Featured
Op-Ed: Your Use of “Netizen” Hurts Responsible China Coverage
It’s not innocent jargon. Not anymore.
It’s unlikely that when internet theorist and author Michael F. Hauben coined the word “netizen” more than thirty years ago, he would have imagined that, one day, on the other side of the world, a few handfuls of Western reporters and media critics covering China would be divided: in one camp applauding and in the other cursing his creation. It’s equally unlikely he’d recognize at first glance what his word has come to mean in 2018 – and to whom.
Common thought is that whether or not “netizen” should be used, and what it means, are at the heart of this debate, which by now spans publications both big and small, free and censored. It hasn’t gotten us anywhere.
But in view of China’s escalation of online policing and digital surveillance, the concept of “netizen” is evolving, as must its coverage in Western media. Far from innocent jargon, the word today has political implications and a growing potential for harm, one Western media must recognize if it is to conduct responsible reporting.
A Western interpretation
When considering the word “netizen,” it helps to know what one is talking about. Namely, pick a definition, and stick with it.
Scenario A)
One clear-cut definition offered by the Atlantic designates a unique identity; young, wealthy, educated Chinese urbanites and/or politically active individuals in online communities adept at skirting censorship.
Here, simple protocol applies. Writers using “netizen” must first make sure the subjects of their story actually match this description. Then, they must assess whether these complex socioeconomic and political elements are evident in this word. Hint: they’re not. Inevitably, writers should be explaining these elements to accompany the use of this term in each article it appears in. Anything short of this is incomplete reporting.
Scenario B)
If broadly defined to be a synonym to “Chinese internet users,” as is more often the case, then several questions emerge: Why do Chinese internet users need a special label in the first place? Why is “Chinese internet user” inadequate when this type of terminology works for everyone else? If research (paywall) suggests the online habits of Chinese are similar to the rest of us, what are we trying to accomplish by othering them?
Self-applied labels
In advocacy reporting, we try to respect a person’s self-applied labels, such as with race or sexual orientation, so I appreciate the irony when I say that just because Chinese people call themselves “netizens” doesn’t necessarily mean we should.
Be it when describing race, sexual orientation, disability, etc. there is a general effort to use terminology that centers the person, and not the circumstance, which is often complex. “Person with impaired vision,” “a cisgender gay man,” “the woman, who identifies as a second-generation Filipino immigrant,” “individuals claiming to be members of the Anonymous collective” are infinitely better than “the blind,” “the gay,” “the Filipino,” “Anonymous.” In pieces where nuance and individuals matter, these words do more than fill up space.
“Netizen,” as it is currently used, erases both.
What’s more, these often political labels emerged in societies with freedom of association where one makes a statement simply by publicly identifying. By contrast, what does it mean to label yourself with something as vague and abstract as “netizen” in a society that doesn’t allow such freedom, and what effect does it have when Western media take up this cause?
A Chinese strategy
The self-applied label argument is also unsound when you consider that “netizen” is actually a mistranslation of the word “wǎngmín” (网民).
In wǎngmín 人民 (people), nóngmín 农民 (farmer), jūmín 居民 (resident), yímín 移民 (migrant), yúmín 渔民 (fisherman), and míngē 民歌 (folk song), “mín” 民 simply means “people,” without any “citizen” connotation, and therefore “wǎngmín” 网民 really just means “internet people/people on the internet.”
In other words, “netizen” and “wǎngmín” are faux amis. It’s a mistake that Western media has allowed to proliferate and one that we must now contend with.
While the use of the English word by ordinary Chinese and private Chinese media could boil down to guileless ignorance towards English nuance, by contrast, “wǎngmín,” when applied by the Chinese government and its mouthpieces, is part of deliberate national policy. As described by Manya Koetse in her analysis, the Chinese term is an official category of Chinese nationals on which the CCP imposes severe restrictions.
What ramifications are there for Western media in not consciously decoupling these wildly different interpretations by different actors? By casually tossing the word around, do we not run the risk of normalizing Chinese internet policy?
While we, working in the Far East, may feel at times that our work is isolated, it should be noted that people are, in fact, reading, for better or worse.
“[‘Netizen’] has been used when reporting on China for a decade+ [sic] in order to relieve journalists of understanding what they’re reporting on,” one Reddit user (Western netizen?) writes. “Today it is a lazy way to assume all internet users in China think the same way by f*cking lazy journalists.”
“Netizen” may well stick around. China’s emerging digital policies have all but ensured it. But we owe it to our readers and the people we cover to get with the program, to evolve our terminology and critical judgment at the same pace as the subject matter.
We need to understand that the benefits of its selective, judicious use, as a result of explicit purpose, come from highlighting and decoding China’s socioeconomic and political situation, not from generalizing 772 million individuals, and least of all from othering them or normalizing their constraints. It may help everyone’s understanding of this country, including our own.
By Dave Yin
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China Brands, Marketing & Consumers
Signals: Hasan Piker’s China Trip & the Unexpected Journey of a Chinese School Uniform to Angola
Hasan Piker’s controversial China tour, a Chinese school uniform resurfaces in Africa, a new winter hotspot, why Chinese elites ‘run’ to Tokyo, and more.
🌊 Signals — Week 47 (2025)
Part of Eye on Digital China, Signals highlights slower trends and underlying shifts, connecting the dots beyond the daily scroll. This edition was sent to paid subscribers — subscribe to receive the next issue in your inbox.
For the coming two weeks, I’ll be traveling from Beijing to Chongqing and beyond (more on that soon) so please bear with me if my posting frequency dips a little. I’ll be sure to pick it up again soon and will do my best to keep you updated along the way. In the meantime, if you know of a must-try hotpot in Chongqing, please do let me know.
In this newsletter: Hasan Piker’s controversial China tour, a Chinese school uniform in Angola, a new winter hotspot, discussions on what happens to your Wechat after you die, why Chinese elites rùn to Tokyo, and more. Let’s dive in.
- 💰 The richest woman in China, according to the latest list by Hurun Research Institute, is the “queen of pharmaceuticals” Zhong Huijuan (钟慧娟) who has accumulated 141 billion yuan (over 19 billiob USD). Women account for over 22% of Chinese billionaires (those with more than 5 billion RMB), underscoring China’s globally leading position in producing wealthy female entrepreneurs..
- 🧩 What happens to your WeChat after you die? A user who registered for NetEase Music with a newly reassigned phone number unexpectedly gained access to the late singer Coco Lee’s (李玟) account, as the number had originally belonged to her. The incident has reignited debate over how digital accounts should be handled after death, prompting platforms like NetEase and Tencent to reconsider policies on long-inactive accounts and take stronger measures to protect them.
- 📱 Although millions of viewers swoon over micro-dramas with fantasy storylines where rich, powerful men win over the “girl next door” through money and status, Chinese regulators are now stepping in to curb exaggerated plots featuring the so-called “dominant CEO” (霸道总裁) archetype, signaling stricter oversight for the booming short drama market.
- ☕ A popular Beijing coffee chain calling itself “People’s Cafe” (人民咖啡馆), with its style and logo evoking nationalist visual nostalgia, has changed its name after facing criticism for building its brand – including pricey coffee and merchandise – on Mao era and state-media political connotations. The cafe is now ‘Yachao People’s Cafe’ (要潮人民咖啡馆).
- 👀 Parents were recently shocked to see erotic ads appear on the Chinese nursery rhymes and children’s learning app BabyBus (宝宝巴士), which is meant for kids ages 0–8. BabyBus has since apologized, but the incident has sparked discussions about how to keep children safe from such content.
- 🧧The 2026 holiday schedule has continued to be a big topic of conversation as it includes a 9-day long Spring Festival break (from February 15 to February 23), making it the longest Lunar New Year holiday on record. The move not only gives people more time for family reunions, but also gives a huge boost to the domestic travel industry.
Hasan Piker’s Chinese Tour & The US–China Content Honeymoon
Livestreamer Hasan Piker during his visit to Tiananmen Square flag-rising ceremony.
It’s not time for the end-of-year overviews just yet – but I’ll already say that 2025 was the US–China ‘honeymoon’ year for content creation. It’s when China became “cool,” appealing, and eye-grabbing for young Western social media users, particularly Americans. The recent China trip of the prominent American online streamer Hasan Piker fits into that context.
This left-wing political commentator also known as ‘HasanAbi’ (3 million followers on Twitch, recently profiled by the New York Times) arrived in China for a two-week trip on November 11.
Piker screenshot from the interview with CGTN, published on CGTN.
His visit has been controversial on English-language social media, especially because Piker, known for his criticism of America (which he calls imperialist), has been overly praising China: calling himself “full Chinese,” waving the Chinese flag, joining state media outlet CGTN for an interview on China and the US, and gloating over a first-edition copy of Quotations from Chairman Mao (the Little Red Book). He portrays China as heavily misrepresented in the West and as a country the United States should learn from.
Hasan Piker did an interview with CGTN, posing with Li Jingjing 李菁菁.
During his livestreaming tour, Hasan, who is nicknamed “lemonbro” (柠檬哥) by Chinese netizens, also joined Chinese platforms Bilibili and Xiaohongshu.
But despite all the talk about Piker in the American online media sphere, online conversations, clicks, and views within China are underwhelming. As of now, he has around 24,000 followers on Bilibili, and he’s barely a topic of conversation on mainstream feeds.
Piker’s visit stands in stark contrast to that of American YouTuber IShowSpeed (Darren Watkins), who toured China in March. With lengthy livestreams from Beijing to Chongqing, his popularity exploded in China, where he came to be seen by many as a representative of cultural diplomacy.
IShowSpeed’s success followed another peak moment in online US–China cultural exchange. In January 2025, waves of foreign TikTok users and popular creators migrated to the Chinese lifestyle app Xiaohongshu amid the looming TikTok ban.
Initially, the mass migration of American users to Xiaohongshu was a symbolic protest against Trump and US policies. In a playful act of political defiance, they downloaded Xiaohongshu to show they weren’t scared of government warnings about Chinese data collection. (For clarity: while TikTok is a made-in-China app, it is not accessible inside mainland China, where Douyin is the domestic version run by the same parent company).
The influx of foreigners — who were quickly nicknamed “TikTok refugees” — soon turned into a moment of cultural celebration. As American creators introduced themselves, Chinese users welcomed them warmly, eager to practice English and teach newcomers how to navigate the app. Discussions about language, culture, and societal differences flourished. Before long, “TikTok refugees” and “Xiaohongshu natives” were collaborating on homework assignments, swapping recipes, and bonding through humor. It was a rare moment of social media doing what we hope it can do: connect people, build bridges, and replace prejudice with curiosity.
Some of that same enthusiasm was also visible during IShowSpeed’s China tour. Despite the tour inevitably getting caught up in political and commercial interests, much of it was simply about an American boy caught up in the high energy of China’s vibrant cities and everything they offer.
Different from IShowSpeed, who is known for his meme-worthy online presence, Piker is primarily known for his radical political views. His China enthusiasm feels driven less by cultural curiosity and more by his critique of America.
Because of his stances — such as describing the US as a police state — it’s easy for Western critics to accuse him of hypocrisy in praising China, especially after a brief run-in with security police while livestreaming at Tiananmen Square.
Seen in broader context, Piker’s China trip reflects a shift in how China is used in American online discourse.
Before, it was Chinese ‘public intellectuals’ (公知) who praised the US as a ‘lighthouse country’ (灯塔国), a beacon of democracy, to indirectly critique China and promote a Western modernization model. Later, Chinese online influencers showcased their lives abroad to emphasize how much ‘brighter the moon’ was outside China.
In the post-Covid years, the current has reversed: Western content creators — from TikTok influencers to political commentators — increasingly use China to make arguments that are fundamentally about America.
Between these cycles, authentic cultural curiosity gets pushed to the sidelines. The TikTok-refugee moment in early January may have been the closest we’ve come in years: a brief window where Chinese and American users met each other with curiosity, camaraderie, and creativity.
Hasan’s tour, in contrast, reflects a newer phase, one where China is increasingly used as a stage for Western political identity rather than a complex and diverse country to understand on its own terms.
“Liu Sihan, Your School Uniform Ended Up in Angola”: China’s Second-Hand Clothing in Africa
A Chinese school uniform went viral after a Chinese social media user spotted it in Angola.
“Liu Sihan, your schooluniform is hot in Africa” (刘思涵你的校服在非洲火了) is a sentence that unexpectedly trended after a Chinese blogger named Xiao Le (小乐) shared a video of a schoolkid in Angola wearing a Chinese second-hand uniform from Qingdao Xushuilu Primary School, that had the nametag Liu Sihan on it.
The topic sparked discussions about what actually happens to clothing after it’s donated, and many people were surprised to learn how widely Chinese discarded clothing circulates in parts of Africa.
Liu Sihan’s mother, whose daughter is now a 9th grader in Qingdao, had previously donated the uniform to a community clothing donation box (社区旧衣回收箱) after Liu outgrew it. She intended it to help someone in need, ever imagining it to travel all the way to Africa.
In light of this story, one netizen shared a video showing a local African market selling all kinds of Chinese school items, including backpacks, and people wearing clothing once belonging to workers for Chinese delivery platforms. “In Africa, you can see school uniforms from all parts of China, and even Meituan and Eleme outfits,” one blogger wrote.
When it comes to second-hand clothing trade, we know much more about Europe–Africa and US–Africa flows than about Chinese exports, and it seems there haven’t been many studies on this specific topic yet. Still, alongside China’s rapid economic transformations, the rise of fast fashion, and the fact that China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of textiles, the country now has an enormous abundance of second-hand clothing.
Acordig to one 2023 study by Wu et al (link), there is still a lot to gain in China when it’s about the sustainable disposal of clothing – as 40% of Chinese consumers still keep or throw away unwanted clothes.
But there might be a shift underway wen it’s about Second Hand Clothing donation, especially considerinf China’s emerging and novel ways to ddonate: from government bins, to brand programs, and from second-hand storesto online donation platforms that offer at-home pickup.
According to a 2023 study by Wu et al. (link), China still has a long way to go in sustainable clothing disposal. Around 40% of Chinese consumers either keep unwanted clothes at home or throw them away.
But there may be a shift underway. Donation options are expanding quickly, from government bins to brand programs, and from second-hand stores to online platforms that offer at-home pickup.
Chinese social media users posting images of school/work uniforms from China worn by Africans.
As awareness grows around the benefits of donating clothing — reducing waste, supporting sustainability, and the emotional satisfaction of giving — donation rates may rise significantly. The story of Liu Sihan, which many found amusing, might even contribute to the willingness to contribute. This would also mean that scenes of African children (and adults) wearing Chinese-donated clothes may become much more common than it already is.
Laojunshan: Hotspot in Cold Winter
Images from Xiaohongshu, 背包里的星子, 旅行定制师小漾
Go to Zibo for BBQ, go to Tianshui for malatang, go to Harbin for the Ice Festival, cycle to Kaifeng for soup dumplings, or head to Dunhuang to ride a camel — over recent years, a number of Chinese domestic destinations have turned into viral hotspots, boosted by online marketing initiatives and Xiaohongshu influencers.
This year, Laojunshan is among the places climbing the trending lists as a must-visit spot for its spectacular snow-covered landscapes that remind many of classical Chinese paintings. Laojunshan (老君山), a scenic mountain in Henan Province, is attracting more domestic tourists for winter excursions.
Xiaohongshu is filled with travel tips: how to get there from Luoyang station (by bus), and the best times of day to catch the snow in perfect light (7–9 AM or around 6–6:30 PM).
With Laojunshan, we see a familiar pattern: local tourism bureaus, state media, and influencers collectively driving new waves of visitors to the area — bringing crucial revenue to local industries during what would traditionally be slower winter months.
WeChat New Features & Hong Police on Douyin
WeChat has been gradually rolling out a new feature that allows users to recall a batch of messages all at once, which saves you the frantic effort of deleting each message individually after realizing you sent them to the wrong group (or just regret a late-night rant). Many users are welcoming the update, along with another feature that lets you delete a contact without wiping the entire chat history. This is useful for anyone who wants to preserve evidence of what happened before cutting ties.
The Hong Kong Police Force recently celebrated its two-year anniversary on Douyin (the Chinese version of TikTok), having accumulated nearly 5 million followers during that time. To mark the occasion, they invited actor Simon Yam to record a commemorative video for their channel (@香港警察). The presence of the Hong Kong Police on the Chinese app — and the approachable, meme-friendly way they’ve chosen to engage with younger mainland audiences — is yet another signal of Hong Kong institutions’ strategic alignment with mainland China’s digital infrastructure, a shift that has been gradually taking place. The anniversary video proved popular on Douyin, attracting thousands of likes and comments.
Why Chinese Elite Rùn to Japan (by ChinaTalk)
Over the past week, Japan has been trending every single day on Chinese social media in light of escalating bilateral tensions after Japanese PM Takaichi made remarks about Taiwan that China views as a direct military threat. The diplomatic freeze is triggering all kinds of trends, from rising anti-Japanese sentiment online and a ban on Japanese seafood imports to Chinese authorities warning citizens not to travel to Japan.
You’d think Chinese people would want to be anywhere but Japan right now — but the reality is far more nuanced.
In a recent feature in ChinaTalk, Jordan Schneider interviewed Takehiro Masutomo (舛友雄大) who has just published a book about Japan’s new Chinese diaspora, explaining what draws Chinese dissidents, intellectuals, billionaires, and middle-class families to Tokyo.
The book is titled Run Ri: 潤日 Following the Footsteps of Elite Chinese Escaping to Japan (only available in Japanese and Traditional Chinese for now). (The word Rùn 润/潤, by the way, is Chinese online slang and meme expresses the desire to escape the country)
A very interesting read on how Chinese communities are settling in Japan, a place they see as freer than Hong Kong and safer than the U.S., and one they’re surprisingly optimistic about — even more so than the Japanese themselves.
Thanks for reading this Eye on Digital China Signals. For fast-moving trends and deeper dives, keep an eye on the upcoming newsletters.
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Many thanks to Miranda Barnes for helping curate some of the topics in this edition.
— Manya
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China Trend Watch
China Trend Watch: Japan Tensions, Nexperia Fallout, Yunnan’s ‘Wild Child,’ & “Modern Opium”
From quick scrolls to the discussions that matter, these are the topics trending in China this week.
🔥 China Trend Watch — Week 45-46 (2025)
Part of Eye on Digital China. This edition was sent to paid subscribers — subscribe to receive the next issue in your inbox.
Thank you for the kind reactions I received after the last newsletter, in which I took a bird’s-eye view of China’s evolving social media landscape and announced a soft goodbye to What’s on Weibo (if you haven’t read it yet, you can find it here).
I’m very grateful to everyone who has followed my journey with What’s on Weibo, and I’m excited to start this new chapter together.
Under the Eye on Digital China newsletter, you can expect updates in three categories: fast-moving trends, slower-burn signals, and longer thematic explorations — plus the occasional personal story, including from the road as I travel through China. (I’ll soon be covering roughly 3,000 miles across the country, so I’m sure I’ll run into plenty worth sharing.)
This is the China Trend Watch edition — a quick catch-up on real-time conversations. Let’s dive in.
- 🔺 A new 32-country survey by The Economist and GlobeScan found a sharp increase in the share of respondents who prefer China over the US as the world’s “leading power,” and younger people are driving much of this shift.
- 🛵 As Ele.me (China’s No.2 food-delivery platform) rebrands to “Taobao Flash Delivery” (淘宝闪购), competitor Meituan used it as the perfect marketing moment by bidding farewell to its long-time competitor with a virtual “memorial service,” complete with “farewell coupons.”
- 👀 Famous Chinese author and Nobel laureate Mo Yan (莫言) made his debut on the social media app Xiaohongshu this week, with a meme-ready video and posts. He’s been praised as a “meme king” for quickly adapting to the app’s community — gaining over 950,000 followers in just five days.
- 🏳️🌈 Two of China’s most popular gay apps, Blued and Finka (翻咔), have been removed from from Apple App Store in China as at the request of Chinese internet regulatory authorities. Last month, Blued – which has over 40 million registered users in China – temporarily suspended new user registrations after media reports accused the platform of facilitating encounters that led to HIV infections among minors.
- 🏆 A remarkable moment during the Golden Rooster Awards went viral after Ne Zha 2 won the award for Best Art Film — yet no one came to pick it up. Director Jiaozi (饺子) had already announced earlier in the year that he and his entire team would be too busy working on Ne Zha 3 to attend any events — and he, very clearly, is a man of his word.
- 🔻 Chinese-Canadian celebrity Kris Wu (吴亦凡), convicted in 2022 for rape and sentenced to 13 years in prison, keeps reappearing in online discussions — but only through rumors. This week, speculation about his possible death in prison spread across social media yet again (“What, did he die again?” some joked). Local authorities have denied the rumors.
1. Sino-Japanese Tensions Escalate After Takaichi’s Taiwan Remarks
Political cartoon circulating on Chinese social media, made by Jun Zhengping (钧正平), official social media name/persona used by the People’s Liberation Army.
With the recent appointment of conservative politician Sanae Takaichi (高市早苗) as the new prime minister of Japan, seen as the ideological successor to Shinzo Abe, many expected renewed Sino-Japanese tensions due to her stances on various sensitive bilateral issues, from wartime history to Taiwan. But perhaps few expected relations to escalate so quickly and so intensely.
This week, Japan and Takaichi have been top trending topics after she made provocative remarks during a hearing in the Diet about potential military intervention in Taiwan-related matters, suggesting Japan’s Self-Defense Forces could exercise the right of collective self-defense if such a situation were recognized as “survival-threatening.” She is also pushing defense-related policy changes, including exploring revisions to Japan’s “three non-nuclear principles.”
The remarks have set off a chain of events — and online trends — marking what may be the worst flare-up in ties since 2012, when major anti-Japanese protests erupted in China following Japan’s purchase of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Chinese officials are sharpening their tone, issuing angry and escalatory diplomatic statements via X, domestic social media, and Foreign Ministry press briefings.
The recent escalations have also led to official warnings about safety risks for Chinese nationals in Japan. On Sunday, China’s Ministry of Education advised Chinese citizens to exercise caution when planning study-abroad arrangements in Japan.
Beyond nationalist discourse and general anti-Japanese sentiment on Chinese social media — and users vowing not to travel or study there — many discussions are also focusing on geopolitics and history rather than consumer boycotts. Well-known nationalist knowledge blogger Pingyuan Gongzi Zhao Sheng (@平原公子赵胜) posted a lengthy post on Weibo (crossposted to Xiaohongshu) suggesting that Japan is filled with ‘deadly energy’ (死气 sǐqì) – acting irrationally and aggressively because it is in complete decline — socially, economically, technologically, and militarily — but unable to accept it. He argues that a strong and stable country would never gamble its future like this, and that only a “zombie-like” nation in denial would provoke China unnecessarily. A related hashtag about Japan’s gloomy status-quo (#日本死气#) has also been used by other commentators across social media.
2. New Updates in Yunnan’s “Wild Child” Case Raise More Questions
Last month, I wrote about a distressing case involving a 3-year-old boy from Nanjian County (南涧县) in Yunnan who was seen walking on all fours, behaving dog-like with possible spinal deformities, naked and apparently neglected by his parents. Several netizens recorded the scene, and videos quickly spread online in mid October, with thousands referring to the boy as the “wild child” (野孩子 or “naked child” 赤裸小孩) of Yunnan and demanding that authorities intervene and hold the parents accountable.
What followed was a wave of confusing — and sometimes contradictory — media reports. Some outlets initially claimed the boy’s parents were impoverished and struggling, while others reported they were well-educated and financially stable, framing their dubious parenting approach as a deliberate and philosophical “lifestyle choice.”
The parents, who live a camper-van lifestyle, turned out to both hold university degrees (the mother even holds a post-graduate degree). They claimed they practice “natural education” (自然教育法) and said their son disliked wearing clothes because of eczema. Some reports said they refused to cooperate with local authorities; others said they agreed to stop letting their child crawl around naked. Neither the 3-year-old nor his younger brother had ever been registered for a household hukou (registered permanent residence), raising further concern.
Online, speculation intensified. Many netizens feared the child was being deliberately mistreated for profit, suggesting a dark-web content industry behind the scenes.
This week, local authorities and state media posted a new update, releasing a video of the boy — referred to as Pingping (平平, an alias) — walking and playing normally. According to officials, the parents are now receiving support and guidance in raising their children, and both boys are being issued official household registrations by local authorities. The investigation, they said, found no evidence that the parents were involved in “illegal online profit-making.”
But many netizens are anything but convinced. They argue the child shown in the video isn’t the same boy — his face is blurred, and his voice appears overdubbed. Posts questioning the official narrative are being censored. And although authorities say the case is now closed, with the family under ongoing guidance, many people online feel the story is anything but over, and that the real truth still hasn’t surfaced.
Some of the doubts about the veracity of the story and videos are being expressed in more subtle ways to avoid censorship. One Weibo commenter simply wrote that “mild spinal deformities in a 3-year-old may improve within 3–6 months through corrective treatment (…) while recovery from severe deformities may take 1–2 years or even longer” — subtly suggesting that it would be impossible for the boy to be walking and playing normally now if he had shown signs of spinal deformity just weeks earlier. On Douyin, users also questioned what happened to the supposedly severe eczema that had allegedly prevented the boy from wearing clothes. A Zhihu writer expressed frustration: “The official report is extremely fake, but there’s no way to talk about it.” Another commenter echoed the sentiment: “People today aren’t stupid. Even if you forbid them to speak, do you think they won’t know something is wrong?” For many, the case is troubling not only because of the child’s situation, but because the official handling of it has reinforced a growing sense that the public is being managed rather than informed.
3. Nexperia and Dutch ‘Pirate Gene’ Discussions
It wasn’t just bilateral relations with Japan that took a hit this week — tensions between China and the Netherlands have also deepened due to the ongoing dispute surrounding Dutch intervention in the chipmaker Nexperia. This is an issue I wrote about last month. After the incident made international headlines, China responded by blocking the export of Nexperia chips from its factory in China, putting major European automakers at risk of running short on critical components for vehicle electronics.
In brief: Nexperia (安世半导体), a Dutch semiconductor company based in Nijmegen and wholly owned by the Chinese conglomerate Wingtech (闻泰科技) since 2019, became the center of a major diplomatic clash after the Dutch government reportedly ordered a one-year freeze on strategic and governance changes within the company on September 30. Citing national security concerns and a desire to secure domestic chip production, the Dutch move came amid reports that Nexperia CEO Zhang Xuezheng was relocating production facilities and sensitive technology from Europe to China.
While tensions had previously seemed to ease, the conflict escalated again this week. The Dutch public broadcasting organization reported on a widening rift as Nexperia China accused the Dutch branch of disrupting production by refusing to send chip components to the Dongguan factory. Meanwhile, Nexperia Netherlands claimed the Chinese side had been urging customers to reroute payments away from the Netherlands and into Chinese bank accounts. A Dutch delegation is expected to travel to Beijing next week to discuss the situation and attempt to break the deadlock.
On Chinese social media, many users view the Dutch actions as an unfair use of a Cold-War-era law to target a modern, legally operating multinational company. The move is widely seen as another example of Western countries shifting rules to maintain technological dominance when faced with strong competition from Chinese firms. As a result, what began as a company-specific dispute has grown into a broader geopolitical struggle over global chip control and economic sovereignty.
Modern Opium [当代鸦片] (dāngdài yāpiàn)
Over the past year, the term “modern opium” has become more common on Chinese social media— used as a popular term to promote food or other products. It’s perhaps not unlike the famous “finger-licking good” slogan in the West, but applied far more broadly, also to refer to “addictive” online accounts, collector toys, or restaurants. In fact, it has become so commonplace that you can now find “modern-opium food recommendation” suggestions on platforms when searching for good places to eat in major Chinese cities.
Recently, the term began trending as a controversial expression after Chinese media focused on an official online complaint arguing that it “turns national trauma into entertainment” (将民族伤痛娱乐化) and trivializes a painful chapter of Chinese history, drawing a direct connection to the Opium Wars (1839–1842 and 1856–1860).
The complaint has put the term at the center of public attention — but how controversial is it, really? While Chinese media are eager to highlight how inappropriate the phrase is, given China’s collective memory of the “century of humiliation,” many Xiaohongshu users nevertheless seem to think it’s perfectly acceptable to describe their newfound addiction to a milky drink, a sweet dessert, or the perfect hotpot. (I can relate to the latter.)
During this year’s Single’s Day Shopping Festival (11.11), “Europe” was a popular item on shopping lists, not for its fashion or chocolate, but for anti-theft tools. Using “Europe is not safe” slogans and real footage of pickpockets in action, hundreds of Taobao sellers promoted handy anti-theft accessories for Chinese tourists traveling abroad, some even labeled for specific countries, from Spain to Germany.
This year’s shopping festival reportedly generated 1.695 trillion RMB ($238B) across platforms — still up 14.2% year-on-year, but with far slower growth than in previous years (2024: 26.6% growth). Jing Daily noted a noticeably more negative social media vibe surrounding the festival, with young consumers on Xiaohongshu growing more skeptical and questioning its purpose. Gen Z users are prioritizing timeless purchases over trend cycles and embracing more practical spending (like gadgets to avoid getting robbed in Europe).
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