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The Hashtagification of Chinese Propaganda

From tech-powered messaging to pop culture politics, China’s propaganda has undergone a major transformation in the social media age.

Manya Koetse

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PREMIUM NEWSLETTER | ISSUE #38

 

Dear Reader,

 

October 1st marked the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Flags, hearts, balloons—National Day celebrations turned Chinese social media red.

Among the key players in leading the propaganda around National Day was People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China. To commemorate the occasion, People’s Daily published a column titled “Today’s China, Tomorrow’s China” (今天的中国,明天的中国)1, outlining a clear vision for the future and emphasizing China’s rise under the Party’s leadership.

The article highlighted how hard work and perseverance are crucial to achieving the ‘China Dream,’ with national unity being the driving force behind the country’s continued progress. It also stressed the pivotal role of China’s youth in shaping the future of the nation.

The article was accompanied by four posters, each conveying a specific message:

“Today’s China is a China where dreams are continuously realized” (今天的中国是梦想接连实现的中国)
“Today’s China is a China full of vibrancy and vitality” (今天的中国是充满生机活力的中国)
“Today’s China is a China that carries on the national spirit” (今天的中国是赓续民族精神的中国)
“Today’s China is a China closely connected to the world” (今天的中国是紧密联系世界的中国)

A related hashtag, “75th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” (#新中国成立75周年#), received over 590 million views on Weibo.

But People’s Daily also put out a much simpler message, posting the hashtag: “I Love You, China” (#我爱你中国#).

This hashtag was accompanied by an online poster featuring the Chinese characters for “China.” The characters in the picture are shaped by various symbols representing both traditional and modern China, from lanterns and Tiananmen to rockets and railways. That post was shared over six million times.

The immense popularity of the poster and the “I Love You China” hashtag page, initiated by People’s Daily and garnering over eight billion views through the times, highlights the strength of Party-led propaganda in the social media era.

 
A Major Shift
 

A few days ago, De Balie, a cultural venue in Amsterdam, hosted an event focused on how Chinese state propaganda has evolved, coinciding with the 75th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. As a participant in the discussion, I’ve recently been reflecting on the nature of Chinese propaganda in the digital age.

Propaganda has always been a key element of the Party’s strategy—not just for the past 75 years, but for over a century. Since the founding of the Central Propaganda Department in 1924, three years after the establishment of the Communist Party, propaganda has played a central role in shaping official narratives. China’s propaganda system exerts significant influence over nearly every major medium involved in disseminating information within the country, from news outlets and educational institutions to cultural organizations, artistic circles, and literary institutions.2

China’s rapid digitalization and the rise of social media posed significant challenges for officials in disseminating propaganda, particularly in the early 2010s when there was an explosion of self-media, app culture, and intense celebrity idolization. Amid this cacophony of new media channels, Party propaganda was increasingly overlooked as people’s attention shifted to what they found more engaging, such as movie stars and other celebrities representing new, exciting lifestyles.3

This was not the first ‘disruptive force’ the Party Propaganda Department had to confront. (Side note: Chinese officials, aware of the negative connotations of ‘propaganda’ in English—though it’s a neutral term in Chinese, 宣传—later changed its English name to the ‘Publicity Department.’)

As Stefan Landsberger notes in Chinese Propaganda Posters,4 the Party’s well-established system for propaganda and political education faced similar challenges in the 1980s following the Open Door policy. This policy significantly transformed Chinese society, bringing a wave of foreign cultural and lifestyle influences and accelerating the spread of electronic media.

Although the spread of non-official media and information may have disrupted the central messaging dynamics of the Propaganda Department in the 1980s, the growing presence of radio and television sets in people’s homes also allowed Party leaders to shift their focus from propaganda posters to new media as a means of communicating political messages.5

A similar shift has occurred over the past seven to eight years when it comes to social media. Initially, propaganda authorities struggled to convey official messages on Weibo and other emerging digital platforms, but in 2017, China’s propaganda system saw a pivotal change in its approach to domestic social media, particularly on Weibo.

Instead of trying to pull young people into traditional Party narratives, it began weaving propaganda directly the fabric of social media itself —blending politics seamlessly into the digital content young audiences were already engaging with.

No three-and-a-half-hour speech, but a three-and-a-half minute video. In 2017, Chinese state media explained China’s new strategies through catchy rap music and trendy graphics. Read more.

2017 was a pivotal year for Chinese propaganda with three major events: the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Summit, the 19th Party Congress, and the APEC Summit. For each occasion, publicity authorities launched distinctive, high-profile campaigns.

The OBOR Summit featured several high-production videos with catchy tunes, often starring foreigners (though some found them awkward). The 19th Party Congress saw a flood of new propaganda videos and initiatives, including a clapping game produced by Tencent that allowed users to applaud Xi Jinping’s speech. Meanwhile, the APEC Summit videos saw a manga-style version of Xi Jinping, portraying him as lovable and approachable.

 
Hashtagification of Propaganda
 

Propaganda departments in China have adapted various strategies over the past few years to make official Party narratives more appealing by adjusting to the fast-paced, fleeting, and trendy nature of China’s social media environment. I’d call this the ‘hashtagification’ of Chinese propaganda—turning political messaging into viral trends by embedding it in hashtags and social media content. These are essentially hashtag-driven narratives that netizens can easily engage with and share.

Within this movement, I see six major strategies of digital propaganda emerging on Weibo and other social apps, such as Douyin, from 2017 to 2024.

📌 1. Old Message, New Media: Revival of Classic Propaganda

The types of posts that People’s Daily shares around National Day and other celebrations often echo classic nationalist messages about unity and national pride. This is part of a broader strategy within China’s social media propaganda, focusing on strong, simple messages that, at their core, are not much different from the political narratives promoted in previous decades. However, these messages are now disseminated through modern channels, using more sophisticated techniques and production methods. These can include online posters, as well as music or high-quality videos (example).

📌 2. Double Agenda: Foreign-Facing Propaganda with Domestic Goal

Although there’s traditionally been a clear distinction between domestic propaganda and waixuan (“external propaganda”), the past few years have seen the rise of a new kind of propaganda. It appears to target an international audience but is actually aimed at bolstering domestic support and reinforcing a positive image of China. Assertive or aggressive videos and posts, supposedly directed at foreign viewers, are often used to stir national pride at home. A good example of this is the Xinhua video series featuring Young Lady Guoshe (国社小姐姐), whose real name is Wang Dier (王迪迩), an anchor for Xinhua who previously worked for CCTV. If you’re unsure what this looks like, check the full clip here.

📌 3. Grassroots ‘Propaganda’ in Official Communication

Over the past few years, particularly during the Covid period, official channels began repurposing satirical online artworks created by independent artists or popular nationalistic influencers as a form of national propaganda. Much of this art was produced by Chinese cartoonists and artists, mocking Western hypocrisy and political leaders. These pieces were then retweeted and widely shared by official Chinese channels, amplifying domestic support and fueling anti-Western sentiment. You can read more about this trend here.

‘Investigate Thoroughly! Except Here’ (‘彻查!除了这儿’) satirical illustration by artist 半桶老阿汤 / Half Can of Old Soup in response to US calls for investigation into the origins of Covid in China while ignoring a possible link with Fort Detrick. This post was shared by the Communist Youth League on social media.

📌 4. Tech-Driven Party Messages

The use of advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, virtual reality, and gamification by Chinese state media serves a dual purpose: reinforcing the Party’s messaging while simultaneously showcasing China’s digital innovation. By integrating technology with propaganda, the Party’s message becomes more engaging and interactive, while also projecting China as a leading tech power. For instance, in recent years, the annual CCTV New Year’s Gala has become a platform to display China’s cutting-edge digital technologies on stage. Online, tech and propaganda are frequently intertwined, such as in the aforementioned clapping game by Tencent. Other examples include virtual newsreaders for state media and the ‘Study Xi app’ (Xuexi Qiangguo), which allows users to earn points for engaging with official Party content. You can read more about these innovations here and here.

📌 5. Pop Culture Propaganda

By ‘Pop Culture Propaganda,’ I refer to the blending of propaganda with pop culture in various ways. One example is the use of Chinese celebrities to promote official Party messages, such as the 2017 campaign for China’s New Era (hashtag: ‘Give A Shout-Out to the New Era‘) or the Social Credit song launched by the Communist Youth League. Another form of this propaganda involves colorful and cute animations and cartoons that primarily appeal to younger generations. These often incorporate Japanese influences, like anime and manga, which are especially popular among Chinese youth, making propaganda more accessible and attractive. Currently, many manga-themed propaganda-style images are circulating, blurring the lines between fan-made content and official productions (as mentioned in point 3!).


Official or not? Official channels sometimes share non-official digital art on their pages, while everyday netizens often post official “pop propaganda” on their own accounts (Images via Weibo).

📌 6. Guerrilla Propaganda: Coordinated, Multi-Front Engagement Across Media & Influencers

A final technique I’ve observed on Chinese social media since 2016-2017 is topic-centered propaganda that is spread simultaneously across multiple platforms. In these campaigns, social media, local authorities, businesses, and influencers collaborate to create a coordinated wave of messaging. A notable example is the 2021 Xinjiang cotton campaign, which followed H&M and the Better Cotton Initiative’s boycott of Xinjiang cotton over alleged human rights abuses. In response, a massive pro-Xinjiang cotton campaign erupted on Weibo, with state media, Baidu, e-commerce platforms, and celebrities uniting to cancel H&M and support Xinjiang-sourced cotton. The campaign was highly effective, with the hashtag “Wo Zhichi Xinjiang Mianhua” (“I Support Xinjiang Cotton” #我支持新疆棉花#) receiving over 8 billion views on Weibo—comparable to the “I Love China” hashtag.

Propaganda posters by People’s Daily at the time of the Xinjiang cotton controversy. The posters say “Xinjiang Mianhua” (Xinjiang cotton) in a similar font to the H&M logo, the “H” and “M” within ‘mianhua‘ being identical to the H&M letters.

What’s particularly interesting about propaganda in China’s social media era is that, unlike previous periods, it’s no longer a one-way street from billboard to pedestrian or from TV screen to viewer. Social media is inherently interactive, and despite the overwhelming presence of official accounts on platforms like Weibo, WeChat, and Douyin, there are still over a billion individual social media users in China who can choose to scroll away, mute, or ignore these messages.

While the line between state media and other accounts is increasingly blurred, state propaganda continues to compete for attention in a dynamic and vibrant online culture.

 
Stefan Landsberger – In Memoriam
 

There is so much more to say about all of this, and it only highlights how multi-faceted and complex the topic of propaganda in China truly is.

No one understood this better than sinologist Prof. Dr. Stefan Landsberger. I was shocked and deeply saddened to hear of his sudden passing this week. Coincidentally, I received the news while working on this newsletter, with his beautiful Chinese Propaganda Posters book open on my lap.

If you’re not familiar with his name, you might have come across his work if you’ve ever read anything about Chinese propaganda. Landsberger was a leading authority on the subject, having spent decades—since the late 1970s—collecting an extensive array of posters and conducting thorough research in the field. His collection grew to become one of the largest private collections of Chinese propaganda posters in the world.

Landsberger was an Associate Professor of Contemporary Chinese History and Society at Leiden University. In that role, he also taught me Chinese Modern History when I was an undergraduate there. He was a dedicated teacher—often critical, which made him intimidating to some students—but deeply appreciated by most for his brutal honesty and his immense passion for Chinese history and modern Sinology.

One memory from 2018 stands out. I was in China as a post-graduate student and took a taxi on a cold and rainy January night in Beijing. During the ride, I struck up a conversation with the driver, who asked me where I was from. When I told him I was Dutch, he proudly shared that he had a Dutch friend—one of his dearest, he said, whom he’d known since the early 1980s. That intrigued me, as I’d never heard anything like that from a Beijing taxi driver before. As we continued talking, he mentioned that his friend was a teacher and then showed me a photo on his phone of them together. I was surprised to see that the man in the picture, smiling warmly beside the taxi driver, was none other than my own teacher Stefan Landsberger.

In a city of 21 million people, I had somehow hailed a cab driven by one of Landsberger’s oldest friends in the city, whom he had known since he was a student in Beijing. I shared this story with Dr. Landsberger later through WeChat—it made him laugh. This chance encounter left a lasting impression on me, not just because of the coincidence, but because it spoke volumes about Landsberger’s enduring love for China and his ability to cultivate deep, lasting friendships. It showed his loyalty, not just to his work and research but to the people and connections he built over decades.

Landsberger will be greatly missed. His contributions to the growing body of work on Chinese propaganda are invaluable. This ever-evolving phenomenon can only be fully understood by examining both its current trends and its historical roots—and Landsberger’s work will forever be foundational in that effort, helping to better understand “Today’s China, Tomorrow’s China.”

My thoughts are with his family and friends during this difficult time.

Best,
Manya Koetse
(@manyapan)

1 Ren Ping, “今天的中国,明天的中国” [Today’s China, Tomorrow’s China], People’s Daily, September 29, 2024, https://weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309405083853533610297
2 David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy,” The China Journal 57 (2007):27-28.
3 See Willy Lam quoted in Yi-Ling Liu, “Chinese Propaganda Faces Stiff Competition from Celebrities,” AP News, October 23, 2017, https://apnews.com/article/1616c60ab01d43caae024d34cb98d532 (accessed October 12, 2024).
4 Stefan Landsberger, Chinese Propaganda Posters: From Revolution to Modernization (Amsterdam: The Pepin Press, 2001): 11.
5 Landsberger, Chinese Propaganda Posters, 15.

PS: If you’re a loyal reader of Weibo Watch, you might have noticed I’ve been trying out some changes in the newsletters lately to deliver more frequent updates while balancing things on the site. Don’t worry if this edition is missing the hot topics section—it’s not going anywhere! But if there’s anything you’d love to see in the newsletters moving forward, please let me know. Your feedback really helps with planning future editions.

 

A closer look at featured stories

Golden Week | China celebrated its National Day Holiday earlier this month. This week-long holiday, also known as the Golden Week, is a popular time for trips, travel, and sightseeing. On Chinese social media, it has become somewhat of a tradition to post about just how busy it is in China’s various sightseeing spots. This is often done by using hashtags including “人人人人[place]人人人人.”

Read here
 

Being Watched | Could it be that someone is watching you while you think you’re all alone in your private hotel room? Without realizing it, some guesthouses or hotels may have hidden cameras secretly recording their guests. This issue has long been a source of concern in China and has recently become a hot topic again. The Chinese Douyin and Weibo blogger @ShadowsDontLie (@影子不会说谎), an ‘anti-fraud’ influencer, has made it his mission to expose hidden cameras in guesthouses. The controversy following his recent discoveries are perhaps just a tip of the iceberg – we’ll follow up on this story soon. Meanwhile, check out the full story here.

Read here
 

For the Clicks |The debate over influencers performing dangerous stunts for clout is ongoing in the West, but it has also recently gained attention in China after another motorcycle influencer was killed in a crash.

Read here

China’s Image | On October 10, 2024, De Balie hosted an event discussing how China portrays itself to its citizens and the world, marking the 75th anniversary of the People’s Republic. The panel explored the evolution of Chinese state propaganda, the public’s response, and how the emergence of digital China has reshaped the landscape. Speakers included Ardi Bouwers, Florian Schneider, Qian Huang, and myself (Qian and I appear in the second half). You can watch the full event here.

Watch here

 

What’s Memorable

Best reads from the archive

Old one-child policy propaganda slogans, especially in rural areas, remain visible on walls across China, even though they contradict the government’s current push for families to have more children due to declining birth rates. While efforts to remove these outdated slogans have intensified, some people question the urgency.

Read here
 

 

Weibo Word of the Week

The catchword to know

Rushing to the Counties

Our Weibo word of the week is 奔县 (bèn xiàn), which translates to “rushing to the county.” This term has recently surged in Chinese media after this month’s National Day holiday, a popular travel time, saw an increased popularity of lesser-known county-level towns instead of large cities or famous tourist destinations.

According to the latest travel industry reports following the week-long holiday, bookings have significantly increased compared to last year, despite last year already being notably crowded. This year, 765 million trips were taken nationwide, marking a 10.2% increase compared to pre-pandemic 2019.

Last year, ‘domestic travel’ was the key trend, with the so-called “special forces travel” (特种兵旅游 tè zhǒng bīng lǚxíng) becoming popular among Chinese youth. That trend was all about visiting as many places as possible at the lowest cost within a limited time, often involving incredibly tight schedules and 12-hour travel days.

This year, the focus has shifted to a more relaxed and cost-effective approach. This has turned county-level tourism (奔县游 bènxiànyóu) into a new trend. People are not just visiting county-level towns to see family; more young travelers from China’s major cities are exploring nearby smaller towns for “micro-holidays” (微度假 wēi dùjià).

County-level towns in China are smaller than bigger cities like Beijing or Shanghai, but still big enough to usually have plenty to do as they are important hubs for the surrounding rural areas. In these county-level destinations, the cost of hotels and meals tends to be much cheaper than in popular tourist hotspots. Staying closer to home also reduces travel time and expenses, while offering the opportunity to visit lesser-known locations and avoid the peak tourist crowds.

According to The Observer, places like Jiuzhaigou, Anji, Shangri-La, Pingtan, Dujiangyan, and Jinghong saw booking increases of 109%, 86%, 74%, 67%, 51%, and 50%, respectively.

This is an on-site version of the Weibo Watch newsletter by What’s on Weibo. Missed last week’s newsletter? Find it here. If you are already subscribed to What’s on Weibo but are not yet receiving this newsletter in your inbox, please contact us directly to let us know.

Manya is the founder and editor-in-chief of What's on Weibo, offering independent analysis of social trends, online media, and digital culture in China for over a decade. Subscribe to gain access to content, including the Weibo Watch newsletter, which provides deeper insights into the China trends that matter. More about Manya at manyakoetse.com or follow on X.

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Dear Reader

Eye on Digital China: How Chinese Social Media Evolved from the Blog Era to the AI-driven Age

A look back at the three major phases of China’s social media — and why What’s on Weibo is evolving into Eye on Digital China.

Manya Koetse

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on

This edition of the Eye on Digital China newsletter by Manya Koetse was sent to premium subscribers. Subscribe now to receive future issues in your inbox.

 

“Do you still remember going to the internet cafe, paying 2 yuan ($0.30) per hour during the day or 7 yuan ($1) for an all-nighter? Staying up playing games and surfing around?”

It’s the kind of content you’ll often see today on platforms like Douyin or Bilibili — nostalgic videos showing smoky internet cafes (wangba 网吧) from the early 2000s, where people chatted on QQ or played World of Warcraft on old Windows PCs while eating instant noodles. These clips trigger waves of nostalgia, even among internet users too young to remember that era themselves.

Internetcafe in 2005, image via 021zhaopin.com

The current nostalgia wave you see on Chinese social media is indicative of how China’s digital world has evolved over the past 25 years, shifting from one era to the next.

As I welcome a new name for this newsletter and say goodbye to ‘Weibo Watch’— and, in the longer run, to the ‘What’s on Weibo’ title, I’m feeling a bit nostalgic myself. It seems like a good moment to look back at the three major stages of Chinese social media, and at the reason I started What’s on Weibo in the first place.

 

 

1. The Blogging Boom (2002–2009): The Early Rise of Chinese Social Media

 

 

When I first came to China and became particularly interested in its online environment, it was the final phase of the early era of Chinese social media — a period that followed soon after the country had laid the foundations for its internet revolution. By 1999, the first generation of Chinese internet giants — Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, and Sina — had already been founded.

China’s blogging era began with the 2002 launch of the platform BlogChina.com (博客中国), followed by a wave of new platforms and online communities, among them Baidu Tieba and Renren. By around 2005, there were roughly 111 million internet users and 16 million bloggers, and the social impact was undeniable. 2005 was even dubbed China’s “year of blogging.” 1

Chinese writer Han Han (韩寒, born 1982), a high-school-dropout-turned–rally car racer, became one of the most-read figures on the Chinese internet with his sharp and witty blogs. He was just one among many who rose to fame during the blog era, becoming the voice of China’s post-1980s youth.

The rebel of China’s blog era, Han Han, became of voice of his generation.

 

When I moved to Beijing in 2008, I had a friend who was always out of money and practically lived in an internet cafe in the city’s Wudaokou district, not far from where I studied. We would visit him there as if it were his living room — the wangba was a local hangout for many of us.

Not only online forums and blogging sites were flourishing at the time, but there was also instant messaging through QQ (腾讯QQ), online news reading, and gaming. Platforms like the YouTube equivalents Tudou (土豆) and Youku (优酷) were launched, and soon Chinese companies began developing more successful products inspired by American digital platforms, such as Fanfou (饭否), Zuosa (做啥), Jiwai (叽歪), and Taotao (滔滔), creating an online space that was increasingly, and uniquely, Chinese.

That trajectory only accelerated after 2009, when popular Western internet services, including Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, became inaccessible from within mainland China.

⚡ The launch of Sina Weibo in 2009 came at a crossroads for China’s social media landscape: it was not only a time when many foreign platforms exited China, but also when internet cafes faced major crackdowns.

As a foreigner, I don’t think I ever visited internet bars in Beijing anymore by that point — internet use had largely shifted to home connections. Laptop ownership was rising, and we all had (pre-smartphone) mobile phones, which we used to text each other constantly, since texting was cheaper than calling.

Some of the mobile phones in China’s 2009 top 10 lists.

 

Weibo came at just the right time. It filled the vacuum left by the online crackdowns across China’s internet while still benefiting from the popularity of blogging. Weibo (微博), after all, literally means “micro-blog” — micro because the number of characters was limited, just like Twitter, making short-form posts the main way of communication.

Weibo quickly became hugely successful, for many more reasons than just timing. Its impact on society was so palpable that its trending discussions often seeped into everyday conversations I had with friends in China.

In English-language media, I kept reading about what was being censored on the Chinese internet, but that wasn’t necessarily what I wanted to know — I also wanted to know what was on Weibo, so I could keep up with my social circles.

That question planted the seed for What’s on Weibo: the simple curiosity of “What are people talking about?” What TV series are popular? What jokes and controversies are everyone discussing (but that I never fully grasped)? I wanted to get a sense of an online world that was, in many ways, intangible to outsiders — including myself. As I had moved back to Europe by then, it was also a way for me to stay connected to those everyday conversations unfolding online in China.

With scissors, glue, and some paper, I started sketching out what a future website might look like.

Papercrafting the idea for a website named ‘What’s on Weibo’ in 2012.

 

And in March 2013, after doing my best to piece it together, I launched What’s on Weibo and began writing — about all kinds of trends, like the milk powder crisis, about China’s many unmarried “leftover men” (shengnan 剩男), and about the word of the moment, “Green Tea Bitch” (lǜchá biǎo 绿茶婊) — a term used to stereotype ambitious women who act sweet and innocent while being seen as calculating or cunning.

 

2. From Weibo to the Taobao MomentChina’s Mobile Social Era: (2010–2019)

 

Around 2014–2015, people started saying Weibo was dead. In fact, it hadn’t died at all — some of its most vibrant years were still ahead. It had simply stumbled into the mobile era, along with China’s entire social media landscape.

As mobile internet became more widespread and everyone started using WeChat (launched in 2011), new mobile-first platforms began to emerge.2 In 2012–2013, for example, apps like Toutiao and Xiaohongshu (小红书, RED) were launched as mobile community platforms. With the rapid rise of China’s new tech giants — Bytedance, Meituan, and Didi — a new mobile era was blossoming, leaving the PC-based social media world far behind.

Spending another summer in Beijing in 2014, I called it the “Taobao Moment” — Taobao being China’s most successful online marketplace, a platform for buying and selling practically everything from clothes and furniture to insurance and even Bitcoins. At the time, I thought Taobao captured everything Beijing was at that moment: a world of opportunities, quick decisions, and endless ways to earn and spend money.

On weekends, some of my friends would head to the markets near the Beijing Zoo to buy the latest dresses, purses, jeans, or shoes. They’d buy stock on Saturday, do a photo shoot on Sunday, and sell the goods online by Monday. You could often spot young people on the streets of Beijing staging their own fashion shoots for Taobao — friends posing as models, Canon cameras in hand.

During that period, What’s on Weibo gradually found its audience, as more people became curious about what was happening on Chinese social media.

Around 2016, Weibo entered another prime era as the “celebrity economy” took off and a wave of “super influencers” (超级红人) emerged on the platform. Papi Jiang stood out among them — her humorous videos on everyday social issues made her one of China’s most recognizable online personalities, helping to drive Weibo’s renewed popularity.


Witty Papi Jiang was a breath of fresh air on Weibo in 2016.

 

People were hooked on social media. Between 2015 and 2018, China entered the age of algorithm- & interest-driven multimedia platforms. The popularity of Kuaishou’s livestreaming and Bytedance’s Douyin signaled the start of an entirely new era.

 

 

3. The New Social Era of AI-fication and Diversification (2020–Current)

 

China’s social media shifts over the past 25 years go hand in hand with broader technological, social, and geopolitical changes. Although this holds true elsewhere too, it’s especially the case in China, where central leadership is deeply involved in how social media should be managed and which direction the country’s digital development should take.

Since the late 2010s, China’s focus on AI has permeated every layer of society. AI-driven recommendation systems have fundamentally changed how Chinese users consume information. Far more than Weibo, platforms like Douyin, Kuaishou, and Xiaohongshu have become popular for using machine-learning algorithms to tailor feeds based on user behavior.

China’s social media boom has put pressure on traditional media outlets, which are now increasingly weaving themselves into social media infrastructure to broaden their impact. This has blurred the line between social media and state media, creating a complex online media ecosystem.

At the same time, it’s not just AI and media convergence that are reshaping China’s online landscape — social relationships now dominate both information flows and influence flows. 3 Not everyone is reading the same headlines anymore; people spend more time within their own interest-based niches. It’s no longer about microblogging but about micro-communities.

China now has 1.12 billion internet users. Among new users, young people (aged 10–19) and the elderly (60+) account for 49% and nearly 21%, respectively. The country’s digital environment has never been more lively, and social media has never been more booming.

As a bit of a dinosaur in China’s social media world, Weibo still stands tall — and its trending topics still matter. But the community that was once at the heart of the Chinese internet has dispersed across other apps, where people now engage in more diverse ways than ever.

In China, I notice this shift: where I once saw the rise of Weibo, the Taobao boom, or the Douyin craze, I now see online and offline media increasingly converging. Social media shapes real-life experiences and vice versa, and AI has become integrated into nearly every part of the media ecosystem — changing how content is made, distributed, consumed, and controlled.

In this changing landscape, the mission of What’s on Weibo — to explain China’s digital culture, media, and social trends, and to build a bridge between Western and Chinese online spaces — has stayed the same. But the name no longer fits that mission.

Over the past few years, my work has naturally evolved from Weibo-focused coverage to exploring China’s digital culture through a broader lens. The analysis and trend updates will continue, but under a new name that better reflects a time when Weibo is no longer at the center of China’s social media world: Eye on Digital China.

For you as a subscriber (subscribe here), this means you can expect more newsletter-based coverage: shorter China Trend Watch editions to keep you up to date with the latest trends, along with other thematic features and ‘Chapter’ deep dives that explore the depth behind fleeting moments.

For now, the main website will remain What’s on Weibo, but it will gradually transition into Eye on Digital China. I’ll keep the full archive alive — more than twelve years of coverage that helps trace the digital patterns we’re still seeing today. After all, the story of China’s past online moments often tells us more about the future than the trends of the day.

Thank you for following along on this new journey.

 

By Manya Koetse

(follow on X, LinkedIn, or Instagram)

 

1 Liu, Fengshu. 2011. Urban Youth in China: Modernity, the Internet and the Self. New York: Routledge, 50.

2 Mao Lin (Michael). 2020. “中国互联网25年变迁:两次跃迁,四次浪潮,一次赌未来” [25 Years of China’s Internet: Two Leaps, Four Waves, and a Gamble on the Future]. 人人都是产品经理 (Everyone Is a Product Manager), January 3. https://www.woshipm.com/it/3282708.html.

3 Yang, Shaoli (杨绍丽). 2025. “研判2025!中国社交媒体行业发展历程、重点企业分析及未来前景展望:随着移动互联网兴起,社交媒体开始向移动端转移 [Outlook for 2025! The Development History, Key Enterprises, and Future Prospects of China’s Social Media Industry: With the Rise of Mobile Internet, Social Media Has Shifted to Mobile Platforms].” Zhiyan Consulting (智研咨询), February 7. https://www.chyxx.com/industry/1211618.html.

 

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China Media

IShowSpeed in China: Streaming China’s Stories Well

Manya Koetse

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“This man is doing God’s work. In just six hours, he eliminated all Western media propaganda about China,” Chinese influencer Li Sanjin (李三金) said in one of his videos this week. The man he referred to, allegedly doing ‘God’s work,’ is the American YouTuber and online streamer Darren Watkins, better known as IShowSpeed or Speed, who visited China this week and livestreamed from various locations.

With 37 million followers on his YouTube account, Watkins’ visit hasn’t exactly flown under the radar. His streams from China have already accumulated over 17.5 million views on YouTube alone, and he also became the talk of the week on Chinese social media.

In China, the 20-year-old IShowSpeed is known as Jiǎkànggē (甲亢哥), or “Hyper Bro,” since the immensely popular YouTube star is known for being highly energetic.

Although IShowSpeed is originally known for soccer and gaming-related content, he’s been streaming live from various countries over the past year, from Ecuador to Bolivia, from Australia to Indonesia, from Romania to Japan, and also from the Netherlands, where a mob of fans harassed the YouTuber to such an extent that the influencer fled and panicked, until the police intervened and asked him to shut down the livestream for safety reasons — which he did not comply with.

It was not the only time IShowSpeed’s visit got chaotic. He also got into trouble during livestreams from other countries. While streaming from Norway, he injured his ankle and was swarmed by a crowd while trying to get out. In Greece and Indonesia, he had to ask for police support as well. In Thailand, he crashed a tuk-tuk into a temple wall.

In China, IShowSpeed’s livestreams went far more smoothly, and netizens, state media, and other official channels raved about his visit and its favorable portrayal of the country and its culture.

 
🔹 Symbol of Cultural Exchange & Positive Diplomacy
 

Jiǎkànggē” became one of the viral terms of the week, on Weibo, Kuaishou, Douyin, and Toutiao. During his China trip, the livestreamer hit several YouTube milestones — not only breaking the 37 million subscriber mark while on stream, but also surpassing the magic number of 10 million views in total.

Watkins, also known for being (sometimes aggressively) loud and chaotic, suddenly emerged as a symbol of cultural exchange and positive diplomacy. The past week saw hashtags such as:

#️⃣”IShowSpeed gives young foreigners a full-window view into China” (#甲亢哥给国外年轻人开了全景天窗#)
#️⃣”IShowSpeed’s Shanghai livestream breaks Western filter on China” (#甲亢哥上海直播打破西方对中国滤镜#)
#️⃣”American influencer IShowSpeed amazed by stable wifi on China’s high-speed train” (#美国网红甲亢哥被高铁稳定网络震惊#)
#️⃣”IShowSpeed praised deep tried tripe for being incredibly delicious” (#甲亢哥赞爆肚太好吃了#), or
#️⃣ “IShowSpeed bridges the cultural divide” (#甲亢哥弥合文化鸿沟#).

While in Chinese media, Watkins was lauded for shining a positive light on China, this message was also promoted on English-language social media, where he was praised by the Chinese embassy in the US (#驻美大使馆称赞甲亢哥中国行#), writing:

Post by Chinese Embassy in the US on X, March 26.

This 20-year-old American internet star is bridging cultural gaps through digital means and creating new channels for foreign audiences to better understand China.

So what exactly did IShowSpeed do while in China?

On March 24, Watkins livestreamed from Shanghai. He wandered around the city center, visited a KFC, danced with fellow streamers, stopped by a marriage market, ate noodles, played ping-pong, had hotpot, joined a dragon dance group and got acquainted with some traditional Chinese opera performance, and walked along the Bund.

On March 26, he streamed from Beijing, starting in Donghuamen before briefly entering the Forbidden City—dressed in a Dongbei-style floral suit. He later took a stroll around Nanluoguxiang and the scenic Houhai lake, rode a train, and finally visited the Great Wall, where he did backflips.

In his stream on March 28, Watkins traveled to Henan to visit the famous Shaolin Temple in Dengfeng, hoping to find a master to teach him kung fu. He trained with Shaolin monks—footage that quickly went viral.

Lastly, on March 29, he opened his own Weibo account and published his first post. On Douyin, he shared a video of his visit to Fuxi Mountain in Zhengzhou, featuring the popular “Stairway to Heaven” tourist spot.

On social media, many viewers were captivated by the content. One major talking point was the remarkably strong internet connection that allowed him to livestream for six-hour stretches without losing signal in Shanghai. (Though his Beijing stream started off patchier, the drop was minor.) For many, it symbolized the quality of China’s 5G services.

Foreign viewers also praised how safe, friendly, and clean the country appeared, and how his streams highlighted various aspects of Chinese culture—from everyday people to traditional arts and local cuisine.

 
🔹 Telling & Spreading China’s Stories Well
 

It is no wonder the success of the Jiǎkànggē livestreams is celebrated by Chinese official media in an age where China’s foreign communication aims to increase China’s international discourse power, shaping how the world views China and making that image more credible, more respectable, and more lovable.

That’s not just an observation — it’s an official strategy. Introduced by Xi Jinping in 2013, “Telling China’s Story Well” (“讲好中国故事”) is a political slogan that has become a key propaganda strategy for China and continues to be a priority in finding different ways of promoting Chinese culture — new ways of telling China’s story in the social media age – while countering Western dominant narratives about China.

In increasingly digitalized times, it is not just about telling China’s story well, but also spreading China’s message effectively — preferably through genuine and engaging stories (Cai 2013; Qiushi 2021).

Especially young, non-official ‘storytellers’ can make China’s image more relatable and dynamic. One major example, highlighted in a 2022 case study by Zeng Dan (曾丹), is Chinese influencer Li Ziqi (李子柒). You’ve probably heard of her, or seen snippets of her videos: she creates soothing, cinematic content depicting China’s countryside lifestyle, focused on cooking, crafts, and gardening. With 26 million followers on YouTube, Li Ziqi became a viral sensation who successfully communicated an authentic and appealing ‘China story’ to a broad global audience.

Li Ziqi in one of her YouTube videos.

Although the calm and composed Li Ziqi and the loud, chaotic IShowSpeed couldn’t be more different, they have some things in common: both have large international fanbases, including their millions of YouTube subscribers; they offer perspectives that differ from Chinese state media or official channels; and they have the capacity not just to tell China’s story well, but to spread it effectively through videos and livestreams.

 
🔹 Spontaneous Stream or Scripted Propaganda?
 

IShowSpeed’s China streams have triggered a wave of responses from fans and viewers, sparking discussions across international social media and even making newspaper headlines.

In English-language online media spheres, there appear to be a range of perspectives on Watkins’ China trip:

📌 One prominent view—also echoed by various foreign influencers on YouTube and other platforms—is that IShowSpeed’s visit counters “Western media lies” about China and has successfully shown the “real China” through his livestreams. The Shanghai-based media outlet Radii claimed that “IShowSpeed’s China Tour is doing more for Chinese Soft Power than most diplomats ever could.”

📌 Others challenge this narrative, questioning which dominant Western portrayals of China IShowSpeed has actually disproven. Some argue that the idea of China being a “bleak place with nothing to do where people live in misery” is itself a false narrative, and that presenting IShowSpeed’s livestreams as a counter to that is its own form of propaganda (see: Chopsticks and Trains).

📌 There are also those who see Watkins’ trip as a form of scripted propaganda. To what extent were his livestreams planned or orchestrated? That question has become one of the central points of debate surrounding the hype around his visit.

These rumors have been addressed by cameraman Slipz (@shotbyslipz), who took to X on March 28, 2025. Slipz posted that the team is “(..) not making political content, not any documentary and no journalism,” and later added: “Fact: amount of money IShowSpeed has received from Chinese Government = $0.”

But does the fact that IShowSpeed did not receive money from the Chinese government mean that it wasn’t also a form of China promotion?

➡️ Organized — it definitely was. Any media trip in China has to be. IShowSpeed would have needed a visa, he had translators with him, and throughout the streams it’s evident that local guards and public security officers were present, walking alongside and helping to keep things under control, especially in crowded areas and at major tourist spots — from Nanjing Road in Shanghai to an entire group of guards seemingly accompanying the entourage in the Forbidden City.

One logistical “advantage” to his visit was the fact that YouTube is blocked in China. While some Chinese fans do bypass the Great Firewall to access the platform, IShowSpeed remains far less known in China than in many other countries — a factor that likely contributed to how smoothly the streams went and helped prevent chaos. The team also launched a Douyin account during the trip, where he now has over two million followers. (To stream directly to their 37 million followers on YouTube, Watkins’ team either needed a VPN to access WiFi or had arranged roaming SIM cards to stay connected.)

➡️ Was it staged? Many parts clearly weren’t: casual public conversations, spontaneous barber visits in both Shanghai and Beijing (with barbers looking unsure of how to handle the situation), and wholesome fan encounters. There was even a moment when Watkins walked into a public restroom and forgot to mute the sound.

But other parts of the trip were undeniably staged — or at least framed to appear spontaneous. When visiting a marriage market in Shanghai, for instance, two actors appeared, including one woman with a sign stating she was looking for someone “capable of doing backflips.”

When Watkins took a “random” ride in what was described as the fastest car in China — the Xiaomi SU7 Ultra — the vehicle appeared to be conveniently parked and ready.

Similarly, when the streamer “ran into” Chinese-American TikTok influencer Miles Moretti (李美越) in Beijing, it turned out to be the person who would give him the now-iconic bright Dongbei flower suit and accompany him on his journey.

The ping-pong, the kung fu, the Peking opera, the hotpot, the Forbidden City tour — it all plays into the kinds of experiences that official channels also like to highlight. While likely planned by Watkins’ team in coordination with local partners, it was all far more orderly and tourism-focused than, for example, Watkins’ chaotic visit to the Netherlands.

Watkins and his entourage were also well-informed about the local dos and don’ts. At one point, Watkins even mentions “following the rules,” and when Moretti tells him mid-stream that “somebody very important lives on our left,” Watkins asks “Who?” — but the camera zooms out and the question goes unanswered, suggesting they may have been reminded that certain names or topics were off-limits (judge the moment for yourself here).

The livestream didn’t always go exactly the way Watkins wanted, either. When he attempted to take more random walks around the city, the crew appeared to be informed that some areas were off-limits, and he was asked to return to the car to continue the trip (clips here and here).

 
🔹 The “Nàge” Song
 

One major talking point surrounding IShowSpeed’s China livestreams was “the N-word.” No, not that N-word — but the Chinese filler word “nàge” or “nèige” (那个). Like “uhm” in English or “eto” in Japanese, “nàge” is a hesitation marker commonly used in everyday Mandarin conversation. It also functions as a demonstrative pronoun meaning “that.”

The word has previously stirred controversy because of its phonetic resemblance to a racial slur in English. In 2020, an American professor at the University of Southern California’s Marshall School of Business was even temporarily suspended after using the word during an online communications class — some students misunderstood its context and took offense.

The word — and the song “Sunshine, Rainbow, White Pony” (阳光彩虹小白马) by Chinese singer Wowkie Zhang (大张伟), which repeatedly features the word nàge in its chorus — popped up multiple times during Watkins’ trip. The catchy tune essentially became the theme song of his visit.

The first nàge moment actually already appeared within the first five minutes of Watkins’ Shanghai stream, when a Chinese comedian approached him on the street, trying to recall a joke. “What?!” Watkins reacted, with laughter in the background. “That’s not a joke, you said n**! It’s my first five minutes in China!” he exclaimed, before patting the man’s back in a friendly gesture, clearly not offended.

🔄 It resurfaced again within the first hour when Watkins visited a marriage market and one of the performers sang the Wowkie Zhang song. Watkins initially acted shocked, then demanded they sing it again — only to burst out laughing and start singing along.

🔄 Later, he sang the song again with a street saxophonist and encouraged others to join in.

🔄 At other moments, he played up the drama again, feigning anger when a crowd broke into the chorus, and it became a recurring gag throughout the streams.

These incidents all seem staged. One of the main reasons Watkins is known to many netizens in China is because of an older video clip showing his exaggerated reaction to the nàge song — dating back to at least 2022. So while it may have looked spontaneous, Watkins was already familiar with the word and the viral song long before his China trip.The attention given to the nàge ‘controversy’ was likely amplified for views and engagement.

While Watkins was clearly in on this part of the show — as with others — he also seemed genuinely, and at times amusingly, unaware of many things in China. He repeatedly referred to RMB as “dollars,” mistook elderly women for retired YouTube streamers, and even assumed that a woman livestreaming near the Forbidden City was reading his chat and trying to collaborate with him — although she seemed totally uninterested and was just minding her own business.

 
🔹 A Win-Win Situation
 

In the end, IShowSpeed’s visit highlighted two sides effectively doing their job. Watkins and his team successfully arranged a YouTube trip that generated high ad revenue, attracted millions of new subscribers, and boosted his brand and global fame.

On the Chinese side, there was clearly coordination behind the scenes to ensure the trip went smoothly: avoiding controversy, ensuring safety, and showcasing positive aspects of Chinese culture. From traditional opera and kung fu to ping pong, IShowSpeed’s content gave center stage to the kinds of cultural highlights that align closely with China’s official narratives and tourism goals. Even if the government didn’t pay the YouTuber directly, as his team has emphasized (and there’s no reason to doubt them), the trip still fit seamlessly into China’s soft power strategy.

IShowSpeed’s China visit has created a unique media moment that resonates for several reasons: it’s the encounter of a young modern American with old traditional China; it is a streamer known for chaos visiting a nation known for control. And it brings different benefits to both sides: clicks and ad revenue for IShowSpeed, and free foreign-facing publicity for China.

No, IShowSpeed didn’t undo years of critical Western media coverage on China. But what his visit shows is that we’ve entered a phase where China is becoming more skilled at letting others help tell its story — in ways that resonate with a global, young, online audience. He didn’t do “God’s work.” He simply did what he always does: stream. And with China’s help, he streamed China very well.

There’s so much more I want to share with you this week — from Chinese reactions to the devastating Myanmar earthquake, to a recent podcast I joined with Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf (link in Dutch, for those interested). But it also happens to be my birthday today, and I’m really hoping to still grab some birthday hotpot — so I’ll wrap this up here. I’ll keep you informed on the other trends in the next newsletter.📨.

Best,
Manya
(@manyapan)

 

References:

Cai, Mingzhao 蔡名照. 2013. “Telling China’s Stories Well and Spreading China’s Voice: Thoroughly Studying and Implementing the Spirit of Comrade Xi Jinping’s Important Speech at the National Conference on Propaganda and Ideological Work [讲好中国故事,传播好中国声音——深入学习贯彻习近平同志在全国宣传思想工作会议上的重要讲话精神].” People’s Daily 人民日报, October 10. http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/1010/c1001-23144775.html. Accessed March 29.

Qiushi 求是网. 2021. “Xi Jinping: Telling China’s Story Well, Spread China’s Voice Well [习近平:讲好中国故事,传播好中国声音].” Qs Theory, June 6. http://www.qstheory.cn/zhuanqu/2021-06/02/c_1127522386.htm. Accessed March 29.

Zeng Dan 曾丹. 2022. “How to Tell China’s Story Well: Taking Li Ziqi as an Example [如何讲好中国故事——以李子柒为例].” Progress in Social Sciences 社会科学进展 4 (1): 10–19. https://doi.org/10.35534/pss.0401002.

 

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