Recently, news broke that two Chinese nationals were captured by Ukrainian forces while fighting on the Russian side in eastern Ukraine. Their capture quickly made international headlines, not just because of their nationality but also because of how they allegedly got there.

As I worked on an article about this case, I kept running into something noteworthy: the recurring assumption that if something is visible on Chinese social media, it must have the government’s tacit approval.

Here, I’ll briefly get into more about the story and why that assumption misses the mark.

Earlier this month, Ukrainian President Zelensky announced that two Chinese nationals fighting for Russia on Ukrainian soil were captured by Ukrainian troops. On Monday, April 14, the two Chinese men – handcuffed and guarded – spoke during a press conference in Kyiv. They were identified as the 33-year old Wang Guangjun (王广军) from Henan and the 26-year old Zhang Renbo (张仁波) from Jiangxi.

Zhang and Wang during the press conference, image via Weibo user @边沁-Bentham.

Zelensky has claimed that at least “several hundred” more Chinese citizens are fighting on Russia’s side in Ukraine. On April 9, he stated that Ukraine had obtained the surnames and passport details of 155 Chinese mercenaries recruited by Russia through social media platforms.

The Kyiv Independent reported that both Wang and Zhang stated that they were not sent to the war by the Chinese government, and joined of their own free will.

While Wang claims he joined the Russian army after seeing an advertisement on Chinese social media, Zhang said he came to Russia in December for construction work and was recruited for military service there. Both men joined for monetary gain. Wang said he was promised to make $2,000-$3,000 per month, but that his phone and bank card were later taken from him.

The news that Chinese nationals were captured while fighting on the Russian side made international headlines — particularly the claim that Russia is recruiting Chinese mercenaries through social media, which has become a focal point in various media reports, such as this one by The Guardian, this article by ABC News, and this video report by RFE.

Some reports, including the latter, suggest a link between online recruitment ads circulating on Chinese social media, Beijing’s stance toward Russia, and the fact that these ads have not been censored. Zelensky himself stated that Russia has been recruiting Chinese citizens via social media, and that “official Beijing knows about this.”

RFE writes:

📰✍️ “Zelenskyy himself has stopped short of saying the Chinese government authorized the mercenaries’ involvement in Ukraine, but he has accused Beijing of turning a blind eye to Russia’s recruitment of its citizens.

And there’s some indication Chinese authorities haven’t made a concerted effort to stop them.

The Chinese Internet is heavily censored, and social media is closely monitored and controlled, yet many of these recruitment posts — some of which are months old — are still online and being shared.”

Over recent years, I have noticed a recurring assumption in English-language media coverage when it comes to interpreting China’s stance on certain issues — from international conflicts to social issues: if something is not censored, it is assumed to be officially condoned.

A 2023 report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), for example, argued that China needs to take more robust measures to combat anti-Black racism on social media platforms. The report suggested that Chinese authorities systematically fail to properly address this issue, and that platforms like Bilibili, Kuaishou, Weibo, and Xiaohongshu should intensify efforts to remove problematic content that perpetuates racial stereotypes, belittles interracial relationships, impersonates Black people, etc.

One radio editor who later called me to talk about this report also suggested that surely, if it was not being censored, the authorities must approve of it?

Similar discussions came up when there was a significant rise in anti-Jewish sentiments and anti-Semitic posts on Chinese social media after the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War. An opinion piece in the Washington Post by Josh Rogin titled “Fueling online antisemitism is China’s new tool against the West” argued that, because antisemitism was ubiquitous on Chinese social media, it thus must be promoted by Chinese authorities — suggesting that this is how it works “on China’s internet, where no opinion is allowed to flourish without government approval.”

Rogin wrote:

📰✍️ “This unprecedented surge in antisemitism online in China could be possible only with the blessing of the Chinese government, which appears to be using anti-Jewish hate as a tool of its anti-U.S. and anti-Western diplomacy.”

“Of course, not all criticism of Israel is antisemitic, and antisemitism existed in China before Oct. 7. But via its internet censorship regime and state-controlled media, Chinese authorities have been fueling the flames of anti-Jewish hate online.”

The piece also quoted Aaron Keyak, the US Deputy Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism, in saying:

📰✍️ “What we saw after October 7 was a drastic change in the social media within China. The antisemitism became more unplugged, more free-flowing,” (…) “And because we know that the Chinese internet is not free, that’s a conscious decision by the Chinese government to allow that kind of rhetoric to be greatly increased.”

The pervasiveness of both anti-Black racism and anti-Semitic content on Chinese social media raises significant concerns. Belonging to a different category of concern, it’s understandable that certain Russian army recruitment ads circulating on various Chinese platforms trigger some alarm bells.

However, this line of arguing that lumps together the censoring policies of various Chinese social media platforms and Beijing’s official stance is not only flawed — it is also heading into somewhat Kafkaesque territory, where Western media outlets, generally rooted in free speech ideals, end up criticizing China not for censoring too much, but for not censoring enough.

There are several misunderstandings in the line of thinking that if something circulates on Chinese social media, it must ipso facto be tolerated by the authorities.

 
🔍 1. Mistaking China’s Censorship Model for the Western One
 

First, it conflates how censorship operates on Chinese platforms with how moderation works on Western platforms.

Those who are not used to surfing around Weibo, Douyin, Kuaishou, and others might be surprised to find just how much questionable content remains uncensored on Chinese social media. From graphic violence to deadly accidents, bloody war videos, raunchy images, doxxing, discrimination, or dangerous stunts — scrolling these apps can sometimes seriously be bad for your blood pressure.

At the same time, doomscrolling Chinese social media also makes you realize how tightly platforms like Facebook, TikTok, YouTube, or Instagram are moderated (TikTok’s parent company is Chinese, but its community guidelines are tuned to align with EU/US standards). Even the slightest hint at shocking or sexual content or violence could get you flagged on Western social media.

(For example, one video I made years ago about a Chinese woman intentionally tripping a 4-year-old in a restaurant got flagged by YouTube for “graphic violence,” another post I made about a deadly flash flood in the mountains of Pengzhou was removed by TikTok for “promoting dangerous activities”).

The emergence of online videos showing military violence, assaults against women, bullying among schoolchildren, or irresponsible pet ownership does not suggest that Beijing tacitly endorses violence, misogyny, campus aggression, or animal cruelty. Rather, it reflects the realities of a vast and multifaceted online ecosystem where millions of videos, images, and posts get uploaded every single day, and where, with over a billion users, not every corner of social media is going to be wholesome or tightly controlled.

It also means that some issues, even though they could be considered sensitive, are not prioritized by social media moderating systems (whether automated or human) or by Chinese regulators.

 
🔄 2. China’s Censorship is Selective and Shifts Over Time
 

Censorship in China is not static. It constantly changes in response to evolving and changing social, economic, and (geo)political contexts.

There are many laws & regulations regarding online content, involving the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and other regulatory bodies, which set rules for internet content — from Weibo posts to online advertisements, from livestreaming to online series and web novels. Social media platforms moderate their own content in various ways, adhering to state regulators and self-censoring through AI algorithms and human reviewers.

Outside the regulatory framework, there is a lot of grey area. For state regulators, social media censorship is just one way to protect national security, Party power, economic stability, and cultural cohesion. For Chinese platform businesses, it is a necessary evil — they must navigate complicated dynamics between keeping social media flourishing while keeping (cyberspace) authorities content. If they don’t, they risk punishment, which affects business. They are busy enough moderating priority content and generally won’t touch content that poses no immediate threat to their operations, even if it could be considered sensitive.

This doesn’t mean censorship cannot fluctuate with the times — on the contrary, it changes all the time. Something that once seemed unharmful might later be perceived as disruptive and still get censored.

In some ways, there is overlap with how companies like Meta (Facebook, Instagram) moderate their content; they also use a combination of AI tools and human moderators to identify and remove content. However, the regulatory frameworks from which they operate are closely tied to their respective legal, historical, and social contexts, resulting in very different censorship practices.

One thing that is prevalent in the guidelines of companies like Meta or Google is the need to keep content far away from explicit material or violent and shocking content, in order to remain “advertiser-friendly” within their socio-cultural and legal contexts. This is very different from the Chinese online environment, where one of the main priorities for social media companies is to avoid politically controversial or subversive content to keep things as “Party-friendly” as possible.

 
🌏 3. Imposing Western Ethical Standards on China
 

An (overlapping) misunderstanding behind the suggestion that any sensitive or questionable content that emerges on Chinese social media must be tolerated by the authorities is that Western media outlets are projecting Western ethical standards onto China’s internet governance.

Assuming that all sensitive content must be immediately censored or flagged — because that’s what would happen under Western frameworks — ignores China’s different historical, political, and social contexts.

China’s censorship is not intended to please the West; it serves domestic political, cultural, economic and social goals under the Party’s leadership. Besides the censorship, there’s a major propaganda apparatus that goes beyond deleting posts and focuses on guiding public opinion and controlling the official narrative.

Criticizing China for censoring too little on issues that are of concern in the West misses the point. China’s censorship serves Chinese interests, not the moral priorities of the international community.

Furthermore, telling the country known for having the world’s most sophisticated censorship apparatus that it is “not censoring the right things” is not only somewhat Orwellian – it also reinforces existing frustrations in China that the West often acts as a morally superior enforcer on the global stage, pointing fingers at China despite ongoing instances of violence, racism, and injustice within their own societies.

Back to the article I’ve been working on and the case of Chinese mercenaries Wang, Zhang, and the Russian recruitment ads circulating on Chinese social media. These army recruitment ads definitely circulated (example, example, example, example), although not ubiquitously — they mostly appeared within specific circles on platforms like Douyin or Zhihu, and mainly if you were looking for them. Often, they seemed to be shared more for their novelty or news value rather than for direct recruitment purposes. (Similarly, some Ukrainian recruitment ads were also shared online.)

Before Zelensky’s big reveal, there had already been speculation about whether Chinese nationals might be serving in Russian military units. In March 2025, some influential X accounts claimed that footage from Donetsk showed Chinese individuals wearing Russian military uniforms. At the time, as you can read here, this suggestion caused some banter and disbelief on Chinese social media. Some users suggested that the men seen in the footage could be cosplayers or Chinese vloggers who had traveled to Russia to play-act as soldiers — since military cosplay and related tourism are popular in certain online niches — the same niches where those Russian recruitment ads were being shared.

Stills from the video that made its rounds online in early March 2025.

Recent reports and various online accounts, however, indicate that Chinese nationals fighting in the Russian army is more than just cosplay — it is a reality, although it remains unclear how many people are actually involved. At the same time, the “cosplay” and “military enthusiast” (军迷COS) theory is not far-fetched and seems to hold water in some cases. In fact, these two realities may very well coexist.

In response to Zelensky’s statements about Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine and Beijing’s alleged role, one sentiment raised online is that the issue is being purposely “hyped” by foreign media and by Zelensky himself.

This idea was echoed in some popular internet posts. In one post that circulated on social media (Zhihu, Weibo), author Liu Renzhi (刘任之) on the WeChat account of Russian Big World (俄语大世界) wrote: “Why does Zelensky continue to hype up the incident of Chinese nationals captured by the Ukrainian army? There are three reasons” (“泽连斯基为何要持续炒作中国公民在乌军被俘事件？有三方面原因”).

In this piece, Liu suggests that Zelensky intentionally amplified the story about Chinese nationals in the Russian army — among other things, by posting at least two videos about them on social media (link, link) — even though, as Liu notes, “it is nothing new that foreign nationals fight on both sides, and China’s position has been clearly stated.”

China’s Foreign Ministry has previously responded to questions about Chinese nationals in the Russian army, stating that:

🇨🇳📢 “We’ve issued multiple security alerts to ask Chinese nationals to stay away from areas of armed conflict, avoid any form of involvement in armed conflict, and in particular avoid participation in any party’s military operations.”

“China’s position on the issue of the Ukraine crisis is consistent and clear. We have all along been committed to promoting talks for peace and ending the conflict. We urge relevant parties to have a correct and clear understanding of China’s objective and just position and refrain from political manipulation and hype. ”

According to the blogger Liu, Zelensky supposedly “hyped” the situation for these reasons:

➡️ To attract global attention & rally support for Ukraine’s cause at a time when international attention to Ukraine has waned due to Trump and his own efforts to push for a Russia–Ukraine reconciliation. By playing up the “Chinese nationals in the war” narrative, Zelensky is catering to Western media interest and refocusing global attention on Ukraine.

➡️ To specifically seek Western support. Liu writes that Zelensky purposely promotes the news of the Chinese soldiers to hint at Chinese involvement in times of US trade war with China and efforts to ally with Russia against China, as a way to signal that Ukraine is also on the side of the ‘West’ in helping the US in its confrontation with China.

➡️ To put pressure on China. Liu suggests that Kyiv believes China has not remained fully neutral in the war. By exposing Chinese captives, Zelensky therefore aims to apply international pressure on China, pushing it to distance itself from Russia.

It would be interesting to know more about the Chinese online responses to this theory, but Liu’s article has been taken offline from all the sites where it initially appeared.

There is plenty more to say about pro-Russian sentiments on Chinese social media, and about the stories behind the Chinese mercenaries in Russia. But the problem with the latter now is that since this issue became an international political talking point and drew attention on Chinese social media, research has become significantly harder: Chinese platforms collectively started taking down related content shortly after the Wang and Zhang news broke.

Not only has Liu’s post been removed, but so have most posts about the two soldiers — along with the accounts of some young Chinese men who were seemingly vlogging from the Russo-Ukrainian battlefield, such as the Douyin account Li Jianwei (李建伟, nicknamed @狼血龙魂).

Some reporters I spoke with also told me their struggles, pointing at Douyin, Weibo, and Zhihu becoming more active in taking down content related to Chinese nationals fighting on the Russian side.

In other words: when nobody was paying attention, the content was there — hidden in the margins, not a priority for censors. But now that everyone is noticing, it’s getting wiped.

Does that mean Beijing changed its stance? No – it simply became a more sensitive topic, and now falls under stricter censorship.

“It’s making it a lot harder to research the topic like this,” one European journalist complained to me.

The very fact that so much content is now being censored just because Western media are paying attention is yet another reminder that China is definitely not censoring to please the West — and certainly not to accommodate Western media.

Best,
Manya

(follow on X, LinkedIn, or Instagram)

PS If you’re interested to know more about what motivates those Chinese joining the Russian army, see Chai Jing’s interview with a Chinese mercenary, translation via China Digital Times Part 1 and Part 2.

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