, fuel depots, electric power plants, transportation hubs, and communications centers..”

🗣️ “Iran’s counterattack against the US and Israel is something that will rewrite global military history”

▪️Luosifen Ge (螺蛳粉哥, a commentary account with 330k followers) shared another popular thread, where he suggested that Iran’s ability to bypass Israeli missile defenses reveals their weakness and serves as a lesson for China on the shortcomings of US/Israel military power.

💬 “The harder Iran’s missiles strike, the more the United States fears the nation-destroying capabilities of China and Russia. Many people have not realized that Iran’s counterattack against the US and Israel is an event that will rewrite global military history. (..) The reason is that Iran’s strikes represent the largest-scale missile war in human history, and also the first comprehensive real-combat stress test of modern strategic and tactical air-defense systems. (..) Iran used more than one hundred missiles to give the world a very real lesson. After this lesson, one conclusion is clear: the US homeland is no longer truly secure in the face of China and Russia.”

● The Armchair Generals and Women’s Rights Defenders on Chinese Social Media

While official media outlets are shaping China’s online discourse in response to developments in Iran, and key opinion leaders are sharing their views on the future of the conflict, there are also large numbers of commentators who focus on specific and often polarized views of the war in Iran.

⚔️ China’s online army of military strategists

Chinese social media users like the aforementioned “Luosifen Ge” are part of a large group of nationalist commentators with a specific interest in military affairs, who believe they know the best strategies for handling the war. We’ve seen them in action before, such as during the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war and in the years afterward.

Now, these supposed “military strategists” (军师们) have appeared in various online discussions, such as in the comment section under the Douyin account of the Iranian Embassy in China, sharing detailed plans and strategic outlines for how Iran should build defense lines, strike civilian infrastructure, and eliminate its enemies.

Some commenters even went so far as to list the names and exact coordinates of major Israeli desalination plants, concluding: “Don’t stop, attack until the coast.” Others listed multiple US bases in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, Iraq, and Syria, including geolocations and troop numbers, and described their strategic functions.

These “armchair generals” seem to use the conflict as a way to fulfill militaristic fantasies while also showing Chinese nationalist feelings.

They are the ones who want Iran to retaliate against America for Chinese gains. Maybe because they believe that if Iran collapses, China loses a key strategic buffer in the broader Middle East, or because they see Iran as a counterweight to challenge US dominance. Or perhaps because they view Iran as a prime military learning example for China, especially given that its main vulnerability is said to be not just military capacity but also counterintelligence failures.

“The weak get beaten. I suggest we significantly increase military spending this year,” some wrote. Such messaging is also in part boosted by Chinese official military accounts, writing things like: “The law of the jungle still prevails across human history. The moment vigilance slackens, it may bring irreversible disaster upon the nation and the people.”

On Kuaishou, one of China’s official military accounts posted a video featuring Chinese armed forces, with the text reading, “Only by being able to fight can you stop war.” The video clearly conveyed that “if war breaks out today,” China is prepared for it.

Screenshots from the video posted by China’s military account on Kuaishou: “If war breaks out today, only those who are able to fight can stop it.”

China’s “armchair generals,” who are mostly found on Bilibili besides Douyin, show little empathy for ordinary Iranians. Instead, their discussions focus on military analysis, market watching, and a general sympathy for Iran as the party being attacked by the US and Israel — not for its people as potential beneficiaries of regime change.

⚔️ “A new era has begun”: Iran through a women’s rights lens

On the other end of the online spectrum, there’s a group of social media users whose voices have also become prominent over the past few days. They focus not on the military aspect but on women’s freedom, and are generally positive about the US-Israeli strikes as a possible liberation for Iranian women.

These days, one of the most-liked non-state-media posts on Weibo about Iran was a video shared by one Weibo user (光影总管) showing an Iranian woman crying tears of joy after hearing about the death of Khamenei, shouting: “Khamenei is dead! Finally! We are free! I can’t believe it!” It received at least 81,000 likes before being taken offline.

Many commenters expressed empathy for ordinary Iranians like her who lived under Khamenei’s theocratic rule, writing things like “Iranian women and children are [finally] seeing some light” (“伊朗女人，儿童看到光明了”) and: “In a country where women get killed for wearing the wrong headscarf, how could she not be glad?”

Examples of images shared by netizens: Iranian women in the 1970s, a meme about women in Islam being covered up, and a post with an AI image suggesting women in Iran lived under a regime that’s like a prison.

One Douyin user posted a photo showing women drinking beer and seemingly celebrating the death of the Iranian supreme leader, writing “Iranian girls tear off their face coverings and reveal their true faces, how beautiful.”

“A new era has begun,” others wrote, and some even called Khamenei’s death, which coincided with the end of the Spring Festival, the “first joy of the year” (“开年第一喜”).

Image posted on Douyin discussing Iranian women removing their headscarves and celebrating: ““Iranian girls tear off their face coverings and reveal their real faces.” (Original photo source unverified).

Others who expressed delight over the death of Khamenei called him “an enemy of civilization, the rule of law, openness, and progress,” and took this as an opportunity to remember Mahsa Amini.

Netease creator “Legal Classroom” (@法律学堂) expressed his hope that the death of the supreme leader represents a form of historical justice: “Today, the Iranian girl Mahsa Amini may finally be able to rest in peace.”

In comment sections, people cheer on women who celebrate a new beginning: “Iran, stand strong!”

One social media user (狮子头萌萌) wrote:

💬 “Iranian women are different, okay? They have always stood at the very front of resistance, whether during the struggle against the imperial monarchy back then, or later in opposition to the religious regime. The mistake they made was believing that religion and modern democracy could coexist.”

Meanwhile, there are also voices condemning these sentiments. One well-known nationalist account (@子午侠士) criticized a Chinese-speaking woman in Tehran who livestreamed, rejoicing during her broadcast. She said that because the United States and Israel launched a war against Iran, the political climate inside the country has changed. On the streets of Iran, fewer women are wearing headscarves, and Iranian women are moving toward greater freedom.

The Chinese blogger argued: “A headscarf does not represent everything, and the happiness of a people cannot be measured solely by whether they wear one,” and suggested the woman was an “anti-regime traitor.”

Those who disagree responded: “Did you go to Iran? Did you live there? Did you ask them? Do you know what they want?” Others echo this sentiment: “Go and ask Iranian women.”

Another commenter added: “There is nothing wrong with wanting to fight for freedom.”

Aside from detailed discussions regarding Iran, “armchair generals,” and women’s rights advocates, celebrity news continues as usual. Although the conflict in Iran remains a major topic, a juicy new scandal involving a popular Chinese singer has begun dominating headlines.

As the initial shock over the war in Iran subsides, it is becoming just another part of the daily news cycle. It now competes with Chinese celebrity gossip and is being shaped, reshaped, and contested in ways that, perhaps, reveal more about China’s online discourse than about the events in Iran themselves.

Many thanks to Miranda Barnes for her research contributions to this newsletter. Stay tuned for an overview of other trending news (including that juicy celebrity story) in our next edition.

Best,

Manya

Chapter Dive

The Fake Patients of Xiangyang: Hospital Scandal Shakes Welfare System Trust

Han Futao’s explosive report on fake patients and systemic abuse has triggered a heated online debate over hospital malpractices, the fragility of the welfare system, and the vital role of investigative reporting.

Published

1 month ago

February 15, 2026

Ruixin Zhang

In early February, as China settled into the quiet anticipation of the Chinese New Year, one of the country’s leading investigative journalists, Han Futao (韩福涛), dropped a bombshell report that sent shockwaves of anger across the country.

Han Futao is known for breaking massive scandals. In 2024, he exposed how tank trucks that delivered chemical products also transported cooking oil, without being cleaned. That food safety scandal sparked waves of outrage and prompted a high-level official investigation, leading to criminal charges for those involved.

In his latest explosive report, published by Beijing News (新京报), Han has turned his lens to malpractice in China’s hospital sector. His investigation led him to Xiangyang, in Hubei province, a city with more than twenty psychiatric hospitals, cropping up on every corner “like beef noodle shops” over recent years.

Recruiting Patients

Han found that multiple private psychiatric hospitals lure people in under the guise of free care, promising treatment for little or no cost, along with medication and daily expenses. Some even dispatched staff to rural villages to recruit “patients.”

Troubled by the unusual marketing procedures of these psychiatric hospitals, Han went undercover at several facilities as a caregiver, and sometimes posing as a patient’s family member, only to expose a disturbing reality.

Except for a handful of genuine patients, these hospitals were filled with healthy people who actually received no treatment. Many were elderly citizens swayed by the promise of “free care,” checking in with the hope of finding a free retirement home.

When Han, posing as a patient’s family member, spoke to a hospital manager at Xiangyang Yangyiguang Psychiatric Hospital (襄阳阳一光精神病医院), the director enthusiastically pitched their “free hospitalization” by saying medical fees were completely waived and promising the potential patient a great stay: “Lots of patients stay here for years and don’t even go home for Chinese New Year!”

Meanwhile, the hospitals’ own staff, including caregivers, nurses, and security guards, were also officially registered as patients, complete with admission and hospitalization procedures.

The motive was simple: insurance fraud (骗保 piànbǎo). In China, even after state medical insurance covers part of psychiatric care costs, patients are typically still responsible for a co-pay. These hospitals, both in Xiangyang and in the city of Yichang, exploited the financial vulnerability of those unwilling or unable to pay, using the lure of free accommodation to attract the misinformed. Once admitted, the hospitals used their identities to fabricate medical records and bill the state for non-existent treatments.

According to internal billing records, medication accounted for only a small fraction of patients’ costs. The bulk of the charges came from psychotherapy and behavioral correction therapy, which often leave little material trace and, in these cases, were never actually provided. Many of these hospitals even lacked basic medical equipment and qualified personnel.

Staff were essentially manufacturing invoices, generating around 4,000 yuan (US$580) in fraudulent charges per patient each month, with most funds diverted from the National Healthcare Security Administration (NHSA).

With each patient yielding thousands of yuan, profitability became a numbers game: the more bodies in beds, the higher the revenue. This perverse incentive gave rise to a specialized workforce of marketers who recruited ordinary people from rural areas, developing sales pitches and establishing referral-based kickback chains, offering bonuses of 400 ($58) to 1,000 yuan ($145) for every new “patient” successfully brought in.

To stay under the radar, hospitals periodically discharged patients on paper to avoid scrutiny from insurance auditors, only to readmit them immediately, or never actually let them leave at all. One story involved a patient who was discharged seven times, each time being readmitted on the same day he was “discharged.”

Day after day, the national medical insurance fund, built on the collective contributions and trust of the entire population, was drained through these calculated deceptions.

From Patients to Prisoners

Han uncovered more. Even more harrowing than the scale of the medical insurance fraud was the condition of those trapped inside. To maximize profit margins, these hospitals slashed costs to the bone. Living conditions were terrible: wards overcrowded, beds crammed side-by-side, and daily activities and food substandard at best.

The hospitals treated their patients more like profit-generating assets than human beings. Patients were subjected to a strict regime: they were forced to follow rigid schedules, restricted to designated zones, and faced physical violence if they did not comply.

During Han’s undercover research, he witnessed the horrific sight of patients being tied to a bed for not following orders, with some patients allegedly being restrained for up to three days and three nights.

Photo by Han Futao, in Beijing News, showing a hall filled with beds at the Yichang Yiling Kangning Psychiatric Hospital, where more than 160 people were housed in just one ward. The lower photo, also by Han Futao, shows elderly “patients” kept in their wheelchairs all day at Xiangyang Hong’an Psychiatric Hospital.

Some patients, despite technically being the ones receiving care, were forced to perform manual labor for the staff. They scrubbed pots, cleaned wards, mopped latrines, and moved supplies. Others even had to take on nursing tasks for fellow patients, such as feeding, bathing, and changing clothes, all in exchange for a few cents to buy a cigarette. Their personal freedom and quality of life were virtually non-existent.

Escape was also difficult. The hospitals had no intention of releasing their cash cows. Rarely was a patient discharged on the scheduled date. To ensure long-term residency, many hospitals confiscated patients’ phones and cut off contact with their families.

Some individuals spent nearly ten years in these prison-like conditions; some even died there. Meanwhile, those truly suffering from mental illness received no real treatment, often seeing their condition worsen or developing deep-seated trauma toward psychiatric care.

Fragile Public Trust in Welfare-Related Institutions

In China, there is a common belief that if you spot one cockroach in the room, there are already a hundred more hiding. As the story has gone viral over the past two weeks, netizens pointed out that Xiangyang and Yichang were likely not the only cities using such predatory tactics to cannibalize the national treasury. Han’s investigation struck a deeper nerve, and public anxiety over the security of social insurance once again bubbled to the surface.

China’s national health insurance is a cornerstone of the broader social insurance system and a vital part of life for nearly every citizen. It is generally divided into two categories: Employee Medical Insurance and Resident Medical Insurance. Employers are legally, at least in theory, required to contribute to the employee scheme, typically 6% to 9% of a worker’s salary. Non-employees, such as farmers, students, and freelancers, usually pay for Resident Insurance out of pocket, currently costing around 400 yuan ($58) annually. Under the employee scheme, inpatient reimbursement rates are roughly 80% to 85%; after approximately 25 years of contributions, members enjoy lifelong coverage without further payments. The Resident Insurance, however, offers significantly lower protection.

This system was designed as a fundamental safety net to alleviate the fear of falling into poverty due to illness or being left destitute in old age. For young Chinese job seekers, whether a company pays into social security used to be a non-negotiable criterion. However, as scandals shaking the foundation of this system have become more frequent, the mindset of the youth is shifting: Is it even worth paying into anymore?

Recent years have seen a steady stream of corruption scandals involving the embezzlement of social security funds.

Despite the authorities’ firm stance and high-profile punishments, 2025 was still marked by reports of officials — including the insurance bureau’s finance head — misappropriating funds to play the stock market. A June 2025 report even alleged that 40.6 billion yuan (US$5.8 billion) in national pension funds had been misappropriated or embezzled by local governments.

In one surreal case from Shanxi, a CDC employee’s records were doctored 14 times to create an absurd history of “starting work at age 1 and retiring at 22,” allowing them to pocket 690,000 yuan ($100,000) in pension while still drawing a salary at a new job.

These stories exposing large-scale abuse of the medical insurance system, combined with the extension of the minimum contribution period for retirement from 15 to 20 years amid a slowing job market and a gradually rising retirement age, are leading netizens to question the necessity of paying into the system. This is reflected in comments such as:

-“First it was 20 years, then 25, then 30. They move the goalposts whenever they want, but the benefits never improve.”
-“I won’t buy anything beyond the bare minimum resident insurance; who knows if there will even be a payout in the future?”
-“With a deficit this large, whether we’ll ever see that money is a huge question mark.”
-“I’m not even sure I’ll live to see 65 anyway.”

Echoes of the Cuckoo’s Nest

In response to Han’s latest exposure, local authorities immediately launched investigations, and state-run media outlets issued sharp criticism. By now, fourteen hospital executives have been criminally detained on suspicion of fraud.

Although the official report, published on the night of February 13, acknowledged that there was widespread medical fraud, with patients remaining hospitalized after recovery or empty beds being registered without any patients there, it said no evidence was found that people without mental disorders were admitted, which was one major finding of Han’s undercover operation.

This led to new questions, because how could fraud, abuse, fake discharges, and official corruption be acknowledged while denying the central allegation: that healthy people were being locked up? And how could people prove they were not mentally ill, while being a patient inside a psychiatric hospital?

Political & social commentator Hu Xijin (胡锡进) wrote on Weibo that, while he applauded Han and his team for exposing the mismanagement at psychiatric hospitals in Hubei, he also saw the report’s conclusions about the patients as a reminder that journalists should exercise caution when making accusations. Some sarcastic commenters suggested that perhaps Han had not sacrificed enough and should have admitted himself as a patient instead.

And so, in a way, the debate has now slowly also shifted – from the initial shock over Han’s report, to the anger and distrust surrounding state institutions and social security abuse, to the role of investigative journalism in China today. “He’s a hero,” some commenters said about Han.

In the end, the entire story is so absurd that some commentators have drawn parallels to One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (飞越疯人院), where Randle P. McMurphy (Jack Nicholson) fakes insanity to serve his sentence in a mental hospital instead of a prison work farm, only to find out that the endless chain of control and abuse at the psych ward is much more brutal than a prison cell.

The question inescapably becomes who the sane ones actually are.

Meanwhile, the scandal shows that public anxiety about the future and distrust of state institutions tend to rise quickly and deepen slowly with each new controversy. As trust in the national welfare system appears fragile, one sentiment persists: that there is far more to uncover, and that there are far too few Han Futaos to do it.

By Ruixin Zhang

With additional reporting by Manya Koetse