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Paper over Cracks: Online Frustrations about Official Language Sugarcoating China’s Youth Employment Crisis

Netizens are growing tired with the persistent use of positive language and creative use of data to mask unemployment challenges in China.

Zilan Qian

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From manipulating employment statistics to the use of euphemistic terms, Chinese netizens are growing increasingly frustrated about how official media and authorities are portraying the situation on the job market. As one in five young Chinese faces joblessness, they criticise the stark contrast between official rhetoric and their lived experiences.

The National Bureau of Statistics recently released a new report on China’s national economy, asserting that the Chinese economy has continued on its upward trajectory.

According to the report, the surveyed urban unemployment rate in May stood at 5.2%, which remained unchanged from the previous month, while the unemployment rate for the 16-24 age group was reported at 20.8%.

Despite the subtitle of the employment data section claiming that “the overall employment situation in China remains stable,” this stability only seems to be a paperwall painted by the government to cover instability that is permeating throughout society as youth unemployment is a rising problem, with 1 in 5 young Chinese currently facing joblessness.

How ’employment’ was defined in the recent official report has sparked heated discussions online.

 
The Controversy of One Hour per Week: Challenging the Definition of Employment
 

According to the National Statistic Bureau, the survey adopted the standards of the International Labour Organization (ILO). The employed population refers to individuals who, during the reference period of the survey (usually a week), “have worked for one hour or more and have received labor compensation or earned income, as well as those who are temporarily absent from work due to vacation, temporary shutdowns, and similar reasons.” All these people are officially considered as ’employed.’

This situation implies that nóngmíngōng (农民工), migrant workers from rural areas who relocate to cities in search of employment opportunities, may be classified as “employed” even when they engage in occasional labor jobs and wait on the streets for temporary work, such as carpentry or cement work.

Netizens expressed their confusion regarding the classification of individuals offering these occasional labor jobs, characterized by extreme instability, as “employed.” [Photo via ChinaNews]

Despite quoting the ILO to justify its definition of employment as “scientific,” the bureau’s definition has faced strong criticism from Chinese netizens who find it unacceptable and ridiculous.

One netizen on Zhihu, representing many others, questioned, “How can someone who doesn’t even meet the minimum wage standard be considered ’employed’?!” They raised concerns about the viability of sustaining a living on the income earned from just one hour of work, which ranges from 25 RMB to 13 RMB depending on the region.

Under the hashtag “Working for One Hour or More Per Week Is Considered Employment” (#一周工作1小时及以上属于就业#), one netizen humorously highlights the absurdity of the employment standard by suggesting a comical solution: “I propose that all unemployed individuals go out and pick up trash for an hour to help alleviate the country’s unemployment rate.”

While netizens have long been aware of the government’s manipulation of data to present favorable statistics, the recent manipulation of classifying one hour of work per week as employment has reached an extreme level that many find amusing: “I admire our leaders for their shamelessness in front of the camera.”

Others mocked the government’s modesty in not declaring a zero employment rate, suggesting that it is the state, rather than the actual situation, that determines the numbers they present. As one Weibo user remarked, “If it weren’t unscientific to for the government claim 100 percent employment rate, ours would surely be 100 percent.”

 
Postponing Graduation in Response to a Challenging Job Market
 

Despite the contentious interpretation of employment, the unemployment rate for the 16-24 age group has experienced a steady rise. From December 2022 to May, the rate surged from 16.7% to 20.8%.

Monthly surveyed urban unemployment rate of people aged 16 to 24 in China from May 2021 to May 2023 by Statista.

Facing the undeniable crisis, the state still claims a positive prospect for the youth. According to the spokesman of the National Statistic Bureau, although there are about 96 million people in this age group, many are still students who have not yet entered the labor market. Additionally, there are approximately 6 million who are currently still searching for jobs among the estimated 33 million people who enter the labor market.

The spokesman highlighted that “over 26 million people have found jobs,” emphasizing that with the continuous improvement of the economy, employment has remained generally stable and has good support.

However, netizens are not convinced by the optimistic outlook presented by the authorities. In conjunction with the “one hour per week as employment” standard, the reported 20.8% youth unemployment rate appears even more alarming. “With such stringent unemployment criteria, they still manage to calculate a rate of 20 percent!” exclaimed a user on Zhihu, suggesting that the actual situation may be much worse than the officially stated figure.

Furthermore, there is a pessimistic sentiment regarding future development. Some individuals point out that the peak graduation season in June and July is yet to come. Additionally, the so-called “flexible employment” sectors, such as food delivery and ride-sharing, have already reached saturation. As a result, the situation may worsen when a large number of graduates enter an already saturated job market.

A survey poster reveals that among the surveyed students, 63.2% acknowledged knowing individuals who have opted to postpone their graduations, while 9.9% reported being acquainted with a significant number of people making the same choice.

University students have devised different mechanisms to cope with the situation. Many have chosen to postpone their graduation in response to the job market. According to a recent survey by China Youth Daily (中国青年报), 73.1% of the surveyed college students stated that they have classmates who have chosen to postpone their graduation. Among the various reasons for postponing graduation, 37.8% of the students explicitly state that they do so because they are unable to find suitable jobs.

 
Positive Phrasing to Sugarcoat Unemployment
 

Due to the challenging job market, a considerable number of university students have resorted to relocating from metropolitan areas in search of opportunities in more peripheral regions.

The official Weibo account of China Business Network (CBN, @第一财经日报), has launched the hashtag “The focus of employment for fresh university graduates continues to shift downwards” (#应届大学生就业重心继续下沉# ), shedding light on the growing trend among graduates to pursue employment prospects in medium-sized or small-sized cities, as well as rural areas. This shift is primarily driven by the limited job prospects available in major cities.

One of Weibo user sarcastically commented: “Our wordsmiths always have a way of disguising crises as peace and tranquility.” The commenter, along with many others, expressed discontent over the attempt to ‘beautify’ the phenomenon of students being unable to find employment in big cities by labeling it as a ‘downward shift of focus.’

A circulating meme on social media humorously highlights how official statements tend to present negative trends in a more positive light. Instead of straightforwardly stating that “the new energy vehicle market is saturated” or that “fresh graduates face difficulties in the employment market,” official language twists it to “new energy vehicles go to rural areas” and “the focus of employment for fresh graduates shifts downwards.”

Meme making fun of official language turning negative trends in something positive.

One commenter pointed out: “Negative terms such as ‘parasite’ (寄生虫) or ‘burden on parents (坑爹妈)’ have vanished from the media. Instead, positive terms like ‘full-time children (全职儿女)’ and ‘staying at home to take care of parents’ (留在家乡陪父母) have emerged.”

From manipulating employment statistics to employing euphemistic terms for unemployment, Chinese netizens are becoming increasingly weary of the government’s use of wordplay and number manipulation to portray an illusory sense of prosperity. A Zhihu user questioned, “Is it truly so difficult to acknowledge the phrase ’employment recession’?”

The frustration with the sugarcoating of unemployment realities is palpable in online discussions. “They are aware that we know they are lying,” wrote one Weibo user. Another individual wondered, “Why is everything filled with lies?” to which a reply succinctly stated, “They claim lies don’t hurt, but the truth is like a sharp knife.”

By Zilan Qian

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©2023 Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.

Zilan Qian is a China-born undergraduate student at Barnard College majoring in Anthropology. She is interested in exploring different cultural phenomena, loves people-watching, and likes loitering in supermarkets and museums.

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China Insight

“Jiangyou Bullying Incident”: From Online Outrage to Offline Protest

“You think we’re scared of you? It’s not like we haven’t been to jail before.”

Manya Koetse

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These days have been filled with tension and anger in the city of Jiangyou (江油市), Sichuan, after a rare, large-scale protest broke out following public outrage over a severe bullying incident and how it was handled.

The bullying incident at the center of this story happened outside school premises in Mianyang on the afternoon of July 22. Footage of the assault, recorded by bystanders at the scene, began circulating widely online on August 2, sparking widespread outrage among concerned netizens, many of them worried parents.

The violent altercation involved three girls between the ages of 13 and 15 who ganged up on another minor, a 14-year-old girl named Lai (赖).

After Lai and a 15-year-old girl named Liu (刘) reportedly had a dispute, Liu gathered two of her friends—the 13-year-old also named Liu (刘) and a 14-year-old named Peng (彭)—to gang up on Lai.

The three underage girls lured Lai to an abandoned building, where they subjected her to hours of verbal and physical violence. The footage showed how they took turns in kicking, slapping, and pushing her.

At one point, after Lai said she would call the police, one of the bullies yelled: “You think we’re scared of you? It’s not like we haven’t been to jail before. I’ve been in more than ten times—it doesn’t even take 20 minutes to get out” (“你以为我们会怕你吗?又不是没进去过,我都进去十多次了,没二十分钟就出来了”).

That same night, the incident was reported to police. It took authorities until August 2 to bring in all involved parties for questioning, and a police report was issued on the morning of Monday, August 4.

Police report by Jiangyou Public Security Bureau, confirming the details of the incident and the (legal) consequences for the attackers.

Two of the girls (the 15- and 14-year-old) were given administrative penalties and will be sent to a specialized correctional school. The younger Liu and other bystanders were formally reprimanded.

 
“Parents Speak Out for the Bullied Girl”
 

The way the incident was handled—not just the relatively late official report, but mostly the perceived lenient punishment—triggered anger online.

Many people who had seen the video responded emotionally and felt that the underage girls should be stripped of their rights to take their exams, and that the bullying incident should forever haunt them in the same way it will undoubtedly haunt their victim.

Especially the phrase “It’s not like I haven’t been taken in [to jail] before” struck a chord, as it showed just how calculated the bullies were—and how, by counting on the leniency of the Chinese judicial system for minors, they made the system complicit in their determination to turn those hours into a living hell for Lai.

China has been dealing with an epidemic of school violence for years. In 2016, Chinese netizens were already urging authorities to address the problem of extreme bullying in schools, partly because minors under the age of 16 rarely face criminal punishment for their actions.

Since 2021, children between the ages of 12 and 14 can be held criminally responsible for extreme and cruel cases resulting in death or disability—but their legal prosecution must first be approved by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP).

It has not done much to stop the violence.

Discussions around extreme bullying like this have repeatedly flared up over the years, such as in 2020, when a 15-year-old schoolboy named Yuan (袁) in Shaanxi was fatally beaten and buried by a group of minors.

Last year, a young boy named Wang Ziyao (王子耀) was killed by three classmates after suffering years of bullying. His body was found in a greenhouse just 100 meters from the home of one of the suspects, and the case shocked and enraged local residents.

But the problem is widespread among girls, too.

In 2016, we already reported on how so-called ‘campus violence videos’ (校园暴力视频) had become a concerning trend. In these kinds of videos—often showing multiple bullies beating up a single victim on camera—it’s not uncommon to see girls as the aggressors.

Girls often form cliques to gang up on a victim to show that they are in control or to gain popularity. They also tend to be more inclined than boys to make cruel jokes or stage pranks meant to embarrass or humiliate their target. This may partly explain why there seem to be more campus violence videos on Chinese social media showing girls bullying girls than boys bullying boys.

In the case of Lai, she appears to have been particularly vulnerable. One of her relatives posted online that her mother is deaf and mute, and her father allegedly is disabled. This fact may have contributed to why Lai was repeatedly targeted and bullied by the same group of girls, who reportedly took away her phone and socially isolated her at school.

In response to the incident, netizens started posting the hashtag “Parents Speak Up for the Bullied Girl” (“#家长们为被霸凌女孩发声#), not only to support Lai and her family, but to demand harsher punishments for school bullies and for stricter crackdown on this nationwide problem.

 
From Online Anger to Offline Protest
 

While many people spoke out for Lai online, hundreds also wanted to show up for her in person.

On August 4, dozens of people gathered in front of the Jiangyou Municipal Government building (江油市人民政府) to demand justice and support Lai’s parents, who had come to express their grievances to the authorities—at one point even bowing to the ground in a plea for justice to be served for their daughter.

Footage and images circulating on social media showing the parents of Lai, the victim, bowing on the ground to demand justice from authorities.

As the crowd grew larger, tensions escalated, eventually leading to clashes between protesters and police.

The arrests at the scene did little to ease the situation. As night fell, the mood grew increasingly grim, and some protesters began throwing objects at the police.

Images of the protest, posted on Weibo.

Near the east section of Shixian Road (诗仙路东段), more people gathered. Hundreds of individuals filming and livestreaming captured footage of the police crackdown—officers beating protesters, dragging them away, and deploying pepper spray.

Netizens’ digital artwork about the bullying incident, the parents’ grievances, and the public protest and its crackdown in Jiangyou. Shared by 程Clarence.

Although the protests briefly gained traction on social media and became a trending topic on Weibo, the search term was soon removed from the platform’s trending list.

 
Lasting Mental Scars
 

On Tuesday, August 5, several topics related to the Jiangyou bullying incident began trending again on Chinese social media.

On the short video app Kuaishou, a collective demand for justice surged to the number one spot, under the tag “A large number of Jiangyou parents demand justice for the victim” (江油大批家长为受害学生讨公道).

As of now, none of the perpetrators’ families have come forward to apologize.

As for Lai—according to the latest reports, she did not suffer serious physical injuries from the bullying incident, but according to her own parents, the mental scars will last. She will need continued mental health support and counseling going forward.

Although many posts about the incident and the ensuing protests have been taken offline, ‘Jiangyou’s Bullying Incident’ has already become one more case in the growing list of brutal school bullying incidents that have surfaced on Chinese social media in recent years. The heat of local anger may fade over time, but the rising number of such cases continues to fuel public frustration nationwide—especially if local authorities fail to do more to address and prevent school bullying.

“Not being able to protect our children, that’s a disgrace to our schools and the police,” one commenter wrote: “I want to thank all those mothers who have raised their voices for the bullied child. Each of us must say no to bullies, and we must do all we can to stop them. I hope the lawmakers agree.”

By Manya Koetse

(follow on X, LinkedIn, or Instagram)

Spotted a mistake or want to add something? Please let us know in comments below or email us. First-time commenters, please be patient – we will have to manually approve your comment before it appears.

©2025 Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.

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The Secret Life of Monks: Shi Yongxin’s Shaolin Scandal Casts a Shadow on Monastic Integrity

“To put it bluntly, temples have been places of deception, corruption, opportunism, and exploitation since ancient times.”

Manya Koetse

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This week, news about a well-known Chinese monk going off the Buddhist path has triggered many discussions on Chinese social media.

The story revolves around Shi Yongxin (释永信), the head monk at China’s famous Shaolin Temple (少林寺) in Dengfeng, Henan. Shi is suspected of embezzlement of temple funds and illicit relationships, and is currently under investigation.

In recent days, wild rumors have been circulating online claiming that Shi fled to the United States after being exposed. On July 26, a supposed “police bulletin” began circulating, alleging that Shi Yongxin had attempted to leave the country with seven lovers, 21 children, and six temple staff. It also claimed he was stopped by authorities before exiting China, that he had secretly obtained U.S. citizenship a decade ago, and that he had misused donations and assumed fake identities.

Although that specific report has since been refuted by Chinese official media, it quickly became clear that there was real fire behind all that smoke.

The report that circulated online and was later confirmed to be fake

Because despite all the sensationalized gossip (some posts even claimed Shi had 174 illegitimate children!), what’s certain is that Shi Yongxin seriously crossed the line. On July 27, 2025, the Shaolin Temple Management Office (少林寺管理处) issued an official statement through its verified channels, including its WeChat account. The statement read:

The report that circulated online and was later confirmed to be fake.

Shi Yongxin, the Abbot of Shaolin Temple, is suspected of criminal offenses, including misappropriating and taking project funds and temple assets. He seriously violated Buddhist discipline, maintained improper relationships with multiple women over a long period and fathered illegitimate children. He is currently under joint investigation by multiple departments. Relevant information will be made public in due course.

Shaolin Temple Management Office
July 27, 2025

China’s Buddhist Association (中国佛教协会) also released a statement on July 28, in which it stated that, in coordination with the Henan Provincial Buddhist Association (河南省佛教协会), Shi Yongxin has been officially stripped of his monastic status.

Various Chinese media sources report that Shi Yongxin was taken away by police on Friday, July 25. Chinese media outlet Caixin suggests that it must not have come as a complete surprise, since Shi had allegedly already been restricted from leaving the country since around the Spring Festival period (late January 2025) (#释永信春节前后已被限制出境#).

 
About Shi Yongxin
 

Shi Yongxin is not just any abbot. He’s the abbot of the Shaolin Monastery (少林寺), which is one of the most famous Buddhist temples in the world and is known as the birthplace of Shaolin Kung Fu. The temple was founded in 495 CE. Besides being a Buddhist monastery, it also operates as a popular tourist attraction, a kung fu school, and a cultural brand.

Shi has been running the monastery for 38 years, a fact that also went trending on Weibo these days (#释永信已全面主持少林寺38年#, 140 million views by Monday).

Shi Yongxin is the monastic name of Liu Yingcheng (刘应成), born in Yinshang county in Fuyang, Anhui, in 1965. He came to Shaolin Temple in 1981 and became a disciple of abbot Shi Xingzheng (释行正), who passed away in 1987. Shi Yongxin then followed in his footsteps and managed the temple affairs. He formally became head monk in 1999.

Moreover, Shi Yongxin reportedly served as President of the Henan Provincial Buddhist Association since 1998 and as Vice President of the Buddhist Association of China since 2002.

Shi Yongxin, photos via Weibo.

Shi Yongxin was thus an incredibly powerful figure—not only because of the decades he spent overseeing temple affairs, but also due to his influence within public, institutional, and religious spheres.

Holding such a visible role, Shi Yongxin (释永信) also had (or has—though it’s unlikely he’ll ever post again) a Weibo account with over 882,000 followers (@释永信师父). His last post, made on July 24, was a Buddhist text about the ‘Pure Land’ (净土)—a realm said to make the path toward enlightenment easier.

That post has since attracted hundreds of replies. While some devoted followers express disbelief over the scandal, many others respond with cynicism, questioning whether anything about Buddhism remains truly ‘pure.’

One widely shared post shows an artist sitting in front of a painting of Shi Yongxin, writing, “Worked on this painting for six months, just finished late last night—feels like the sky’s collapsed.” The second picture, posted by someone else, says, “Just change it a bit.”

One aspect of the scandal fueling online discussions is the fact that Shi Yongxin had led the monastery for so long. Rumors about his “chaotic private life” and unethical behavior surfaced years ago, going back to at least 2015 (#释永信10年前就曾被举报私生活混乱#; #释永信曾被举报向弟子索要供养钱#). One of the questions now echoing across social media is: why wasn’t he held accountable sooner? “Who was protecting him?”

 
“The Tip of the Iceberg”
 

The Shi Yongxin scandal does not just hurt the reputation and cultural brand of the Shaolin Monastery; it also damages a certain image of Buddhist monks as a collective of people with true faith and integrity.

According to well-known knowledge blogger Pingyuan Gongzi Zhao Sheng (@平原公子赵胜), many people’s understanding of abbots or Buddhist masters (“方丈大师们”) is flawed, since it’s generally believed they attained their high positions within the monasteries due to their moral virtue or deep understanding of Buddhism. In reality, Zhao Sheng argues, these individuals often rise to power because they are skilled at earning money and gaining influence.

“To put it bluntly,” Zhao Sheng writes, “temples have been places of deception, corruption, opportunism, and exploitation since ancient times.”

The blogger argues that much of the influence and power of Buddhist masters was stripped away under Mao Zedong, but that some new famous monks rose in the 1980s, using their skills and connections to rebuild temples and turn them into thriving enterprises.

“If you want to find a few people in temples who truly have faith, who truly have personal integrity, and who are truly dedicated to saving all living things, it’s not that they don’t exist—but it’s rather difficult, like finding a needle in a haystack,” Zhao Sheng wrote.

Some commenters suggest that Shi Yongxin is just the tip of the iceberg (“冰山一角”). They believe that if someone as influential as him can be involved in such misconduct—despite whistleblowers having tried to expose him for over a decade—there must be many more cases of power abuse and corruption within China’s monasteries.

“I previously donated money to the temple,” one commenter on Xiaohongshu wrote: “Although it wasn’t much, it does make me a bit uncomfortable now.”

Another person posted that the Shi Yongxin scandal gave them a sense of despair.

Some older posts about the extravagant lifestyles of head monks — including their luxury cars — have also resurfaced online and are once again making the rounds, suggesting that netizens are actively revisiting other potential instances of misconduct within the monastic world.

Abbot Guangquan Fashi (光泉法师) with a Ferrari California T, Kaihao Fashi (开豪法师) with a Porsche Panamera, Shi Yongxin (释永信) linked to an Audi Q7, and Huiqing (慧庆) and a BMW 7 Series.

One image that resurfaced online shows Shi Yongxin—allegedly driving an Audi Q7—alongside other abbots, such as Guangquan Fashi (光泉法师), the head monk of Lingyin Temple (灵隐寺), who is associated with a Ferrari.

More images like these are now circulating, as people delve into the ‘secret lives of monks’ beyond the spiritual, shifting focus to their material lives instead.

Monks from major temples, including Qin Shangshi (钦尚师) of Famen Temple, E’erdeni (鄂尔德尼) of Jokhang Temple in Lhasa, Yin Le (印乐) of Baima Temple, and Huiqing (慧庆) of Baishou Temple, are rumored to be associated with high-end cars like BMWs, a Porsche Cayenne, and a Range Rover.

While the results of the investigation into Shi Yongxin are still pending, many netizens are already looking beyond him. One person writes: “Are you realizing now? It’s not just Shaolin Temple that has money, other temples aren’t exactly short on money either.”

Another person wonders: “Are the monks in today’s temples actually still truly devoted to spiritual practice at all?”

By Manya Koetse

(follow on X, LinkedIn, or Instagram)

Spotted a mistake or want to add something? Please let us know in comments below or email us. First-time commenters, please be patient – we will have to manually approve your comment before it appears.

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