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China’s 2018 New Marriage Law? Online Discussions on ‘Three Child Policy’ and Lowering of Marriage Age

Alleged changes to China’s marriage law have set rumors going on Chinese social media about a ‘three-child policy.’

Manya Koetse

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Image is part of larger poster, see: https://chineseposters.net/themes/marriage-law.php

Alleged changes to China’s marriage law have ignited discussions on Chinese social media about a ‘three-child policy’ and a lowering of legal marriage age to 18. Although “it’s all just rumors”, many netizens already raise their voices against such potential changes, saying it would pressure and burden Chinese women even more.

China’s ‘New Marriage Law’ (新婚姻法) has become a topic of discussion on Chinese social media over the past few days, where many netizens have started talking about an alleged “Three Child Policy” and a lowering of China’s legal marriage age to 18.

The New Marriage Law was passed in 1950 as one of the first pieces of legislation passed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Mutual consent to marry and a heightened legal age to marry to 18 (for women) and 20 (for men) were among the important points stipulated in this legislation.

In the Marriage Law of 1980, this was again raised to 22 for men and 20 for women to promote population control.

Throughout the years, there have been various legal changes in the Marriage Law or in its interpretation, to deal with emerging marriage and family issues in a rapidly changing Chinese society.

Three Child Policy?

Over the past few days, various Chinese bloggers (e.g. here, here, here) suggest that Chinese authorities are putting forward a 2018 renewed Marriage Law, which includes the alleged proposal of a loosening of the two-child policy towards a ‘three-child policy’ (“放开三胎政策”).

These bloggers and many netizens denounce such a potential measure in saying that an extension from the Two-Child Policy to a ‘Three Child Policy’ would add to the burden of Chinese women.

Such a policy, they argue, might lead to Chinese women facing social expectations to birth a third child. And with supposed longer maternity leaves, they would also face unequal opportunities in the employment market.

When the ‘Two-Child Policy’ was officially announced in 2015 as the new national standard (全面二孩), allowing all Chinese couples to have two children instead of the one-child rule that was the norm since 1979, there were also concerns about the economic and gendered pressures of having a second child.

The end of the One Child Policy relates to the growing societal burdens of China’s aging crisis; many demographers proposed a further liberalization of the Chinese family planning system before.

But according to a Chinese Law site (66law.cn), news about an alleged ‘Three-Child policy’ is all just rumors: “Recently, online rumors about the three-child policy to be implemented in 2018 have grown. We live in a populous country, and if this three-child policy would be implemented, it would only add to the pressure [of this big population],” they write, adding that there is “no truth” to the reports.

The rumors find their root in the parliamentary sessions of March, when, as SupChina notes, a proposal drafted by a deputy named Zhu Lieyu (朱列玉) to the National People’s Congress made headlines for suggesting that a three-child policy might be adopted nationwide.

Zhu Lieyu (朱列玉): proposing a ‘three child policy’

“If China’s birth rate doesn’t see a rise after a three-child policy, we should consider ending any sort of family-planning policy,” the deputy reportedly told Chinese reporters.

Marriage Age to 18

The idea to lower China’s marriage age from the age of 22 for men and 20 for women to 18 years old is something that has already been proposed since last year.

In 2017, National People’s Congress deputy Huang Xihua (黄细花) called for lowering China’s legal marriage age. At the time, many people on Weibo were not happy about the proposal – with some finding it outright shocking.

Huang Xihua (黄细花) is an advocate of lowering China’s marriage age.

Netizens then expressed that they were afraid that such a measure will negatively affect the status of women in Chinese society and increase the nation’s divorce rates. “Won’t this lead to a drop in the percentage of women with a higher education?”, some wondered.

The potential lowering of the legal marriage age, a big trending topic in 2017, is still a source of concern for Chinese netizens now. “This is just a way to make us have more babies!” some say.

“We can’t draft a law based on gossip.”

Despite all talks on social media and blogs, China’s official state media have not released news about any new changes to the legislation yet. “Where is this official launch of the New Marriage Law?”, one female netizen (@澄明居-許振雲) wonders: “We can’t draft a law based on gossip!”

“WeChat accounts are one by one publishing about the New Marriage Law,” another commenter writes: “But there’s nothing here yet – it’s just WeChat users making up their own laws.”

“I actually still hope that we can be open to having three children [in the future],” one female netizen responds: “It will be nice for those who are capable of doing so, and people who like have more children. It’ll also ease the worries on the collapse of the social insurance [system] of those of us who are not having children. Those who want to can have children, and those who do not want to, do not need to. Then we’ll find the middle way in a developing nation.”

Others say such a measure would only add to the pressure of women in China today: “We have 30 million leftover men,” another commenter writes: “The more women’s lives are pressured and the more the value of women’s contribution to family life is neglected, the more females will be afraid to get married.”

By Manya Koetse, with contribution from Diandian Guo.

Featured image is part of a larger poster that can be viewed on the website https://chineseposters.net/themes/marriage-law.php.

Spotted a mistake or want to add something? Please let us know in comments below or email us.

©2018 Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.

Manya is the founder and editor-in-chief of What's on Weibo, offering independent analysis of social trends, online media, and digital culture in China for over a decade. Subscribe to gain access to content, including the Weibo Watch newsletter, which provides deeper insights into the China trends that matter. More about Manya at manyakoetse.com or follow on X.

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Trump, Taiwan & The Three-Body Problem: How Chinese Social Media Frames the US Strike on Venezuela

How Chinese social media is making sense of the first geopolitical shockwaves of 2026.

Manya Koetse

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2026 hasn’t exactly seen a peaceful start. In a shocking turn of geopolitical events, Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro was captured by the US on Saturday. Facing narco-terrorism charges, he was flown to New York, where he is still being held in custody alongside his wife, Cilia Flores. President Trump announced that the United States would be taking control in Venezuela, stating they are going to “get the oil flowing.”

Maduro has pleaded not guilty to the charges during an initial hearing in federal court. Meanwhile, Maduro ally Delcy Rodríguez was formally sworn in as Venezuela’s interim president, while up to 50 million barrels of oil resources are set to go to the US.

Further shaking up geopolitical tensions were Donald Trump’s comments suggesting an American takeover of Greenland, arguing that the US needs to control Greenland to ensure the security of the NATO territory in the face of rising threats from China and Russia in the Arctic.

On Chinese social media, these developments have been dominating trending lists, with “Greenland” (格陵兰岛), “military force” (武力), “Trump” (特朗普), “Venezuela” (委内瑞拉), and “Maduro” (马杜罗) among the hottest keywords across various platforms from January 6 to today.

So what is the main gist of these discussions? From official reactions to dominant interpretive frames used by Chinese commentators and bloggers, there are various angles that are highlighted the most. I’ll explore them here.

 

🔴 China’s Official Response: Stressing Sovereignty & Strategic Ties

 

Chinese officials strongly condemned the capture of the Venezuelan president. Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) stated in Beijing on Sunday that China has never accepted the idea that any country has the right to act as an “international police” or an “international judge.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for Maduro’s immediate release.

Spokesperson Lin Jian (林剑) described the strikes on Venezuela as “a grave violation of international law and the basic norms governing international relations,” while spokesperson Mao Ning (毛宁) condemned what she called the United States’ “long-standing and illegal sanctions” on Venezuela’s oil sector.

These statements match the broader trajectory of China–Venezuela relations.

Over the past decades, particularly since Xi Jinping’s leadership began, the relationship between the two countries has evolved from a basic economic partnership into a more strategically significant one.

During Maduro’s 2023 visit to Beijing, the two sides elevated China–Venezuela ties to a so-called “all-weather strategic partnership” (全天候战略伙伴关系), signaling close, deep, and broad bilateral relations that go beyond a general partnership, with oil cooperation as a central pillar. (In 2025 alone, Venezuela exported around 470,000 barrels per day of crude oil to China.)

Following China’s condemnation of the US actions, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Gil expressed gratitude for China’s support, underscoring their bilateral friendship.

Beyond the official response to the recent developments, there are three main frameworks within which the ‘Trump turmoil’ is discussed on Chinese social media.

 

🔴 Three Main Angles in China’s Online Debate

 

🔷 1. Major Power Politics & US Aggression

 

Chinese media commentators are calling Trump’s capture of Maduro a potential “major turning point” for the world. While many described the developments as a sign that “the world has gone crazy” (这个世界太疯狂了), those trying to make sense of what happened see the US move as a warning: that relatively weak countries may increasingly become playgrounds for major powers & potential targets of US aggression.

Within this reading, China is portrayed as the most stable and peaceful superpower, increasingly important in a future multipolar world order.

On the popular podcast Qiánliáng Hútòng FM (钱粮胡同), recent developments were discussed as part of America’s dominant behavior on the world stage over decades. The hosts argued that, unlike previous US leaders, Trump is far less secretive about his goals and, in this case, no longer even follows the process of seeking UN authorization or congressional approval.

Similar views appeared elsewhere, including in a trending Bilibili video by the political commentary channel Looking at America from the Inside (内部看美国), which described the Venezuela raid not as an endpoint, but as a “signal” of what is yet to come, as the US, sensing structural decline, increasingly acts reactively rather than strategically.

Zhihu author Fēng Lěng Mù Shī (枫冷慕诗), whose post rose in the platform’s popularity charts on Wednesday, also framed the moment as pivotal. While the US may once have held the upper hand, they argue, other countries now have an actual choice in which side to take in a world ruled by superpowers. They write:

💬 “If the US truly had the strength to crush everyone and dominate everything completely, it might still be able to control global affairs. But now, with the rise of China, countries bullied by the US have new choices. If you were one of them, what would you choose? To cooperate with a bandit who might kill you with an axe at any moment? Or to cooperate with a reasonable businessman who follows the rules? I believe any rational person would make the obvious choice.“1

Social media posts made with AI featuring “Know-It-All Trump” or “The King of Understanding.”

At the same time, US behavior also became a source of banter. Some netizens, from Bilibili to Xiaohongshu, posted about “The Know-It-All King” (懂王 Dǒng Wáng—a Chinese nickname for Trump reflecting his often-quoted claims to understand complex issues better than anyone) as a comical villain on a shopping spree for new territories to conquer.

Weibo post: a creative solution to the Greenland issue?

One poster offered a creative solution to the Greenland issue:

💬 “Regarding Greenland, a simple diplomatic solution would be for Barron Trump [Trump’s son, b. 2006] to marry Princess Isabella [of Denmark, b. 2007], with Greenland given to the United States as the dowry. 😁”

 

🔷 2. The Taiwan Parallel

 

Taiwan also quickly entered the discussion. In English-language media, some commentators suggested that the raid on Venezuela could smooth and accelerate Beijing’s path toward taking Taiwan.

China’s Taiwan Affairs Office firmly rejected such comparisons. Spokesperson Chen Binhua (陈斌华) emphasized that the Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair and fundamentally different from Venezuela’s situation. Many social media commenters also argued that comparing Venezuela to Taiwan makes little sense, stressing that Venezuela is a sovereign state while Taiwan is considered a province of China.

Even so, Taiwan continues to surface in discussions on Venezuela in various ways. Some users jokingly suggested that the US has now provided a “copy-paste example” of what a tactically impressive raid might look like, while others more seriously draw comparisons between the arrest of Maduro and a hypothetical arrest of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te.

The central question in these debates, also raised by Taiwanese media commentator Hou Han-ting (侯汉廷), is this: if Lai Ching-te were captured alive in Beijing today, what right would the United States have to object? A common view in these discussions is that Trump’s actions lower the threshold for such scenarios and implicitly pave the way for China’s ‘reunification’ with Taiwan.

This reading seems to sharply contrast Washington’s own framing. In a speech on Monday, US Defense Secretary Hegseth described China as the US’s primary competitor and claimed that America is “reestablishing deterrence that’s so absolute and so unquestioned that our enemies will not dare to test us.”

On Chinese social media, however, this claim is openly questioned: does the raid on Venezuela actually deter China or Russia, or does it instead give them greater freedom of action?

💬 As political commentator Hu Xijin wrote on Weibo: “Americans might do well to ask the Taiwan authorities, and look at the global media commentaries, if the US military action in Venezuela has made the Democratic Progressive Party authorities pushing Taiwan independence feel more secure, or more anxious?2

 

🔷 3. Little Europe and the Big Striped Wolf

 

A third major angle centers on Europe’s role. Hu Xijin has been particularly active in commenting on these developments, especially after Tuesday’s joint statement by the leaders of seven European countries pushing back against Trump’s Greenland remarks.

Hu described the moment as one of “unprecedented turmoil within the Western bloc” and, with Denmark (including Greenland) being a NATO member, as a signal of “the collapse of the so-called ‘values alliance’.”3  This idea was further strengthened by Trump’s withdrawal from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, alongside exits from 65 other organizations, which he described as “contrary to the interests of the United States.”

On Chinese social media, Europe is, on the one hand, seen as one of the weakest actors in this geopolitical episode, while at the same time being criticized as the biggest “hypocrite.”

This week’s joint statement—and Europe’s broader position—are framed as weak due to Europe’s structural dependence on the US.

Weibo commentator Zhang Jun (@买家张俊) argues that Europe leans on a “rules-based international order” which, in reality, would amount to little more than a “US-based order” should Trump succeed in taking Greenland. At the same time, the European statement lacked economic sanctions or concrete follow-up measures, amounting to little more than mere rhetoric.

💬 As one nationalistic account put it: “Europe wonders why, even after kneeling down and licking America’s shoes, it still ends up getting hit.”4

Europe is mainly criticized for being “hypocritical” for remaining largely silent on Venezuela, while forcefully defending Greenland’s sovereignty once Trump turned his attention there.

Britain, in particular, has been singled out in Chinese media narratives surrounding the developments in Venezuela. Guancha ran a piece accusing the BBC of instructing journalists not to use the word “kidnap” when describing Maduro’s capture, suggesting the broadcaster was “whitewashing” the US’s illegal actions. It also pointed to Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s response in a BBC interview, describing his comments on US actions against Venezuela as “playing tai chi” (打起了太极)—a Chinese idiom for being evasive and dodging the question.

One Weibo user (@突破那一天) noted that a Jan 5 speech by Foreign Secretary Cooper appeared to frame US actions as contextually justified, while simultaneously stressing that Greenland’s future is a matter solely for Greenlanders and Danes—accusing her of applying a double standard on sovereignty and speaking out clearly only when the target is a Western ally.

Other users summed up Europe’s role as one of “deceiving others and deceiving themselves” (自欺欺人).

Another commenter suggested that Europe has been so focused on perceived threats from Russia and China while throwing itself into America’s arms, that it failed to notice the real danger. “Oh Europe, little piggy Europe,” they mocked. “You’ve let the wolf into the house.”

 

🔴 “You Think the US Invasion of Venezuela is None of Your Concern?”

 

How unexpected was the American military operation in Venezuela, really? One final aspect that trended online was how eerily familiar it all felt.

In the second book of the popular 2008 Chinese sci-fi trilogy The Three-Body Problem, author Liu Cixin (刘慈欣) described a scenario in which Venezuela, ruled by the fictional President Manuel Rey Diaz, is attacked by the US. That Venezuela storyline from the sci-fi novel has become widely discussed for its parallels to the current developments.

The Three Body Problem from 2008 featured a storyline about the US invading Venezuela.

The famous Japanese anime series Black Jack (怪医黑杰克) by Osamu Tezuka (1928–89) also went trending for featuring a fictional plot that many netizens see as strikingly similar to what happened in Venezuela.

It involves the president of the United Federation, named Kelly, citing “global justice” to justify cross-border airstrikes on the presidential residence of the small, oil-rich fictional country Republic of Aldiga, before arresting its leader, General Cruz. Some netizens noted how the blond President “Kelly” even somewhat resembles Trump.

Scenes from Black Jack (怪医黑杰克) by Osamu Tezuka

(Some commenters argued that Osamu Tezuka was not predicting the future so much as drawing on an already familiar pattern of US interventions abroad, and that the character “Kelly” was more likely modeled on Ronald Reagan.)

In Liu Cixin’s Three-Body Problem, there’s a classic line told by retired Beijing teacher Yang Jinwen to former construction worker Zhang Yuanchao, who dismisses world news as “irrelevant”. In the book, Yang tells him:

📖 “Every major national and international issue, every major national policy, and every UN resolution is connected to your life, through both direct and indirect channels. You think the US invasion of Venezuela is none of your concern? I say it has more than a penny’s worth of lasting implications for your pension.”5

In the current situation, some netizens think that the quote needs to be rewritten. In 2026, it would be:

💬“Do you really think the US arresting Venezuela’s president Maduro, conflicts in the Middle East, tensions across the Taiwan Strait, or Europe’s energy crisis are none of your concern? Don’t be naive. They drive up electricity bills, food prices, and mortgage rates. In the end, what gets drained is both your wallet and your future retirement security.

It’s clear that many people are, in fact, deeply concerned about these geopolitical developments. As some have noted, science fiction is not always about distant futures. Sometimes, it turns out, we are already living in them.

In Liu Cixin’s version of the story, ‘Rey Diaz’ drives the Americans away through a united fight of the people, breaking the streak of victories by major powers over developing countries and turning the Venezuelan president into a hero of his time.

This story, I suspect, is going to end very differently. For now, it is still being written.🔚

By Manya Koetse

(follow on X, LinkedIn, or Instagram)

 

1 “如果说美国人有实力碾压一切,彻底的一家独大,那或许他还可以继续操控世界的局势,但如今随着咱们的崛起,全世界被美国欺凌的国家就有了新的选择,假如你是他们,你会做出什么样的决定? 是和一个随时会砍死你的强盗合作?还是和一个讲道理讲规则的生意人合作?我觉得所有的正常人都会做出合理的判断.”

2 “美国人最好问一问台湾当局,也看一看世界媒体的评论:美军在委内瑞拉的行动究竟让推动“台独”的民进党当局更加安心了,还是更加惶恐不安了?”

3 “欧洲7国领导人和丹麦领导人共同发表声明,反对美国吞并格陵兰岛,这标志着西方集团前所未有的内乱以及 它们的所谓”价值同盟”面临崩溃.”

4 “欧洲:我都跪下舔美国鞋子了、你为什么还要打我.”

5 “我告诉你老张,所有的国家和世界大事,国家的每一项重大决策,联合国的每一项决议,都会通过各种直接或间接的渠道和你的生活发生关系。你以为美国入侵委内瑞拉与你没关系?我告诉你,这事儿对你退休金的长远影响可不止半分钱”

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©2025 Eye on Digital China/What’s on Weibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.

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China’s 2025 Year in Review in 12 Phrases

Andrew Methven’s favorite Chinese phrases of the year, a special feature by RealTime Mandarin.

Andrew Methven

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Dear Reader,

Happy New Year! A new year is, undoubtedly, filled with new resolutions. I have a few on my list, and maybe we have some in common—like reading more books (my new e-reader is arriving from Shenzhen tomorrow!) and being more diligent about practicing my new Chinese vocabulary.

If upping your Chinese is also on your list for 2026, Andrew Methven’s newsletter, RealTime Mandarin, is a must-follow. It’s a free weekly resource that helps you improve your Mandarin in just 10 minutes a week, specifically designed for intermediate to advanced learners. I’ve been following Andrew’s work for over three years and love how he makes mastering the language more manageable, so I highly recommend giving it a follow.

Looking back on 2025, here is Andrew’s curated pick of 12 Chinese phrases to remember.


Every year at this time, we wrap up with our own “unofficial” list of top words and phrases. These are expressions that probably didn’t exist a year ago, but have gone viral and become mainstream lingo over the last 12 months. We’ve picked 12 phrases and avoided overlap with the “official” top ten lists.

Most of these phrases were newly invented or popularised in 2025. So if you haven’t been to China this year, you probably won’t know them.

And as always, these phrases began life in the most unlikely places: from Japanese Manga to Taiwanese baseball; from American online games, to viral moments shared by Chinese students living in the UK.

As we pulled this list together, we noticed something interesting: That it’s full of contradictions. According to these 12 phrases, and the trends they represent, it seems that for any one trend you can say is happening in China right now, you could also find another one that proves the exact opposite is true.

So we decided to explain our favourite phrases of 2025 through five contradictions:

 

⚔️ Contradiction #1: Consumers are not buying, but are buying like crazy

 

In January, consumer confidence collapsed, with retail sales in Shanghai and Beijing declining steeply. The broader trend of “consumption downgrading” (消费降级) began in 2024, with policymakers pushing for “rational consumption” (理性消费).

Yet 2025 also saw unbelievable and irrational sales success stories.

“Hard to get a Labubu” (一娃难求) became a trending phrase in June following the explosion of the Labubu (拉布布), an ugly-cute, kind-of-scary toy. Other consumer successes included the move into flavoured beer by ice tea giant, Mixue Bingcheng (蜜雪冰城).

 

⚔️ Contradiction #2: Businesses had an awful year, but a great year

 

In April, as the tariff war escalated, many of China’s exporters feared the worst: a “total wipeout” (团灭) of their sales.

China’s tech darling Xiaomi (小米) started the year strong with soaring EV sales, but by the end of the year faced a string of consumer backlashes.

While another EV brand, Neta (哪吒), battled collapse rumours at the start of the year, and outdoor brand, Arc’teryx, was boycotted after its disastrous “mind-blowing” (炸裂) exploding mountain PR stunt.

China’s big three ecommerce platforms — JD, Alibaba, and Meituan — continued in their “tripartite rivalry” (三足鼎立), each invading the others’ turf in a race to the bottom on price.

Yet 2025 also saw stunning business breakthroughs, such as when chipmaker Cambricon (寒武纪), fuelled by China’s “domestic substitution” (国产替代) push, surged from loss-making startup to briefly become China’s most valuable stock, surpassing liquor brand, Moutai (贵州茅台) in the process.

With investors coining a new phrase: “choosing chips over liquor” (喜芯厌酒).

 

⚔️ Contradiction #3: Government policy was forward-thinking, but also backfired spectacularly

 

2025 was the year of “Embodied intelligence” (具身智能), after the government prioritised this technology in its Work Report in March.

The following month, Beijing hosted the world’s first “humanoid robot half marathon” (人形机器人半马). And in November, XPENG’s humanoid robot, IRON, stunned observers with its lifelike female form.

Also in March, the State Council announced measures to stamp out “involuted” work practices. And by April, some of China’s tech giants had responded with the introduction of “anti-involution” (反内卷) policies, which has been an ongoing theme throughout the year.

But other government policies backfired spectacularly.

Strict alcohol bans introduced for government officials were criticised as “bureaucratic overreach” (层层加码), the introduction of the K-visa (K签) aimed at attracting foreign talent was derided on social media as youth unemployment sat at 19%. Mosquito eradication efforts in Guangdong were criticised as “using a cannon to kill a fly” (高射炮打蚊子) following heavy-handed measures reminiscent of COVID.

And in Hangzhou, a water contamination scandal resurrected one of our top phrases from 2024 when locals blasted the city government as an “unprofessional team” (草台班子).

 

⚔️ Contradiction #4: Youth are lying flat, but are fighting back

 

In August, we discussed a new phrase which had emerged: “rat people” (老鼠人).

It started when Chinese students in the UK began sharing “low-energy rat people” (低能量老鼠人) videos of their isolated lives enduring long, dark British winters. The meme took off as young people embraced “low energy” lifestyles.

But not all youngsters were taking it easy and giving up.

A Chery Auto (奇瑞) graduate employee went into “full confrontation mode” (贴脸开大) with his employer in August after refusing to work Saturdays, citing the government’s “anti-involution” (反内卷) directive.

And earlier in the year, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) faced “widespread condemnation” (千夫所指) after its tone-deaf PR campaign celebrated how it had received 1 million applications for just 8,000 graduate positions.

 

⚔️ Contradiction #5: Influencers are out, but influencers are in

 

2025 saw established celebrities fall out of favour with their fans.

High profile entrepreneurs Lei Jun (雷军) and Jia Guolong (贾国龙), were branded “out-of-touch middle-aged men” (老登).

Meanwhile, unlikely viral stars emerged from the grassroots. Director Fang (房主任), a 50-year-old divorced housewife from Shandong, became one of China’s most-watched stand-up comics.

And a street vendor selling 6-yuan fried chicken cutlets in Jingdezhen (景德镇) became “Chicken Cutlet Brother” (鸡排哥) after a customer’s Douyin video of him cooking and serving customers went viral.

Of course, some unchanging themes continued to draw attention in 2025 as in previous years.

Like the abuse of power and privilege by China’s “celestial dragons” (天龙人): the next generation of elites who “leverage family ties” (拼爹) for their own interests.

So, let’s dive in!


Our Favourite Phrases of 2025

 

1. Mind-blowing

炸裂 zhà liè

💬 一个标榜户外精神的户外品牌,在最脆弱的生态环境里,搞了一场炸裂的秀。

💬 An outdoor brand that claims to embody the spirit of nature put on a “spectacular” fireworks show in one of the most fragile ecosystems.

 

Background:

Internet slang which started in Japanese baseball to describe explosive performance. It gained popularity in Taiwan baseball to describe spectacular moments. In Mainland Chinese it describes stunning and sudden success — such as the overtaking of Moutai by semi chip maker, Cambricon (寒武纪).

“Mind-blowing” can also be used as an ironic statement when something goes mind-blowingly wrong, like Arc’teryx’s disastrous fireworks PR stunt in the Himalayas in September.

Related RTM content:

 

2. Total wipeout

团灭 tuán miè

💬 最坏的情况下,储能在美国的业务会被“团灭”。

💬 In the worst-case scenario, the energy storage business in the U.S. will be totally wiped out.

 

Background

Started as a gaming phrase in team-based video games like World of Warcraft and League of Legends to describe total team wipe outs (all members dying together). It extended beyond gaming to describe collective failures in exams, work, or daily life.

We first came across it listening in to discussions between Chinese exporters in the face of US tariffs and the growing tariff war.

Related RTM content:

 

3. Out-of-touch middle-aged man

老登 lǎo dēng

💬 一连串的老登翻车,不能单纯用偶然和倒霉解释。

💬 When one boomer after another messes up, it’s not just coincidence or bad luck anymore.

 

Background

Originally a northern slang phrase, and a derogatory term for an old man (something like the English, “old git”). It took off this year after a number of high profile, self-inflicted PR disasters of high profile, influential male entrepreneurs. The most notable is Xiaomi founder, Lei Jun (雷军).

You can use it to describe any middle aged man who is condescending and appears out of touch with reality.

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4. Hard to get a Labubu

一娃难求 yì wá nán qiú

💬 火爆到“一娃难求”的LABUBU是泡泡玛特旗下“THE MONSTER”系列的一员。

💬 Labubu is part of Pop Mart’s “THE MONSTER” series, which has become so popular that it’s impossible to get one.

 

Background

One of the craziest shopping trends of 2025 — the obsession with these tiny, ugly, key ring toys made by Chinese company, Pop Mart. Since early 2025, images of Labubu filled social media feeds and become a must-have item for millions of fans and collectors in China.

Expect to see more from the Labubu in 2026.

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5. “Chicken Cutlet Brother”

鸡排哥 jī pái gē

💬 最近,景德镇有个卖鸡排的大哥突然爆火,还被广大网友封为“鸡排主理人”。

💬 Recently, a man selling fried chicken in Jingdezhen suddenly went viral and was even dubbed the “chicken chop curator” by netizens.

 

Background

The “Chicken Cutlet Brother” (鸡排哥) story is one of our favourites from 2025. This 48-year-old overnight sensation is genuine, authentic, and unpolished – a refreshing change from the heavily curated content that dominated Chinese social media this year. His story echoes the “Second Uncle” (二舅) phenomenon we covered in 2022.

The sheer volume of memes and slang spawned by a single short video is staggering. Three phrases in China’s official top ten lists came directly from him. “Chicken Cutlet Brother” will likely become shorthand for authentic grassroots creators in 2026.

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6. Rat person

老鼠人 lǎo shǔ rén

💬 今年以来,“低能量老鼠人的一天”系列短视频走红社交媒体,很多年轻人热衷于自我诊断为“低能量老鼠人”。

💬 This year, the short video series “A Day in the Life of a Low-Energy Rat Person” went viral on social media, with many young people eager to self-diagnose as such.

 

Background

The phrase “rat people” (老鼠人) began gaining traction in early 2025. It evolved from an earlier internet meme, “rat literature” (鼠鼠文学), a buzzword that first emerged in early 2023. By 2025, a related phrase emerged on social media: “low-energy rat people” (低能量老鼠人). It was first popularized by Chinese students in the UK, enduring long, dark winters in isolation.

It’s now become a way young people describe their low energy lifestyles.

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7. Over-privileged elite

天龙人 tiān lóng rén

💬 这的确是中国“新天龙人”的普遍特点——他们是很真诚地认为,集众美于一身的人生赛道是理所应当的。

💬 This indeed reflects a common trait of the next generation of the privileged in China—they genuinely believe that inheriting multiple forms of privilege is their birthright.”

 

Background

Originates from the Japanese manga, One Piece by Oda Eiichiro, referring to the descendants of twenty kings who founded the World Government. These characters enjoy extreme privileges, and consider themselves superior to ordinary people.

In Chinese online discourse, the term has evolved into internet slang to describe privileged elites in real life who are disconnected from ordinary people, who possess power and resources, live luxurious lives, and operate above the rules that govern everyone else.

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8. Consumption downgrade

消费降级 xiāo fèi jiàng jí

💬 也只有走上消费降级,扩大食客基础的道路。

💬 The only way out is to embrace the consumption downgrade and broaden their customer base.

 

Background

Emerged around 2018 in response to economic pressures like high housing costs and slowing income growth. The explosive rise of discount e-commerce platforms like PDD (拼多多) became a symbol of this shift. The phrase represents a reversal of China’s decades-long consumption upgrade trend.

This year we’ve seen a number of major trends which fit the “consumption downgrade trend” — including the collapse of consumer confidence in Beijing and Shanghai, and incredible success of low priced convenience products like “one yuan iced cup” by tea brand, Goodme (古茗).

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9. Full confrontation mode

贴脸开大 tiē liǎn kāi dà

💬 一名00后奇瑞校招生李某凯“贴脸开大”,在收到公司周六开会的邮件后,直接回复拒绝,并且将邮件抄送公司高层,包括集团二把手。

💬 Li, a Gen Z Chery campus recruit, chose to confront it head-on by saying no to the Saturday meeting in an email, in which he copied the company’s senior executives, including the group’s second-in-command.

 

Background

Started online gaming where it describes high-risk, high-reward move of rushing directly up to an enemy and unleashing your ultimate ability at point-blank range. The phrase has evolved into internet slang to describe being direct or blunt.

It’s similar to “bringing up exactly what shouldn’t be mentioned” or being brutally frank, often used with a teasing or mocking tone. Just like a graduate employee at Chery did this year when he refused to attend Saturday training and meetings.

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10. Choosing chips over liquor

喜芯厌酒 xǐ xīn yàn jiǔ

💬 在资本市场「喜芯厌酒」情绪托举下,寒武纪摇身变新王。

💬 Fueled by investor’s shift from liquor to chips, Cambricon is crowned the new king on the capital markets.

 

Background

A clever wordplay on the Chinese idiom “love the new, hate the old” (喜新厌旧), which is typically used to criticise disloyalty in relationships or fair-weather behaviour. The new version substitutes two characters while maintaining the original pronunciation: “new” (新 xīn) becomes “microchip” (芯 xīn), and “old” (旧 jiù) becomes “alcohol” (酒 jiǔ). This perfectly captures investor enthusiasm for semiconductor stocks like Cambricon while abandoning traditional alcohol companies like Moutai.

But the wordplay retains the original idiom’s critical edge, questioning whether Cambricon represents genuine long-term value or just another fleeting trend investors will abandon.

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11. Using a cannon to kill a fly

高射炮打蚊子 gāo shè pào dǎ wén zi

💬 重型机械来灭蚊,真有种高射炮打蚊子的既视感。

💬 Heavy machinery for mosquitoes? Brilliant strategy, just like using a cannon to kill a fly.

 

Background

Literally “using anti-aircraft guns to kill mosquitoes”, which is a xiehouyu (歇后语), a traditional two-part allegorical saying where a vivid scenario delivers its punchline through absurd imagery. The phrase describes massively disproportionate responses to minor problems. While not coined in 2025, it became popular this year as commentary on heavy-handed government policies, particularly Guangdong’s extreme mosquito eradication campaigns.

It perfectly captures public frustration with bureaucratic overreach, when authorities deploy maximum force against minimal threats.

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12. The beauty of an economic upturn

经济上行期的美 jīng jì shàng xíng qī de měi

💬 最近刷到越来越多人开始怀念10年代经济上行期的美。

💬 Lately, I’ve seen more and more people reminiscing online about the beauty of the economic upturn during the 2010s.

 

Background

This has become a viral hashtag on Chinese social media. It refers to roughly 2001-2015, when China’s economy maintained near double-digit growth and quality of life visibly improved year after year. Upward mobility felt tangible. Opportunities seemed everywhere.

This optimism defined early iterations of China’s largest online shopping festival, Double 11, launched in 2009, when it was ok to “consume and be happy” (消费即幸福).

But for many, that sense of optimism has now faded.

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By Andrew Methven

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