Chapter Dive
How ‘Chinese’ are China’s Muslims? Islam in China: An Overview
An overview of Islam in China and China’s relation to its Muslim minority.
Published
11 years agoon
WHAT’S ON WEIBO ARCHIVE | PREMIUM CONTENT ARTICLE
As Muslim extremist attacks have ignited discussions on Islam in Europe, Chinese leaders increasingly expand restrictions on the Muslims within their borders. What’s on Weibo brings you an overview of Islam in China and China’s relation to its Muslim minorities.
The January attacks on the headquarters of Charlie Hebdo and a kosher supermarket in Paris by Muslim extremists have ignited heated discussions on radical Islam across Europe. From a distance, Chinese leaders watch Europe’s Islam debate and increasingly expand restrictions on the Muslims within their borders. Since this month, the burqa is banned, along with other garments that ‘promote religious extremist ideology’. “They see themselves as Muslim, we see them as Chinese,” says one Weibo netizen. What is the connection between Islam and China? What’s on Weibo brings you an overview of Islam in China and China’s relation to its Muslim minorities.
French Muslims: not ‘French’ enough?
After the Charlie Hebdo attacks, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared that France was now at war with “radical Islamism” (Economist 2015). In France, and Europe at large, hard questions have been emerging on Islam-inspired terrorism and the recruitment of people within European countries by radical groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. France has the biggest Muslim minority in Europe, and the country’s relationship with them is not easy (Economist/Colchester 2015, 215). In response to the extremist attacks, U.S. President Obama stated that Europe has failed to integrate its Muslims (Francis 2015). About the U.S. he says: “Our biggest advantage is that our Muslim populations, they feel themselves to be Americans.” Europe has not had the same process of assimilation and immigration, according to Obama, suggesting that the identification of Muslims with their nation is crucial in combating radical Islam: French Muslims are simply not ‘French’ enough.
As Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed his sympathy for the victims of the Paris attacks, he said that terrorism was also an enemy to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (SCMP 2015). China has a history of extremist terrorist attacks, linked to its Uyghur Muslim minority. What is the situation on Muslim integration in China? How ‘Chinese’ are China’s Muslims?
Islam in China: an overview
No burqa in Urumqi, no fasting for Ramadan, no niqabs, hijabs or large beards in buses. Since 2014, China has implemented several measures to keep religious expressions to a minimum after a string of attacks allegedly committed by Chinese Muslim extremists. In March 2014, a knife attack at the Kunming railway station left 29 civilians dead. In May, 43 were killed when a Urumqi market was bombed. On June 22, attackers drove into a Kashgar police building and set off explosives. The list continues. The government responded to the increasing violence in 2014 with a crackdown that resulted in more than 380 arrests within one month and public controls on religious expression (Tang 2014). The restrictions continued in 2015, when a ban on wearing burqa’s, or ‘face masking veils’ (面罩袍), was legally approved and went into effect on February 1st. The prohibition on burqa’s and other clothing ‘promoting religious extremism’ applies specifically to Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, which is home to the majority of China’s Muslims.
Few people in the West are aware of China’s large Muslim community. Yet Muslims are part of China’s history: they have lived in China from as early as the eighth century (Lipman 1997, xvii). Many Muslims came to China as soldiers, giving military aid to the Tang dynasty government during a rebellion uprise and then settling down afterwards. They also came as traders and diplomats along the Silk Road, setting up compact communities that maintained their own religion and lifestyle. Since intercultural marriages with local Chinese often occurred, the Muslim population increased, as non-Muslims had to convert to Islam before marrying (Mi & You 2004, 3-7). Although Muslims live all over China, the majority lives in the northwestern regions of Xinjiang, Ningxia, Gansu and the Qinghai provinces.
Is there such a thing as a ‘Chinese Muslim’? Within the PRC, Muslims are not defined as a specific category. Chinese citizens are divided into 56 different ‘minzu’ or ethnic groups; a categorization that is separated from religion. The vast majority of Chinese belong to the ‘Han’, which is considered a ‘culturally Chinese’ group. Within the other 55 minzu, there are ten that take Islam as their faith: the Huis, Uyghurs, Kazaks, Dongxiangs, Khalkas, Salas, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Bao’ans and Tatars (Mi & You 2004). About half of China’s Muslims belong to the Hui, the ethnic minority that descents from the foreign Muslims of the Tang (Lipman 1997, xxiii).
The northwestern region of Xinjiang is almost entirely Muslim, and was only joined by non-Muslims since the last fifty years. Of the 20 million-something people who live there, around eight million belong to the Uyghur minority. Although there are no official government records of how many people practice Islam within the PRC, it is estimated that there are currently are around 23 million Muslims in China, a number that is expected to grow to almost 30 million in 2030 (Pew 2011).
China’s northwest has always been a region filled with unrest. While Muslim identity strengthened throughout the 17th and 18th century, other rulers (Arab, Mongols, Russians) were looking for new lands to expand their power in present-day Xinjiang. The situation reached a crisis point. In the 19th century, the Chinese Qing government ordered a suppression of Muslim rebels. It is estimated that 20 to 30 million lives were lost in this suppression (Jones-Leaning & Pratt 2012, 317). During the Mao years, Muslims in the northwestern regions suffered greatly from the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), as the famine was especially severe in these provinces. Religious buildings and schools were destroyed by the Red Guards, Arabic script was prohibited, and Muslims were expected to rear pigs and eat pork (ibid., 318).
“Believe it, don’t show it”
After the Mao years, it was acknowledged that religious beliefs could not be completely abolished (ibid., 318). Freedom of religion was officially declared in 1949, but the Communist Party believed that theistic religion would ultimately disappear. Atheism was therefore propagated amongst the people. In current-day China, religion is more or less tolerated, as long as it conforms to state-approved principles and organization (Boyle & Sheen 2003, 179-180). Instead of guaranteeing free exercise of religion, the constitution only guarantees freedom of religious belief. In other words; you can believe what you want, but how you engage with your religion in everyday life has to comply with what the state deems right.
In the reform period of the 1980s, the PRC had a policy of cultural liberalization that also applied to China’s northwest. Mosques were reopened and religion was revived. But as extremist Islamic movements expanded internationally, radical groups mushroomed in China’s northwest. Muslim separatist groups called for Xinjiang to form an independent East Turkestan state. Especially after September 11, Chinese authorities focused on its northwest, that had by now become its most politically sensitive region – Western media were also watching the “Islamic terrorism” in Xinjiang (Dwyer 2005, 3). For the last decades, Beijing has been propagating Chinese monoculturalism, trying to assimilate the major minorities of the northwest (especially the Uyghurs) to the dominant Chinese culture (ibid., 2).
Amnesty International has reported harsh measures taken by Chinese authorities to suppress unrest in the northwest, including executions and unfair trials (Jones-Leaning & Pratt 2012, 328). “The fight against terrorism is no excuse for repression,” says Amnesty. In its crackdown on terrorism, the government has introduced several policies, including those on language: they prioritize Chinese language before minority language. It also also closed several mosques and islamic schools because of “anti-Chinese activity” (ibid., 328). Ramadan has been officially discouraged, religious dress restricted, and media freedom constrained.
How ‘Chinese’ are China’s Muslims?
The burqa ban has stirred online discussions on what does and does not belong to the identity of China’s Muslims. “I fully support the ban on face-covering veils,” says one netizen: “Uyghurs can wear authentic Uyghur clothing, but the black veil definitely is not part of it – it belongs to terrorism.” Another netizen agrees: “The burqa is part of an evil cult, and has no place within the Uyghur community.”
Although there definitely are various traditional styles of clothing within the different Muslim communities of China, their clothing also follow the Quran’s instructions on moderate dress. Women in some parts of Xinjiang are expected to cover their heads and faces (ibid., 327). Chinese authorities have been trying to root out orthodox Islam wear within Muslim minorities by launching the ‘Beauty Project‘ (靓丽工程), discouraging men to grow beards and women to wear veils.
Propaganda murals painted next to a mosque in Kashgar, Xinjiang, showing what the Chinese government deems as acceptable (BBC 2015).
“They identify themselves through their religion,” says a Weibo user about Chinese Muslims: “They only identify themselves with Islam. But we identify them as Chinese.” Is this the key to the problem of China’s relations with its Muslims? Does the majority of China really see their Muslim minorities as ‘Chinese’? Do the Muslim minorities see themselves only as ‘Muslim’? The truth probably lies in the middle, and relates to problematic questions on what it means to be ‘Chinese’ or what identifies a ‘Muslim’ in China.
The fact is that Muslims are part of modern-day China. It is their motherland; the only home they have ever known. Yet they are still working to make a place for themselves. Historically, they are more ‘Chinese’ than America’s Muslims are ‘American’. Culturally, they are less ‘Chinese’ than the Muslims of France are ‘French’.
The wider problem remains; China’s relations to its Muslim minorities in the northwest has no sign of progress. Meanwhile, Islam-related terrorist attacks continue. Not enough integration? Too much suppression? China’s government, propagating monoculturalism, does not hold the key to the Islam problem. Nor do European leaders, who have advocated multiculturalism. Obama emphasises the importance of Muslim integration, but it needs two things in order to be successful: a free society that protects faith, and a faith that protects free society. Unfortunately, there is still a long road ahead.
– by Manya Koetse
Did you know…?
* The majority of China’s muslims are orthodox Sunni Muslim.
* The oldest mosque of China is the Great Mosque of Xi’an from 742, covering 130,000 square meters.
* Before 1884, present-day Xinjiang was divided in a northern part (Dzugaria) and southern part (Tarim Basim). It was designated as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 1955.
* Xinjiang borders on eight different countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Mongolia, Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan.
* Xinjiang literally means ‘new border’ in Chinese.
* Beijing has 40 mosques, whereas Kashgar currently has over 6000, which is only half of the number prior to the Cultural Revolution.
*China’s Hui Muslim minority has a long cultural tradition of female imams. There are hundreds of female imams leading mosques around the country.
References
Abe, Tetsuya. 2015. “Living with terror: China clamps down on Uighurs after Paris attacks.” Nikkei Asian Review, 15 January http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20150115-Living-with-terror/Politics-Economy/Living-with-terror-China-clamps-down-on-Uighurs-after-Paris-attacks [17.1.15].
BBC. 2015. “The Colorful Propaganda of Xijiang.” BBC News, January 15 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30722268 [17.1.15].
Boyle, Kevin and Juliet Sheen. 2003 (1997). Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report. London: Routledge.
Cartillier, Jerome. 2015. “Obama: Europe should better integrate Muslims.” Yahoo News, 16
January http://news.yahoo.com/us-britain-vow-help-france-paris-attacks-obama-
175747690.html [18.1.15].
Colchester, Max. 2015. “France Mulls Deep-Rooted Problems Behind Attacks.” Wall Street
Journal, 9 January http://www.wsj.com/articles/france-mulls-deep-rooted-problems-behind-attacks-
1420824161 [17.1.15].
Dwyer, Arienne M. 2005. “The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse.” Policy Studies: 15.
Economist. 2015. “Terror and Islam: After the Atrocities.” Economist, 17 January
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21639540-attacks-charlie-hebdo-and-kosher-supermarket-brought-french-together-unity [17.1.15].
Francis, David. 2015. “Obama Slaps Europe for Failing to Integrate Muslims.” Foreign
Policy, 16 January http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/16/obama-slaps-europe-for-failing-to-
integrate-muslims/ [18.1.15].
Jones-Leaning, Melanie and Douglas Pratt. 2012. “Islam in China, From Silk Road to Separatism.” Muslim World 102: 308-334.
Koetse, Manya. 2015. “Chinese reacties op de aanslag op Charlie Hebdo.” 360 Magazine, 15
January http://www.360magazine.nl/politiek/4274/chinese-reacties-op-de-aanslag-op-charlie-
hebdo#.VLvM-YrF_xg [18.1.15].
Lipman, Jonathan. 1997. Familiar Strangers, A History of Muslims in Northwest China. Washington: University of Washington Press.
Mi, Shoujiang and Jia You (translated by Min Chang). 2004. Islam in China. Beijing: China Intercontinental Press.
Pew 2011. “The Future of the Global Muslim Population.” Pew Research Center, January 27
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-population/ [18.1.15].
SCMP. 2015. “France mourns victims in Charlie Hebdo attack as police hunt gunmen.” South
China Morning Post, 9 January http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1677755/france-mourns-
police-hunt-charlie-hebdo-gunmen [18.1.15].
Tang, Didi. 2014. “China Bans Ramadan Fast In Schools.” The Huffington Post. June 2 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/02/china-bans-ramadan_n_5551063.html [11.2.15]
Images
http://d.ibtimes.co.uk/en/full/1392110/xinjiang.jpg
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30722268
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1567483/xinjiang-city-bans-muslim-clothing-and-large-beards-public-buses?page=all
©2014 Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.
Manya Koetse is a sinologist, writer, and public speaker specializing in China’s social trends, digital culture, and online media ecosystems. She founded What’s on Weibo in 2013 and now runs the Eye on Digital China newsletter. Learn more at manyakoetse.com or follow her on X, Instagram, or LinkedIn.
Chapter Dive
China’s CITIC Tower Crash: The Story That Never Trended
How information surrounding the CITIC Tower crash was managed, from a five-day media blackout to a sixth-day official narrative.
Published
3 weeks agoon
July 2, 2026
My premium newsletter covering the stories, memes, debates, and viral moments shaping online conversations in China. Subscribe here to receive future editions.
The story that never went trending was undoubtedly the biggest story of the week. On June 26, an incident at the Beijing landmark CITIC Tower (aka China Zun 中国尊) in the Chaoyang central business district sparked disbelief online. At 5:55 pm local time, a small plane, a Sunward SA60L Aurora, crashed into the tower, after which wreckage from the small aircraft fell to the street below (video).
For those who immediately responded to the incident on social media, it seemed unimaginable that this had happened in the capital. Beijing is one of the most heavily defended airspace zones in China. Since May of this year, recreational drones are also banned in Beijing, with outdoor flights requiring prior approval from authorities.

“A small plane hit CITIC Tower??? How could something like this happen? What happened to the air defense capabilities in our core restricted zone???“ one Weibo commenter wrote on Friday night.
After videos and images of the incident spread, online discussions were swiftly and thoroughly censored. That same day, while media outlets around the world began reporting on the crash, it did not appear among the top 50 trending topics on Chinese platforms—in fact, it wasn’t reported anywhere at all. As related keywords and hashtags were taken offline, it quickly became clear that this was the “6.26 Incident That Shall Not Be Mentioned.”
Even the next day, when Chaoyang authorities issued a brief official notice, republished by state media, the name of the tower was never mentioned, just that “a single-engine, two-seat light sport aircraft collided with a high-rise building during flight,” and that an investigation was underway. The one person on board, the pilot, died in the crash. Thirteen others were injured.

Later, flight tracking data revealed that the aircraft had taken off from Shifosi Airport, northeast of Beijing, and had come close to a Hainan Airlines passenger jet, forcing at least two commercial flights to abort their landings.
For the five days following the incident, little to no official information was available on the highly unusual incident. Meanwhile, Chinese authorities reportedly ordered a nationwide suspension of most general aviation activities, including recreational flying.
Why the CITIC Tower Incident Triggered an Information Blackout
But why has the censorship surrounding this incident been so intense, leading online censors to scrub all footage and discussion of it from the internet?
This has to do with the nature of the incident.
It is not uncommon for major incidents to be heavily censored, especially when the details surrounding them are still unfolding. But this kind of information “blackout” generally occurs only when incidents are considered particularly sensitive, and the regular toolkits used to manage and control information are no longer deemed sufficient.
Some examples include:
▪️The 2011 Wenzhou Train Crash, which happened at a time when the prestige and reliability of China’s high-speed rail system was celebrated as a flagship national project.
▪️The 2013 Tiananmen SUV ‘Suicide Attack’, which happened in a tightly guarded, already politically sensitive public space and the symbolic heart of the state.
▪️The 2022 Anti-Party Protest Banner at Sitong Bridge, which happened just before the opening of the 20th Party Congress that confirmed Xi Jinping’s unprecedented third term.
▪️The 2024 Beishan Park Stabbings of American Tourists, which happened just as China’s inbound tourism was beginning to recover in the post-COVID era and “China is safe” narratives were playing an increasingly important role in official messaging.
All of these incidents are different in nature, but what they have in common is not just that they are examples of bad news being suppressed, but that they reflect a specific pattern in which news that is bad for the Party-state is suppressed. In their own ways, these incidents—and the discussions and speculation surrounding them—challenge one or more foundational narratives about the competence of China’s leadership, its modernization, its security, its stability, and its capacity to maintain social order.
📌 The 6.26 CITIC Tower incident is particularly sensitive because it touches on several of these core narratives. It immediately opened the door to a flood of politically sensitive questions: How could this happen in the capital? Were the authorities really in control? Were the security systems adequate? Was it a deliberate attack? This all directly contradicts the logic of “Safe China” (平安中国), a grand strategy for governance in the Xi era that seeks to project an image of a closely monitored society in which risks are anticipated and prevented through the integration of efficient public security, surveillance, and Party leadership (see Trevaskes & Lin 2024)1. A small aircraft striking Beijing’s tallest building—located in one of the country’s most tightly controlled airspaces—challenges precisely this claimed capacity to maintain order, guarantee security, and keep China safe.
📌 Another reason why incidents like the 6.26 one are censored so heavily is that they have the potential to snowball or even trigger copycat behavior. What begins as an isolated accident can quickly evolve into broader discussions about political dissatisfaction, which might spiral into social unrest – and protecting domestic stability is central to the Party-state’s legitimacy and maintenance of power.
📌 A third factor is the symbolic significance of the location. Unlike an ordinary office building, the CITIC Tower is a symbol of Beijing’s cosmopolitan skyline and of China’s economic rise and state-led modernization. Situated in the heart of the capital’s central business district, next to CCTV headquarters and visible across much of the city, it is one of Beijing’s most recognizable landmarks. An incident involving such a building inevitably carries far greater symbolic weight than one occurring in a less prominent location.
⮕ Taken together, these factors make the 6.26 incident unusually sensitive in political, social, and symbolic terms. It is not just a random aviation accident; it touches upon national security, state competence, political control, social stability, and the protection of one of the country’s most symbolic urban spaces. Rather than threatening a single Party narrative, as some of the other aforementioned incidents did, it threatens several at once. This helps explain why it was treated not as an ordinary censored event, but as one requiring an almost complete information blackout.
A Familiar Censorship Playbook
Although these top-censored news incidents are all unique, they follow a similar whack-a-mole-style playbook in suppressing discussion of these events, even though they had only just happened.2
The main playbook is always more or less the same: Sensitive incident occurs → News disappears from front pages and trending search lists → Popular videos and images are taken offline → Incident-specific keywords and hashtags are scrubbed → Censorship expands to generic category-level terms (such as “Beijing,” “Chaoyang District,” or “small plane”) that could lead users back to the incident) → State media remain silent while shifting attention to other news.
(This week, the distraction might have been an otherwise arguably uninteresting controversy involving Chinese singer Han Hong.)3
Offline, the same pattern often plays out through physical scene control: bystanders are asked to delete their footage, journalists are kept away from the scene, or even entire street signs are removed (as happened after the protests on Wulumiqi Road and following the Sitong Bridge protest).
Meanwhile, selected commentary from permitted voices is sometimes allowed to appear online—for example, from former Global Times editor Hu Xijin—although even those posts are not immune from later deletion, as happened following the Beishan Park stabbings. This is often the first step in shaping the official narrative.
A brief authoritative news report may then be released, often ending with a statement that “the incident is under investigation,” which also buys time. Sometimes, however, no meaningful official explanation ever follows. After the 2022 China Eastern MU5735 crash, for example, authorities never released a full public investigation report, even though reports emerging in 2026 claimed the crash, which killed all 132 people on board, was deliberate.
Nevertheless, an official narrative and investigation outcome do usually follow. The 2013 Tiananmen attack, for example, was officially labeled a premeditated terrorist attack orchestrated by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), with Chinese authorities presenting it as evidence that Xinjiang-linked militancy had become part of a broader international terrorist threat. In doing so, the incident was reframed from a local security failure into part of a global fight against terrorism.
Finally, arrests often follow, and people are held accountable. At the same time, those accused of “spreading rumors” online may also face consequences, while foreign media are often criticized for biased reporting or double standards. These counterattacks further reinforce the official narrative while simultaneously shifting attention away from the original incident.
How AI Chatbots Are Part of the Censorship Ecosystem
For the 6.26 incident, the main narrative for the first five days after it happened was that nothing really happened. Even Hu Xijin posted nothing about the incident.
On Weibo, the hashtag “The Story Behind the CITIC Tower Crash Incident” (#中信集团大厦被撞事件始末#) was taken offline, along with many others.
Five days after the crash, Weibo’s Qwen-3 chatbot (powered by Alibaba) claimed it knew nothing about any incident involving CITIC Tower.
The Weibo chatbot responds to a question about the CITIC Tower incident, saying it knows nothing (July 1st).
Six days after the incident, on July 2nd, DeepSeek’s chatbot went a step further. Rather than simply claiming no information was available, it described reports about the crash as fake news, stating that there were no official records or media coverage and that such rumors originated on “overseas social media platforms.” Kimi refused to answer questions about the incident altogether, while Baidu’s ERNIE Bot said it had no information about the incident and warned users not to believe or spread unverified rumors.
The 6.26 CITIC Tower incident illustrates a broader development in China’s online information ecosystem. A great deal has changed since the 2011 Wenzhou train crash. Social media control has become far more sophisticated—not only through better automated filtering, but also through platform regulation, agenda-setting, distraction strategies, and increasingly coordinated narrative management.
Now, AI chatbots have become part of that ecosystem.
Integrated AI assistants (LLM-powered chatbots embedded in platforms such as Weibo, Douyin, and other Chinese apps since 2025) are not merely additional tools subject to censorship. They have become an integral part of the online information environment and increasingly play a role in the handling of sensitive incidents.
Unlike Grok on X, these AI assistants are deeply integrated into the user experience and actively encourage people to ask questions, search for information, and receive summaries of ongoing events and controversies. What makes them particularly powerful from the perspective of propaganda and information control is that they can centralize official narratives at the platform level. Previously, that role was distributed across state media, government accounts, and other official actors.
Because these chatbots do not present themselves as state media or government authorities, they can appear more neutral and objective. Users may perceive them simply as AI-generated summaries with less media bias and greater factual accuracy.4 In the case of the 6.26 incident, they effectively conveyed a state-ordered message to social media users: that really, nothing happened, and that if something happened, it must be fake news.
“A Public Security Incident Caused by Personal Factors”
On July 2nd, Beijing Chaoyang’s verified official account issued a second short statement via its WeChat channel. This time, providing more details about what had happened on June 26.
According to the statement, the pilot was 66-year-old Mr. Liu (刘), a Beijing resident who was self-employed and lived alone. He obtained a sport pilot license in 2021 and a private pilot license in 2024.
Authorities said Liu deliberately deviated from his flight route, subsequently lost contact with the airport, and then intentionally crashed into the building, killing himself. They added that he had suffered from depression in recent years and that his diary contained multiple references to wanting to “end his life.” The incident was officially described as “a public security incident caused by personal factors” (个人原因造成的危害公共安全案件).
It is noteworthy that such a short statement includes details about the pilot’s age, marital status, pilot licenses, mental health, and even diary entries, yet provides virtually no information about the building itself, the security response, or the broader circumstances of the incident. The statement never mentions the CITIC Tower by name, referring only to “a high-rise building near the East Third Ring Road.” It likewise omits any mention of the aircraft entering restricted airspace, the reported disruption to commercial air traffic, or the obvious questions the incident raises about security failures.
On Weibo, the statement was widely shared, but comment sections beneath those posts remained either hidden or only contained a selection of replies.
And so, six days after the incident, there is a slight opening in the media blackout—just enough to establish the official narrative. This framing reduces a wide range of sensitive questions to the story of one troubled individual. It is not about broader questions of public safety or governance, but about a lonely man’s suicide; it is not about the Party-state, but about personal circumstances; it minimizes a news event that received maximum attention and turns a possible mass attack into an isolated incident. And so the message subtly shifts from “nothing happened” to “it’s time to move on.” The playbook is complete. It’s almost as if nothing really happened.
By Manya Koetse
With contributions by Miranda Barnes
- See: Susan Trevaskes and Delia Lin, “Integrating Stability Maintenance into Comprehensive Governance: The Burgeoning ‘Safe China’ Behemoth,” Modern China 50, no. 6 (2024): 671–701. https://doi.org/10.1177/00977004241254709.
- Some might say the 2015 Tianjin explosions also belong here, but that disaster was so large and witnessed by so many people that, while the official narrative was tightly controlled, it did not receive the same near-total information blackout.
- This controversy involved Han Hong (韩红), a popular Chinese singer and philanthropist, who recently urged Beijing audiences in the local dialect to show up at the box office for the underperforming latest Feng Xiaogang film Catch the Spy (《抓特务》), for which she is the music producer. She used the colloquial expression zǒu ge miànr (走个面儿, roughly “show your face”), and was accused of inappropriately putting moral pressure on people to buy tickets, which also led to criticism of her charity work. She made the remarks at a June 17 premiere, and it didn’t become a dominant story until eleven days later.
- See also: Yan Li, “The Impact of Automated Journalism on Media Bias, Accuracy, and Public Trust: Evidence from Young Chinese News Consumers,” Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 13 (2026): 688. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-06612-6.
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China Brands, Marketing & Consumers
Quack Like a Goose: Why Beijing Street Vendor “Auntie Goose Legs” Sparked a Nationwide Debate
After the first complaints surfaced, Auntie Goose Legs admitted the truth about her business: she ha been selling duck legs all along.
Published
1 month agoon
June 20, 2026
My premium newsletter covering the stories, memes, debates, and viral moments shaping online conversations in China. Subscribe here to receive future editions.
If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it might still be a goose – or the other way around. That, at least, is the takeaway from two stories that recently went viral on Chinese social media.
The woman at the center of it all is Beijing street-food vendor Chen Xiufeng (陈秀凤), better known as “Auntie Goose Legs” (鹅腿阿姨). Over the years, she became something of a local celebrity in Beijing’s university district. Originally from Jiangsu, the migrant vendor had been selling her famous roasted goose legs to students since 2011.
She skyrocketed to national fame in 2023 , but became the target of widespread criticism last week after it was revealed that her celebrated goose legs – sold for 16 yuan ($2.20) per piece – were actually duck meat all along.
The controversy came up after the vendor ventured beyond the university area into Beijing’s business district. At the universities, she enjoyed a loyal customer base and dedicated WeChat groups. In her new market, however, customers proved more skeptical. Some noticed that the meat looked suspiciously duck-like; others complained that the color seemed off.

In the university district, Auntie Goose Legs she enjoyed a loyal customer base and dedicated WeChat groups.
After the first complaints surfaced, Auntie Goose Legs admitted the truth on WeChat on June 9.
“The ingredients I originally used were goose legs,” she wrote, “but they have been out of stock for more than fifteen years. The current ingredient is duck legs.”
It turned out that she had only sold goose legs, the product that made her famous, for two months back in 2011 before switching to the much cheaper duck. “Did geese become extinct without us knowing?” some netizens joked.
The revelation quickly exploded online. The hashtag “What Auntie Goose Legs is Selling Turns Out to be Duck Legs” (#鹅腿阿姨卖的是鸭腿#) became the top trending on Weibo for an entire day, with millions of people discussing the topic.
Why did millions of people become so outraged over a single Beijing street vendor selling duck instead of goose?
Piggybacking on the debate, Anhui-based commentators pointed out that a beloved regional specialty has the exact opposite ‘problem.’ Wuwei smoked duck (无为板鸭) is branded as duck, but is usually goose. According to local standards, however, goose products may be sold under this name, prompting discussions about “hanging up a goat’s head, while selling dog meat“ (挂羊头卖狗肉): advertising one thing while selling another.
Because geese are more expensive than ducks in China, and generally considered tastier, the Anhui duck-is-goose story, unlike the Auntie Goose Legs controversy, did not provoke online anger. Instead, many people saw it as an example of sellers prioritizing flavor over cost. Auntie Goose Legs is seen as doing the exact opposite.
But why did millions of people actually become so outraged over a single Beijing street vendor selling duck instead of goose, especially when there were no indications that anyone became ill? The answer has little to do with poultry and everything to do with trust.

Auntie Goose Legs during the prime time in Beijing’s University District in late 2023 (image via Lianhe Zaobao 联合早报).
Food fraud and mislabeling have been longstanding concerns in China. Earlier surveys found that food safety worries even outweighed concerns about public security and environmental issues, and while China’s food safety record has improved in recent years, public trust remains fragile.
Part of these concerns are immediate and practical. Major scandals in the past involving melamine-tainted infant formula or recycled “gutter oil” have posed serious risks to public health. But the issue goes beyond health risks alone.
If a goose can be a duck, then what exactly is the duck?
Whereas food safety concerns in many Western countries often focus on contamination, Chinese consumers are frequently just as concerned with economic deception. It is unfair to pay for a more expensive goose and receive a duck. Even if no one gets sick, Chinese consumer law still treats it as fraud.
More important, however, is what such deception does to confidence in the broader food system. If a goose can be a duck, then what exactly is the duck?
As a major 2023 college canteen scandal demonstrated, the build-up of deceit can reach a breaking point among the public. During that somewhat Kafkaesque “rat head or duck neck” (鼠头or鸭脖”事件) controversy, officials insisted a rat head found in a student’s rice was merely a “duck neck,” even though everyone could clearly see the snout and teeth of a rodent.
This kind of gaslighting shatters social trust and reinforces a generalized sense that, as a consumer, you are entirely on your own. When regulators fail to step in honestly, even a seemingly isolated incident comes to symbolize more dangerous forms of systemic food fraud.
And this is where the Auntie Goose Legs story stings the most.
People did not come to her simply because her food was good. Over the years, she had become part of local student life, and she felt safe and authentic. Her pink scooter helmet, which she continued to wear while working, became an iconic symbol of her no-nonsense and humble image. Her success was built on word of mouth and, above all, on the trust her customers placed in her.
That this particular “auntie” deceived her customers by selling a different product than the one she advertised is no longer really about her. If duck is goose, goose is duck, and your local auntie has deceived you for years, then who can you trust anymore?
- Read more about how Auntie Goose Legs rose to fame in 2023 here.
By Manya Koetse
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goldie wan kenobi
February 15, 2015 at 5:48 am
Talking with Xinjiang person I learned that she did not consider herself Chinese she said ” I am Chinese when around ethnic Chinese people, and I am myself when they are gone. We don’t feel Chinese and barely look it.” Muslim is not an ethnicity the writer continually referred to these people of Xinjiang as an ethnic group called Muslims. Thats incorrect.
Manya Koetse
February 15, 2015 at 10:30 am
Dear Goldie,
Thanks for this comment, it is interesting and it shows that your Xinjiang acquaintance, although probably nationally Chinese, does not feel ‘Chinese’. About Muslims as an ethnicity, you are right. But the article also does not state that being ‘Muslim’ is an ethnicity. It says that there officially is no such a thing as a ‘Chinese Muslim’, because, within the PRC, Muslims are not defined as a specific category. Chinese citizens are divided into 56 different ‘minzu’ or ethnic groups; a categorization that is separated from religion. Nevertheless, within these minzu, there are ten that take Islam as their faith. This article is about Islam in China, and not specifically about Uyghurs or Hui etc, it therefore speaks about ‘Muslims’, meaning those ethnic minorities within the PRC that take Islam as their faith. The issue of Muslims in China is complex and cannot be oversimplified. Nowhere does the article state that all people in Xinjiang are Muslims, nor that they all belong to the same ethnicity. Regards, Manya
Alec
February 16, 2015 at 1:49 am
In the last paragraph you wrote ‘China’s relations to its Muslim minorities in the northeast has no sign of progress’, did you mean ‘northwest’? 🙂
Manya Koetse
February 17, 2015 at 4:04 pm
You’re right, thanks Alec, adjusted.