China Media
Russian Perspectives, Ridiculing Putin Supporters: Chinese Online Media Responses to the Wagner Mutiny
Exploring Chinese online media reactions to the Wagner Rebellion in Russia on June 24.

Published
2 years agoon

The recent developments involving Putin and the Wagner group have gained significant attention in China’s media landscape, with a Russia-focused perspective dominating the online discussions. While some Chinese netizens express support for Russia, there is also a notable segment that mocks and ridicules staunch pro-Russia supporters, labeling them as ‘Yellow Geese’.
Note: This article was written on June 24, 2023, as the situation in Russia was unfolding, including the Chinese responses to it at the time.
As the world is watching how Russia is facing an armed mutiny after the Wagner group accused Russia of a deadly missile strike on its troops in Ukraine, the topic is also making headlines in China, becoming a number one top trending topic in Baidu’s and Weibo’s hot search lists.
While reports on the conflict between Russian troops and the Wagner mercenaries are flooding in, the topic “Putin Accuses Wagner Head [Prigozhin] of Treason” (#普京指责瓦格纳负责人叛国#) received a staggering 1.2 billion views on the Weibo platform within just a few hours time.
The hashtag directly refers to the televised speech Russian President Putin gave earlier on on the 24th in which he mentioned how the Russian private military force Wagner was attempting to subvert Russia from within, classifying it as an act of treason and calling it “a blow to Russia” and “a knife in the back of our people.”
Chinese Online Media: A Russian Perspective
Chinese social media discussions on the evolving situation in Russia are heavily influenced by reports from Chinese state media outlets, which share the latest news and updates not only on Weibo but also on other social media platforms such as WeChat, Douyin (China’s TikTok), and others. The hashtags surrounding the news reports are also initiated by Chinese media outlets.
In their online news posts, there may not be a distinct ‘pro-Russian’ stance, but there clearly is a strong Russia-focused perspective.
Putin’s condemnation of the Wagner military has become one of the major trends in China’s online media landscape. Alongside that, discussions about Russia’s “anti-terror measures” and Putin’s phone conversations with a select few international allies regarding the latest developments are also gaining significant attention.
By early Sunday morning (China local time), both Putin’s speech and Russian media reports about the Russian army setting up machine gun positions on the outskirts of Moscow became two of the most popular hashtags on Weibo.
Another aspect that is capturing considerable attention in the Chinese online media sphere is the involvement of Putin ally and Chechen leader Kadyrov and the Chechen troops. Discussions surrounding their role in the unfolding events have become a prominent topic of interest.
On Saturday, Kadyrov called the actions of the Wagner group a military rebellion, and he promised help in putting down the mutiny.

Chechen troops heading to the tense region, this news was trending on Douyin as well.
News about the deployment of Chechen forces to the Rostov region has been extensively covered by media outlets and has garnered significant attention on Weibo. Additionally, it has emerged as a top trending topic on Douyin, further amplifying public interest in the matter.
It is noteworthy that during the live coverage on Saturday afternoon and early evening UK time, BBC World News did not mention Kadyrov at all, nor did they report about Putin’s international calls to allies.
Instead, they focused more on a Ukrainian perspective, highlighting a difference in coverage between Chinese media and Western media regarding the developments.
A Plea for Peace
A prevailing response on Chinese social media to the recent events in Russia is a plea for global peace and the restoration of stability, emphasizing a desire for calm rather than further unrest.
“A fragmented Russia would be the most dangerous destabilizing factor in the world,” remarked a Chinese commenter.
“The border line between China and Russia is very long, and the two countries are closely interconnected. I hope for peace and a quick end to all the turmoil,” another Weibo user wrote.
Others also wondered about the safety of Russia-based Chinese citizens.
“Has China started evacuating its citizens? Has the Chinese Embassy in Russia issued a warning notice?”, some netizens wondered.
There has been no announcements about safety measures taken by the Chinese Embassy in Moscow at the time of writing.
Witnessing History
Another common context in which the Wagner mutiny is discussed on the Chinese social media platform Weibo is through a historical lens.
Many commenters perceive the recent developments as a significant historical moment and draw comparisons to previous instances in history of rebellious army groups, either in China or in other countries.
An influential voice on Weibo discussing the Prigozhin-led Wagner mutiny is Hu Xijin, a political commentator and former editor-in-chief of the state media outlet Global Times. With a background in journalism and Russian Literature and Language, Hu Xijin is also well-informed about Russia and geopolitics.
In an early post on June 24th, Hu said it was still uncertain if the situation should be seen as “internal strife” (内讧) or “armed rebellion” (叛乱). Hu also suggested that if all the Wagner forces would follow Prigozhin’s defiance of Putin, the Russian defense line could collapse.
In a later post, Hu Xijin noted that traditional armed rebellions or coups d’état have been uncommon in Russian history, with palace coups being more prevalent. He therefore called the Wagner rebellion a “very unexpected occurrence,” similar to historical instances of regional military leaders challenging central authority in ancient China.

The small survey, of which screenshots circulated on social medial
One Baidu blogger’s small-scale survey asked Chinese netizens what historical episode the Wagner mutiny was most similar to. The most popular answer was the “Revere the Emperor, Destroy the Traitors” movement from 1936, when a group of rebellious Japanese troops, led by members of the Young Officers’ Movement, seized control of Tokyo and carried out the assassination of several prominent officials. Four days after their initial mutiny, the rebels surrendered (see ‘February 26 incident‘).
Hu Xijin also commented on the uncertain political situation in Russia, highlighting that anything could happen and that the outcome is highly dependent on the responses of Putin, the Russian military, society, and the Wagner forces to the evolving developments.
Mocking Chinese Staunch Supporters of Russia
Meanwhile, the latest developments also show a clear divide between Chinese social media users who are supporting Russia and those ridiculing them.
As per the statement by Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov on Saturday, where he expressed his readiness to assist in suppressing the Wagner mercenary mutiny, there is a hope among pro-Russian voices that Kadyrov will play a crucial role in quickly defeating the Wagner Group.
Popular Toutiao blogger Erhaimi (@洱海弥), who has over a million Weibo fans, wrote: “Chechen troops have already arrived in the Rostov-on-don region. Currently, the Moscow forces are advancing from the front, while the Chechen forces are positioned at the rear, both sides are attacking. The Wagner rebels are done.”
However, numerous commenters on Chinese online platforms dismiss such statements as “naive,” “childish,” or “fairytales.” They mock Chinese pro-Russian enthusiasts for “indulging in fantasies” by blindly believing in Russia’s victory, and they label them as “Yellow Goose Filial Sons” (黄俄孝子), “Yellow Geese” (黄鹅), or other related terms.
“How are the Yellow Geese doing in light of today’s news?” some commenters wonder, with others saying: “They crack me up,” “they will have to wait another 200 years for their powerful Russia.”
The ‘goose’ reference is because Russia is usually nicknamed ‘big goose’ in China (大鹅) since the words for ‘goose’ and ‘Russia’ sound the same.
Previously, the term “Weak Goose” or “Noob Goose” (菜鹅) also became popular on Chinese social media as a wordplay on the phrase “Weak Russia” (菜俄), which has the same pronunciation in standard Chinese and jokingly refers to “the weak Russian army” (“俄军很菜”) (read here).
As news broke that Wagner chief Prigozhin announced the order to his mercenaries to halt their march on Moscow to avoid “shedding Russian blood” after negotiations with Belarus’ leader Lukashenko, many Chinese netizens were ready to call it a day after a day filled with news updates.
“Rest well,” one commenter said: “I hope your ‘weak Russia’ will manage to remain standing while I sleep. If there actually will be a battle to defend Moscow tonight, please wait until I wake up [with engaging with me], otherwise I will struggle to catch up with the latest developments tomorrow morning.”
By Manya Koetse
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Manya is the founder and editor-in-chief of What's on Weibo, offering independent analysis of social trends, online media, and digital culture in China for over a decade. Subscribe to gain access to content, including the Weibo Watch newsletter, which provides deeper insights into the China trends that matter. More about Manya at manyakoetse.com or follow on X.

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China Media
China’s “AFP Filter” Meme: How Netizens Turned a Western Media Lens into Online Patriotism
Chinese netizens embraced a supposed “demonizing” Western gaze in AFP photos and made it their own.

Published
1 month agoon
September 10, 2025By
Ruixin Zhang
For a long time, Chinese netizens have criticized how photography of Chinese news events by Western outlets—from BBC and CNN to AFP—makes China look more gloomy or intimidating. During this year’s military parade, the so-called “AFP filter” once again became a hot topic—and perhaps not in the way you’d expect.
In the past week following the military parade, Chinese social media remained filled with discussions about the much-anticipated September 3 V-Day parade, a spectacle that had been hyped for weeks and watched by millions across the country.
That morning, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, accompanied by his wife Peng Liyuan, welcomed international guests on the red carpet. When Xi arrived at Tiananmen Square alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, office phone calls across the country quieted, and school classes paused to tune in to one of China’s largest-ever military parades along Chang’an Avenue in Beijing, held to commemorate China’s victory over Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II.
As tanks rolled and jets thundered overhead, and state media outlets such as People’s Daily and Xinhua livestreamed the entire event, many different details—from what happened on Tiananmen Square to who attended, and what happened before and after, both online and offline—captured the attention of netizens.
Amid all the discussions online, one particularly hot conversation was about the visual coverage of the event, and focused on AFP (法新社), Agence France Press, the global news agency headquartered in Paris.
Typing “AFP” (法新社) into Weibo in the days after the parade pulled up a long list of hashtags:
- Has AFP released their shots yet?
- V-Day Parade through AFP’s lens
- AFP’s god-tier photo
- Did AFP show up for the parade?
The fixation may seem odd—why would Chinese netizens care so much about a French news agency?

Popular queries centered on AFP.
The story actually goes back to 2022.
In July of that year, on the anniversary of the Communist Party’s founding, one Weibo influencer (@Jokielicious) noted that while domestic photographers portrayed the celebrations as bright and triumphant, she personally preferred the darker, almost menacing image of Beijing captured by Western journalists. In her view, through their lens, China appeared more powerful—even a little terrifying.

The original post.
The post went viral. Soon, netizens began comparing more of China’s state media photos with those from Western outlets. One photo in particular stood out: Xinhua’s casual, cheerful shot of Chinese soldiers contrasted sharply with AFP’s cold, almost cinematic frame.

Same event, different vibe. Chinese social media users compared these photos of Xinhua (top) versus AFP (down). AFP photo shot by Fred Dufour.
Netizens joked that Xinhua had made the celebration look like the opening of a new hotel, while AFP had cast it as “the dawn of an empire.”
Gradually, what began as a dig at the bad aesthetics of state media turned into something else: a subtle shift in how Chinese netizens were rethinking their country’s international image.
Under the hashtag #ChinaThroughOthersLens (#老中他拍), netizens shared images of China as seen through the lenses of various Western media outlets.
This wasn’t the first time such talk had appeared. In the early days of the Chinese internet, people often spoke of the so-called “BBC filter.” The idea was that the BBC habitually put footage of China under a grayish filter, making its visuals give off a vibe of repression and doom, which many felt was at odds with the actual vibrancy on the ground. To them, it was proof that the West was bent on painting China as backward and gloomy.
These discussions have continued in recent years.
For example, on Weibo there were debates about a photo of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, shot by Peter Thomas for Reuters, and used in various Western media reports about Wuhan and Covid as early as 2021. The top image shows the photographer’s vantage point.
“Looks like a cockroach in the gutter,” one popular comment described it.

Top image by Chinese media, lower image by Peter Thomas/Reuters, and was used in various Western media reports about Wuhan and Covid since as early as 2021.
Another example is the alleged “smog filter” applied by Western media outlets to Beijing skies during the China visit of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in 2024.

The alleged “smog filter” applied to Beijing skies during Blinken’s visit. Top image: Chinese media. Middle: BBC. Lower: Washington Post.
AFP, meanwhile, seemed to offer a different kind of ‘distortion.’
Netizens said AFP’s photos often had a low-saturation, high-contrast, solemn tone, with wide angles that made the scenes feel oppressive yet majestic. Over time, any photo with that look—whether taken by AFP or not—was dubbed the “AFP filter” (法新社滤镜).
AFP has clarified multiple times that many of the viral examples weren’t even theirs—or that they were, but had been altered with an extra dark filter. They also refuted claims that AFP had published a photo series of Chinese soldiers titled “Dawn of Empire” to discredit China’s army.

AFP refuted claims that their photos discredited the Chinese army.
Nevertheless, the “AFP filter” label stuck. It became shorthand for a Western gaze that cast China not as impoverished or broken—as some claimed the “BBC filter” did—but as formidable, like a looming supervillain.
One running joke summed it up neatly: domestic shots are the festive version; Western shots are the red-tyrant version. And increasingly, netizens admitted they preferred the latter, commenting that while AFP shots often emphasize red to suggest authoritarianism, they actually like the red and what it stands for.
So, when this year’s V-Day came around, many were eager to see how AFP and other Western outlets would frame China as the dark, dangerous empire.
But when the photos dropped, the reaction was muted. They looked average. Some called them “disappointing.” “Where are the dark angles? Not doing it this time?” one blogger wondered. “Where’s the AFP hotline? I’d like to file a complaint!”
“Xinhua actually beat you this time,” some commented on AFP’s official Weibo account. Others agreed, putting the AFP photos and Xinhua photos side by side.

AFP photos on the left versus Xinhua photos on the right.
To make up for the letdown, people began editing the photos themselves—darkening the tones, adding dramatic shadows, and proudly labeling them with the tag “AFP filter” or calling it “The September 3rd Military Parade Through a AFP Lens” (法新社滤镜下的9.3阅兵). “Now that’s the right vibe,” they said: “I fixed it for you!”

Netizen @哔哔机 “AFP-fied” photos of the military parade by AFP.
Official media quickly picked up on the trend. Xinhua rolled out its own hashtags—#XinhuaAlwaysDeliversEpicShots (#新华社必出神图的决心#) and #XinhuaWins (#新华社秒了#)—and positioned itself as the true master of a new aesthetic narrative.
The message was clear: China no longer needs the Western gaze to frame itself as powerful or intimidating; it can do that on its own.
The “AFP v Xinhua” contest, the online movement to “AFP-ify” visuals, and the Chinese fandom around AFP’s moodier shots may have been wrapped in jokes and memes, but they also pointed to something deeper: the once “demonized” image of China that Western media pushed as threatening is now not only accepted by Chinese netizens, it’s embraced. Many have made it part of a confident, playful form of online patriotism, applauding the idea of being seen by the West as fearsome, even villainous, believing it amplifies China’s global authority.
As one netizen wrote: “I like it when we look like we crawl straight into their nightmares.”
Chinese journalist Kai Lei (@凯雷) suggested that these kinds of trends showed how the Chinese public plays an increasingly proactive role in shaping China’s global image.
By now, the AFP meme has become so strong that it doesn’t even require AFP anymore. Ultra-dramatic shots are simply called “AFP-level photos” (法新社级别).
For now, as many are enjoying the “afterglow” of the military parade, their appreciation for the AFP-style only seems to grow. As one Weibo user summed it up: “AFP tried to create a sense of oppression with dark, low-angle shots, but instead only strengthened the Chinese military’s aura of majesty.”
– By Ruixin Zhang and Manya Koetse
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©2025 Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.
China Arts & Entertainment
Yearnings, Dreamcore, and the Rise of AI Nostalgia in China
From China’s first soap opera Yearnings to the rise of AI-fueled nostalgia.

Published
3 months agoon
July 2, 2025
The year is 1990, and the streets of Beijing’s Fangshan District are eerily quiet. You can almost hear a pin drop in the petrochemical town, as tens of thousands of workers and their families huddle around their televisions, all tuned to the same channel for something groundbreaking: China’s very first soap opera, Yearnings (渴望 Kěwàng).
Yearnings tells the story of Liu Huifang (刘慧芳), a female factory worker from a traditional working-class family in Beijing, and her unlikely marriage to university graduate Wang Husheng (王沪生), who comes from a family of intellectuals. When Liu finds an abandoned baby girl, she adopts her and raises her as her own, against her husband’s wishes.
The couple is unaware that the foundling is actually the illegitimate child of Wang’s snobbish sister, Yaru. After Liu and Wang have a biological son, the marriage comes under further pressure, eventually leading to divorce. Liu is left as a single mother, raising two children on her own.

Still from Yearnings, via OurChinaStory.
Drawing inspiration from foreign dubbed television shows, Yearnings was produced as China’s first truly domestic, long-form indoor television drama. Spanning 50 episodes, the series traces a timeline from the onset of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s through to the late 1980s—one of the most turbulent periods in modern Chinese history.
Before the series aired nationally on CCTV and achieved record viewership, the first station to air Yearnings in the Beijing region was the Yanshan Petrochemical TV Station (燕山石化电视台), China’s first major factory TV station (厂办电视台) located in Fangshan District.
Here, in this town of over 100,000, Yearnings garnered an astonishing and unprecedented 98% audience share. The series was truly groundbreaking and became a national sensation—not just because it was China’s first long-form television drama, or because it was a locally produced drama that challenged the long-standing monopoly of state broadcaster CCTV, but because Yearnings marked a major shift in television storytelling.
Until then, Chinese TV stories had always revolved around communist propaganda, or featured great heroes of the revolution. Yearnings, on the other hand, was devoid of political content and focused on the hopes and dreams of ordinary people and their everyday struggles—love, desire, marital tension, single motherhood—topics that had never before been so openly portrayed on Chinese television.
The show’s creators had perfectly tapped into what was changing: the Communist Party was slowly withdrawing from private life, and people were beginning to see themselves less defined by their work unit and more by their home life—as consumers, as partners and parents, as citizens of a new China filled with aspirations for the future. Yearnings’ storyline was a reflection of that.
Chinese-Style “Nostalgia Core”
Yearnings marked a cultural turning point, coinciding with the rapid spread of TV sets in Chinese households. In 1992, economic reforms triggered a new era in which Chinese media became increasingly commercialized and thriving, before the arrival of the internet, social media, and AI tools once again changed everything.
Today, Yearnings still is a topic that often comes up in Chinese online media. On apps like Douyin, old scenes from Yearnings are reposted and receive thousands of shares.
📌 It’s emblematic of a broader trend in which more netizens are turning to “nostalgia-core.” In Chinese, this trend is known as “中式梦核” (Zhōngshì Mènghé), which literally means “Chinese-style dreamcore.”
Dreamcore is an internet aesthetic and visual style—popular in online communities like Tumblr and Reddit—that blends elements of nostalgia, surrealism, and subconscious imagery. Mixing retro images with fantasy, it evokes a sense of familiarity, yet often feels unsettling and deserted.
The Chinese-style dreamcore (中式梦核), which has become increasingly popular on platforms like Bilibili since 2023-2024, is different from its Western counterpart in how it incorporates distinctly Chinese elements and specifically evokes the childhood experiences of the millennial generation. Content tagged as “Chinese-style dreamcore” on Chinese social media is often also labeled with terms like “nostalgia” (怀旧), “childhood memories” (童年回忆), “when we were little” (小时候), and “Millennial Dream” (千禧梦).
According to the blogging account Yatong Local Life Observer (娅桐本地生活观察), the focus on the millennial childhood can be explained because the formative years of this generation coincided with a decade of rapid social change in China —leaving little in today’s modern cities that still evokes that era.
🌀 Of course, millennials in the West also frequently look back at their childhood and teenage years, particularly the 1980s and 1990s—a trend also embraced by Gen Z, who romanticize these years through media and fashion. In China, however, Gen Z is at the forefront of the “nostalgia-core” trend, reflecting on the 1990s and early 2000s as a distant, almost dreamlike past. This sense of distance is heightened by China’s staggering pace of transformation, modernization, and digitalization over the past decades, which has made even the recent past feel remote and irretrievable.
🌀 Another factor contributing to the trend is that China’s younger generations are caught in a rat race of academic and professional competition, often feeling overwhelmed by the fast pace of life and the weight of societal expectations. In this high-pressure environment—captured by the concept of “involution” (内卷)—young people develop various coping mechanisms, and digital escapism, including nostalgia-core, is one of them. It’s like a cyber-utopia (赛博乌托邦).
🌀 Due to the rise of AI tools available to the general public, Chinese-style nostalgia core has hit the mainstream because it’s now possible for all social media users to create their own nostalgic videos and images—bringing back the 1990s and early 2000s through AI-generated tools, either by making real videos appear more nostalgic or by creating entirely fictional videos or images that recreate scenes from those days.
So what are we seeing? There are images and videos of stickers kids used to love, visuals showing old classrooms, furniture, and children playing outside, accompanied by captions such as “we’re already so far apart from our childhood years” (example).

Images displayed in Chinese Dreamcore.
And notably, there are videos and images showing family and friends gathering around those old big TVs as a cultural, ritualized activity (see some examples here).

Stills from ‘nostalgia core’ videos.
These kinds of AI-generated videos depict a pre-mobile-era family life, where families and communities would gather around the TV—both inside and outside—from classrooms to family homes. The wind blows through the windows, neighbors crack sunflower seeds, and children play on the ground. Ironically, it’s AI that is bringing back the memories of a society that was not yet digitalized.
Nowadays, with dozens of short video apps, streaming platforms, and livestream culture fully mainstream in China—and AI algorithms personalizing feeds to the extreme—it sometimes feels like everyone’s on a different channel, quite literally.
In times like these, people long for an era when life seemed less complicated—when, instead of everyone staring at their own screens, families and neighbors gathered around one screen together.
There’s not just irony in the fact that it took AI for netizens to visualize their longing for a bygone era; there’s also a deeper irony in how Yearnings once represented a time when people were looking forward to the future—only to find that the future is now looking back, yearning for the days of Yearnings.
It seems we’re always looking back, reminiscing about the years behind us with a touch of nostalgia. We’re more digitalized than ever, yet somehow less connected. We yearn for a time when everyone was watching the same screen, at the same time, together, just like in 1990. Perhaps it’s time for another Yearnings.
By Manya Koetse
(follow on X, LinkedIn, or Instagram)
Sources (other sources included in hyperlinks)
Koetse, Manya. 2016. “From Woman Warrior to Good Wife – Confucian Influences on the Portrayal of Women in China’s Television Drama.” In Stefania Travagnin (ed), Religion and Media in China. New York: Routledge.
Rofel, Lisa B. 1994. Yearnings: Televisual Love and Melodramatic Politics in Contemporary China. American Ethnologist 21(4):700-722.
Wang, Dan (汪丹). 2018. “《渴望》的艺术价值” [The Artistic Value of Yearnings].” Originally published in Beijing Daily (北京日报), October 12, 2018. Reprinted in Digest News (文摘报), October 20, 06 edition. Also see Sohu: 当年红遍大江南北的《渴望》.
Wang Min and Arvind Singhal. 1992. “Kewang, a Chinese television soap opera with a message.” Gazette 49: 177-192.
Zhuge Kanwu. 2021. “重温1990《渴望》:苦得“刘慧芳”希望被导演写“死” [Revisiting 1990’s Yearnings: The Suffering Liu Huifang Hoped to Be Written Off by the Director]. Zhuge Dushu Wu (诸葛读书屋), January 22. https://wapbaike.baidu.com/tashuo/browse/content?id=b699ee532cf79f862bfa14ad.
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