China Insight
Chinese Social Media Reactions to Israel-Hamas War: Pro-Palestinian Sentiments and Anti-Semitic Discourse
Chinese perspectives on the Israel-Palestine conflict are influenced by China’s historical context and perceptions of its role in the world today.
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After the Hamas attacks began on October 7, the Israel-Hamas war has been a major topic of discussion on Chinese social media.
Over the past two weeks, a series of critical events have unfolded since Palestinian militant group Hamas fired more than 5,000 rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israel and infiltrated Isreal. The attacks killed a large number of Israeli civilians, including the 260 deaths at the Supernova music festival massacre. As deadly fights continued, the Israeli government formally declared war and retaliated against Hamas.
Israel has since dropped some 6,000 bombs on the Gaza Strip, killing hundreds of Palestians. More than a million people have fled their homes in the Gaza Strip.
On October 17 and 18, various media reported that at least 500 people were killed in a devastating blast hitting the Al-Ahli Arab hospital in Gaza City, a day before US President Biden arrived in Israel for a wartime diplomatic trip, marking a public show of support for Israel.
While Palestinian officials blamed Israel for the hospital blast, Israel asserts it was a rocket launched by an Islamist militant group that caused the explosion. This claim was later backed by American officials, who cited intelligence suggesting that the explosion was indeed caused by an armed Palestinian group.
On Chinese social media sites, various discussions related to the Israel-Hamas war and all the latest developments have attracted a lot of attention. From October 7 to October 19, the Weibo hashtag “Palestian-Israeli Conflict” (#巴以冲突#) received over 2 billion views. One hashtag related to the Gaza hospital explosion received over 320 million views in a day (#加沙地带一医院遭袭数百人死亡#).
Amid all of the hashtags, posts, videos, images, and discussions on Chinese social media, we have identified three prominent trends concerning the Israel-Hamas conflict: growing pro-Palestinian sentiments, a surge in anti-Jewish racism, and an increased focus on China’s role on the world stage and how its calls for peaceful resolutions contrast with U.S. policies.
1. Pro-Palestine Sentiments
There is a clear trend on Weibo, as well as on other Chinese social platforms like Douyin and even Xiaohongshu, that netizens are demonstrating greater support for the Palestinian side than for Israel.
Some posts (here, here) argue that if the recent attacks on civilians by Hamas militants are labeled as “extreme terrorism,” Israel’s actions against Palestinians over the years should be seen as a form of “mild terrorism.”
This view is repeated by many bloggers and regular netizens all over Chinese social media, where numerous videos depict bombings in Gaza, emphasizing heartbreaking scenes of severely injured children and their grieving parents and siblings.
In Weibo’s ‘hot’ section, which features currently popular posts, it’s evident that there’s a stronger emphasis on images and videos portraying the suffering in Palestine compared to those depicting hardships on the Israeli side.
These distressing videos evoke significant sympathy on Chinese social media, where some commenters suggest that the Hamas movement is becoming more prominent because of the suffering Palestians are enduring (“If my child were killed like that, I would immediately turn into a terrorist as well.”) Others argue that Hamas should be seen as guerrilla fighters rather than terrorists.
The pro-Palestinian sentiments go beyond netizens’ views alone, and are strengthened by Chinese media reports and official positions. The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s initial response to the conflict focused on expressing concerns about the escalating tensions and voicing China’s stance that civilians should be protected and that further deterioration should be prevented.
They reiterated that the fundamental solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the path to peace, according to China, lies in the implementation of the “two-state solution” (两国方案) and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
Days later, on October 13, Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Wang Yi stated that the “historical injustice suffered by the Palestinian people” lies at the root of the conflict between Israel and Palestinians, emphasizing the “two-state solution” and the importance of realizing the dream of an independent State of Palestine.
Wang also stated on October 15 that Israel’s bombing campaign had gone “beyond the scope of self-defence” and that it “should stop collective punishment of the people of Gaza.”
One Weibo newsblogger called Creamy Banana (@Creamy蕉, 140k fans) writes:
“What many people do not understand is that when we support Palestine in the Israel-Palestine [conflict], is that we do not support a specific regional political group, that we do not support or oppose a specific racial group, and that we certainly do not support a particular religion. None of that. In this issue, supporting Palestine means supporting justice, supporting the weak, supporting the eggs resisting the high wall, it’s as simple as that.
For instance, during World War II, when Jews were massacred by the Nazis, we sympathized and supported the Jews because they were the weak ones and the victims at that time. Now, Israel is involved in genocide against Palestine, killing civilians, attacking hospitals, and it is the Palestinians who are the weak and the victims. Former victims—the Jews—have now become the perpetrators.
Good people and bad people, justice and evil, they are all relative and ever-changing. This may be the complexity of human nature. There is no absolute goodness, no absolute evil. You can be a victim and a villain hurting others at the same time.”
While the blogger argues that the pro-Palestine sentiment on Chinese social media is unrelated to politics or race, this isn’t exactly accurate. Many Chinese netizens’ support for the Palestinians is closely connected to current geopolitics, America’s pro-Israel stance, existing prejudice towards Jews, and China’s own historical context.
As suggested by Yiyi Chen in “The Basis of China’s Pro-Palestine Stance and the Current Status of Its Implementation” (2013), China leans towards supporting the Arab side because, in the Chinese perspective on the Israel-Palestine conflict, Israel was established by aligning with the Imperial powers of its era. In this context, the Palestians are seen as sufferers of imperialism (p. 216).
This deeply resonates with many Chinese, who, both explicitly and implicitly, associate the current Palestinian issue with China’s historical scars of the “hundred years of national humiliation,” during which China also suffered from imperialism by Western powers and Japan from 1839 to the 1940s.
“The Gaza children shaken and trembling from Israeli bombardments experience scenes similar to what China went through during the War of Resitance against Japan,” one Weibo user wrote: “So don’t say that it has nothing to do with you.”
“We’re helping Palestine, but we’re helping ourselves from 70 years ago,” (“帮的是巴勒斯坦，也是七十几年前的自己”) one commenter (@
姜橙橙_捏唐冽大脸) wrote, receiving over 5500 likes. Others reiterated similar views, writing: “It’s because we endured hardship that we now hold the umbrella for others who are suffering.”
Another reason for the pro-Palestine stance, as detailed by Chen, is rooted in reciprocity. The Chinese tend to support the Palestinians as a way of reciprocating the solidarity shown by Arab countries during the 1960s and 1970s when China was isolated due to Western animosity (p. 216).
Furthermore, and this is particularly evident in the numerous posts and blogs within China’s online media landscape, support for Palestine also stems from opposition to the United States and a lack of trust in Israel due to the close alliance between the U.S. and Israel.
New York Times changing its headline, image posted and reposted on Weibo.
This distrust also extends to American media, which is seen as biased and untrustworthy on Chinese social media platforms. For instance, when the New York Times modified its headlines about the Gaza hospital blast to reflect new information indicating that Israel might not be responsible, many Chinese netizens viewed it as another instance of American media deliberately distorting facts and concealing the truth.
“They did it because of political correctness,” some suggested: “They were afraid to trigger the anger of the Jewish people.”
2. Anti-Semitic Sentiments
Apart from the general pro-Palestinian views on Weibo, there are also voices on Chinese social media denouncing Hamas and the people who support them. For instance, when a video captured students from New York University (NYU) tearing down posters depicting Israeli children held hostage by Hamas, many commenters condemned their actions and questioned why they didn’t go to Gaza themselves. Others comment general phrases such as, “The Hamas evil must be eradicated” (“消灭哈马斯恶魔”).
But despite some condemnation of Hamas, it is hard to find many strong pro-Israel voices on Weibo these days.1 Notably, the Israeli Embassy in Beijing, which is one of the most popular foreign embassy Weibo accounts with 2.4 million followers, is currently not only shadowbanned on the platform (it does not immediately show up in search results), it has also disabled comments on many of its posts or is showing only a limited number of replies.
The posts that do allow comments do not only show strong anti-Israeli sentiments, denouncing Israel as a state engaged in acts of terror and genocide in Gaza, but they also display instances of anti-Semitic racism.
For instance, when the Israeli Embassy posted about the Kutz family, murdered by Hamas terrorists in their home, some netizens commented: “Auschwitz misses you.”
References to the Holocaust, Hitler, Goebbels, and related topics are also evident in many other posts on Weibo. Some bloggers (@扫天下媒体, over 70,000 fans) write things such as “(..) the Germans have since long seen through the true nature and character of the Jewish people.”
Alongside openly anti-Semitic comments, there are anti-Semitic conspiracy theories circulating on Chinese social media. Some of these theories mention Hollywood actors or American political figures of Jewish descent, hinting that Jews control different parts of America’s political, entertainment, and business sectors.
The ubiquity of anti-Semitic comments in China’s online media sphere may be surprising, especially considering how bilateral relations between China and Israel have blossomed since the 2000s.
Not only did a 2019 Pew Research Center study discover that the Israeli public held a “very favorable” opinion of China, but a 2016 China Radio International feature also sought the views of Chinese people on Jews and Israelis. The responses were generally positive, with many respondents describing Jews and Israelis as “very smart” (Yellinek 2022, 185-192).
There are also those who generally express pity for Jews, considering them “stateless” or “oppressed,” and empathizing with their historical struggles. This is one of the reasons why the Holocaust, and Holocaust studies, have received relatively more attention in China than in other Asian countries (Haime 2020; Timmermans 2016).
In 2010, the animated film A Jewish Girl in Shanghai (犹太女孩在上海) was proudly described as “China’s first homegrown Jewish film” – it was part of a renewed remembrance of shared Jewish-Chinese history (read more). The Shanghai Jewish Refugees Museum was opened in 2007 to commemorate the Jewish refugees who lived in Shanghai during World War II, and the first musical themed around the Jews in Shanghai saw the light at the Shanghai International Arts Festival in 2015, the same year when a renewed Chinese translation of The Diary of Anne Frank was published.
Still from Jewish Girl in Shanghai, China’s first domestic Jewish film.
However, the perception of ‘Jews’ or ‘Jewishness’ in China is multifaceted and often conflicting, as shown by various studies. According to Zhou Xun (2016), Chinese attitudes towards Jews and Jewishness are often a mixture of curiosity and envy, yet Jews are primarily seen as a racialized ‘Other’ who differ significantly from social groups in China. Xun suggests that anti-Semitic language in China is frequently borrowed from Western sources, but that the racialized discourse itself is inherently rooted in Chinese society.
The many popular books that exist about Jews in China, ranging from What’s Behind Jewish Success to 16 Reasons for Jews Getting Wealthy, demonstrate that the authors’ perceptions of Jewishness are often riddled with misunderstandings and stereotypes. These books frequently highlight the perceived success of Jews in business and education to promote values highly cherished by the Chinese (Ross 2016, 25-30).
While many prevailing opinions and stereotypes about Jews in China today revolve around their perceived success, intelligence, and warmheartedness, there are also those who portray them as devious, dominating, and cruel.
The recent surge of anti-Semitism on Chinese social media underscores that ‘Othering’ and stereotyping of Jewish people can focus on their perceived admirable traits in times of flourishing Israel-China relations, but that this praise, exaggerated and rooted in prejudice, can just as swiftly turn into hatred in times of Israel-Palestine conflict escalation.
3. Sending Help: China as Responsible World Leader
Another key trend within Chinese online discussions about the Israel-Hamas conflict is the focus on China’s role as a geopolitical influencer: many see China as a promoter of global peace that is “mending the world.”
Within this context, the topic of China providing humanitarian assistance to Palestinians gained traction on Weibo recently (#中国政府向巴勒斯坦提供紧急人道主义援助#, #中方向巴方提供紧急人道主义援助#), referring to China’s efforts to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
“We bring emergency relief, others bring bullets,” some commenters wrote.
This ubiquitous narrative of China as a responsible, fair, and peaceful global power, supported by Chinese state media reports, underscores a distinction between American and Chinese influence on the world stage. It implies that the U.S. frequently interferes and provokes conflicts, while China discreetly offers aid and works to reduce tensions.
In this context, reports of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi telling his U.S. counterpart, Anthony Blinken, that the United States should genuinely play a constructive role in the Israel-Hamas war and push for a political solution sparked hundreds of online comments praising China for being a responsible and peaceful leader (#中方呼吁召开巴以冲突国际和会#) .
On October 18, the United States vetoed a UN resolution calling for a humanitarian pause in the Israel-Hamas war, citing Israel’s right to self-defence. China was one of the countries voting in favor of the ‘humanitarian pauses’ resolution.
In response to the American decision to vote against the resolution, China’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Zhang Jun, said: “We cannot help but doubt that some countries do not genuinely wish to resolve the issue” (#联合国巴以问题决议草案遭美一票否决#).
Among the comments are statements like: “This clearly indicates a lack of desire for peace.” “They’re the tumor of the world.” “The U.S. is lacking moral values.”
China as the rabbit in the Chinese webcomic series Year Hare Affair (那年那兔那些事儿).
One popular Weibo reply suggested that “the rabbit is quietly patching up [mending] the world” (“兔子总在默默为世界缝缝补补”). In this context, the ‘rabbit’ is ‘China’, referring the Chinese webcomic Year Hare Affair (那年那兔那些事儿) in which different animals represented different countries.
These phrases about China “mending the world” have been posted numerous times on Chinese social media (also: “世界破破烂烂，兔子缝缝补补”). Some of these posts also include a political cartoon showing Western media solely focusing on a crying baby in Israel while turning their backs to the bodies in Gaza.
Posted on Weibo (@粤港澳小小胖).
Meanwhile, there are also many commenters who simply express their hopes for a swift end to the war. “I hope for peace between Palestine and Israel. War is merciless.”
Some netizens also just share their appreciation for living in China. “We are not living in peaceful times, but at least we’re living in peaceful China.”
By Manya Koetse
1 Given the scope of this article and its time sensitivity, this comment exclusively focuses on online discussions on Weibo on October 16-19, and it does not reflect the period prior to the current Israel-Hamas conflict
References
Chen, Yiyi. 2013. “The Basis of China’s Pro-Palestine Stance and the Current Status of Its Implementation.” Digest of Middle East Studies 22 (2): 215-228.
Haime, Jordyn. 2020. “Chinese Philo-Semitism: Why China Admires the Jewish People.” Student Research Projects. 26. https://scholars.unh.edu/student_research/26
Ross, James R. 2016. “Images of Jews in Contemporary Books, Blogs, and Films”. The Image of Jews in Contemporary China, edited by James R. Ross and Song Lihong, Boston, USA: Academic Studies Press, pp. 24-36.
Timmermans, Glenn. 2016. “Holocaust Studies and Holocaust Education in China”. The Image of Jews in Contemporary China, edited by James R. Ross and Song Lihong, Boston, USA: Academic Studies Press, pp. 185-205.
Xun, Zhou. “Perceiving Jews in Modern China”. The Image of Jews in Contemporary China, edited by James R. Ross and Song Lihong, Boston, USA: Academic Studies Press, pp. 5-23.
Yellinek, Roie. 2022. “China’s Media Strategy Towards Israel.” Israel Affairs 28: 184-198.
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Chapter Dive
Cancel-Proof: The Rise of China’s AI Actors
China’s AI actors are on the rise, and not everyone is buying it. The country’s microdrama industry offers a glimpse of what’s to come for the broader film and TV sector.
– By Ruixin Zhang and Manya Koetse
For Chinese audiences, AI in film and television is nothing new. In the fall of 2023, the first fully AI digital performer in a Chinese domestic drama, the character Erzhuang (二壮) in I Am Nobody (异人之下) sparked debate on Chinese social media.
Some fans, due to Erzhuang’s convincing northeastern Chinese dialect and natural expressions, almost couldn’t believe she wasn’t a real actress.
Erzhuang in I Am Nobody (异人之下) in 2023.
But Erzhuang was just the beginning.
In 2024, China Mythology (中国神话) was promoted by state media as China’s first fully AI-produced short drama series.
A year later, In My Heart, You Are One of a Kind (在我心中，你是独一无二) premiered as Hong Kong’s very first AI-generated short drama, a youth campus romance that sparked further discussion about whether AI actors could actually replace human actors.
From the two AI dramas from 2024 and 2025: China Mythology and In My Heart, You Are One of a Kind.
Those discussions were reignited in late March of this year when Shanghai-based production company Yaoke Media (耀客传媒) introduced two newly signed AI actors, Qin Lingyue (秦凌岳) and Lin Xiyan (林汐颜), who’ll be starring in the fantasy short drama Qinling (秦岭).
Qin Lingyue (秦凌岳) and Lin Xiyan (林汐颜)
Unlike earlier AI figures in microdramas, this high-profile ‘signing’ marks a shift: the company plans to develop these characters as independent IPs, much like human actors. In other words, they are to attract fans both through their on-screen performances and their off-screen ‘personalities.’
Soon after, the two AI actors created their own social media accounts on Douyin and Xiaohongshu, and began cultivating a sense of authenticity and ‘liveness’ (活人感).
A real-looking social media profile.
But as these digital performers and real actors become harder to distinguish, audience discomfort is growing, too.
The Rise of AI Microdramas
In China’s microdrama market, AI is already playing a dominant role, with “AI dramas” (AI剧 or AI短剧) standing out as a distinct creative category within the broader industry.
Microdramas, also simply known as short dramas, have been around in China for at least a decade, but have become especially popular in recent years due to their vertical, ultra-short formats, designed for quick mobile viewing and easy ‘binge watching.’ Microdramas typically run for 60 to 100 episodes, but with each episode lasting just one to three minutes, an entire season can be watched in an hour or two.
That format also makes the industry particularly well-suited to AI. It is large, fast-moving, and often operates on limited budgets, with productions turning around quickly. In this environment, using AI-generated effects and AI actors simply makes sense. This is very different from traditional drama production, which typically involves longer timelines, higher budgets, well-known actors, and less room for experimentation.
“AI is no longer just an add-on in China’s drama sector—it is an integral part of the production process”
As a result, AI is no longer just an add-on in China’s short drama sector—it is becoming an integral part of the production process, with digital actors helping to improve efficiency and reduce costs. With the launch of Bytedance’s Seedance 2.0, production costs for AI-generated videos have dropped significantly, further boosting the growth of AI microdramas.
The scale of this shift is already clear: AI microdramas are now often outpacing live-action productions on trending charts. In 2025 alone, one Zhejiang-based production company (刚刚好影视) released 229 AI micro-dramas, generating over 513 million views.
According to Sixth Tone, short dramas featuring AI actors already represented approximately 40% of the top 100 animated short dramas in January 2026.
Turning AI Actors into Real Idols
With AI and microdramas entering a kind of symbiosis, virtual actors are no longer disposable, one-off creations. They are evolving into continuous, persona-driven figures, often designed to resemble real celebrities—much like “fandom-driven actors” (流量演员), whose core function is to monetize fan attachment and sell fantasies rather than just act.
According to Yaoke Media, their plans for Qin Lingyue and Lin Xiyan are similar to those of idol models: they are expected to interact with fans, appear in multiple productions, and eventually become monetizable assets through brand endorsements and image licensing.
This also means they will likely take on the full spectrum of idol labor, including promotional events, fan service, and carefully manufactured on-screen chemistry—sometimes even “queerbaiting” (卖腐). (There’s no perfect English equivalent, but the term refers to deliberately staging romantic interactions between two male characters aimed in particular at a female “danmei” fans or “rotten girls” audiences who like indulging in such fantasies.)
In one AI costume drama, behind-the-scenes clips showed the lead actor and actress “live-streaming” together, answering fan questions, and deliberately hyping up their on-screen chemistry.
“Behind the scenes” livestream screenshots by AI actors.
Such human-coded content is now increasingly becoming an important part of the AI microdrama industry.
Some of these online videos also show the supposed perspective of “fans” and “staff” watching the actors walk around or interacting with them, creating a simulated world that some netizens feel is pushing a sense of “realness,” with comments like: “Please don’t force AI to act so human-like.”
“AI actors featuring in AI dramas that are watched by AI audiences, it’s the perfect closed loop”
For the same AI costume drama, some clips even mimic the perspective of ‘fansite admins’ (站姐)—dedicated fan photographers who typically capture and share candid, off-stage footage of real stars.
In one vlog by a supposed prop assistant, she appears as an overworked but witty crew member, taking viewers around the set, chatting with the leads, buying them coffee, and even stepping in as an extra.
“Behind the scenes” of an AI microdrama.
These glimpses of everyday, behind-the-scenes life all feel oddly real, but everything is AI-generated: the actors, the sets, the audience interactions, the staff, even the paparazzi (see example videos here and here).
For ordinary audiences, it is striking how deeply AI has already penetrated the film & television industry. Beyond criticisms of stiff expressions and rigid aesthetics, many netizens describe the new phenomenon as “uncanny” or “just too real😨.”
With AI actors now realistic enough to pass as human at a glance, but with small details like emotional expression still being off, that gap between being almost human but not quite creates a sense of discomfort among viewers, who dub these AI actors ‘stuffed monsters’ (缝合怪) or ‘stitched-together corpses’ (尸块).
More than the actors, it’s the entire ecosystem around them that makes us believe we’re watching “candid moments” of something that is not even alive. Screenwriter Wang Hailin (汪海林) was sarcastically commented on Weibo: “AI actors featuring in AI dramas that are watched by AI audiences 👍, it’s a perfect closed loop.”
‘Borrowing’ Facial Features
Besides the simulated “aliveness” of digital performers, another controversial issue surrounding the recent rise of China’s AI actors is whether these creations infringe on portrait rights. Since the debut of Qin Lingyue and Lin Xiyan, these AI figures have been criticized for appearing to use facial features from multiple real actors.
As online discussions intensify, more AI actors in microdramas have been found to resemble real celebrities. Fans of beloved Chinese celebrities such as Dilraba Dilmurat (迪丽热巴) and Xiao Zhan (肖战) have taken to Weibo to protest this kind of “face swapping” (AI换脸) and demand protection of their idols’ likenesses.
An “AI face swap” (AI换脸): an AI actor on the left, Xiao Zhan on the right.
Yaoke responded that these images were “derived from massive datasets on the internet” and did not replicate any specific individual’s features.
This only fueled further backlash. To many, the use of “massive data” suggests that anyone, celebrity or ordinary person, could potentially have their image appropriated.
“The vlogger discovered the face swap infringement after a friend recognized his face while watching the AI drama”
In related recent trending news, a Chinese content creator (白菜汉服妆造), who typically wears traditional Chinese clothing in his videos, accused Hongguo (红果短剧), ByteDance’s short drama platform, of using his likeness without authorization to create a greedy villain in the AI-generated drama Taohua Zan (桃花簪).
On the left: greedy villain in the AI-generated drama Taohua Zan. On the right: Chinese content creator (白菜汉服妆造).
The vlogger discovered the face swap infringement after a friend recognized his face while watching the drama. The series was later taken offline.
One problem is that legal frameworks around AI lag behind technological development: by the time victims try to fight back legally, the technology has already moved on, making enforcement almost impossible.
Better Than the Real Thing?
Despite the backlash against the AI-fication of China’s short drama industry, some netizens are more optimistic about its development.
One blogger recently noted that as many people have already formed near friendship-like emotional dependencies on chatbots like ChatGPT—initially seen as cold technological tools—it is entirely possible that audiences will also develop genuine attachment to AI actors.
Current limitations that still make AI actors feel stiff, such as robotic voices or unnatural expressions, will likely diminish as the technology continues to improve.
Some call binging on AI short dramas their “guilty pleasure,” just to watch the AI actors perform. As one Weibo user wrote: “The female characters are just so beautiful—seriously, unbelievably beautiful. And they’re becoming more and more realistic: their facial expressions, especially the way their mouths move, are incredibly precise. Even the makeup looks stylish, and the hair feels very real. I honestly find myself wondering what eyeshadow and mascara they’re using.”
But support for AI performers in China’s drama industry is not limited to guilty pleasures and tech enthusiasts. For some, it also reflects a broader weariness with the perceived lack of quality among human actors.
“If the performances of real actors are already no better than AI, why not use AI actors instead?”
China’s film and television industry’s strong focus on fandom culture and good-looking idols, combined with limited budgets and a lack of formal training, has produced a wave of actors who are widely criticized for poor acting and a lack of professionalism. They are also frequently caught up in controversies, from refusing to memorize lines to relying heavily on green-screen acting.
These criticisms intensified during the 2021 major scandal involving former drama actress Zheng Shuang (郑爽), who had long faced criticism over her acting. A leaked recording at the time revealed she was earning a staggering 2.08 million RMB per day (roughly $320,000 then). Since then, “2.08 million” (208万) has become a derogatory label for fandom-driven actors who get high pays despite low-quality performances.
Amid weak acting and a distorted pay structure, many viewers have been calling for change. A common sentiment is: if their performances are already no better than AI, why not use AI actors, and give real actors a sense of crisis?
From Cancel Culture to AI Actors
But will the use of AI actors actually push the industry to improve human actors, or simply replace them?
Some Chinese industry insiders remain optimistic, arguing that AI can never fully replicate the nuance of human emotion. Among those who have spoken out are A-list actors such as Zhang Ruoyun (张若昀) and Feng Yuanzheng (冯远征), president of the Beijing People’s Art Theatre.
Others, however, are less optimistic.
“China’s “cancel culture” will eventually make AI actors an increasingly attractive bet for industry investors”
Agan Jackie (阿甘Jackie), a streamer working in the film industry, pointed out in a recent podcast that China’s “cancel culture” will eventually make AI actors an increasingly attractive bet for industry investors.
Although there’s “cancel culture” in the Western entertainment industry as well, the moral bar for Chinese celebrities is exceptionally high: anything from tax evasion to littering, simply being rude to fans could destroy an actor’s commercial value. The superstar Fan Bingbing (范冰冰), for example, disappeared from public view after a tax evasion scandal. Even after repaying her debts, she is still effectively banned from mainland productions.
China’s cancel culture is also closely tied to political red lines. One remark or move – intended or not – could end a career overnight. Zhang Zhehan (张哲瀚), an actor who quickly rose to fame a few years ago, vanished from the industry after photos surfaced of him posing near the Japanese Yasukuni Shrine.
For production companies and streaming platforms, such unpredictability creates a high-investment, high-risk environment. “Scandal-proof” AI actors offer a low-risk substitute.
This perhaps also plays a major role in why major streaming platforms such as Tencent and iQiyi are now promoting or encouraging the use of AI actors through AI feature film experiments, with the first fully AI-generated commercial blockbusters expected to be released later this year.
A Glimpse into the Future
At the recent China TV Drama Production Industry Conference, it became clear that the industry is undergoing something of an earthquake, with major changes ahead: while top actors will continue to function as traffic drivers, demand for human actors is expected to decline, and much of the mid- and lower-tier acting segment (such as extras and body doubles, but also voice actors) could largely disappear as it becomes replaceable by AI.
The microdrama industry, already heavily infiltrated by AI, offers a glimpse of the future of the broader TV and film industry when it comes to digital performers.
Microdrama actress Zhou Ye (周野) recently said that her pay has been slashed by 50% since AI-driven microdramas flooded the market, leaving many more actors jobless. For the 140,000 registered extras at Hengdian World Studios, China’s largest filming base, these developments could have far-reaching consequences.
Sometimes, these actors even sign away their fate—quite literally—as some companies now require “AI authorization” clauses as a condition of employment, effectively selling their digital likeness just to get a job. Companies can then create AI actors based on real individuals. Chinese talent management company Yuxiao Media (聿潇传媒) has introduced six such AI actors, directly modeled on real performers.
“The microdrama industry, already heavily infiltrated by AI, offers a glimpse of the future of the broader TV and film industry when it comes to digital performers”
One of these, influencer Han Anran (韩安冉), openly stated during a livestream that she had sold her likeness rights for AI creation. Playing into public criticism of her acting and heavily altered appearance, she said this was the best way to monetize her image. She even wondered that if her AI doppelganger were ever to win an award, whether she or the AI should go on stage to accept it.
Han Anran (韩安冉) on the left and the AI actress modeled after her on the right.
Perhaps nobody likes to see ordinary actors’ livelihoods being taken over by AI. But despite concerns about shrinking job opportunities, China is unlikely to see Hollywood-like strikes, as it lacks unions or organizations comparable to SAG-AFTRA or the AFL-CIO, which focus on labor representation beyond awards and industry guidelines.
For now, the only collective pushback against the full “AI-fication” of the industry comes from Chinese netizens themselves: boycotting platforms and production companies using AI actors, and voting with their views. Ultimately, only when public demand for realness becomes strong enough to threaten profits—or when laws finally catch up—will there be a sense of security for the people behind the screen—the real ones.
By Ruixin Zhang, with editing and additional context by Manya Koetse
©2026 Eye on Digital China/Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.
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Hasan Piker’s China Trip & the Unexpected Journey of a Chinese School Uniform to Angola
Hasan Piker’s controversial China tour, a Chinese school uniform resurfaces in Africa, a new winter hotspot, why Chinese elites ‘run’ to Tokyo, and more.
🌊 Signals — Week 47 (2025)
Part of Eye on Digital China, Signals highlights slower trends and online currents behind the daily scroll. This edition was sent to paid subscribers — subscribe to receive the next issue in your inbox.
For the coming two weeks, I’ll be traveling from Beijing to Chongqing and beyond (more on that soon) so please bear with me if my posting frequency dips a little. I’ll be sure to pick it up again soon and will do my best to keep you updated along the way. In the meantime, if you know of a must-try hotpot in Chongqing, please do let me know.
In this newsletter: Hasan Piker’s controversial China tour, a Chinese school uniform in Angola, a new winter hotspot, discussions on what happens to your Wechat after you die, why Chinese elites rùn to Tokyo, and more. Let’s dive in.
- 💰 The richest woman in China, according to the latest list by Hurun Research Institute, is the “queen of pharmaceuticals” Zhong Huijuan (钟慧娟) who has accumulated 141 billion yuan (over 19 billion USD). Women account for over 22% of Chinese billionaires (those with more than 5 billion RMB), underscoring China’s globally leading position in producing wealthy female entrepreneurs.
- 🧩 What happens to your WeChat after you die? A user who registered for NetEase Music with a newly reassigned phone number unexpectedly gained access to the late singer Coco Lee’s (李玟) account, as the number had originally belonged to her. The incident has reignited debate over how digital accounts should be handled after death, prompting platforms like NetEase and Tencent to reconsider policies on long-inactive accounts and take stronger measures to protect them.
- 📱 Although millions of viewers swoon over micro-dramas with fantasy storylines where rich, powerful men win over the “girl next door” through money and status, Chinese regulators are now stepping in to curb exaggerated plots featuring the so-called “dominant CEO” (霸道总裁) archetype, signaling stricter oversight for the booming short drama market.
- ☕ A popular Beijing coffee chain calling itself “People’s Cafe” (人民咖啡馆), with its style and logo evoking nationalist visual nostalgia, has changed its name after facing criticism for building its brand – including pricey coffee and merchandise – on Mao era and state-media political connotations. The cafe is now ‘Yachao People’s Cafe’ (要潮人民咖啡馆).
- 👀 Parents were recently shocked to see erotic ads appear on the Chinese nursery rhymes and children’s learning app BabyBus (宝宝巴士), which is meant for kids ages 0–8. BabyBus has since apologized, but the incident has sparked discussions about how to keep children safe from such content.
- 🧧The 2026 holiday schedule has continued to be a big topic of conversation as it includes a 9-day long Spring Festival break (from February 15 to February 23), making it the longest Lunar New Year holiday on record. The move not only gives people more time for family reunions, but also gives a huge boost to the domestic travel industry.
Hasan Piker’s Chinese Tour & The US–China Content Honeymoon
Livestreamer Hasan Piker during his visit to Tiananmen Square flag-rising ceremony.
It’s not time for the end-of-year overviews just yet – but I’ll already say that 2025 was the US–China ‘honeymoon’ year for content creation. It’s when China became “cool,” appealing, and eye-grabbing for young Western social media users, particularly Americans. The recent China trip of the prominent American online streamer Hasan Piker fits into that context.
This left-wing political commentator also known as ‘HasanAbi’ (3 million followers on Twitch, recently profiled by the New York Times) arrived in China for a two-week trip on November 11.
Piker screenshot from the interview with CGTN, published on CGTN.
His visit has been controversial on English-language social media, especially because Piker, known for his criticism of America (which he calls imperialist), has been overly praising China: calling himself “full Chinese,” waving the Chinese flag, joining state media outlet CGTN for an interview on China and the US, and gloating over a first-edition copy of Quotations from Chairman Mao (the Little Red Book). He portrays China as heavily misrepresented in the West and as a country the United States should learn from.
Hasan Piker did an interview with CGTN, posing with Li Jingjing 李菁菁.
During his livestreaming tour, Hasan, who is nicknamed “lemonbro” (柠檬哥) by Chinese netizens, also joined Chinese platforms Bilibili and Xiaohongshu.
But despite all the talk about Piker in the American online media sphere, online conversations, clicks, and views within China are underwhelming. As of now, he has around 24,000 followers on Bilibili, and he’s barely a topic of conversation on mainstream feeds.
Piker’s visit stands in stark contrast to that of American YouTuber IShowSpeed (Darren Watkins), who toured China in March. With lengthy livestreams from Beijing to Chongqing, his popularity exploded in China, where he came to be seen by many as a representative of cultural diplomacy.
IShowspeed in China, March 2025.
IShowSpeed’s success followed another peak moment in online US–China cultural exchange. In January 2025, waves of foreign TikTok users and popular creators migrated to the Chinese lifestyle app Xiaohongshu amid the looming TikTok ban.
Initially, the mass migration of American users to Xiaohongshu was a symbolic protest against Trump and US policies. In a playful act of political defiance, they downloaded Xiaohongshu to show they weren’t scared of government warnings about Chinese data collection. (For clarity: while TikTok is a made-in-China app, it is not accessible inside mainland China, where Douyin is the domestic version run by the same parent company).
The influx of foreigners — who were quickly nicknamed “TikTok refugees” — soon turned into a moment of cultural celebration. As American creators introduced themselves, Chinese users welcomed them warmly, eager to practice English and teach newcomers how to navigate the app. Discussions about language, culture, and societal differences flourished. Before long, “TikTok refugees” and “Xiaohongshu natives” were collaborating on homework assignments, swapping recipes, and bonding through humor. It was a rare moment of social media doing what we hope it can do: connect people, build bridges, and replace prejudice with curiosity.
Some of that same enthusiasm was also visible during IShowSpeed’s China tour. Despite the tour inevitably getting entangled with political and commercial interests, much of it was simply about an American boy swept up in the high energy of China’s vibrant cities and everything they offer.
Different from IShowSpeed, who is known for his meme-worthy online presence, Piker is primarily known for his radical political views. His China enthusiasm feels driven less by cultural curiosity and more by his critique of America.
Because of his stances — such as describing the US as a police state — it’s easy for Western critics to accuse him of hypocrisy in praising China, especially after a brief run-in with security police while livestreaming at Tiananmen Square.
Seen in broader context, Piker’s China trip reflects a shift in how China is used in American online discourse.
Before, it was Chinese ‘public intellectuals’ (公知) who praised the US as a ‘lighthouse country’ (灯塔国), a beacon of democracy, to indirectly critique China and promote a Western modernization model. Later, Chinese online influencers showcased their lives abroad to emphasize how much ‘brighter the moon’ was outside China.
In the post-Covid years, the current reversed: Western content creators, from TikTok influencers to political commentators, increasingly use China to make arguments that are fundamentally about America.
Between these cycles, authentic cultural curiosity gets pushed to the sidelines. The TikTok-refugee moment in early January may have been the closest we’ve come in years: a brief window where Chinese and American users met each other with curiosity, camaraderie, and creativity.
Hasan’s tour, in contrast, reflects a newer phase, one where China is increasingly used as a stage for Western political identity rather than a complex and diverse country to understand on its own terms. I think the honeymoon phase is over.
“Liu Sihan, Your School Uniform Ended Up in Angola”: China’s Second-Hand Clothing in Africa
A Chinese school uniform went viral after a Chinese social media user spotted it in Angola.
“Liu Sihan, your schooluniform is hot in Africa” (刘思涵你的校服在非洲火了) is a sentence that unexpectedly trended after a Chinese blogger named Xiao Le (小乐) shared a video of a schoolkid in Angola wearing a Chinese second-hand uniform from Qingdao Xushuilu Primary School, that had the nametag Liu Sihan on it.
The topic sparked discussions about what actually happens to clothing after it’s donated, and many people were surprised to learn how widely Chinese discarded clothing circulates in parts of Africa.
Liu Sihan’s mother, whose daughter is now a 9th grader in Qingdao, had previously donated the uniform to a community clothing donation box (社区旧衣回收箱) after Liu outgrew it. She intended it to help someone in need, never imagining it to travel all the way to Africa.
In light of this story, one netizen shared a video showing a local African market selling all kinds of Chinese school items, including backpacks, and people wearing clothing once belonging to workers for Chinese delivery platforms. “In Africa, you can see school uniforms from all parts of China, and even Meituan and Eleme outfits,” one blogger wrote.
When it comes to second-hand clothing trade, we know much more about Europe–Africa and US–Africa flows than about Chinese exports, and it seems there haven’t been many studies on this specific topic yet. Still, alongside China’s rapid economic transformations, the rise of fast fashion, and the fact that China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of textiles, the country now has an enormous abundance of second-hand clothing.
According to a 2023 study by Wu et al. (link), China still has a long way to go in sustainable clothing disposal. Around 40% of Chinese consumers either keep unwanted clothes at home or throw them away.
But there may be a shift underway. Donation options are expanding quickly, from government bins to brand programs, and from second-hand stores to online platforms that offer at-home pickup.
Chinese social media users posting images of school/work uniforms from China worn by Africans.
As awareness grows around the benefits of donating clothing (reducing waste, supporting sustainability, and the emotional satisfaction of giving), donation rates may rise significantly. The story of Liu Sihan’s uniform, which many found amusing, might even encourage more people to donate. And if that happens, scenes of African children (and adults) wearing Chinese-donated clothes may become much more common than they now are.
Laojunshan: New Hotspot in Cold Winter
Images from Xiaohongshu, 背包里的星子, 旅行定制师小漾
Go to Zibo for BBQ, go to Tianshui for malatang, go to Harbin for the Ice Festival, cycle to Kaifeng for soup dumplings, or head to Dunhuang to ride a camel — over recent years, a number of Chinese domestic destinations have turned into viral hotspots, boosted by online marketing initiatives and Xiaohongshu influencers.
This year, Laojunshan is among the places climbing the trending lists as a must-visit spot for its spectacular snow-covered landscapes that remind many of classical Chinese paintings. Laojunshan (老君山), a scenic mountain in Henan Province, is attracting more domestic tourists for winter excursions.
Xiaohongshu is filled with travel tips: how to get there from Luoyang station (by bus), and the best times of day to catch the snow in perfect light (7–9 AM or around 6–6:30 PM).
With Laojunshan, we see a familiar pattern: local tourism bureaus, state media, and influencers collectively driving new waves of visitors to the area, bringing crucial revenue to local industries during what would otherwise be slower winter months.
WeChat New Features & Hong Kong Police on Douyin
🟦 WeChat has been gradually rolling out a new feature that allows users to recall a batch of messages all at once, which saves you the frantic effort of deleting each message individually after realizing you sent them to the wrong group (or just regret a late-night rant). Many users are welcoming the update, along with another feature that lets you delete a contact without wiping the entire chat history. This is useful for anyone who wants to preserve evidence of what happened before cutting ties.
🟦The Hong Kong Police Force recently celebrated its two-year anniversary on Douyin (the Chinese version of TikTok), having accumulated nearly 5 million followers during that time. To mark the occasion, they invited actor Simon Yam to record a commemorative video for their channel (@香港警察). The presence of the Hong Kong Police on the Chinese app — and the approachable, meme-friendly way they’ve chosen to engage with younger mainland audiences — is yet another signal of Hong Kong institutions’ strategic alignment with mainland China’s digital infrastructure, a shift that has been gradually taking place. The anniversary video proved popular on Douyin, attracting thousands of likes and comments.
Why Chinese Elite Rùn to Japan (by ChinaTalk)
Over the past week, Japan has been trending every single day on Chinese social media in light of escalating bilateral tensions after Japanese PM Takaichi made remarks about Taiwan that China views as a direct military threat. The diplomatic freeze is triggering all kinds of trends, from rising anti-Japanese sentiment online and a ban on Japanese seafood imports to Chinese authorities warning citizens not to travel to Japan.
You’d think Chinese people would want to be anywhere but Japan right now — but the reality is far more nuanced.
In a recent feature in ChinaTalk, Jordan Schneider interviewed Japanese journalist & researcher Takehiro Masutomo (舛友雄大) who has just published a book about Japan’s new Chinese diaspora, explaining what draws Chinese dissidents, intellectuals, billionaires, and middle-class families to Tokyo.
The book is titled Run Ri: 潤日 Following the Footsteps of Elite Chinese Escaping to Japan (only available in Japanese and Traditional Chinese for now). (The word Rùn 润/潤, by the way, is Chinese online slang and meme expresses the desire to escape the country.)
A very interesting read on how Chinese communities are settling in Japan, a place they see as freer than Hong Kong and safer than the U.S., and one they’re surprisingly optimistic about — even more so than the Japanese themselves.
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Many thanks to Miranda Barnes for helping curate some of the topics in this edition.
— Manya
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