Originally published in the Eye on Digital China newsletter on Sunday, October 25, 2026.

The protests in France have been trending in China all week. The ways in which they are being discussed perhaps reveal more about Chinese views of France and Europe—and about China’s own place in the world today—than about the protests themselves. Here are five of the main narratives shaping the discussion.

Over the past week, the widespread protests and unrest in France have been trending on Chinese social media. From October 18 to today, turmoil in Paris and other cities consistently appeared in the top trending lists on Weibo, Kuaishou, and other apps, with Chinese netizens and commentators discussing the situation in various ways under numerous hashtags.

The topic remained trending all week not only because of the October 17–18 riots and their aftermath, but also because of the new round of protests on October 24, for which French authorities deployed 70,000 police officers and the Chinese embassy in France issued new warnings.

Here, we’ll take a closer look at five dominant narratives surrounding the protests in France on Chinese social media, and what this says about Chinese perceptions of France and Europe, from common ideas about the decline of Europe to the protests being a form of “historical karma.”^[1]

1. “France Has Lost Control”: A Nation in Crisis

How can a developed country like France fail to maintain basic order? One dominant framing of the recent protests on Chinese social media is that they demonstrate the French state’s inability to keep the situation under control, indicating a crisis of governance and security.

One of the highest-ranking hashtags among more than 300 trending topics on Chinese social media apps related to the unrest in France is: “France is out of control” (法国失控了). Along with hashtags like “France is in chaos again,” that hashtag first came up last Sunday on Weibo during a weekend filled with looting, arson, destruction, and violence by groups of rioters in Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Lille, and elsewhere.

The perceived weakness of President Macron’s leadership was highlighted on Chinese social media through memes and jokes mocking the leader for attending a Celine Dion concert right before the situation escalated. A commentary on Sina compared the concert to company executives holding a celebration banquet and handing out bonuses just before the firm collapses, framing the riots as a “run on trust” (信任挤兑) against the government.

Videos of the chaotic scenes on the streets spread to various platforms, where some described it as a “war zone.” Others suggested that

💬 “it looks like France is finished (..) The situation has spiraled completely out of control.”

💬 “If I didn’t see this with my own eyes, I never would’ve believed it,” one Douyin user wrote, with others stressing:

💬 “I’m so grateful to live in China.”

Many Chinese netizens wondered who would pay for the losses and who the victims of the riots could turn to. In some of these discussions, there was little understanding or sympathy for the protesters, with some Douyin users writing:

💬 “And yet there are still people trying to spin this as a revolution, as something righteous. I genuinely don’t understand. What kind of revolution involves smashing the doors of luxury stores and setting cars parked along the streets on fire? Isn’t this just outright rioting?”

But following videos showing the more peaceful protests, there are also voices that praise the French for standing up:

💬 “These are people who are expressing their demands and anger, they are far braver than the Chinese who remain silent.”

 
🔹 Revolutionary Spirit
 

At the same time, the protests also serve as an opportunity for sarcasm and jokes that echo the Chinese revolutionary spirit, writing:

💬 “The French people should sing The Internationale at the top of their lungs! Unite with the people of Germany, Italy, and Britain to fight (…) Smash the old world and create a new one! Keep going, keep going, and strive for even greater victories! Let the red flag fly across all of Europe!”

💬 “Who would’ve thought France would be the first country to enter a communist society?”

💬 “The Paris Commune is back! They’ve achieved communism ahead of schedule. Distribution according to need: whatever you want, just go and take it.”

By portraying the French protesters as though they are carrying out a glorious proletarian revolution, netizens may be mocking the protests, but are actually also implicitly poking fun at China’s own Mao-era revolutionary past.

 
🔹 Zero Yuan Shopping
 

As part of this online sarcasm and humor surrounding the protests, Chinese netizens refer to the looting as “Zero-Yuan Shopping” (líng yuán gòu, 零元购 or 0元购), joking that the riots are the French version of China’s Singles’ Day Shopping Festival.

Zero Yuan Shopping on Chinese social media

“Zero-Yuan Shopping” was originally a livestream promotion term for getting a product for free, but it has become a sarcastic buzzword among netizens for flash mob-style looting in Western countries, especially since the plundering following the George Floyd protests in 2020.

Some netizens suggest that the protests are no longer about their original aims at all, but have just become a way to get free goods for masked rioters, while ordinary people and their livelihoods get hurt in the meantime.

 
🔹 Welcome to Paris
 

A globally viral AI-generated video by Dutch filmmaker Wytse Koetse, presented as an advertisement for the fictional “Paris City Tours,” also struck a humorous chord with Chinese netizens as it was shared on various platforms, including by a state media outlet on Kuaishou.

The video shows an upbeat French tour guide taking a group of Asian tourists through the “real Paris,” seemingly unfazed by the flames, looting, and fighting unfolding around them. She cheerfully continues the tour as though everything is business as usual. “Very passionate people, the French,” she remarks, before wishing the tourists a pleasant stay in Paris as explosions erupt around them.

Featured image of the Paris City Tours AI video that went viral (see original)

“She’s giving these Chinese country bumpkins a taste of the free France,” some sarcastically commented. Others replied: “A tour to witness the European revolution,” and: “Now, this is real romance!”

The video, as well as the reactions to it, plays with the contrast between the old image of Paris, associated with romance, luxury, refinement, and intellectual life, and the current-day scenes of chaos, looting, disorder, and street confrontations.

💬 “It’s like the end of a civilization,” one Weibo user wrote.

2. “France Is the New Sick Man of Europe”: A Failure of the European Model

Another common way in which the French unrest has appeared in Chinese media and online discussions this week goes beyond framing it as just a French domestic issue. Instead, it’s framed as a broader European crisis where the same problems appear in various countries, from Spain to Belgium and Italy.

Everywhere, you see the same interconnected issues: growing public debt paired with slow economic groth, widening social inequality and increased pressure on social services, and more polarization among the people together with political distrust.^[2]

In this context, the protests across France are merely treated as part of a much bigger crisis: “the decline of Europe.”

 
🔹 High Welfare Spending, Growing Social Discontent
 

According to the Xinhua article titled “How Will an ‘Aging’ Europe Confront the Anger of Its Young People?” (“老去”的欧洲如何面对年轻人的愤怒), an online video that showed boomers dancing by the Seine against the backdrop of the riots was emblematic of the situation, showing the unequal distribution of resources between different social groups/generations as a root problem of the unrest.

The Xinhua article suggests that France’s high welfare spending and rising social discontent is a European problem, quoting economics professor Rudolf Debord who described it as “a microcosm of Europe’s broader predicament.” Other European countries are also facing aging populations, generous welfare systems, and rising debt-to-GDP ratios, while their net population growth still depends on immigration.

An analysis by Dong Yifan (董一凡) in Chinese news outlet Global Times also argued that the fiscal instability behind the French protests is widespread across Europe, and that the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact has become ineffective. He writes:

💬 “Europe regards its systems of political participation and electoral democracy as a ‘global model.’ Yet amid overlapping domestic and international crises, limited fiscal resources, and restricted room for reform, it has become increasingly difficult for European countries to undertake deep reforms that directly address their underlying problems.”

 
🔹 A Vicious Cycle
 

Within this context, Chinese state-affiliated media have been amplifying the idea of France as “the new sick man of Europe” (欧洲新病夫). This phrase, attributed to investors quoted in British media, resonated in Chinese discourse because “the sick man of Asia” (东亚病夫) is historically associated with China’s perceived weakness and humiliation in the late nineteenth century.

Political commentator Hu Xijin (胡锡进) further expanded this idea, and suggested that “when Paris and other French cities develop a fever, other parts of Europe start coughing,” as the problems in France are dragging down the momentum for reform across the entire European Union.

In Hu’s column, he mostly focused on how France’s high welfare costs are draining the pond. High spending, low growth, and the difficulty of implementing reforms have accumulated to such an extent that there’s now a vicious cycle: protests obstruct reforms > leading to larger fiscal deficits and even scarcer resources > followed by more protests. Hu concluded:

💬 “France is not merely sick; it is seriously ill.”

 
🔹 Blaming the ‘Baizuo’
 

Besides Chinese state media and political commentators, nationalist bloggers also paint the French developments as part of a broader decline of Europe. Many of them, however, do not focus on economic troubles, but instead emphasize cultural issues across Europe, particularly in relation to the baizuo, immigration, and the European refugee crisis.

The term báizuǒ (白左), literally meaning “white left,” has been widely used on Chinese social media over the past decade (mainly since the 2015 European refugee crisis) to refer to Western liberals portrayed as overly politically correct, idealistic, and naively sympathetic toward immigrants.

In these kinds of discussions, European troubles are explained as a consequence of leftist policies and immigration, with typical comments appearing on various platforms being comparable to this one by a military blogger with over 170k followers on Weibo (浪涛万里铸星河):

💬 “Europe really is in complete chaos! The unrest in France hasn’t even ended, and now Belgium is kicking off, spreading further to Spain, and now Italy has joined in too. These European baizuo politicians must be completely out of their minds. They’ve brought in so many Middle Eastern and African immigrants whose cultures are incompatible with their own (..) that scenes of vandalism, looting, and arson will simply become the new normal in Europe.”

3. “My Uncle’s Restaurant Got Burned Down”: Chinese Victims of a French Crisis

Another lens brings the unrest in France closer to Chinese audiences by focusing on how it affects and threatens Chinese people and their businesses abroad. This makes the foreign crisis more immediately relevant to Chinese netizens, adding an emotional connection and, perhaps, also reinforcing the idea that French authorities are failing not only to protect their own citizens and their property, but also foreign residents and businesses.

This happens especially through stories of Chinese shopkeepers in France being affected by the riots.

One Douyin user wrote:

💬 “They’re just grabbing and looting anything they can get their hands on. My uncle runs a restaurant there, and it was completely burned down.”

The story that drew the most attention was that of Aline Li (阿琳), the 50-year-old Chinese-French owner of the café and tobacco store La Barrique in Paris, which she had run for seven years. Crowds of rioters broke into the café, where she and her husband had locked themselves inside, and beat her unconscious, after which they completely ransacked the place.

Business owner Aline Li after rioters looted her business and beat her unconscious.

The incident also reopened some old wounds regarding the vulnerability of Chinese people in France. An old DW interview resurfaced in this context, suggesting that Chinese people were deliberately targeted because they had become “too rich” in France. Even though those comments seemed related to the current riots, the context for that 2017 interview was actually the killing of a Chinese tailor Zhang Chaolin 张朝林 in the north of Paris. His death at the time led to large protests by the Chinese community over repeated robberies targeting Chinese residents.

One WeChat blogger commented:

💬 “If you want to live as well as Chinese people do, then work as hard as they do! These riots originally had absolutely nothing to do with us.”^[3]

4. “France In Complete Chaos, Yet Some Still Threaten China”: Using Domestic Disorder to Delegitimize Criticism of China

Another theme within these discussions is that the ongoing unrest and riots undermine France’s credibility and authority to criticize, pressure, or threaten China. The underlying message is: you have no business pointing fingers when your own house is in disarray.

This line of argument, propagated by Chinese state media, explicitly links the turmoil in France to its position in the world and its relations with China, using the domestic unrest to challenge France’s position on bilateral issues.

One noteworthy post within this framing comes from Chinese Party-affiliated newspapers Beijing Daily and Global Times, headlined “France is in complete chaos, yet some still threaten China” (“法国乱成一锅粥了还有人威胁中国”).^[4]

The original column focused on how French economist Philippe Aghion, winner of the 2025 Nobel Prize in Economics, had suggested that, in the automotive manufacturing sector, Chinese electric vehicles could be allowed to be produced in Europe by European workers. If China refuses, Europe should “take a tough stance and threaten to impose additional tariffs.”

The Global Times denounced his stance, calling it “absurd” and “regrettable” that a renowned French economist would openly advocate trade protectionism while, in the streets of France, even the most basic public order was difficult to maintain.

By setting his comments – which were actually made on October 16, before the violent weekend – against the backdrop of chaos in the streets, the Chinese media outlet implies that European elites have lost touch with reality: they’re pointing to China as if that is where Europe’s difficulties lie, while it’s their own structural failures that are causing the chaos at home.

5. “History Repeats Itself!”: France's Past Comes Back to Haunt It

A final prominent narrative, largely driven by nationalist bloggers, interprets the disorder and destruction that unfolded in France through the memory of France’s role in the burning and looting of the Old Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan).

The violent riots here become a form of karma or historical payback, with France now suffering the same kind of destruction it once inflicted on others. This especially came up in light of the deliberate arson attack on the 143-year-old Limoges City Hall in central France.^[5]

While comparisons to the looting of the Old Summer Palace have surfaced before, such as during the Notre-Dame fire, this time is different. Not only because it involves arson and looting in the center of France, just as the Old Summer Palace pillaging hurt the heart of China’s imperial power, but also because so much of the violence took place on October 18, the exact date on which, in 1860, Anglo-French forces burned the Yuanmingyuan to the ground during the Second Opium War (1856–1860).

For reference: The Yuanmingyuan was an imperial summer palace complex in Beijing’s suburbs and the Qianlong Emperor’s principal residence. In 1860, Anglo-French forces invaded Beijing during the Second Opium War, driven by demands for expanded trade access and other diplomatic concessions. They thoroughly plundered the Yuanmingyuan, a vast complex consisting of more than a hundred buildings and scenic sites filled with books, artworks, and other treasures.

The burning came afterward, understood in Chinese historical memory as an attempt to destroy the evidence of the looting. The fire blazed for three days and three nights, and left the enormous palace grounds in ruins.

It’s a historical episode so deeply ingrained in patriotic education and collective memory that it’s still very much a part of online discourse in China today. This helps explain why, in recent days, so many bloggers have portrayed the destruction in France as historical retribution for the destruction of the Old Summer Palace.

Nationalistic blogger Zhou Kelixiusi (周可莉修斯) described the situation as mere “karma” for France. Others put images of Anglo-French forces looting and burning down the Old Summer Palace side by side with images of the City Hall of Limoges being consumed by fire, writing:

💬 “History repeats itself on October 18!”

Others added:

💬 “Over the past century, China has learned that weakness invites aggression, and has worked hard to strengthen itself.”

The language of “karma” and “retribution” that recurringly comes up in these discussions carries a broader nationalist message: that the balance of power has shifted. France, once powerful enough to plunder China’s imperial palace, is now portrayed as being so weak that it can’t even keep order at home, while China has overcome its past weakness and become a global superpower. In this online narrative, the unrest in France is ultimately presented as a symbolic reversal of China’s own historical humiliation.

🔚

Notes & Footnotes

1. Examples of hashtags associated with each of the narrative ‘categories’ I set out. These hashtags appeared across multiple Chinese social media platforms.

   1: “France has lost control” (Breakdown of order & governance) / Hashtag examples: [#法国失控了#] [#法国又乱了#] [#法国多地抗议引发骚乱#] [#法国多城实施宵禁防骚乱#] [#法国爆发近年来最严重暴力骚乱#] [#法国多地街头火光冲天#] [#法国骚乱赃物涌入二手平台#] [#法国多地LV门店被洗劫一空#] [#法国政坛极化撕裂#] [#马克龙夫妇看演唱会时法国骚乱#] [#法国骚乱超500警员受伤#] [法国骚乱巴黎警力不堪重负] [#特朗普说抗议者毁了法国#] [#法国乱到宵禁都没用#]

   2: “The European model is failing” (France protests are a symptom of a European crisis) / Hashtag examples: [#法国抗议潮迅速蔓延欧洲多国#] [日媒称法国成欧洲新病夫][#欧洲多国爆发抗议示威 民众怎么看#] [#街头骚乱背后的欧洲治理困局#][“老去”的欧洲如何面对年轻人的愤怒][ 欧洲多国陷入混乱] [#法国成欧洲新病夫#] [#法国三条血管齐崩#] [#法国高福利模式难以为继#]

   3: “Chinese victims of a French crisis” (Connecting French problems to Chinese vulnerability) / Hashtag examples: [#法国华人店主：毕生心血都没了#] [#法国多地骚乱中方发布提醒#] [#提醒赴法国中国公民加强安全防#][#中国游客亲历巴黎骚乱#][#中国驻法国使领馆再发领事提醒#][#刚开业一周中国店主亲历法国骚乱#]

   4: “France in chaos, yet still threatening China” (Criticism of French politicians taking hard line on China while unable to contain own problems) / Hashtag examples: [法国乱成一锅粥了还有人] [法国骚乱下竟有人叫嚣对华强硬] [法国骚乱下竟有人叫嚣对华强硬]

   5: “Historical retribution” (Trying French unrest to Chinese historical humiliation) / Hashtag examples: [法国骚乱百年市政厅被烧毁] [法国143年历史市政厅被烧毁] [法国骚乱致多处历史建筑损毁]

   ↩

2. The phrase “France’s three blood vessels collapsing at once” (法国三血管齐崩) circulated on Weibo soon after the first round of protests as a media metaphor to refer to these three major interconnected issues: 1) growing public debt & slow economic growth, 2) widening social inequalities & pressure on public services, and 3) increasing social polarization & declining trust in government.

   ↩

3. Worth mentioning here is that not everyone in these discussions see overseas Chinese business owners as truly “Chinese.” Different terms distinguish being Chinese by nationality, ethnicity, and ancestry, more on this discussion here.

   ↩

4. Original article by Global Times (环球时报), “France is already in complete chaos, yet some are still clamoring for a hard line against China” (法国都乱成一锅粥了，还有人在叫嚣对华强硬), reposted by Beijing Daily on Weibo as “France is in complete chaos, yet some still threaten China” (法国乱成一锅粥了还有人威胁中国). The Global Times article is also available in English here.

   ↩

5. The 143-year-old Limoges City Hall in central France was actually not set on fire on October 18 but on Saturday, October 17, 2026.

   ↩

Eye on Digital China, by Manya Koetse, is co-published on Substack and What’s on Weibo. Both feature the same new content — so you can read and subscribe wherever you prefer. Substack offers community features, while What’s on Weibo provides full archive access.

Spotted a mistake or want to add something? Please let us know in comments below or email us. First-time commenters, please be patient – we will have to manually approve your comment before it appears.

©2026 Eye on Digital China/Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.

Originally published in the Eye on Digital China newsletter on Sunday, September 27, 2026. Want to receive the next edition in your inbox? Become a paid subscriber here.

The past week was all about the Trump-Xi meeting in Washington. On mainstream Chinese social media feeds, much of the focus wasn’t on what was discussed, who gained what, or what was promised. It was about: How was China welcomed? How far did they go? How exceptional was the reception? And what does this say about China’s status as a major power on the world stage today?

Symbolic moments mattered more than strategic talks. Within that framework, President Trump, along with First Lady Melania Trump, hit the right notes.

The US visit by Xi Jinping and First Lady Peng Liyuan began on Wednesday (Sep 23), with Donald Trump and the First Lady personally welcoming them at Joint Base Andrews, a highly unusual move. Presidents typically receive foreign leaders at the White House; in recent decades, airport welcomes at Andrews have been reserved almost exclusively for popes. The last comparable presidential welcome was Kennedy’s 1962 greeting of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, a particularly close US ally at the time.

Wednesday’s welcome came with a red carpet, which members of the US military meticulously inspected and cleaned on their hands and knees right before Xi and Peng’s arrival. A photo of that scene was widely shared on Chinese social media, where many netizens seemed both bemused and struck by the sight of Americans quite literally bending over backward for their Chinese guests, with one popular Weibo account (@提刀探花在缅北) writing: “This is a scene that we will remember for decades.”

Red-carpet preparation at Joint Base Andrews

At the White House welcome ceremony on Thursday (Sep 24), where both leaders delivered remarks, Trump touched on the history of war and mentioned the American volunteer fighter group in China — the Flying Tigers — saying:

🗣️ “If we focus on our common interest, I’m confident there is much we can achieve. Throughout history, the pursuit of those common interests has connected our people across the vast oceans, across big, tremendous distances and many differences, and even made us allies in World War II. Look at the greatness we had together fighting in World War II.”

After the Washington summit concluded, Trump posted on Truth Social, calling the meeting one of “Friendship, Strength, and Success, for both China and the U.S.A.,” and adding that he looked forward to the next US-China meeting in November.

Historical Memory at the White House

But why did the special treatment given to the Chinese delegation in the US seem to matter so much in China, especially considering the ubiquitous anti-American sentiment of recent years? Not only did official media highlight it, but it also resonated strongly with netizens and became the defining story about this meeting on social media.

It goes much deeper than flattery.

Narratives of “never forget national humiliation” (勿忘国耻) and “never forgetting history” (牢记历史) are part of everyday online discourse in China, and a central component of collective historical memory. State media, official education, bloggers, and key opinion leaders keep China’s century of humiliation a part of the present by emphasizing how China has been victimized, attacked, and bullied by Japan and Western powers in the past, from the beginning of the Opium War in 1840 to the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1945.^[1]

China’s current international discourse — and its national identity and place in the world — is deeply shaped by this historical consciousness. But it is not only about the century of humiliation. It is also about China’s role in the “global anti-fascist war” and its place in the world that emerged from that war. Underlying official Chinese narratives is what Rana Mitter describes as a “forgotten ally” story: China made enormous sacrifices, contributed crucially to the Allied victory, and helped create the postwar international order, yet its contribution and rightful status have long been undervalued.^[2]

At the same time, although Beijing promotes the emergence of a multipolar world order, China’s own external international discourse remains largely defined in opposition to the United States. Beijing rejects American hegemony and seeks to decenter the US from the international system, while the US, ironically, also remains a central reference point through which China defines its own international identity and status.^[3]

📍 Seen through this historical lens, the grandeur of the Washington reception carries significance beyond the ceremony itself. It can be read as both recognition of a China that has overcome historical humiliation and of the international status Beijing believes it has long deserved. The fact that this is coming from the United States — China’s former wartime ally and the nation that remains the most important reference point in the international order — makes the symbolism particularly meaningful.

Trump’s remarks about China and the US as World War II allies therefore resonated particularly well online. President Xi himself took the time to emphasize that same point again during his address at the White House:

🗣️ “As President Trump mentioned earlier, during the Second World War, Chinese and Americans fought shoulder to shoulder against fascist aggression. Chinese people have never forgotten that part of history, nor have the American people.”

No More Noodles

Beyond the historical angle, there is also the idea of diplomatic ceremony as a direct reflection of power.

After the hospitality and spectacle shown by the Chinese side when Trump visited Beijing earlier this year, many netizens felt that the Washington welcome showed the American side was willing to reciprocate at a level matching China’s own reception at a time when many other Western powers might not do the same.

This was a far cry from how the Chinese delegation was received in Alaska during the high-level US-China talks six years ago. At the time, an instant-noodle lunch came to symbolize the American treatment of China after a short video went viral showing Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) and top diplomat Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪) entering a session of the talks. Wang asks Yang, “Have you had lunch?” Yang replies: “Yes, instant noodles.”

A 12-second video in which top diplomat Yang Jiechi said he had an instant-noodle lunch became a big topic of discussion in China in 2021. A hashtag on the moment, that happened on the sidelines of the top level meetings in Alaska, attracted over 270 million views.

The perceived lack of diplomatic etiquette was taken as a sign that the American side was not treating China as a power of equal standing, a dynamic also evident in the famously icy talks themselves.

Of course, the circumstances were very different: another US president, during COVID, Alaska instead of Washington, and high-level talks rather than a leader-to-leader state visit. But many Chinese commenters see the difference in ceremonial treatment between then & now as something more than just that context. They see it as a sign of China’s growing power — and of the idea that “respect comes from strength” (“尊重来自于实力”).

Welcome in Washington, photo posted by Weibo blogger Daniu (@Most大牛n)

Weibo blogger Daniu (@Most大牛n) argued that these kinds of ceremonies are never about cultural differences, but are a matter of hierarchy in international status:

💬 “Who would have thought that the ceremony the United States put on to welcome our leader this time would be of such an unprecedentedly high standard? […] People used to deliberately spread the idea that Americans no longer care about red-carpet protocol, that Western diplomacy is simple and casual and doesn’t bother with pomp and ceremony […] Well, reality has just delivered a slap in the face.

“The truth is that they have always treated people differently according to who they are […]. In international relations, protocol, pomp, ceremony, and displays of respect are never governed by fixed standards, nor are they simply a matter of a particular country’s customs. They are a naked ranking of power.

“The reality is that the vast majority of foreign visitors to the United States simply do not carry enough weight for US military personnel to bend down and meticulously tend to the red carpet for them. […] Diplomatic protocol is never simply about courtesy. It is a precise weighing of power.”

Leaving Japan Behind

The idea that the unusual grandeur with which Xi and the First Lady were welcomed reflects China’s current rise to great-power status was also highlighted on Chinese social media through comparisons with Japan.

Former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, writing on X, commented on the stark contrast between the reception of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and that of the Chinese delegation.

Two days before Xi’s arrival, Takaichi landed at New York’s JFK Airport to attend the UN General Assembly. A photo posted by the Japanese Cabinet showed her arrival, with Takaichi waving across a relatively empty tarmac. The image was widely mocked on Chinese social media.

The image of Takaichi’s arrival in the US, as posted on social media.

According to Hatoyama, the contrast between the warmth and coldness of the two receptions — although they concerned two very different kinds of visits — signaled improving US-China relations and Japan being “left behind.”

He suggested that Takaichi should retract her earlier statements (regarding a possible Taiwan contingency) and work toward better Japan-US-China relations.

🇯🇵 Another point of discussion was how Japanese officials and media were “confused” over Trump referring to China as a US ally during World War II. Japan’s own war memory has developed from a very different perspective, with its narratives centered on the “Greater East Asia War” in which Japan fought Western powers while China was a target of Japanese military operations.^[4]

“What are their history teachers teaching them?” some commenters wondered.

Others simply rejoiced in the Japanese response, arguing that the Washington welcome was further evidence that “the United States has already acknowledged China’s status as the world’s number-one power.”

From Red Carpet to Pandas

Aside from the extraordinary welcome and what it suggested about historical recognition and diplomatic status, the announcement that pandas would once again be coming to the United States added another symbolic layer to the summit.

Few animals are as closely associated with the history of US-China rapprochement as the giant panda.

The giant panda is China’s most beloved animal; it is the cultural symbol of China and is generally called a ‘national treasure’ (国宝). Modern panda diplomacy — China sending pandas abroad to build goodwill (and later, to support conservation partnerships) — practically began when two giant pandas were sent to the United States in 1941 as a gesture of thanks for American support during China’s war against Japan.^[5] The gift of two pandas crowned Nixon’s historic 1972 visit to China.

After Xi Jinping personally announced during this week’s Washington visit that giant pandas Ping Ping (平平) and Fu Shuang (福双) are starting their ten-year American adventure at Zoo Atlanta, the panda pair became a highly symbolic and widely discussed topic on Chinese social media.

Pandas, known as “envoys of friendship” (友谊的使者), are basically a barometer of bilateral relations. For Chinese netizens, whether they are treated well abroad and which countries are deemed worthy of hosting them can also reflect broader views on China’s relations with those countries.

During the previous period of heightened political tensions between the US and China, for example, Chinese netizens were very critical of the treatment of Chinese giant panda Yaya at the Memphis Zoo, as the panda was suffering from hair loss, looked skinny, and seemed unhappy. When relations with Russia improved, Chinese media highlighted the contrast by showing China’s pandas in Moscow rolling around, playing, and putting on plenty of weight.

A funny detail about the pandas now welcomed in Atlanta is that Ping Ping was initially named “Noodle,” or, to be more precise, “Hot-Dry Noodle” (热干面). Born in the first weeks of the COVID outbreak in 2020, his name was a tribute to Wuhan’s signature breakfast dish – and it also reminds us of a time when US-China relations were far less rosy.

Ping Ping (“Hot Dry Noodles”) on the left. The arrival of Ping Ping and Fu Shuang in Atlanta on the right. Images via Xinhua.

With the addition of Ping Ping and Fu Shuang, the United States, now hosting six pandas, surpasses South Korea (which has four) to become the country with the most giant pandas outside China. Japan once had as many as thirteen. It now has zero.

Ping Ping and Fu Shuang arrived in Atlanta on Sunday aboard the “FedEx Panda Express,” beginning their stay in the United States. At this moment of ‘rekindled’ Sino-American relations, many netizens are cautiously optimistic about the future.

In the end, the pandas are part of the same symbolic reading of US-China relations as Xi’s reception in Washington. How they are welcomed and treated becomes another small indicator through which the larger relationship can be read.

Despite all the positive signs this week, many netizens also express worry about China’s “national treasures” and simply hope that their pandas will be treated well and return home safely. After all, a lot can happen in a decade. Warm welcomes can turn icy, red carpets can change into empty tarmacs, and state banquets could be replaced by instant noodles.

🔚

1. For more on the role of “national humiliation” and historical memory in Chinese politics and foreign relations, see Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (Columbia University Press, 2012). ↩
2. For more on China’s often overlooked role as an Allied power during World War II, see Rana Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937–1945 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013). ↩
3. Rana Mitter, China’s Good War: How World War II Is Shaping a New Nationalism (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2020), 9. ↩
4. For more on this, see my article from last week: “Keeping Score of History: The Mukden Incident and China’s Basketball Defeat to Japan”. ↩
5. This was the Republic of China—the government led by Chiang Kai-shek, not today’s People’s Republic of China. Soong Mei-ling (宋美龄, Madame Chiang Kai-shek) arranged the gift. ↩

Eye on Digital China, by Manya Koetse, is co-published on Substack and What’s on Weibo. Both feature the same new content — so you can read and subscribe wherever you prefer. Substack offers community features, while What’s on Weibo provides full archive access.

Spotted a mistake or want to add something? Please let us know in comments below or email us. First-time commenters, please be patient – we will have to manually approve your comment before it appears.

©2026 Eye on Digital China/Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.