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China Is Not Censoring Its Social Media to Please the West

Manya Koetse

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Dear Reader,



Recently, news broke that two Chinese nationals were captured by Ukrainian forces while fighting on the Russian side in eastern Ukraine. Their capture quickly made international headlines, not just because of their nationality but also because of how they allegedly got there.

As I worked on an article about this case, I kept running into something noteworthy: the recurring assumption that if something is visible on Chinese social media, it must have the government’s tacit approval.

Here, I’ll briefly get into more about the story and why that assumption misses the mark.  

🔹 Russian Army Ads on Chinese Social Media  

Earlier this month, Ukrainian President Zelensky announced that two Chinese nationals fighting for Russia on Ukrainian soil were captured by Ukrainian troops. On Monday, April 14, the two Chinese men – handcuffed and guarded – spoke during a press conference in Kyiv. They were identified as the 33-year old Wang Guangjun (王广军) from Henan and the 26-year old Zhang Renbo (张仁波) from Jiangxi.

Zhang and Wang during the press conference, image via Weibo user 边沁-Bentham.

Zelensky has claimed that at least “several hundred” more Chinese citizens are fighting on Russia’s side in Ukraine. On April 9, he stated that Ukraine had obtained the surnames and passport details of 155 Chinese mercenaries recruited by Russia through social media platforms.

The Kyiv Independent reported that both Wang and Zhang stated that they were not sent to the war by the Chinese government, and joined of their own free will.

While Wang claims he joined the Russian army after seeing an advertisement on Chinese social media, Zhang said he came to Russia in December for construction work and was recruited for military service there. Both men joined for monetary gain. Wang said he was promised to make $2,000-$3,000 per month, but that his phone and bank card were later taken from him.

The news that Chinese nationals were captured while fighting on the Russian side made international headlines — particularly the claim that Russia is recruiting Chinese mercenaries through social media, which has become a focal point in various media reports, such as this one by The Guardian, this article by ABC News, and this video report by RFE.

Some reports, including the latter, suggest a link between online recruitment ads circulating on Chinese social media, Beijing’s stance toward Russia, and the fact that these ads have not been censored. Zelensky himself stated that Russia has been recruiting Chinese citizens via social media, and that “official Beijing knows about this.”

RFE writes:

📰✍️ “Zelenskyy himself has stopped short of saying the Chinese government authorized the mercenaries’ involvement in Ukraine, but he has accused Beijing of turning a blind eye to Russia’s recruitment of its citizens.

And there’s some indication Chinese authorities haven’t made a concerted effort to stop them. The Chinese Internet is heavily censored, and social media is closely monitored and controlled, yet many of these recruitment posts — some of which are months old — are still online and being shared.”  

🔹 Kafkaesque Territory  

Over recent years, I have noticed a recurring assumption in English-language media coverage when it comes to interpreting China’s stance on certain issues — from international conflicts to social issues: if something is not censored, it is assumed to be officially condoned.

A 2023 report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), for example, argued that China needs to take more robust measures to combat anti-Black racism on social media platforms. The report suggested that Chinese authorities systematically fail to properly address this issue, and that platforms like Bilibili, Kuaishou, Weibo, and Xiaohongshu should intensify efforts to remove problematic content that perpetuates racial stereotypes, belittles interracial relationships, impersonates Black people, etc.

One radio editor who later called me to talk about this report also suggested that surely, if it was not being censored, the authorities must approve of it?

Similar discussions came up when there was a significant rise in anti-Jewish sentiments and anti-Semitic posts on Chinese social media after the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War.

An opinion piece in the Washington Post by Josh Rogin titled “Fueling online antisemitism is China’s new tool against the West” argued that, because antisemitism was ubiquitous on Chinese social media, it thus must be promoted by Chinese authorities — suggesting that this is how it works “on China’s internet, where no opinion is allowed to flourish without government approval.”

Rogin wrote:

📰✍️ “This unprecedented surge in antisemitism online in China could be possible only with the blessing of the Chinese government, which appears to be using anti-Jewish hate as a tool of its anti-U.S. and anti-Western diplomacy.

Of course, not all criticism of Israel is antisemitic, and antisemitism existed in China before Oct. 7. But via its internet censorship regime and state-controlled media, Chinese authorities have been fueling the flames of anti-Jewish hate online.

The piece also quoted Aaron Keyak, the US Deputy Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism, in saying:

📰✍️ “What we saw after October 7 was a drastic change in the social media within China. The antisemitism became more unplugged, more free-flowing,” (…) “And because we know that the Chinese internet is not free, that’s a conscious decision by the Chinese government to allow that kind of rhetoric to be greatly increased.

The pervasiveness of both anti-Black racism and anti-Semitic content on Chinese social media raises significant concerns. Belonging to a different category of concern, it’s understandable that certain Russian army recruitment ads circulating on various Chinese platforms trigger some alarm bells.

However, this line of arguing that lumps together the censoring policies of various Chinese social media platforms and Beijing’s official stance is not only flawed — it is also heading into somewhat Kafkaesque territory, where Western media outlets, generally rooted in free speech ideals, end up criticizing China not for censoring too much, but for not censoring enough.

🔹 Getting China’s Censorship Dynamics Wrong

There are several misunderstandings in the line of thinking that if something circulates on Chinese social media, it must ipso facto be tolerated by the authorities.  

🔍 1. Mistaking China’s Censorship Model for the Western One  

First, it conflates how censorship operates on Chinese platforms with how moderation works on Western platforms.

Those who are not used to surfing around Weibo, Douyin, Kuaishou, and others might be surprised to find just how much questionable content remains uncensored on Chinese social media. From graphic violence to deadly accidents, bloody war videos, raunchy images, doxxing, discrimination, or dangerous stunts — scrolling these apps can sometimes seriously be bad for your blood pressure.

At the same time, doomscrolling Chinese social media also makes you realize how tightly platforms like Facebook, TikTok, YouTube, or Instagram are moderated (TikTok’s parent company is Chinese, but its community guidelines are tuned to align with EU/US standards). Even the slightest hint at shocking or sexual content or violence could get you flagged on Western social media.

(For example, one video I made years ago about a Chinese woman intentionally tripping a 4-year-old in a restaurant got flagged by YouTube for “graphic violence,” another post I made about a deadly flash flood in the mountains of Pengzhou was removed by TikTok for “promoting dangerous activities”).

The emergence of online videos showing military violence, assaults against women, bullying among schoolchildren, or irresponsible pet ownership does not suggest that Beijing tacitly endorses violence, misogyny, campus aggression, or animal cruelty. Rather, it reflects the realities of a vast and multifaceted online ecosystem where millions of videos, images, and posts get uploaded every single day, and where, with over a billion users, not every corner of social media is going to be wholesome or tightly controlled.

It also means that some issues, even though they could be considered sensitive, are not prioritized by social media moderating systems (whether automated or human) or by Chinese regulators.  

🔄 2. China’s Censorship is Selective and Shifts Over Time  

Censorship in China is not static. It constantly changes in response to evolving and changing social, economic, and (geo)political contexts.

There are many laws & regulations regarding online content, involving the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and other regulatory bodies, which set rules for internet content — from Weibo posts to online advertisements, from livestreaming to online series and web novels. Social media platforms moderate their own content in various ways, adhering to state regulators and self-censoring through AI algorithms and human reviewers.

Outside the regulatory framework, there is a lot of grey area. For state regulators, social media censorship is just one way to protect national security, Party power, economic stability, and cultural cohesion. For Chinese platform businesses, it is a necessary evil — they must navigate complicated dynamics between keeping social media flourishing while keeping (cyberspace) authorities content. If they don’t, they risk punishment, which affects business. They are busy enough moderating priority content and generally won’t touch content that poses no immediate threat to their operations, even if it could be considered sensitive.

This doesn’t mean censorship cannot fluctuate with the times — on the contrary, it changes all the time. Something that once seemed unharmful might later be perceived as disruptive and still get censored.

In some ways, there is overlap with how companies like Meta (Facebook, Instagram) moderate their content; they also use a combination of AI tools and human moderators to identify and remove content. However, the regulatory frameworks from which they operate are closely tied to their respective legal, historical, and social contexts, resulting in very different censorship practices.

One thing that is prevalent in the guidelines of companies like Meta or Google is the need to keep content far away from explicit material or violent and shocking content, in order to remain “advertiser-friendly” within their socio-cultural and legal contexts. This is very different from the Chinese online environment, where one of the main priorities for social media companies is to avoid politically controversial or subversive content to keep things as “Party-friendly” as possible.  

🌏 3. Imposing Western Ethical Standards on China  

An (overlapping) misunderstanding behind the suggestion that any sensitive or questionable content that emerges on Chinese social media must be tolerated by the authorities is that Western media outlets are projecting Western ethical standards onto China’s internet governance.

Assuming that all sensitive content must be immediately censored or flagged — because that’s what would happen under Western frameworks — ignores China’s different historical, political, and social contexts.

China’s censorship is not intended to please the West; it serves domestic political, cultural, economic and social goals under the Party’s leadership. Besides the censorship, there’s a major propaganda apparatus that goes beyond deleting posts and focuses on guiding public opinion and controlling the official narrative.

Criticizing China for censoring too little on issues that are of concern in the West misses the point. China’s censorship serves Chinese interests, not the moral priorities of the international community.

Furthermore, telling the country known for having the world’s most sophisticated censorship apparatus that it is “not censoring the right things” is not only somewhat Orwellian – it also reinforces existing frustrations in China that the West often acts as a morally superior enforcer on the global stage, pointing fingers at China despite ongoing instances of violence, racism, and injustice within their own societies.  

🔹 Two Soldiers, One “Hype”?  

Back to the article I’ve been working on and the case of Chinese mercenaries Wang, Zhang, and the Russian recruitment ads circulating on Chinese social media. These army recruitment ads definitely circulated (example, example), although not ubiquitously — they mostly appeared within specific circles on platforms like Douyin or Zhihu, and mainly if you were looking for them. Often, they seemed to be shared more for their novelty or news value rather than for direct recruitment purposes. (Similarly, some Ukrainian recruitment ads were also shared online.)

Before Zelensky’s big reveal, there had already been speculation about whether Chinese nationals might be serving in Russian military units. In March 2025, some influential X accounts claimed that footage from Donetsk showed Chinese individuals wearing Russian military uniforms. At the time, as you can read here, this suggestion caused some banter and disbelief on Chinese social media. Some users suggested that the men seen in the footage could be cosplayers or Chinese vloggers who had traveled to Russia to play-act as soldiers — since military cosplay and related tourism are popular in certain online niches — the same niches where those Russian recruitment ads were being shared.

Stills from the video that made its rounds online in early March 2025.

Recent reports and various online accounts, however, indicate that Chinese nationals fighting in the Russian army is more than just cosplay — it is a reality, although it remains unclear how many people are actually involved. At the same time, the “cosplay” and “military enthusiast” (军迷COS) theory is not far-fetched and seems to hold water in some cases. In fact, these two realities may very well coexist.

In response to Zelensky’s statements about Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine and Beijing’s alleged role, one sentiment raised online is that the issue is being purposely “hyped” by foreign media and by Zelensky himself.

This idea was echoed in some popular internet posts. In one post that circulated on social media (Zhihu, Weibo), author Liu Renzhi (刘任之) on the WeChat account of Russian Big World (俄语大世界) wrote: “Why does Zelensky continue to hype up the incident of Chinese nationals captured by the Ukrainian army? There are three reasons” (“泽连斯基为何要持续炒作中国公民在乌军被俘事件?有三方面原因”).

In this piece, Liu suggests that Zelensky intentionally amplified the story about Chinese nationals in the Russian army — among other things, by posting at least two videos about them on social media (link, link) — even though, as Liu notes, “it is nothing new that foreign nationals fight on both sides, and China’s position has been clearly stated.”

China’s Foreign Ministry has previously responded to questions about Chinese nationals in the Russian army, stating that:

🇨🇳📢 “We’ve issued multiple security alerts to ask Chinese nationals to stay away from areas of armed conflict, avoid any form of involvement in armed conflict, and in particular avoid participation in any party’s military operations.”

China’s position on the issue of the Ukraine crisis is consistent and clear. We have all along been committed to promoting talks for peace and ending the conflict. We urge relevant parties to have a correct and clear understanding of China’s objective and just position and refrain from political manipulation and hype.”

According to the blogger Liu, Zelensky supposedly “hyped” the situation for these reasons:

➡️ To attract global attention & rally support for Ukraine’s cause at a time when international attention to Ukraine has waned due to Trump and his own efforts to push for a Russia–Ukraine reconciliation. By playing up the “Chinese nationals in the war” narrative, Zelensky is catering to Western media interest and refocusing global attention on Ukraine.

➡️ To specifically seek Western support. Liu writes that Zelensky purposely promotes the news of the Chinese soldiers to hint at Chinese involvement in times of US trade war with China and efforts to ally with Russia against China, as a way to signal that Ukraine is also on the side of the ‘West’ in helping the US in its confrontation with China.

➡️ To put pressure on China. Liu suggests that Kyiv believes China has not remained fully neutral in the war. By exposing Chinese captives, Zelensky therefore aims to apply international pressure on China, pushing it to distance itself from Russia.

It would be interesting to know more about the Chinese online responses to this theory, but Liu’s article has been taken offline from all the sites where it initially appeared.

There is plenty more to say about pro-Russian sentiments on Chinese social media, and about the stories behind the Chinese mercenaries in Russia. But the problem with the latter now is that since this issue became an international political talking point and drew attention on Chinese social media, research has become significantly harder: Chinese platforms collectively started taking down related content shortly after the Wang and Zhang news broke.

Not only has Liu’s post been removed, but so have most posts about the two soldiers — along with the accounts of some young Chinese men who were seemingly vlogging from the Russo-Ukrainian battlefield, such as the Douyin account Li Jianwei (李建伟, nicknamed @狼血龙魂).

Some reporters I spoke with also shared their struggles, pointing at Douyin, Weibo, and Zhihu becoming more active in taking down content related to Chinese nationals fighting on the Russian side.

In other words: when nobody was paying attention, the content was there — hidden in the margins, not a priority for censors. But now that everyone is noticing, it’s getting wiped.

Does that mean Beijing changed its stance? No – it simply became a more sensitive topic, and now falls under stricter censorship.

“It’s making it a lot harder to research the topic like this,” one European journalist complained to me.

The very fact that so much content is now being censored just because Western media are paying attention is yet another reminder that China is definitely not censoring to please the West — and certainly not to accommodate Western media.

Best,

Manya

(@manyapan, or follow on Bluesky here)

PS If you’re interested to know more about what motivates those Chinese joining the Russian army, see Chai Jing’s interview with a Chinese mercenary, translation via China Digital Times Part 1 and Part 2.


What’s Trending

Trending stories that made an online impact


⚖️🚔 Anti-Corruption Official Arrested for Corruption

Earlier this week, the name “Li Gang” went top trending on Chinese social media platforms Weibo, Douyin, and Kuaishou, following the news that the Chinese senior official Li Gang was arrested (#李刚被逮捕#) and suspected of accepting bribes.

Li Gang is the former head of the Discipline Inspection and Supervision Office (纪检监察组) at the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). The CCDI (中央纪委) is China’s top internal Party watchdog, while the NSC (国家监委) is the anti-corruption agency at the state level. Together, they form the most powerful Party-state anti-corruption force in the country.

The 59-year-old Li Gang is (or rather: was) an experienced Party member and senior investigator who led the team at the Central Organization Department.

Of course, there is great irony in the fact that the very person whose job it was to act as an internal watchdog overseeing and investigating corruption among officials is now accused of accepting bribes himself. Li reportedly associated with political fraudsters and resisted organizational investigations. He accepted banquets that compromised the impartial execution of his duties, illegally took money and goods, and abused his position for personal gain and to benefit others in various ways.

For many Chinese, the name Li Gang—especially in connection with power abuse—brings to mind another official associated with the famous online meme “My Dad is Li Gang” (“我爸是李刚”).

In October 2010, 22-year-old Li Qiming (李启铭), while driving under the influence, hit two female college students at Hebei University, killing one and seriously injuring the other. After fleeing the scene, he was arrested and infamously said: “Sue me if you dare! My dad is Li Gang!” His father, also named Li Gang, was the deputy director of the local public security bureau in Baoding.

Despite efforts by authorities to suppress the story at the time, “My Dad is Li Gang” quickly went viral, becoming a nationwide meme. The phrase inspired widespread online creativity, including a contest encouraging netizens to incorporate the quote into classical Chinese poetry—drawing thousands of humorous and satirical entries.

The humor extended offline as well. Road safety signs in Guangxi read: “Dear friends, drive slowly. Your father is not Li Gang” (“朋友,开慢点, 你爸不是李刚”). Car stickers appeared with slogans like: “Don’t touch me, my dad is Li Gang” (“别碰我,我爸是李刚”). Li Qiming was eventually sentenced to six years in prison for the accident, but the phrase “My Dad is Li Gang” lived on as a meme to expose and mock abuses of power.

The current Li Gang incident brings everything together for many people, though it has also led to some confusion: “Which Li Gang is this? Is this the Li Gang from ‘My Dad is Li Gang’?” (The current Li Gang is actually much higher in position than the one from 2010.) “Again, another Li Gang,” some say: “Another corrupt official.”

Although the name Li Gang itself may not be so special—many people have an uncle or neighbor with the same name—the current trending Li Gang news story now inevitably links the name with power abuse, entitlement, and corruption, but also with the idea that eventually, those who do wrong will be punished.

As of On April 7, 2025, Li has been expelled from the Communist Party and dismissed from public office. His case has now been transferred to the procuratorate for review and prosecution.

..what else to know?

🔥🧋 Chinese tea brand Gu Ming (古茗, also known as ‘Good Me’), went absolutely viral due to its collaboration with the Chinese anime-style game Honkai: Star Rail (崩坏:星穹铁道), featuring a range of collectible tea cups, bags, and other accessories. Since 2023, the power of Chinese creative brand collaborations has become crystal clear: younger Chinese consumers especially love it when tea or coffee chains team up with unexpected partners — like Luckin and Maotai, LeLeCha and Lu Xun, or HeyTea and the Jingdezhen Ceramics Museum. In the latest successful collabs, you’re seeing even more ACG (Animation, Comics, and Games) culture blending with China’s homegrown coffee and tea brands, like the HeyTea × Hello Kitty crossover, which became a major hit in late 2024. Read more here.

🚽🏃‍♂️ Another noteworthy trending topic is the aftermath of the Suzhou Marathon, which took place in early March with over 25,000 participants. At the time, images and videos went viral showing some runners taking a quick break to urinate against the main sign of Jiangsu Suzhou Experimental Middle School. Now, the Chinese Athletics Association (中国田径协会, CAA) has issued a statement saying that ten participants who urinated against the school sign have been banned from participating in any marathon affiliated with the CAA for the next three years. Additionally, the city of Suzhou will not be eligible to apply for marathon event certification in 2026. Although most online commenters agree that the runners should be punished for their behavior, some argue that it seems “unfair” for the Suzhou Marathon itself to lose eligibility to organize the 2026 event. Read more here.


Weibo Word of the Week

The catchphrase to know


As the tariff turmoil between the US and China continues, President Trump has earned himself a new nickname on Chinese social media. Over the years, Chinese netizens have come up with many different nicknames for the American President, whose Chinese name is usually transliterated as 川普 Chuānpǔ for phonetic reasons (read more here: Why Trump Has Two Different Names in Chinese).

Now, Chinese netizens, including some creators of meme-style ‘nation personification’ videos (鬼畜动画) on Douyin and Bilibili, have started referring to Trump as “税美人” (shuìměirén), which literally means “Tariff Beauty.”

The nickname is a clever pun, since it sounds exactly the same as the Chinese name for the Sleeping Beauty fairytale: 睡美人 (shuìměirén). What makes the nickname extra catchy is the wordplay: “税” (shuì) means “tax” or “tariff,” and “美” is also an abbreviation for America (from Měiguó, 美国). So, “税美人” not only brings to mind a fairytale princess, but also evokes the idea of “the American who taxes,” perfectly capturing Trump’s dramatic tariff policies in a playful way.

Image of the Tariff Beauty via Xiaohongshu

There’s perhaps also another layer to Trump’s new nickname — it also suggests that he is asleep, and, meanwhile, is actually hurting the US and strengthening China. One netizen suggested that when it momentarily seemed Trump was backing down by exempting electronic goods from the tariff, a handsome prince had given him a kiss that made him wake up. But with Trump later declaring that there was no “exception” at all, it seems that the confusion — as well as tariff tensions — are only growing. For now, there’s no happy ending in sight.

To read more about this meme and Trump’s popular nicknames, check out our article here.


This is an on-site version of the Weibo Watch newsletter by What’s on Weibo. Missed the last newsletter? Find it here. If you are already subscribed to What’s on Weibo but are not yet receiving this newsletter in your inbox, please contact us directly to let us know. No longer wish to receive these newsletters? You can unsubscribe at any time while remaining a premium member.

Manya Koetse is a sinologist, writer, and public speaker specializing in China’s social trends, digital culture, and online media ecosystems. She founded What’s on Weibo in 2013 and now runs the Eye on Digital China newsletter. Learn more at manyakoetse.com or follow her on X, Instagram, or LinkedIn.

Chapter Dive

Chinese Postdoc Death Raises Questions as Key Details Remain Missing

About a widely discussed “chilling effect”, the death of Chinese researcher Wang Danhao, and unanswered questions. (April 3 update included)

Manya Koetse

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A Chinese postdoc’s reported suicide after questioning by US authorities became a top trending topic in China this week. Despite the widespread attention, key details remain unclear, highlighting broader concerns about the increasingly sensitive position of researchers across the US–China scientific landscape.

On March 27, news about a Chinese postdoctoral researcher based in the United States who allegedly died by suicide a day after being questioned by US law enforcement officials began trending on Chinese social media.

The news came out during the Friday regular press briefing, where a CCTV reporter asked China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Lin Jian (林剑):

🗣️ “We’ve learned [据了解] that recently, a Chinese postdoctoral scholar took their own life a day after being subjected to questioning by US law enforcement personnel. What’s the Foreign Ministry’s comment?

Spokesperson Lin Jian responded that China is “deeply saddened by the tragedy,” and added that Chinese authorities have formally protested to the US, further commenting:

🗣️”For some time now, the US has been overstretching the concept of “national security” for political purposes, carrying out unwarranted questioning and harassment of Chinese students and scholars, infringing upon the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens, undermining the normal atmosphere of China–US people-to-people exchanges, and creating a serious “chilling effect.”

Lin Jian emphasized that China urges American authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into the case, provide answers to the victim’s family and to China, and stop any “discriminatory law enforcement against Chinese students and scholars in the United States.”

Lin Jian during the March 27 press briefing.

The “chilling effect” referenced by Lin Jian, in Chinese, is hán chán xiàoyìng (寒蝉效应), referring to a climate of fear in which people do not dare to speak out.

While xiàoyìng simply means “effect,” hán chán (寒蝉) literally means “a cicada in cold weather”—a metaphor for a repressive environment, as cicadas fall silent and become inactive in colder temperatures.

 
From MFA Briefing to Trending Topic
 

Following the press briefing, major Chinese news outlets like Xinhua and Global Times picked up the news and amplified the MFA statement across both their international and domestic channels, after which it quickly entered the top five “hot search” lists on platforms like Bilibili, Kuaishou, and Baidu. The MFA statement was also covered by Newsweek.

What is particularly noteworthy about how this news entered the online discourse is that it was reported solely through top-down, official channels. Unlike many incidents involving Chinese nationals overseas—particularly in cases of sudden death or personal tragedy—it did not first surface on social media through posts by friends or family members before prompting an official response. Nor were there any identifiable reports from local news or overseas Chinese community platforms that broke the story before the MFA did.

This left many questions about which university this researcher was affiliated with, where the incident occurred, and why the CCTV reporter asked this question on March 27 without any published news reports to go by.

Some have argued the Chinese government deliberately amplified the story to stir anti-American sentiment amid broader US-China tensions — a claim made, without supporting evidence, by the notoriously biased Epoch Times outlet.

🔍 Given the lack of details, Weibo’s own AI chatbot attributed the incident to the death of Li Haoran (李昊然). Li was a postdoctoral researcher at Princeton University who died at home in September 2025. On February 13, 2026, his death was officially ruled a suicide. Since this case predated the current report and has never been linked to law enforcement questioning, this appeared to be a hallucination error by the Weibo chatbot.

Weibo chatbot “hallucinating” and linking the current case to Li Haoran. Screenshot by author, March 27.

At the same time, claims popped up on social media regarding a recent suicide involving a researcher in the Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering (ECE) department at the University of Michigan.

One US-based Xiaohongshu user shared a screenshot of an email sent by University of Michigan staff on March 20 regarding the “sad news of the death of an Assistant Research Scientist (..) who fell from an upper story of the GG Brown building last night.”

The social media post, as well as an entire thread on another US-based Chinese community forum, had vanished by Monday, March 30, returning a “404” message.

The Michigan connection was also indirectly raised by some netizens (such as “Science Futurist” @科学未来人), who referenced earlier cases where Chinese researchers at the University of Michigan were allegedly “arrested, humiliated, and tormented.”

(🔍 Although there have been multiple incidents involving Chinese researchers at the university, this particular commenter referred to postdoctoral fellow Jian Yunqing (简云清), who was arrested by the FBI in June 2025 on charges including conspiracy and smuggling small samples of “toxic biological materials” into the US. This involved a crop-affecting fungus studied by Jian that, while also found in US fields, is illegal to import without a permit and is classified as a hazardous biological pathogen.)

Meanwhile, at the time of writing, few reports have emerged identifying any key details of the current case, and this lack of information surrounding the incident, both on the American and Chinese sides, is especially noteworthy for a case that has been framed as a major incident and a significant development in Sino-American academic exchanges.

 
The Michigan Connection
 

On March 31, the Chinese Consulate General in Chicago issued a statement via its WeChat account, responding to media inquiries regarding a Chinese scholar’s suicide following questioning by US law enforcement.

🗣️ The spokesperson confirmed that the case had occurred at a US university within its consular district, reiterating the sentiments expressed by the MFA and again using the term “chilling effect” (寒蝉效应, hán chán xiàoyìng). The statement criticized what it described as the US side’s use of “national security” to carry out unwarranted and politically motivated questioning and harassment of Chinese students and scholars.

Wechat post by Chinese Consulate in Chicago, March 31.

The Hong Kong newspaper Sing Tao Daily then connected the case to the University of Michigan’s ECE department, citing the aforementioned internal email and reporting that a local researcher died after falling from a height on the university’s North Campus.

The G.G. Brown Building, where the incident allegedly happened, when it was still under construction in 2013, photo by Michael Barera via Wikimedia Commons.

The deceased researcher was reportedly an Assistant Research Scientist on the team of Professor Zetian Mi, who specializes in semiconductors, nanomaterials, and optoelectronic technologies.

Professor Mi has been previously honored for his contributions to the growth of wide bandgap semiconductor materials, and leads a top-tier semiconductor research group that has received millions of dollars in funding from the US Department of Defense, published groundbreaking research, and earned prestigious awards in photonics and semiconductor science.

 
A Researcher at the Intersection of US–China Science
 

One Assistant Research Scientist previously listed on the official ECE website—who worked in Mi’s lab but has now been removed from the public staff list—is Dr. Wang Danhao (汪丹浩).

Wang’s research focused on next-generation semiconductor materials, including ultra-thin and ferroelectric systems with applications in electronics and photonics. He was previously part of a University of Michigan research team that explained why a new class of ferroelectric semiconductors can sustain opposing electric states without breaking apart—work published in Nature and supported by US funding sources, including the Army Research Office.

Over the years, Wang has built an extensive body of research published in some of the most prestigious scientific journals, including Nature Electronics, Nature Communications, and Science Advances.

More recently, Wang was listed as a co-first author on a study—covered by various industry publications—regarding a neuromorphic vision sensor capable of sensing, storing, and classifying images without external circuits, reportedly achieving over 95% recognition accuracy. The research was led by Professor Sun Haiding’s iGaN lab at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) and funded by Chinese government sources, including the National Natural Science Foundation of China.

Various Chinese sources have described this research as a breakthrough, noting that USTC developed the first optoelectronic diode integrating sensing, memory, and computing in a single device (“中国科大研制出首个具有感存算三合一功能的光电二极管”) (USTC link and news sources here and here).

According to Washtenaw County vital records, Wang Danhao died on March 20, 2026.

On that very same day, the research he contributed to (“A single diode with integrated photosensing, memory and processing for neuromorphic image sensors”) was published in Nature Electronics.

Wang’s profile, spanning research of interest to military and defense institutions, reflects involvement in both US-funded semiconductor projects (including work supported by the Army Research Office & within a DARPA-funded lab), as well as collaboration on Chinese government-funded research with a Chinese state university. This cross-institutional, cross-funded research highlights the increasingly complex and sensitive position of researchers operating across the US–China scientific landscape.

 
From a Mysterious Case to Serious Concerns
 

For now, many questions still surround this case, with official reports—from both the American and Chinese sides—likely to follow. At the time of writing, neither US government agencies nor the University of Michigan have publicly responded to the MFA statement or the Chicago consulate statement.

What we do know, and what is supported by prior studies, is that many Chinese researchers feel pressured and unsafe while carrying out academic work in the US, partly due to concerns about government investigations targeting researchers of Chinese origin.

In this recent case, Chinese online responses reflect that sentiment.

In some of the more notable discussions on Zhihu (such as this thread), users comment on the case’s mysterious nature while also linking it to a broader pattern of scrutiny and pressure on Chinese researchers in the United States.

These discussions reference past FBI investigations of Chinese academics under the so-called “China Initiative,” a 2018–2022 program launched by the US Department of Justice to counter espionage and intellectual property theft involving China.

🔍 One case mentioned is the 2024 death of Northwestern University Chinese-American neuroscientist Jane Wu (吴瑛), who died by suicide following years of federal scrutiny over her China-related ties, during which her lab was shut down, and her academic presence was later removed online.

In this context, some commenters also express skepticism about the suicide narrative in the current case. One popular comment stated:

💬 “Former Boeing quality manager and whistleblower John Barnett once publicly stated that if anything were to happen to him, it would not be suicide. On March 9, 2024, he was found dead in his car in a hotel parking lot in Charleston, South Carolina. The official ruling was suicide. He had been scheduled to testify that day, exposing issues related to Boeing’s production quality.”

Another commenter—a graduate of Peking University—argued that the US is no longer seen as a safe destination for Chinese researchers:

💬 “No matter how you look at it, he had already made it to the postdoc level, traveled all the way across the ocean only for things to end like this, it’s so unfortunate. Looking back now, the three years of the pandemic mark a very clear turning point. The “Bald Eagle” (白头鹰 – the US) is no longer an ideal destination for Chinese students, and is gradually no longer an ideal place for academic exchange and research either.”

At the same time, institutional responses are also taking shape.

🗣️ Dr. Nick Geiser, leader of the University of Michigan Postdoctoral Researchers’ Organization (UM-PRO), the union representing 1,500 postdocs, told Eye on Digital China they are currently bargaining with the university.

The union is preparing a proposal on international scholar rights that would ensure foreign postdocs are supported by the university in cases of abrupt funding cuts or warrantless investigations by US federal authorities.

This is a developing story. At the time of writing, there is no official confirmation that Wang Danhao is the individual referenced in this case. Any important updates will be added here as more information becomes available.

UPDATE April 3:

A news report by local news website MLive has come out earlier today, including additional information on this case.

In an April 1 email, Deputy Police Chief and Public Information Officer Melissa Overton stated that the researcher “jumped from the third floor and fell to the second floor inside the atrium in the George G. Brown Building on March 19.” He was later pronounced dead, and police — first called about 11 p.m. on March 19 — are investigating his death as a “possible act of self-harm.”

Paul Corliss, assistant vice president for public affairs and internal communications at the University of Michigan, has also issued a statement in an April 3 email, writing that: “Our priority is to honor the wishes of the family and those affected while adhering to legal requirements and ensuring that any information shared is accurate and non-speculative.”

See the report by MLive here.

An earlier internal email, sent out to the Michigan Engineering community on April 1, confirmed the passing of Wang Danhao (Dr. Danhao Wang), and stated that there is an active police investigation going on, with no further information to share.

The statement described him as “a promising and brilliant young mind,” whose research into wide bandgap III-nitride semiconductor materials and devices published in Nature “stands as a landmark, uncovering for the first time the switching and charge compensation mechanisms of emerging ferroelectric nitrides.”

The UM Postdoctoral Researchers Organization, the union that represents postdoctoral researchers, is advising its membership not to speak with federal authorities.

If you or someone you know is struggling, international mental health and crisis support helplines can be found at www.befrienders.org.

By Manya Koetse
(follow on X, LinkedIn, or Instagram)

Note: In Chinese, names are written with the surname first, followed by the given name (e.g. Wang Danhao, Mi Zetian). In English-language contexts, this order is usually reversed (e.g. Dr. Zetian Mi, Dr. Danhao Wang).

©2026 Eye on Digital China/Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.

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China Arts & Entertainment

“Auntie Mei” Captured After 20 Years, China’s Train-Stain Scandal, and Zhang Xuefeng’s Final Lesson

The major talking points on Chinese social media this week: from the capture of a notorious child trafficker and unexpected death of Zhang Xuefeng, to one of the most expensive Chinese music video ever made.

Manya Koetse

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🔥 China Trend Watch (week 12½ | 2026) Part of Eye on Digital China by Manya Koetse, China Trend Watch is an overview of what’s trending and being discussed on Chinese social media. This edition was sent to paid subscribers — subscribe to receive the next issue in your inbox.

On Tuesday, March 24, rumors that something had happened to China’s most popular educational influencer were flying across Chinese social media. Some said he had collapsed, others said he was barely hanging on, while others still were refuting the rumors.

This is about “Teacher Zhang Xuefeng” (张雪峰老师, 1984), the man who carved out a big place for himself in China’s online landscape over the past decade by focusing on a sweet spot that virtually all Chinese parents and their children care about: how to choose majors strategically to ensure future employment prospects.

Among Zhang’s common questions: “What kind of salary do you want your child to have in the future?”

Besides the relevance of his focus, Zhang’s northeastern accent, comic remarks, blunt criticism, and talent for triggering controversy also amplified his online appeal, ensuring that his name frequently became part of China’s public discourse.

Like that time when he advised China’s young people against studying journalism, even stating that if he were a parent, he would “definitely knock the child unconscious if they insisted on studying journalism,” deeming it a major that lacks depth and prospects. Although it became a major controversy at the time, a poll of 42,000 voters showed that 39,000 agreed with Zhang.

Zhang capitalized on the collective anxiety in China surrounding the gaokao (高考), the national university entrance exam that determines future paths, as well as concerns that even graduates from top universities may face unemployment if they choose majors with limited practical value. Zhang’s view: choice is more important than effort.

This Tuesday evening, news emerged that Zhang Xuefeng had died on the afternoon of March 24 at the age of 41, after suffering sudden cardiac arrest.

His death has had a huge impact on Chinese social media, where many people are responding with disbelief and shock.

It’s not just that Zhang was widely known (and while not everyone liked him, many respected him)—it’s perhaps also the fact that he spent so much of his life advising others on how to control their careers and income, building great personal wealth in the process, only to die so young, at the peak of his career, with no strategy to protect him.

Besides being “chronically overworked,” Zhang also pushed himself to exercise and run frequently. Adding to this, he had been under pressure since last fall, when he became a target of official criticism and platform regulators.

Isn’t it ironic that, in the end, the most important takeaway Zhang might leave behind is not his advice on choosing majors or making smart career moves, but rather the reminder to sometimes step away from the rat race and appreciate everyday life and health, because you never know when it might all end.

Zhang leaves behind his wife and 11-year-old daughter.

Let’s dive into some of the other trends that have been major talking points this week.

Quick Scroll

    • 🧠 China has approved a coin-sized brain–computer implant for commercial use in people with spinal cord injuries. Developed by Shanghai-based company Neuracle Medical Technology (博睿康) in collaboration with Tsinghua University, the so-called “NEO” is the world’s first market-approved brain implant designed to help people with severe paralysis regain hand motor function.
    • 🚨 Lei Siwei (雷思维), Vice-Governor of Gansu and member of the provincial Party Standing Committee, is under investigation as of March 17, with the notice issued by China’s top anti-corruption body citing “serious violations of discipline and law.” The case is the latest in an ongoing series of provincial-level anti-corruption actions that’ve been continuing into 2026.
    • 📚 Several Chinese provinces and cities are removing biology and geography from high school entrance exams starting from next year, as part of a broader government-initiated campaign to reduce pressure on students and put a stop to “educational involution” (教育内卷).
    • 👀 Taiwanese actor-singer Jerry Yan (言承旭), best known as Dao Mingsi from Meteor Garden and a member of F4, is at the center of somewhat of an authenticity crisis after fans photographed his concert teleprompter showing not just lyrics, but scripted emotional cues for his performance like “your eyes slightly reddening” and “now you take a deep breath.”
    • 🎮 More than 100 Chinese universities are offering esports majors nowadays, sparking online discussions this week. These programmes go far beyond just playing video games, covering esports operations, management, data analytics, game design, etc, reflecting the growing professionalisation of China’s esports industry.
    • 🎓 A feature by Chinese magazine Sanlian Life Weekly (三联生活周刊) went trending for highlighting a sharp gender shift in China’s higher education demographics, with female students now outnumbering men at universities. Female undergraduate enrollment grew by 348% between 2002 and 2022.
    • 🧪 A laboratory explosion at Chongqing University on March 20 killed one student and injured three. Initial findings point to improper handling of chemicals.
    • 💔 China’s superfamous actress Yao Chen (姚晨) and filmmaker Cao Yu (曹郁) jointly announced their separation on Weibo in a poetic way, using classical Chinese language: “A journey through mountains and rivers, a blessing for three lifetimes. Fate comes and goes, all is joy” (山水一程,三生有幸。缘来缘去,皆是欢喜). A related hashtag received 300 million views.

What Really Stood Out This Week

Chinese Woman Who Sold Abducted Toddlers Captured After Two Decades

[#梅姨落网#] [#人贩子梅姨落网#]

A woman who played a key role in a series of China’s notorious child trafficking cases, causing relentless suffering for many families, has finally been caught after being on the run for two decades. The arrest of the woman, referred to as “Mei Yi” or “Auntie Mei” (梅姨), has dominated Chinese social media over the past week, ever since Guangzhou police announced on March 21 that they had finally captured her.

This story touches upon multiple issues that have turned it into such a major topic.

Mei Yi was involved in a series of child trafficking crimes carried out by a gang led by Zhang Weiping (张维平) and Zhou Rongping (周容平) across multiple areas in Guangdong province between 2003 and 2005. She acted as a middleman responsible for transferring and selling abducted children, mostly toddler boys. In just over two years, the group abducted and trafficked nine young children.

The parents of these boys never stopped searching for them, while Chinese authorities worked for years to crack the case. In 2016, eleven years after the last abduction, police arrested five core gang members, including Zhang, who later confessed and revealed that the person reselling the children was a local elderly woman nicknamed “Mei Yi.” However, her real identity and whereabouts remained unknown for years. Zhang Weiping and Zhou Rongping were both sentenced to death and executed in 2023.

Thanks to new technologies—from digital tracking systems to DNA matching—the abducted children were located one by one and reunited with their biological families over the years: the first in 2019 and the last in 2024. By then, the boys were roughly between 14 and 21 years old, meaning they had spent nearly their entire childhoods with the families who had bought them.

Evading Capture by Being Ordinary

One aspect of this case drawing attention is not just how Mei Yi was caught, but how she managed to evade arrest for so long. The crimes took place more than twenty years ago, in factories, rental housing, and other areas with dense migrant populations, leaving very little traceable evidence. It is also unclear how accurate the composite sketch of Mei Yi—circulating since 2017 and updated in 2019—actually was. Authorities have not released a confirmed photo following her arrest, and it is possible her real appearance differed significantly from the sketch.

A lawyer close to the case told Chinese media outlet The Paper that what made her so hard to catch was probably not how clever her tactics were, but that she appeared so normal to those around her, who might have never guessed she was a criminal. Besides arranging illegal “adoptions,” Mei Yi also acted as a local matchmaker and fortune teller, and she even lied about her identity and used aliases with someone who was her partner for two years.

Official media do not disclose exactly how Mei Yi was eventually tracked down, but it’s clear that the authorities got much closer after all the abducted children were found in October 2024, undoubtedly leading to important clues that connected all the cases.

Not Such a Happy Ending

Chinese state media have largely framed the case as a story of justice served: Mei Yi as a long-sought villain, the police as persistent heroes, and China’s advancing technology as the key to solving the case. A kind of “happy ending.”

But the truth seems more complicated, with a loud silence surrounding nine families where the abducted boys spent their entire childhoods. Their willingness to pay for a male child is part of a broader issue linked to China’s one-child policy, relatively light penalties for buyers of trafficked children (or even legal limitations due to statutes of limitation), and a deeply rooted son-preference culture that was especially strong in those years 2003- 2005.

Some online commentators did argue to “not let those hypocritical ‘adoptive parents’ off the hook.” Yet the situation is complicated by the fact that some of the boys still consider these families their parents, and in some cases choose to stay with them rather than return to biological families they barely remember.

The fact is that Mei Yu is just one chapter in a much larger story that is far from finished.

Just earlier this week, the story of another abduction case also went trending. It concerns a man named Du Jun (杜军), who was abducted in 1991 at the age of 3 while playing outside a shop with his sister. Du Jun, who spent 35 years separated from his biological family, finally reunited with his biological mother following a successful identification process that is part of a continuing series of long-separated family reunions facilitated by China’s expanding DNA-matching and digital tracking systems.

Du, now 38, had not known he was trafficked as a child, nor that his biological family had searched for him for years. He became an orphan at a young age and built a life for himself. He was found through online search efforts, the dedication of volunteers, DNA research, and a specific detail only his biological family knew: that he had a bend at the joint of his left middle finger because of an accident as a toddler.

Du Jun as a young child before his abduction, and Du Jun reunited with his biological mother in 2026. Images via Hongxing Xinwen.

As with the nine abducted boys, Du Jun’s reunion with his family does bring light to a long, dark tunnel – but it doesn’t bring back the missed childhood, the shattered families, and the endless, tear-filled years.

Let’s hope many more “Mei Yis” will be brought to justice in the years ahead.

A Censored Menstruation Train-Incident

[#官方通报月经弄脏卧铺事件详情#] [#女子月经弄脏火车卧铺被让赔180元#] [#列车服务应满足卫生巾这一女性刚需#]

Another story that became a major talking point on Chinese social media this week involves a woman named Ms. Zhang, who was charged 180 yuan (US$26) after accidentally staining a bedsheet on a sleeper train. The woman unexpectedly got her period while traveling overnight to Lanzhou and was unable to obtain any sanitary products on board. A train attendant asked her to either wash the bedsheet herself or pay compensation.

The woman, who ended up washing the sheets herself by hand in cold water, later shared her experience on social media and suggested that all trains should sell sanitary pads. Her post resonated with many, and even though she took it offline, it was quickly picked up by Chinese media.

After the post went viral, Lanzhou Railway issued an official statement on March 20, presenting its version of events and challenging some of the woman’s claims.

The statement included details that depicted staff as helpful, such as an attendant allegedly offering to wash the sheets and a conductor searching for sanitary pads (but finding none). At the same time, it used seemingly accusatory language, repeatedly describing the woman’s menstruation as having “contaminated” (污染) the bedding as well as two other spots where she had sat.

Zhang did not accept this explanation and again turned to social media (under the username @勇敢小狐不怕困难) to reveal what she said had been happening behind the scenes. She shared that someone from Lanzhou Railway had repeatedly messaged her privately, asking her to delete her posts, claiming that employees’ jobs were at risk because of the incident, and even offering her money—which she refused, despite ultimately taking the post down.

Zhang further suggested that her posts were “disappearing as soon as they were published,” that the media narrative was being controlled, and that she had been pressured into silence.

On Xiaohongshu and Weibo, many users sided with Zhang. The wording used by Lanzhou Railway struck a chord, particularly the framing of menstruation as “contamination” while simultaneously blaming Zhang for staining multiple areas, despite not providing any sanitary products.

Where exactly was she supposed to sit?” one Xiaohongshu user asked. “In the aisle? On a suitcase? Squatting by the toilet door? Lying on the floor?

One major reason why this debate exploded online is not just the media discourse itself, but the way it taps into broader frustrations among Chinese women over social taboos and structural shortcomings surrounding menstruation in public spaces.

Over the years, various incidents involving menstrual products have gone viral and sparked grassroots efforts to change the current situation.

In 2022, a female passenger also expressed her frustration online about sanitary pads on high-speed trains, drawing online attention. Many commenters, mostly men, argued that pads weren’t “essential items” and shouldn’t take up retail space onboard. The railway authority’s official response—describing sanitary pads as “personal items” that don’t need to be sold—only worsened online outrage.

For many women, these kinds of incidents, from trains and schools to planes, highlight how little society apparently understands or respects their basic needs.

In this case, the way Zhang was seemingly framed as if she had deliberately stained the sheets (and was somehow expected to stop menstruating) triggered widespread anger. Although some of the more outspoken posts were censored on Weibo, more nuanced criticism remained: “Menstrual blood is treated as dirty, described as ‘contamination.’ But this is just menstruation—something that half of all people experience.”

On the Feed

“The Most Expensive Music Video in the History of Mandopop”

Whenever there’s new music by the Taiwanese producer, actor, composer, singer-songwriter, and ‘King of Mandopop’ Jay Chou (周杰伦), it goes trending.

Not only does his music bring back memories of the early 2000s – when he first rose to prominence and became super popular – but his catchy tunes and lyrics also resonate with younger audiences.

But it’s not just the music that makes waves – it’s also the music videos that have become artistic and sometimes spectacular productions by themselves. “Other artists just make a music video, he turns it into a movie,” some commenters wrote after the release of his 2022 Greatest Work of Art video.

On March 24, the music video (MV) for the lead single Children of the Sun (太阳之子) dropped, a production made in collaboration with Wētā Workshop, the New Zealand-based visual effects studio known for its work on Avatar and The Lord of the Rings.

The music video shows Jay Chou in a fictional European world spanning from the 16th to the 20th century, filled with references to famous art, from Vincent van Gogh and Dali to Mona Lisa, Ophelia, and The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp by Rembrandt (Jay Chou appears in the painting himself).

The cost of the music video production reportedly exceeded 20 million yuan (US$2.9 million), and some commentaries described it as the most expensive MV in the history of Mandarin-language pop music.

You can watch the video on Weibo here, or on Youtube here.

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