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Chapter Dive
Inside the Great Chinese Debate Over the Iran War
From official reactions and armchair generals to women’s rights defenders: China’s online discourse surrounding the war in Iran.
This is a deep dive into how the latest developments in Iran are being discussed and reflected on in China, focusing on four aspects: (1) China’s official response, (2) key dynamics within the online discourse, (3) clashing views among key opinion leaders, and (4) polarized reactions within grassroots online communities.
“We’re witnessing history.” That was one sentiment seemingly shared by almost everyone across Chinese social media as news broke of a joint US-Israeli strike on Iran on February 28. Over the past few days, military operations in Iran, Iran’s retaliatory strikes against US military bases across the Middle East, and the death of Supreme Leader Khamenei (哈梅内伊) have been top trending topics across virtually all Chinese social media platforms, from Kuaishou to Douyin and beyond.
Even with the Two Sessions about to start, roughly one in every five posts on Weibo’s main feed have been about Iran in the four days since the attack. Some hashtags there, such as “Khamanei Killed” (#哈梅内伊遇害#), have accumulated over a billion views in less than three days. News of a Chinese civilian killed in the attack reached over 250 million views in a day (#伊朗一名中国公民遇难#).
China’s online responses to the developments in Iran cannot be captured in a few sentences. Interpretations vary among netizens, online commentators, and official actors.
At the same time, sentiments have shifted in response to ongoing strikes and emerging reports, ranging from geopolitical and economic concerns to questions about what this war means for ordinary Chinese citizens.
● China’s Official Response and State Media Coverage
One element that has not changed over the past few days—and was to be expected—is China’s official disapproval of the US-Israeli strikes on Iran.
China-Iran relations have deepened since 1979, and the two countries have been economic and military allies for decades. China is Iran’s largest trading partner, and the Sino-Iranian partnership is strategically important to China, especially in light of the Belt and Road Initiative.
On Saturday, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded, stating that China was “highly concerned” about the military operations, calling for an immediate halt to attacks, urging against further escalation, and advocating a return to diplomatic negotiations. A day later, Beijing described the killing of Iran’s highest leader as a “severe violation of Iran’s sovereignty and security” and a trampling of the principles of the UN Charter.
In a phone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) called the attack “unacceptable” (‘不可接受”) and outlined China’s three-point position:
– Immediately cease military operations.
– Return to dialogue and negotiations as soon as possible.
– Jointly oppose these actions that ignore the rules-based order.
What’s particularly noticeable in the official Chinese hashtags surrounding developments in Iran is that they closely align with the perspective of Iranian media reports rather than Western coverage.
Beyond voicing China’s official expression of concern about the war and highlighting the safety and evacuation of Chinese citizens abroad, the majority of official media hashtags fall into four main categories. Although the reporting tone is relatively neutral, the selection of hashtags—and, because this is social media, the discussions they generate—reveals a clear editorial direction in how the US-Israel war on Iran is framed.
📢 1. Iranian Regime Shock: Continuity Over Collapse
State-media-backed narratives on Chinese social media frame the military attack on Iran as a systemic shock to the regime. While focusing on the leadership crisis, presented as directly caused by the US and indirectly fueled by “internal betrayal,” these stories ultimately prioritize themes of Iranian institutional continuity and the preservation of order, with no attention to popular resistance or potential grassroots power shifts.
Hashtag Examples:
- CCTV: “How Will Iran’s New Supreme Leader Arise?” #伊朗新的最高领袖如何产生#
- China News Service: “Iran Interim Leadership Committee Begins Work” #伊朗临时领导委员会开始工作#
- Global Times: “Internal Traitors Are Iran’s Deadly Danger” #伊朗的致命隐患是内奸#
- China News Service: “Iran’s Foreign Minister Says the US and Israel Cannot Overthrow the Iranian Regime” #伊外长称美以不可能推翻伊朗政权#
📢 2. Iran Fights Back: Agency & Retaliation
There is another set of hashtags that mainly focus on Tehran’s retaliation, military actions, and refusal to negotiate with the United States. These hashtags promote narratives about the agency and strength of Iran’s leadership, and its successful resistance to US-Israeli attacks.
Hashtag Examples:
- Global Times: “Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Promises Further Retaliation Against US and Israel” #伊朗最高领袖顾问承诺进一步报复美以#
- CCTV: “Iranian President Says Enemies Will Be Driven to Despair” #伊朗总统称将让敌人绝望#
- CCTV: “Iranian Missiles Break Through Israel’s Defense System” #伊朗导弹突破以色列防御系统#
- Global Times: “Iran Says It Won’t Talk to US” #伊朗称不会与美国进行谈判#
- CCTV: “Iran Says It’s Preparing for a Long-Term War” #伊朗称已准备好长期战争#
- China Blue News: “Iranian Foreign Minister Says: Though the Leader Was Killed, Iran Will Not Fall” #伊朗外长称领袖虽遇难但伊朗不会倒下#
📢 3. Focus on Iranian Suffering and Human Impact
A third overarching narrative seen in the hashtags is a moral one that highlights death & destruction brought by US–Israeli strikes in Iran and beyond, and their impact on civilians. Especially on Saturday, this perspective became prominent through many hashtags emphasizing how a girls’ elementary school in Minab, southern Iran, was reportedly hit by missiles during the military operation, resulting in around 150 deaths, according to Iranian media.
Hashtag examples:
- CCTV: “US–Israeli Attack Kills 555 People” #美以袭击致伊朗555人死亡#
- China Blue News: “Hospital Bombed: Iranian Medics Rescue Baby from Incubator” #医院被炸伊朗医护抢出保温箱内婴儿#
- Dazhong News: “Iranian People Do Their Best to Escort Chinese to Safety” #伊朗人民拼全力护送中国人安全离开#
📢 4. US–Israeli Actions as Global Destabilization
Another trend in Chinese media headlines over the past few days portrays US and Israeli actions as not only illegitimate and irresponsible but also as the trigger for wider global ripple effects. One post by People’s Daily claimed that the US and Israel are “undermining the foundations of peace established after World War II,” and a provocative AI video posted by China Daily, titled “The Bloody Arsenal,” suggested that the US only engages in bloody warfare for profit and power.
Hashtag examples:
- China News Service: “US-Israel Strike May Lead to a Global Food Crisis” #美以袭击伊朗或引发全球粮食危机#
- CCTV International: “America and Israel Can’t Attack Iran and then Walk Away” #美以不可能打了伊朗就一走了之#
- The Paper: “U.S. Strikes Iran Without Congressional Authorization” #美国未经国会授权空袭伊朗#
- Xinhua: “Iran Will Not Allow a Single Drop of Oil to Flow Out” #伊朗不允许一滴石油流出#
- CCTV: “Protests in US Capital Against US–Israel Strikes on Iran” #美首都集会抗议美以对伊朗动武#
“The Bloody Arsenal” AI video cover, by China Daily. Editor-in-charge, He Si (何思)
Notably, none of the approximately 450 Chinese media hashtags I have gathered and analyzed from Feb 28-March 4 portray Iranians as welcoming American intervention or celebrating Khamenei’s death. Nor do they express any pro-US or pro-Israeli sentiment, directly or indirectly.
Besides Iranian women appearing as victims of strikes, there are also no trending headlines highlighting Iranian women’s voices or women’s rights in this context.
Another viewpoint missing from these official media talking points is how the conflict is directly affecting China, diplomatically or economically, and how China’s own interests are being harmed in this war.
● Beyond the Headlines: Debate, Skepticism, and China-Focused Concerns
Although the main online narratives surrounding the war in Iran are led by Chinese media outlets (mainly CCTV, Xinhua, and China News Service), a lot is happening in the comment sections of state media social posts.
I find three things particularly noteworthy about these comment sections in general:
📌 There is room for relatively open discussion, but within a geopolitical frame
There is room for discussion. For many major international events, especially when China itself is involved, comment sections are often limited or completely closed. Content surrounding the Iranian conflict, however, has become one of the biggest drivers of engagement on Chinese social media in recent days.
In the past, some Iran-related news was heavily censored in China. For example, in 2022, the death of Mahsa Amini—the young woman who died after being detained and beaten by Tehran police for not properly wearing a hijab—made international headlines. The incident sparked outrage and protests worldwide. In China, however, coverage was limited, and there were no hashtags about Mahsa Amini on Chinese social media.
This time, reporting on developments in Iran focuses mainly on geopolitical aspects. By omitting certain grassroots elements (anti-regime demonstrations, pro-American sentiments), the Iranian war becomes less sensitive for China.
At the same time, the story is shaped and amplified in ways that reinforce Chinese narratives portraying the United States and Israel as irresponsible, unreliable aggressors driven by hegemony, while positioning China as a stable and trustworthy great power calling for peace in a multipolar world order.
📌 Netizens push back against state media narratives and are critical of Iran’s regime
Another noteworthy aspect is the overall tone of the comments. Especially in the first two days after the attacks began, I’ve seen far less overwhelming anti-Americanism than one might expect. Compared to other major international news moments, such as the US military operation in Venezuela, there appears to be not only less overt anti-American sentiment but also more skepticism toward Chinese state media reporting on the war, with many comments going against state media narratives.
When initial reports confirmed Khamanei’s death and the Israeli military claimed it had also killed other top Iranian regime officials, state media emphasized official condemnation and mourning, yet waves of Douyin users responded with thumbs-up and applause emojis.
On Kuaishou, some highly upvoted comments under videos of missile attacks, such as the Minab schoolgirl airstrike, questioned the authenticity of the reported facts. Others simply concluded that “war is always cruel.”
Some social media users also called out the algorithms of these short video platforms (Douyin & Kuaishou) for excessively pushing and amplifying Iranian military claims. Some joked that if they believed what their feeds were showing them, not only had the USS Abraham Lincoln already been sunk by Iran, but the United States itself had already been destroyed.
Sarcastic Weibo post: “On Douyin, the USS Lincoln aircraft carrier is about to be sunk by Iran,” responding to fake viral war footage circulating on the platform..
Other videos posted by state media outlets, such as Beijing Times, showing Iranian state media footage of people mourning the death of Khamenei, received top comments such as: “Why cry? Stand up and revolt,” or “They must have hired these people to cry, right?”
Following reports on the death of former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, popular comments praised the US-Israeli intelligence system for its strength and efficiency, while also expressing surprise at the perceived fragility of Iran’s regime following the decapitation of its senior leadership.
The fact that public sentiment is not uniformly condemning the US—and that many comments openly push back against official narratives—does not necessarily indicate a decline in anti-American sentiment on Chinese social media. Rather, it reflects clear negative sentiment toward the Iranian regime, making public responses to recent developments more complex and less monolithic than in previous international crises.
📌 Chinese netizens want to know what the Iran war means for China
Although official media reports and hashtags avoid focusing on how the Iranian conflict directly affects China, the war’s direct consequences are top of mind for netizens – not only do they want to know what it means for China, but also how it could affect them personally.
Perhaps as part of a broader simmering economic anxiety, people immediately began discussing commodity prices and personal financial planning after the attacks were reported.
Besides oil prices and crypto crashes, there’s been a special focus on gold buying. China is seeing a “gold rush” among Chinese consumers. Gold jewelry prices (金饰克价) have soared to 1,600 yuan (US$232) per gram, a historic milestone widely discussed on Chinese social media. Silver and crude oil prices have also risen sharply, while the cryptocurrency market has suffered a major decline, much to the dismay of those who admitted they had just invested.
In response to a video posted on Douyin by Chinese journalist Li Rui (李睿) showing Iranians weeping over Khamenei’s death, people in the comment sections joked:
💬 “I’m also weeping. My gold investment hadn’t recovered yet, and now I’ve lost money on it all over again 😭😭😭” (9300+likes)
💬 “I’m crying more. I just bought oil😭”
💬 “I also wanna cry. I just went all in on tech stocks on Friday.”
Footage shared by journalist Li Rui on Douyin showing Iranians mourning the loss of their Supreme Leader, while many reactions joked that they were also weeping due to rising prices and dropping stocks. Some even joked they found the carpet pretty, and where to get it.
Another popular talking point in this context is energy vulnerability and how the Iranian military locked down the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global energy.
The Strait of Hormuz is important to China because of its reliance on energy imports. In 2025, over 80% of Iran’s shipped oil went to China. Although this represents only about 13.4% of China’s total oil imports, China’s dependence on imported crude oil exceeds 70%, and roughly 40% of its total oil imports pass through Hormuz.
One widely shared Sina Finance article by “Wangye Talks Finance” (王爷说财经讯) predicted “severe turbulence” for the global energy market, leading to dramatic price jumps, not just in China’s domestic fuel windows, but also in driving costs and logistics, adding that “even courier fees and vegetable prices may climb.”
Other sources (Phoenix News, now offline) also covered other risks of supply disruptions, including how the war affects China’s chemical industry. (Iran is the world’s second-largest methanol producer, and over 60% of China’s methanol imports reportedly come from Iran.)
At the same time, there are also voices (such as blogger 枫冷慕诗, with 640k+ followers) who argue that Iran is not nearly as important to China as many believe, and that its role is often overestimated while its relationship with China is misunderstood.
Pointing to Iran’s inconsistent foreign policy, its relative weakness, and China’s limited economic ties with Iran (as well as its diversified energy imports), they argue that China likely anticipated the conflict and would not suffer catastrophic damage, even under the most extreme circumstances.
● Competing Narratives Among China’s Online Commentators
The complexity of US–Israeli military operations in Iran—and what they could mean for China and the rest of the world—is also reflected in the responses of China’s online key opinion leaders (KOLs). Rather than presenting a single narrative, many prominent commentators have offered sharply differing interpretations of the conflict, at times sparking heated debates among their followers.
🗣️ “The only one who can beat Hu Xijin is the Hu Xijin of the next day”
▪️Hu Xijin (胡锡进, former Global Times editor-in-chief, 24.9 million followers) immediately took to Weibo after the first reports came out about strikes on Iran. In one post, he called it “Iran’s tragedy” (“伊朗的悲剧”) that its people have to pay a heavy price for ambitions that exceed its actual strength and for confronting powers much greater than itself. He also proposed that it would be better for Israel to “move to Mars to find a place of peace there,” as the nation is “bound to fight one party after the other in the Middle East.”
But his focus shifted with the news of Khamenei’s death, moving from military escalation to the possible political outcomes in Iran. He described it as a historic turning point and leadership transition that could push the country either toward a harder anti-US/anti-Israel stance to preserve regime unity and deter domestic revolt, or toward a more conciliatory, American-friendly approach.
At the same time, Hu became a target of online jokes. When the first rumors of Khamenei’s death surfaced, he suggested the Iranian leader was probably keeping a low profile and preparing a public address that would be a major blow to the US and Israel, only to acknowledge the next day that Khamenei had indeed died. Later, Hu predicted that Iran’s new leader would be swiftly elected. As none of his predictions seem to be aging well, some netizens joked: “The only one who can beat Hu Xijin is the Hu Xijin of the next day” (“能打败胡锡进的是第二天的胡锡进”).
🗣️ “This is warfare with warmth and humanity, a new realm of the art of war”
▪️Zhu Zhiyong (朱智勇, blogger / formerly an author at the now-defunct China Elections and Governance academic website, 中国选举与治理, 210k followers) also shared a controversial opinion on March 1. He initially suggested that “Iran has taken the wrong path and made the wrong choices, it’s time to correct course,” and then praised the US-Israeli strategy.
💬 “Khamenei was precisely targeted and killed. Israel and the United States are writing a new era in the history of warfare: targeted elimination with minimal civilian and military casualties – this is warfare with warmth and humanity, a new realm of the art of war.”
The framing drew sharp pushback in comments from users who pointed to the bombing of the elementary school and called Zhu’s comments a rationalization of political assassination under international law.
His comments seem to have been deleted at the time of writing.
🗣️ “Iran should concentrate more missiles on striking Israel”
Other key opinion leaders and influencers took a completely different stance. Instead of praising the US and Israel, they praised Iranian counterattacks and promoted anti-American and anti-Israeli aggression.
▪️Sima Pinbang (司马平邦, military blogger, 7 million followers) suggested that Iran should focus more on missiles aimed specifically at Israel, and speculated that confiscated Starlink (星链) devices could give Iran a more useful targeting capability.
▪️Korolev (科罗廖夫, military affairs blogger, 6 million followers) made a bold post suggesting that Iran had only “one single move” left to counter both America and Israel, which would be a full-blown attack on Israel’s city centers, writing:
💬 “Iran should (..) exhaust all means to strike Israel’s population centers and civilian infrastructure. It should strike airports, fuel depots, electric power plants, transportation hubs, and communications centers..”
🗣️ “Iran’s counterattack against the US and Israel is something that will rewrite global military history”
▪️Luosifen Ge (螺蛳粉哥, a commentary account with 330k followers) shared another popular thread, where he suggested that Iran’s ability to bypass Israeli missile defenses reveals their weakness and serves as a lesson for China on the shortcomings of US/Israel military power.
💬 “The harder Iran’s missiles strike, the more the United States fears the nation-destroying capabilities of China and Russia. Many people have not realized that Iran’s counterattack against the US and Israel is an event that will rewrite global military history. (..) The reason is that Iran’s strikes represent the largest-scale missile war in human history, and also the first comprehensive real-combat stress test of modern strategic and tactical air-defense systems. (..) Iran used more than one hundred missiles to give the world a very real lesson. After this lesson, one conclusion is clear: the US homeland is no longer truly secure in the face of China and Russia.”
● The Armchair Generals and Women’s Rights Defenders on Chinese Social Media
While official media outlets are shaping China’s online discourse in response to developments in Iran, and key opinion leaders are sharing their views on the future of the conflict, there are also large numbers of commentators who focus on specific and often polarized views of the war in Iran.
⚔️ China’s online army of military strategists
Chinese social media users like the aforementioned “Luosifen Ge” are part of a large group of nationalist commentators with a specific interest in military affairs, who believe they know the best strategies for handling the war. We’ve seen them in action before, such as during the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war and in the years afterward.
Now, these supposed “military strategists” (军师们) have appeared in various online discussions, such as in the comment section under the Douyin account of the Iranian Embassy in China, sharing detailed plans and strategic outlines for how Iran should build defense lines, strike civilian infrastructure, and eliminate its enemies.
Some commenters even went so far as to list the names and exact coordinates of major Israeli desalination plants, concluding: “Don’t stop, attack until the coast.” Others listed multiple US bases in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, Iraq, and Syria, including geolocations and troop numbers, and described their strategic functions.
These “armchair generals” seem to use the conflict as a way to fulfill militaristic fantasies while also showing Chinese nationalist feelings.
They are the ones who want Iran to retaliate against America for Chinese gains. Maybe because they believe that if Iran collapses, China loses a key strategic buffer in the broader Middle East, or because they see Iran as a counterweight to challenge US dominance. Or perhaps because they view Iran as a prime military learning example for China, especially given that its main vulnerability is said to be not just military capacity but also counterintelligence failures.
“The weak get beaten. I suggest we significantly increase military spending this year,” some wrote. Such messaging is also in part boosted by Chinese official military accounts, writing things like: “The law of the jungle still prevails across human history. The moment vigilance slackens, it may bring irreversible disaster upon the nation and the people.”
On Kuaishou, one of China’s official military accounts posted a video featuring Chinese armed forces, with the text reading, “Only by being able to fight can you stop war.” The video clearly conveyed that “if war breaks out today,” China is prepared for it.
Screenshots from the video posted by China’s military account on Kuaishou: “If war breaks out today, only those who are able to fight can stop it.”
China’s “armchair generals,” who are mostly found on Bilibili besides Douyin, show little empathy for ordinary Iranians. Instead, their discussions focus on military analysis, market watching, and a general sympathy for Iran as the party being attacked by the US and Israel — not for its people as potential beneficiaries of regime change.
⚔️ “A new era has begun”: Iran through a women’s rights lens
On the other end of the online spectrum, there’s a group of social media users whose voices have also become prominent over the past few days. They focus not on the military aspect but on women’s freedom, and are generally positive about the US-Israeli strikes as a possible liberation for Iranian women.
These days, one of the most-liked non-state-media posts on Weibo about Iran was a video shared by one Weibo user (光影总管) showing an Iranian woman crying tears of joy after hearing about the death of Khamenei, shouting: “Khamenei is dead! Finally! We are free! I can’t believe it!” It received at least 81,000 likes before being taken offline.
Many commenters expressed empathy for ordinary Iranians like her who lived under Khamenei’s theocratic rule, writing things like “Iranian women and children are [finally] seeing some light” (“伊朗女人，儿童看到光明了”) and: “In a country where women get killed for wearing the wrong headscarf, how could she not be glad?”
Examples of images shared by netizens: Iranian women in the 1970s, a meme about women in Islam being covered up, and a post with an AI image suggesting women in Iran lived under a regime that’s like a prison.
One Douyin user posted a photo showing women drinking beer and seemingly celebrating the death of the Iranian supreme leader, writing “Iranian girls tear off their face coverings and reveal their true faces, how beautiful.”
“A new era has begun,” others wrote, and some even called Khamenei’s death, which coincided with the end of the Spring Festival, the “first joy of the year” (“开年第一喜”).
Image posted on Douyin discussing Iranian women removing their headscarves and celebrating: ““Iranian girls tear off their face coverings and reveal their real faces.” (Original photo source unverified).
Others who expressed delight over the death of Khamenei called him “an enemy of civilization, the rule of law, openness, and progress,” and took this as an opportunity to remember Mahsa Amini.
Netease creator “Legal Classroom” (@法律学堂) expressed his hope that the death of the supreme leader represents a form of historical justice: “Today, the Iranian girl Mahsa Amini may finally be able to rest in peace.”
In comment sections, people cheer on women who celebrate a new beginning: “Iran, stand strong!”
One social media user (狮子头萌萌) wrote:
💬 “Iranian women are different, okay? They have always stood at the very front of resistance, whether during the struggle against the imperial monarchy back then, or later in opposition to the religious regime. The mistake they made was believing that religion and modern democracy could coexist.”
Meanwhile, there are also voices condemning these sentiments. One well-known nationalist account (@子午侠士) criticized a Chinese-speaking woman in Tehran who livestreamed, rejoicing during her broadcast. She said that because the United States and Israel launched a war against Iran, the political climate inside the country has changed. On the streets of Iran, fewer women are wearing headscarves, and Iranian women are moving toward greater freedom.
The Chinese blogger argued: “A headscarf does not represent everything, and the happiness of a people cannot be measured solely by whether they wear one,” and suggested the woman was an “anti-regime traitor.”
Those who disagree responded: “Did you go to Iran? Did you live there? Did you ask them? Do you know what they want?” Others echo this sentiment: “Go and ask Iranian women.”
Another commenter added: “There is nothing wrong with wanting to fight for freedom.”
Aside from detailed discussions regarding Iran, “armchair generals,” and women’s rights advocates, celebrity news continues as usual. Although the conflict in Iran remains a major topic, a juicy new scandal involving a popular Chinese singer has begun dominating headlines.
As the initial shock over the war in Iran subsides, it is becoming just another part of the daily news cycle. It now competes with Chinese celebrity gossip and is being shaped, reshaped, and contested in ways that, perhaps, reveal more about China’s online discourse than about the events in Iran themselves.
Many thanks to Miranda Barnes for her research contributions to this newsletter. Stay tuned for an overview of other trending news (including that juicy celebrity story) in our next edition.
Best,
Manya
China Memes & Viral
Spring Festival Trend Watch: Gala Highlights, Small-City Travel, and the Mazu Ritual Controversy
Some stories going viral during the holiday season seem to exist in a recurring social cycle of their own.
🔥 China Trend Watch (week 8 | 2026) Part of Eye on Digital China by Manya Koetse, China Trend Watch is an overview of what’s trending and being discussed on Chinese social media. The previous newsletter was a chapter dive into the story of China’s latest hospital scandal. This edition was sent to paid subscribers — subscribe to receive the next issue in your inbox.
The 26-year-old, who described her own family background as “pretty good,” shared her experience on social media. She said she had already known that her new handsome boyfriend came from a lower-income family. But after traveling to his hometown in Jiangxi for the Spring Festival and seeing what his mother had prepared for the New Year’s dinner, she was so shaken that she immediately booked a train ticket back to Shanghai.
Here is a screenshot of her post and the picture of the dinner she posted:
This is actually a story that exploded on Chinese social media back in 2016, and its virality is quite typical of the period surrounding Chinese New Year — it is always a very special time when it comes to the kinds of trends that unfold.
It often feels as though stories simmering in the background suddenly boil over during the holiday season. Digital shifts become more visible, cultural traditions take on new meanings, consumer hypes mushroom across the country, and seemingly insignificant social topics can grow enormous: a road rage incident, a noteworthy TV moment, or that one family’s New Year’s dinner.
What’s perhaps most striking is that the story of that Shanghai woman (who really did break up with her boyfriend after that dinner) could have easily been a trending topic during this year’s Spring Festival, and she would likely face the same backlash today (people found her disrespectful and snobbish). In fact, some stories that went viral during the holiday season years ago still resurface today, as if they exist in a recurring social cycle of their own.
Take the nagging questions from family and nosy neighbors about why the single sons & daughters returning to their hometowns for the New Year are still not married, for example; it’s a topic that somehow comes up every Spring Festival. The pressure caused by these “interrogations” have led some single people to rent a boyfriend or girlfriend to bring home to meet the parents — a story covered by the media for years.
People still “rent a partner” to avoid another year of awkward questions about their (non-existent) love life. What has changed is the price. Ten years ago, one could rent a boyfriend or girlfriend for about 500 yuan (around $75). This week, social media reports suggested that these so-called “life actors” (生活演员) — who rent out their services as a pretend partners — now charge up to 3,000 yuan per day (about $435) (#深圳除夕当天租男友3000元一天#).
All of this unfolds because so much happens around Chinese New Year (春节 Chūnjié) at once. While China is transforming rapidly, some things remain remarkably consistent. The holiday is not just a peak moment for consumer culture and travel, it is also the year’s major moment for the box office and for China’s largest live televised event, the Spring Festival Gala, which reflects what matters not only to commercial sponsors but especially to the Communist Party. At the same time, it is a period of family reunions and homecomings for those who may not have other chances during the year to visit their hometowns.
From living rooms to long train rides, from fear-of-missing-out to social media memes, from pressures and expectations to fun and traditions, this period offers a concentrated snapshot of China’s current momentum, revealing social anxieties, political priorities, and pop culture obsessions all at once.
Let’s dive into some of the other trends that have been especially noteworthy during this year’s Spring Festival.
Quick Scroll
-
- 🧊 China’s short track speed skating, historically one of China’s strongest Olympic teams, has exited the 2026 Milan Olympics with what’s called “the worst results in 28 years.”
- 🥇 Meanwhile, the gold medals for Xu Mengtao (徐梦桃) & Wang Xindi (王心迪) in freestyle ski aerials, Su Yiming (苏翊鸣) in snowboard slopestyle, and Ning Zhongyan (宁忠岩) in 1500m speed skating were widely celebrated online.
- 🇺🇸 The much-discussed Trump–Xi meeting has been confirmed for late March, scheduled from March 31 to April 2. Trump’s planned trip will mark the first U.S. presidential visit to China since his own 2017 visit.
- 🍿 China’s 2026 Spring Festival box office has surpassed the 4 billion yuan (US$550 million) mark. The February 15–23 holiday window — one of the most important periods for the Chinese film market — saw racing comedy Pegasus 3 (飞驰人生3) top the charts this year.
- 🎬 One article called it the “hell yeah!” movie of the year. Blades of the Guardians (镖人) by Xu Xianzhe (许先哲) is the hardcore martial arts film that outperformed its opening-day numbers and became an audience favorite.
- 🏮 Beijing’s Yuanmingyuan (Old Summer Palace) has become a viral hit for its 4.6 km illuminated route with thousands of lanterns lighting up at 17:30 each evening.
- 🌕 Less popular: yellow lanterns used for New Year decorations in various cities triggered criticism online for looking “unfestive” or even representing “mourning colors,” leading local authorities to order a swap back to traditional red after the backlash.
- 🕯️ Two explosions in Jiangsu and Hubei brought the total number of deaths from fireworks-related incidents for the first week of the 2026 Spring Festival holiday to at least 20.
What Really Stood Out This Week
The Highlights of the 2026 Spring Festival Gala
Earlier this week, the 44th edition of the China Media Group Spring Festival Gala took place (see our liveblog of the entire show here). At its peak, an estimated 400 million people were simultaneously watching the 4.5-hour show, which, as usual, contained a variety of performances ranging from dance and song to comedy and acrobatics.
So, what was different this year?
In case you’re not an avid watcher of the Gala—which I fully get—let’s get one thing straight first: the show overall is highly predictable and follows comparable year-on-year patterns. There is always a performance featuring different ethnicities; besides the mainland entertainment elite, there must be a variety of older and younger singers from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao; there is a military song; there is a traditional opera element; and there is always a comic skit that everyone finds cringeworthy. In these respects, 2026 was right on track with previous years.
However, there were definitely some noteworthy aspects to this year’s Gala. Some are significant because they mark a subtle, broader shift, while others are more obvious.
✦ First, the theme. The show was titled “Galloping Steeds, Unstoppable Force” (骐骥驰骋 势不可挡). Every year has a theme, often nodding to the zodiac sign and usually focusing on messaging such as “a thriving nation,” “reunion,” or, as in 2020, “Together Realizing the Moderately Prosperous Dream.” This year’s theme felt less modest, aligning with a larger narrative about China’s role on the world stage today as an “unstoppable force.”
✦ The role of the director. The influence of the show’s director seems to have been somewhat overlooked in coverage of the Gala. Yu Lei (于蕾, b. 1979) is not only the first female director in the show’s 44-year history but also the first to lead the production for four consecutive years. As chief director, Yu Lei has established a very identifiable aesthetic framework, perfecting a style of show that merges Chinese tradition with high technology. Outstanding examples of this include the beautiful and innovative 2024 “Koi Carp” (锦鲤) dance, and the 2022 “painting” dance “Only This Green” (只此青绿) inspired by a famous Chinese handscroll.
This year featured even more segments blending traditional inspiration with state-of-the-art technology, from the creative “Celebrating the Flower Goddess” (贺花神, watch here) to the Xinjiang Dance Troupe’s “Silk Road Ancient Rhymes” (丝路古韵, watch) and dancer Zhang Han’s beautiful performance of “Chasing Shadows” (追影) (link).
These performances align with the broader Guochao (国潮) trend—literally “national trend”—and the promotion of traditional culture seen over the past years. Under Yu Lei’s guidance, this cultural pride is fused with technological innovation to create a new kind of Chinese aesthetic that is indeed “unstoppable.” If we don’t recognize this as the trend of today, it will certainly be the new normal of tomorrow.
✦ Then the global outreach. This is the first time I’ve seen the show so deliberately cater to foreign audiences. A promo added to the YouTube livestream explicitly stated: “This is where it gets cool, this is where the future meets timeless Eastern aesthetics. This is where we feel warmth, where everyone belongs. When the CMG Spring Festival Gala begins, you are coming home.”
This past year was a turning point where China became “cool” among younger Western audiences (see my piece on Becoming Chinese) — this soft-power effect is being fully embraced by Chinese state media, and the Gala is part of this. Beijing is increasingly positioning the event as a global celebration rather than just a national one, which explains the inclusion of more foreign performers—from Lionel Richie and John Legend to Hélène Rollès, Westlife, the Hungarian National Folk Ensemble, Spanish dancer Jesús Carmona, and the Austrian acrobatic troupe Jonglissimo.
✦ Lastly, AI and robotics. Perhaps the most obvious shift was the heavy use of AI and robotics, which became a major talking point on X and in foreign media. While the Gala has already incorporated robots for two decades (!), this year marked the first time they participated across almost every genre, from dance and comedy sketches to martial arts and short films.
The abundance of robots was driven by a historical first: four domestic humanoid robot companies—Unitree Robotics (宇树科技), Noetix Robotics (松延动力), MagicLab (魔法原子), and Galbot (银河通用)—all appeared as official corporate partners. We also saw the world’s first martial arts performance by a fully autonomous humanoid robot cluster.
Although the robots were a highlight, they were also a point of online critique for being a bit “overdone.” Judging by social media comments, many viewers still preferred the classic, iconic performers—like pop superstar Faye Wong (王菲) or the legendary comedian Cai Ming (蔡明), who has performed at the Gala for decades.
So despite all the new technological developments and the clear look into the future, audiences still seemed to love the performances that leaned toward the past, highlighting a bit of a ‘battle’ between innovation and nostalgia.
The Travel Trends to Know
There are two moments in the year that are the major travel periods for China, reflecting the current trends of the tourism industry: the National Day holiday and the Spring Festival holiday. These periods usually reveal trends that were either simmering and have now expanded, or upcoming trends surfacing for the first time.
Some things don’t really change, such as cities like Beijing, Chengdu, Chongqing, and Shanghai being among the most popular domestic destinations. (As for international locations, Seoul, Bangkok, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Ho Chi Minh City, and Bali top those lists).
These are some noticeable trends for this moment:
✦ A big love for small cities has been noticeable among China’s younger travelers recently. This is a different trend from what used to be the post-Covid “special forces travel” (特种兵), which was the kind of tourism where travelers would do as much as possible within a short time and limited budget, almost like crossing destinations off a bingo card.
Now, travelers are turning more to “hidden gems” or what have been called “dark horse destinations” in Chinese media (黑马目的地). The goal is not just to cross them off a list, but to slow down and experience local culture. Folk culture, markets, and arts & crafts have seen a rise in popularity.
Some examples are Jieyang and Chaozhou which, together with Shantou, lie in eastern Guangdong. Some of these places are seeing the fastest tourism growth rates in the entire country, thanks to strong local folk customs and food culture, with people preferring homestays or Airbnb-style holiday rentals for an authentic, local experience.
Cities like Jingdezhen, Kaifeng, Quanzhou, and Zigong—all previously not particularly known as top destinations—are also new “breakout” cities this season.
Another example is Chongzuo in Guangxi, located along the China–Vietnam border, with its Zhuang ethnic minority culture, karst mountains, rivers, and rural scenery.
All of this represents a big shift in China’s domestic tourism industry, offering new experiences to Chinese travelers while also boosting the local economies of these places.
While these new destinations all sound lovely and peaceful, posts on Xiaohongshu show that the viral nature of these “hidden gems” have also caused them to be exceptionally busy during this season.
✦ Reverse Spring Festival (反向过年) has been a trend for several years, but it has been especially prominent this year. It is the trend where, instead of children traveling from big cities to visit parents in their hometowns, the parents are coming to celebrate the New Year with their kids in medium-sized or larger cities. This has also led to the rising popularity of Guangzhou as a Spring Festival destination.
What you also see are families all traveling together to a third location outside of both their hometowns and work-based cities.
✦ “Going the opposite way” is also a popular travel trend that has particularly emerged this year, with people from China’s south traveling to the north and people from the north traveling to the south—one group seeking an experience of ice and snow, while the other wants warmth and sunshine.
The locations that stand out for this are Harbin in the north, with its Harbin Ice and Snow World (哈尔滨冰雪大世界) holding a spot in the national top-ten scenic spots (although, unfortunately, Harbin has seen rising temperatures this winter, leading to melting snowmen).
The tourists from the south who come to visit Habrin are nicknamed “Little Southern Potatoes” (南方小土豆) for being all bundled up in brand-new puffy coats.
In the south, Yunnan’s Kunming has seen a surge in popularity, along with Lijiang, Xishuangbanna, and Dali, which all saw a drastic increase in bookings.
Especially Noteworthy Online Discussions
Door-to-door Pet Sitting as Emerging Business Model
✦ During China’s 2026 Spring Festival travel rush, a specific phenomenon gained traction on Chinese social media in this pet-loving era: “door-to-door pet-sitting” (上门喂宠). This emerged as one of the holiday’s most surprisingly profitable side gigs after Shanghai pet sitter Huan Cong (桓聪) told Jiupai News (九派新闻) that his five-person team would complete some 2,000 jobs within the twenty-day holiday period, with an expected revenue of 160,000 yuan ($22,120).
Huan is not the only one profiting from this lucrative business—pet sitters across the country are cashing in during the Spring Festival. This trending story reflects the massive scale of China’s pet economy, an industry growing year-on-year as those born in the post-90s and post-00s now comprise the majority of pet owners.
At the same time, digging a bit deeper reveals the reality behind the trend. While relatively lucrative, the work is tiresome; Huan sometimes visits 55 households in a single day to ensure he and his team can feed all their customers’ dogs and cats. It might be good business, but it’s certainly not easy.
An Unusually Bad Karma Story
✦ One story that has been especially noteworthy this week involves a religious ceremony dedicated to honoring the Chinese sea goddess Mazu (妈祖). A protector of fishermen and sailors, Mazu has millions of worshippers in eastern and southeastern parts of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan; regions where people have traditionally relied on the ocean for their livelihoods.
On February 18, the second day of the Chinese New Year, something unusual happened during the annual Mazu procession in Shishi Village (拾石村) in Zhanjiang, Guangdong province.
A unique local tradition involves the divine selection of a Mazu “messenger,” a child believed to serve as a vessel for the goddess’s spirit during the procession. This is decided through the ritual of shèngbēi (圣杯) throws or “divination cup” tosses: children throw crescent-shaped wooden blocks, and based on how they land, the child believed to have the closest connection to Mazu is selected to take the place of the statue during the parade.
For the past eight years, the same girl, now 14 years old, had reportedly been selected as the spirit medium through this sacred ritual.
However, this year, a wealthy businessman surnamed Xu (许)—the financial sponsor of the procession—suddenly replaced the chosen girl with his own son. That is where things started going wrong.
According to local reports, the boy seemed unfamiliar with ceremony protocols. He misaligned offerings on the ritual table, stood in the wrong position at the start of the procession, and accidentally stepped on a ritual spot reserved for divine generals, which living participants are forbidden from entering.
Most importantly, the shèngbēi ritual, in which the boy had to seek Mazu’s approval through the blocks, kept giving the same negative result (nùbēi 怒杯) for no less than eight consecutive times. There are three possible outcomes, and the statistical chance of throwing the same negative result eight times in a row was seen as a sign of extreme divine disapproval. People were eventually too afraid to let the boy try a ninth time.
As a result, with no “green light” from Mazu, the bearers of the sedan chair needed for the procession refused to lift it, and the entire ritual halted.
Seeing no other choice, organizers got the girl to come back. Upon her first shèngbēi throw, a valid result was immediately obtained and the sedan chair was reportedly lifted without any difficulties. The procession then proceeded with both children riding the sedan chair together (which also prompted criticism from locals for being a further deviation from tradition). After the procession concluded, the girl was visibly distressed.
As this story has gone viral, many see it as a sign that wealth cannot buy a way into a sacred ritual—the gods simply do not agree, and money cannot buy everything.
Consequently, Mazu and the shèngbēi ritual have unexpectedly become hot topics.
The actress Liu Tao (刘涛), who once played Mazu in a popular television drama, has resurfaced as a “lucky meme” during this holiday. Liu Tao’s relationship to Mazu goes beyond just her role in the series. During the filming, she allegedly also went to the temple and performed the traditional divination ritual and got three positive throws in a row, which was seen as a positive omen for her taking the role.
She’s become a celebrity ambassador for Mazu culture, something that is now highlighted by netizens as the Shishi Village story trends. People have begun using Liu Tao’s image as Mazu as an auspicious phone wallpaper.
The irony, of course, is that the Xu family spent a fortune trying to force Mazu’s blessing, while millions of ordinary netizens are now getting their “lucky fix” for free through their Liu Tao meme. How very “Spring Festival” is that? 🏮
—That’s a wrap. Many thanks to Ruixin Zhang and Miranda Barnes for their input on this newsletter, and for managing to watch the full 4.5 hours of the Spring Festival Gala together with me!
I’m taking a few days off now for some travel, but expect to be back with a new trend newsletter for you next weekend.
See you next edition.
Best,
Manya
Eye on Digital China, by Manya Koetse, is co-published on Substack and What’s on Weibo. Both feature the same new content — so you can read and subscribe wherever you prefer. Substack offers community features, while What’s on Weibo provides full archive access. If you’re already subscribed and want to switch platforms, just get in touch for help. If you no longer wish to receive these newsletters, or are receiving duplicate editions, you can unsubscribe at any time.
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Bruce Humes
October 7, 2017 at 9:32 am
It’s quite revealing that — at least in the Weibo comments cited — all the potential “solutions” are limited to family members.
There is no mention of hiring a baby-sitter, part-time amah or full-time nanny. How come?
Obviously, many Chinese households couldn’t afford the latter, but in 1st- and 2nd-tier cities, they can. In Hong Kong and Taiwan, many middle-class families hire part- or full-time nannies to do housework and look after children. Hong Kongers in particular do so, and insist on a Filipina or Indonesian female who is both truly caring about children, and can teach them English to boot!
Among the Chinese mothers I know in Shenzhen and Guangzhou, however, hiring someone from outside the family to look after one’s children is considered very problematic, and most refuse to do so. Why? Because they are afraid their hires will 1) Steal from them, 2) Mistreat their children if a relative is not present, and/or 3) Kidnap their children and sell them to traffickers.
Tells you a lot about contemporary Chinese society, doesn’t it?