China Insight
Gamifying Propaganda: Everything You Need to Know about China’s ‘Study Xi’ App
Scoring points by doing Xi-focused quizzes and watching ‘Xi Time’ news: this app takes propaganda to a whole other level.

Published
4 years agoon

First published
A new app that encourages China’s online population to study Xi Jinping Thought has made headlines, both in and outside of China. Here’s everything you need to know about this new interactive propaganda tool. An overview by What’s on Weibo.
On January 1st, the Xué Xí Qiáng Guó app was launched on various Chinese app stores. The app is an initiative by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and is linked to the xuexi.cn platform, which was first set up in 2018.
The app has been making headlines in Chinese and English-language media this week. The BBC referred to the app as a “little red book,” and reported that members of the ruling Communist Party, as well as state-owned company employees who are not Party members, have allegedly been required to download and use it on a daily basis (Feb 15).
The Guardian reported that government officials in Fujian province and Qingdao city held workshops last month stressing the political importance of the app, and directing local leaders to promote the app across government departments (Feb 15).
Although some reports claim that the app is making its way to top lists of most downloaded apps in China, it only scored a position 72 in the top 100 list of popular Chinese app store 360app at time of writing. The app store does state that the app has been downloaded 340000 times, with app users rating it with 2,5 stars out of 5. In the Tencent store, the app was downloaded 2,1 million times.
However, these numbers do not necessarily indicate much about the total number of downloads, since the app can be directly downloaded as an APK file from various locations. In the Chinese Apple store, the app is now the number one scoring app in the educational category. The app is only available in Chinese, and is not available from the Google Play store or Apple stores outside of China.
The app’s name (学习强国) is translated as the ‘Study Xi Strong Country’ app in various English-language media reports, but a more suitable translation would perhaps be ‘Study Xi, Strengthen China.’1 There’s a wordplay in the name, since the Mandarin word for ‘studying’ is ‘xuéxí’ which also incorporates the name of Xi, and in this context means both ‘Studying’ as well as ‘Study Xi.’
The main slogan of the ‘Study Xi’ app is one of Xi’s own sayings: “Dreams start with studying, careers start from doing” (“梦想从学习开始,事业从实践起步”, loose translation). Both the idea of ‘Dreams’ and of ‘Studying’ are concepts that are consistently promoted in the Xi era, with the idea that the common dream of the people is the ‘Chinese Dream’ of bringing about the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Within this Chinese dream, studying is generally promoted as a “secret weapon” that will strengthen the Party and the nation (Xiao 2016).
A Multi-Functional Propaganda Tool
So what is the ‘Study Xi, Strengthen China’ app? It basically is a multi-functional educational platform that offers users various ways to study Xi Jinping Thought, Party history, Chinese culture, history, and much more. Once people are registered on the app, they can also access the platform via PC.
An important part of the app is its news feed: its home page features “recommended” reads that all focus on Xi Jinping and the Party. Another major feature is its ‘quiz’ page: every week, there are different quizzes that users can do, relating to all sorts of things, from Party ideology to famous Chinese poems.
We’ve listed some of the app’s functions below. It is much more than a media app alone; it also has a social function, that allows users to connect with friends, message them, call them, and even send them ‘red envelopes’ (money presents).
The ‘red envelope’ function is made possible through Alipay, the online payment platform that is owned by Ant Financial Services Group, an affiliate company of the Chinese Alibaba Group.
One way for users to verify their identity on the app is also by linking it to their Alipay account. Various media reports also claim that the app is linked to Alibaba’s Ding Ding platform, an enterprise chat app that has a multitude of functions, many of which are also incorparated in the ‘Study Xi’ app (for more about Ding Ding, see our article here).
Given the cooperation with Alibaba, it is perhaps not surprising that upon registering for the app with just my phone number, it already knew my nickname without me putting it in. The app also listed an old smartphone I used some two years ago as a “frequently used” device, although I had just downloaded the app the day before and had never registered for it before.
So I just registered for the first time for the new “Study Xi Strong Country” app, which requires a phone number. It then told me “hi manyapan,” and that this phonenumber was already registered for the app. I’ve never registered before and never put in my manyapan nickname. 🤔 pic.twitter.com/8WQWq3D46T
— Manya Koetse (@manyapan) 16 februari 2019
“Study Xi” app day two. Not only did the app know my nickname upon registering for 1st time, it also lists a HTC phone I used some two years ago under “frequently used devices.” Most likely imports data from Alipay app. pic.twitter.com/qQ9Sdgk3Fp
— Manya Koetse (@manyapan) 17 februari 2019
Twitter user @yanshitou12 also noted that, upon using a friend’s number to register for the app, her Ding Ding conversations were automatically loaded into the chat history, suggesting that Alibaba’s Ding Ding is indeed fully integrated with the app.
My phone cn number expired, so I used friend’s number. The app automatically loaded her conversation history from the app 针针, on my phone, without even asking
— 盐石头 (@yanshitou12) 16 februari 2019
Like Ding Ding, the ‘Study Xi’ app also allows users to set up conference calls, send ‘self-deleting’ chats (like Snapchat), and use the app’s calendar function. Its many practical functions make this an app that is especially convenient for China’s 89,5 million Party members to stay close to the Party and its activities.
How to Score with Xi
The app’s most noteworthy and perhaps also most appealing feature is its scoring system, since it turns studying Party ideology and Xi Jinping Thought into a game.
Those who accumulate enough points can get an item from the app’s ‘prize shop.’ There are also contests which users can join to compete over a Huawei tablet or other items.
One Weibo user shared that she had just received her Modern Chinese Dictionary by mail through the app’s ‘gift shop,’ another person expressed her surprise that a delivery man came to deliver her prize at her door. “Thank you, Propaganda Department!”, she wrote.
The score system works as follows:
- Upon registering for the app, you receive 1 point.
- For every article or essay one reads, you get 1 point (one per article, does not work with articles that have already been viewed before).
- For every video you watch you get 1 point (the same video won’t be credited with an extra point if you see it twice).
- The time you spend on the app is also rewarded with points: for every 4 minutes of reading, you get 1 point (max 8 points per day).
- For every 5 minutes of watching a video, you get 1 point (max 8 points per day).
- You get 1 point for “subscribing” to a media account, which will then show up in your news feed.
- If you share two articles with friends, you get 1 point.
- You get 1 point for every two articles or essays you ‘save’ within the app.
- If you score 100% on a quiz, you get 10 points.
What is quite remarkable about the app, is that it encourages users to ‘Study Xi’ at particular times of the day. The morning 6:00-8:30 timeframe, along with the 12:00-14:00 slot and evening 20:00-22:30 times, are designated as so-called “active time slots” during which users can score double points for their activities. Within these time slots, reading an article would, for example, grant a user 2 points instead of 1.
This signals that, in line with good working morale, people are supposed to look into the app during their morning commute, their lunch break, and before bedtime, and are indirectly discouraged from using it during (office) working hours.
The points that are scored on the app will be valid for two years.
On Weibo, some netizens are quite serious about the ‘gaming’ aspect of this app, and have already found ways to cheat the system. They share tips and tricks on how to score within the app: points are credited within 10 seconds of clicking an article, for example, and watching videos can be easily rewarded with a point if one immediately scrolls to the end.
Through the PC version of the app, it is easy to let certain videos play while scrolling the internet, basically earning points without actually watching the videos.
“Thanks,” many commenters reply to these cheating tricks: “Just what I was looking for.” “I already received 50 points in one day!”
A Library in Your Pocket: Media, Books, Movies
The ‘Study Xi’ app focuses on some dozen media outlets that users can subscribe to and which also show up in the ‘recommended’ homepage feed.
Incorporated in the app are state media outlets China Daily (中国日报网), People’s Daily (人民网), Xinhua (新华), Qiushi Journal (求是网), China Military Web (中国军网), Economic Daily (经济日报), and others.
The app also incorporates local ‘Study Xi’ platforms, from Hubei to Jiangxi, from Shandong to Fujian.
Besides these media, the app also has TV channels people can watch videos on, from CCTV News to a special ‘Xi Time’ news programme, to various TV dramas, including Turbulence of the Mu Clan (木府风云) and Romance of Our Parents (父母爱情).

“Xi Time” news clips focus on the activities of Xi Jinping.
There is also a movie section within the app, where users can watch classics such as The Long March (长征), The Founding Ceremony of the Nation (开国大典), films on Deng Xiaoping or Zhou Enlai, and various movies that focus on the Second Sino-Japanese War.
The ‘Study Xi’ library section grants users access to dozens of books. On the desktop version, the library is shown as an actual office, where you can click on the books that are displayed on the shelves and read them.
Some books are those by Xi Jinping, including The Governance of China (习近平谈治国理政), but there are also books by the famous Chinese author Lu Xun, or the 20th-century classic Rickshaw Boy by Lao She, and various works on calligraphy and poetry.
There is also an entire section of books available from a whole range of topics varying from astronomy to maths, biology, and geography. The books are available for online reading in pdf.
In general, you could say that the selection of media, videos, and books all fall into the categories of Chinese traditional culture and canonical literature, historical themes, science and technology, and the political themes of Party ideology and the Xi Jinping Thought that focuses on ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (中国特色社会主义).
Those who read enough state media and Party articles will easily be able to do the quizzes and weekly questions in the app. Besides the standard ideological questions, it also draws from popular culture; I came across a question that used a trailer of China’s latest sci-fi movie The Wandering Earth that needed to be watched in order to complete the question.
Propaganda in the Xi Era
So how popular is the app, really? If the headlines in Chinese and non-Chinese media are to be believed, the majority of Chinese internet users are getting hooked on the app. That picture is perhaps the rose-colored one the Party would like to envision, but judging from social media comments and app ratings, reactions have been somewhat lukewarm.
On Weibo, there are some commenters who are sharing their 1000-point status on the app, or who say they enjoy looking into the app right before sleeping.
Dozens of commenters indicate that they have to assist their parents in using the app, or that it is not them, but their parents who are ‘hooked’ on the app – the majority of Weibo users are in the 20-35 years age group.
There are local trainings on making (older) Party members more familiar with the app, how to download it and how to use it. A local Chongqing community Weibo account recently posted the pictures below of their ‘Study Xi’ gathering.
On social media, some commenters complain about the fact that the Chinese Apple store has turned off the review comment sections on the app, despite the fact that it allegedly scored a number one spot in its “educational app” section.
Then there are also dozens of commenters who say they often use the app: the score matters to them. In a time when everything is mobile, and online gaming is booming, it seems that ‘Study Xi, Strengthen China’ has made its app all the more relevant by adding the scoring element.
In doing so, the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party is continuing on the same route it has taken for the past couple of years, which shows a clear break with the propaganda machine before the Xi era.
Not only does the propaganda in the Xi era strengthen the idea of Xi as a political idol, it also fully embraces the Internet, the online media environment, and its related pop culture in doing so (also see Chang & Ren 2018).
Since 2017, various noteworthy propaganda moments, such as the 2017 Xi Clapping Game, the cartoonification of Xi, or the One Belt, One Road media publicity hype, all point in the same direction, namely that the Party propaganda will use the modes of communication and technology that are most popular among China’s (younger) online population to reach their audiences.
For now, I am still stuck below 50 points on the ‘Study Xi’ app. The scoring element is powerful: I feel triggered to get my score up. Maybe watch a few more videos, do better on the quiz, and read some more state media articles. I might just be tempted to go back for some more Xi-studies.
By Manya Koetse
Follow @whatsonweibo
1Translation suggested by Helen Wang @helanwanglondon.
References
Chang, J., & Ren, H. 2018. “The powerful image and the imagination of power: the ‘new visual turn’ of the CPC’s propaganda strategy since its 18th National Congress in 2012. Asian Journal of Communication, 28(1), 1–19.
Xiao Junhua 肖君华. 2016. “Dreams Start with Learning – Studying General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Important Discourse on Learning [梦想从学习开始——学习习近平总书记关于学习的重要论述]” Guangming Daily, via CPC News, 7 July http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0707/c376186-28531506.html [18.1.19].

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©2019 Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.
Manya Koetse is the founder and editor-in-chief of whatsonweibo.com. She is a writer, public speaker, and researcher (Sinologist, MPhil) on social trends, digital developments, and new media in an ever-changing China, with a focus on Chinese society, pop culture, and gender issues. She shares her love for hotpot on hotpotambassador.com. Contact at manya@whatsonweibo.com, or follow on Twitter.

China Arts & Entertainment
From Comedy to Controversy: Behind the Li Haoshi Incident
Exploring the dynamics that led to the social storm involving Chinese comedian ‘House’ Li Haoshi.

Published
2 weeks agoon
May 21, 2023
The Li Haoshi scandal sheds light on a complex interplay of factors, including the working conditions within the Chinese comedy industry, the expectations placed on performers in China’s entertainment realm, and the significant role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in shaping Chinese nationalism. A deep dive by What’s on Weibo.
Humor is no joking matter. While the business of humor can be competitive and challenging no matter where you are in the world, there are some special considerations and implications for working in humor in China.
This week, Chinese comedian Li Haoshi (李昊石), who performs under the name ‘House’, experienced firsthand that there are strict limitations to what can be openly satirized or joked about in China today. When one of his jokes about two stray dogs described them by referencing a famous People’s Liberation Army (PLA) slogan, he found himself at the center of a social media storm. One related hashtag received over 1.1 billion views on social media platform Weibo this week.
The phrases used in the comic skit, with Li saying they came to mind while watching the dogs chasing a squirrel, were: “Forge exemplary conduct, fight to win.” The lines are part of the PLA slogan “Follow the Party! Fight to win! Forge exemplary conduct!” (“听党指挥,能打胜仗,作风优良!”), which was used by Xi Jinping in 2013.
Li Haoshi was not just socially canceled by angry netizens who defended the honor of Chinese soldiers and slammed the comedian for being so unpatriotic, he also saw his career go up in flames. His shows were called off, he was banned from social media, his employer was fined more than $2 million, he was blacklisted under orders of the China Performing Arts Association (CAPA), and he is now under official investigation.
Following the controversy, there were different views on Chinese social media regarding the issue (read more here). Although the majority of commenters argued that the PLA is never to be joked about, some people also lamented that online discussions lacked nuance.
This scandal sheds light on a complex interplay of factors, including the working conditions within the Chinese comedy industry, the expectations placed on performers in the Chinese entertainment world, and the important role played by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in shaping Chinese nationalism.
HUMOR AND STAND-UP COMEDY IN CHINA
Humor has played a prominent role in Chinese language and culture for centuries, manifested through a diverse array of jokes and humorous texts. Professional comedians, who served to entertain the aristocrats, have been around since as early as 800 BC.
Although humor has always been there, it has not necessarily always been appreciated. Confucianism has played a significant role in devaluing humor in China, as it formally regarded humor and satire as inferior forms of aesthetic expression. Chinese rulers who did not tolerate criticism or dissent also could not appreciate jokes or comics which, in any way, went against their rule and authority (Sullivan & Sullivan 2021, 102; Yue 2008, 403-413).
In the early days of modern China, following the collapse of the Qing dynasty, there was a notable resurgence of various forms of humor and jokes that spanned two decades, including cross-talk (xiàngsheng 相声) and skits (xiǎopǐn 小品). It was during this period that the Mandarin word “yōumò” (幽默) was introduced, derived from the English term “humor.” This term was coined by the renowned Chinese writer and translator Lin Yutang (林语堂), who faced the challenge of finding an exact Chinese translation for the English word (Hsu 2015, 2).
For decades, from the founding of People’s Republic of China to the Anti-Rightists Movement and the Cultural Revolution and beyond, there was not much yōumò around. As described by David Moser (2004), the constraints imposed by the Party and political sensitivities severely limited the content and topics that comedians could explore.
The comparatively relaxed political atmosphere of the post-Mao era gave rise to novel forms of humor and comedy. In subsequent years, influenced by the United States, “stand-up comedy” (tuōkǒuxiù 脱口秀) also gained popularity. Initially originating in small bars or cafes in major cities such as Shanghai and Beijing, this comedic genre swiftly spread across the nation.
But similar to numerous other performance forms in China, stand-up comedy faces challenges in maintaining its spontaneity and provocative nature. Performers and comedy clubs are required to obtain licenses and gain script approval, while also navigating strict boundaries regarding politically sensitive topics that are strictly off-limits (Sullivan & Sullivan 2021: 102).
This does not mean that stand-up comedy is not thriving in China. On the contrary, the genre has only become more popular over recent years as stand-up comedy performers skillfully navigate the boundaries of what is acceptable by employing different techniques, such as irony, self-deprecation, and surreal humor to offer alternative perspectives within the permitted discourse (see: Chen and Gao 2023). In doing so, Chinese stand-up comedy has evolved beyond its American influences and embraced more traditional Chinese comedic language techniques from xiàngsheng and other performing arts.
In today’s landscape, Chinese comedians face a multitude of boundaries beyond just political ones. Operating within an environment where cultural and commercial factors hold significant sway, it becomes almost inevitable for popular performers to encounter controversy at some point in their careers. Authorities, audiences, sponsors, or companies may take offense at the content of their comedic expressions, adding further complexity to their navigation of these boundaries.

Li Dan, Papi Jiang, and Yang Li previously also faced criticism for their “inappropriate” or “vulgar” jokes.
The online comedian Papi Jiang (Papi酱), for example, saw her videos being taken offline in 2016 for containing “vulgar language and content,” after which she vowed to choose her words more carefully in the future. Female stand-up comedian Yang Li (杨笠), also known as the “punchline queen,” was dismissed as the spokesperson for American tech company Intel in 2021 for her jokes that allegedly insulted men. The popular talk show host and comedian Li Dan (李诞) sparked controversy for promoting female underwear brand Ubras with a slogan that was deemed sexist.
In such a working environment, it is difficult to fathom that the 31-year-old Li Haoshi, who had previously appeared on the immensely popular stand-up comedy competition show “Rock & Roast” Season Four, was unaware that his reference to a PLA slogan would surpass the acceptable boundaries. However, like many comedians, he may simply have been testing the limits.
THE POWER OF PERFORMERS
Another factor that comes into play when exploring the reasons behind the ‘House’ scandal is the special role attributed to Chinese performers.
Although Chinese performers and renowned names in the cultural industries have always been seen as fulfilling an exemplary role, this notion holds even greater significance in the era of social media, where Chinese performers and celebrities wield tremendous influence in an online environment with over one billion internet users. The rapid growth of online entertainment-focused apps and platforms has also created opportunities for unknown performers to achieve overnight fame.
There have been various studies about celebrities in China. One study from 2019 by Sullivan and Kehoe highlights the complexity of China’s celebrity scene. Because while the industry flourishes, it still operates under strict regulations imposed by both the state and industry stakeholders. Additionally, moral values play a significant role in shaping the industry. Sullivan and Kehoe argue that the state, through media and cultural industries, retains control over the symbolic economy within which celebrities operate (2019, 242).
Channeling public opinion and safeguarding social stability are priorities for Chinese authorities, and the influence of Chinese celebrities is often used to promote Party ideology and policies. While authorities encourage Chinese famous performers to act as positive role models, negative news surrounding the country’s popular stars is often perceived as having a “negative social impact” or a “bad influence on public morale.”
There are some some noteworthy instances that exemplify the significance of moral values and the role of Chinese celebrities as role models. One such example occurred in 2019 when Roy Wang (Wang Yuan 王源), a young Chinese singer and actor widely regarded as one of the country’s most influential teenagers, found himself embroiled in controversy after being caught smoking during a restaurant dinner in Beijing.
The incident surrounding Wang’s smoking quickly ignited a firestorm on Chinese social media. The controversy stemmed from two main factors. Firstly, Beijing had implemented a ban on smoking in all public indoor spaces since 2015, making Wang’s actions a violation of the law by lighting up in a restaurant. Additionally, as an influential teen icon, Wang held the responsibility of being a role model to his numerous fans, amplifying the impact of his behavior.
The idea that China should “raise the bar” for becoming a celebrity was widely propagated in 2021. In that same year, the China Association of Performing Arts (CAPA) officially released new guidelines for Chinese performers aimed at promoting adherence to the principles of “social morality.” According to these guidelines, performers could face a permanent ban from their profession if they fail to comply.
The guidelines are meant to “promote the healthy development of the performer industry” and lay out the “practice norms,” which stipulate that performers, among other things, should abide by national laws and regulations, should honor their contracts and comply with copyright laws. But they also stipulate that they should “love the motherland and support the Party’s line and policies” (“热爱祖国,拥护党的路线方针政策”), “persevere in the orientation that literature and art should serve the people and socialism” (“坚持文艺为人民服务、为社会主义服务的方向”), and “actively uphold a positive image” (“积极树立正面形象”).
By joking about the PLA, Li Haoshi violated some of the rules laid out by CAPA. His severe punishment not only demonstrates to the public that Chinese performers/celebrities should abide by the same laws as ordinary citizens – if not be held to even higher moral standards, – it also serves as a cautionary message to other entertainers, urging them not to overstep boundaries and to uphold their responsibility as public figures to positively impact public morale.
THE SACRED PLA
In addition to Li Haoshi’s position as a stand-up comedian and his role as a performer/celebrity, another significant aspect of this controversy revolves around the status of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in contemporary China. PLA soldiers are revered as the heroic “soldier sons of the people” who display unwavering loyalty to the Party and the nation.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was founded in 1927, with Mao Zedong counted among its founders. It played a crucial role in the rise of the Chinese Communist Party and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.
In addition to its core duty of protecting the country and conducting military operations, the PLA is also involved in other tasks such as peacekeeping efforts and disaster relief. However, its primary and most significant role is to serve as the military branch of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and ensure the CCP’s continued leadership in China. By safeguarding China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and unity, the PLA carries both a military and symbolic significance.
The PLA plays a major part in Chinese nationalist discourses, while simultaneously also playing a central role in driving nationalism in China. Whether it is the social media spectacle of China’s Taiwan military exercises or ‘100.000 soldier loving girls‘ during the Wuhan floods, the PLA acts as “a bridge between nationalism as an abstract ideological concept and as an everyday concern of the people for the security of their country” (Ji 2004, 248).
Military propaganda, often disseminated online, is important in reinforcing the image of PLA soldiers as guardians of the nation. When four Chinese PLA soldiers were killed during a border clash with Indian troops in 2020, Chinese state media outlets made noteworthy efforts to shape the ways in which the soldiers are to be remembered, blending political and personal elements while lauding their unwavering patriotism. In doing so, they posted their photos along with phrases such as “The place where I stand is China” and “I will defend the motherland with my life.”
Those insulting the PLA can face serious consequences under the “Heroes and Martyrs Protection Law” which was introduced in 2018. In 2021, former Economic Observer journalist Qiu Ziming (仇子明), along with two other bloggers, were the first persons to be charged under the new law as they were detained for “insulting” the Chinese soldiers. Qiu, who had 2.4 million fans on his Weibo page, made remarks questioning the number of casualties China said it suffered in the India border clash. He was sentenced to eight months in prison.
Li Haoshi’s faux-pas is particularly sensitive because the lines used in his joke indirectly made a comparison between PLA soldiers and stray dogs, while also placing words famously used by Xi Jinping in a ridiculous context. Additionally, as highlighted by Chinese bloggers and China Digital Times editor Alexander Boyd, Li’s joke potentially alludes to a scene from the 1956 Chinese war movie Battle on Shangganling Mountain (上甘岭) during the Korean War, where soldiers were depicted chasing after a squirrel. The intention of the scene was allegedly to showcase the kind-hearted nature of the brave soldiers of the Volunteer Army.
Was Chinese comedian Li Haoshi, with his controversial dog-chasing-squirrel joke, alluding to this squirrel-chasing scene from the famous 1956 Chinese Korean War movie "Battle on Shangganling Mountain"? Various Weibo bloggers claim that there is a connection. pic.twitter.com/2AjQKeIhVD
— Manya Koetse (@manyapan) May 21, 2023
Some people believe that Li Haoshi was purposely alluding to that scene with his joke, and in doing so, insulted China’s Korean War ‘martyrs,’ which is illegal under the martyr defamation law. That would be a serious offense. In 2022, former investigative journalist Luo Changping was sentenced to seven months in prison and ordered to make a public apology for insulting Chinese soldiers portrayed in a blockbuster movie about the Korean War.
Whether or not Li intended to make such a connection or put much thought into his joke remains uncertain. However, many netizens are angry with Li for various reasons. Chinese nationalists defend the honor of their hero soldiers, while others blame Li for not respecting the boundaries within which he should operate.
Furthermore, Li’s colleagues, Chinese stand-up comedians, are also upset that he took the risk of making a politically incorrect joke, which has put the entire industry under scrutiny. This incident has created more tension for other performers in an already challenging work environment.
On Chinese social Q&A platform Zhihu, one experienced stand-up comedian performer from Shandong shared his view on the matter, suggesting that Li has brought harm to their industry:
“For commercial performances, our lines have to first have to go through a script reading meeting, they will then go through 4-6 open rounds of ‘polishing,’ and then go through the script polishing of the copywriters working for the show. (..) Moreover, the words and phrases we use in our jokes must have a contextual understanding and source. Therefore, there is no way that Li Haoshi was not aware of the history and origin of the sentences he used.
At the same time, all of our jokes in commercial performances require approval. Therefore, Li Haoshi obviously knew that this particular joke wouldn’t pass the approval, so he intentionally didn’t submit it. This is not a case of ignorance, it is simply being malicious.”
Overall, Li Haoshi’s case serves as a warning to others to be cautious with their words, whether used during performances, talk shows, interviews, or online.
Jokes are not to be taken lightly in a media environment where every line carries weight. When humor becomes such a serious matter, it becomes increasingly challenging to stay funny.
By Manya Koetse
References (other online sources hyperlinked in text)
Chen, Dan, and Gengsong Gao. 2023. “The Transgressive Rhetoric of Standup Comedy in China.” Critical Discourse Studies 20 (1): 1-17.
Hsu, Pi-ching. 2015. Feng Menglong’s Treasury of Laughs. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.
Ji, You. 2004. “Nationalism, the Chinese Defence Culture and the People’s Liberation Army.” In: Leong H. Liew and and Shaoguang Wang (eds), Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration in China, pp. 247-268. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
Moser, David. 2004. “Stifled Laughter: How the Communist Party Killed Chinese the Chinese Humor Form of Xiangsheng.” Danwei.org http://www.danwei.org/tv/stifled_laughter_how_the_commu.php, accessed via https://www.academia.edu/5929719/Stifled_Laughter_How_the_Communist_Party_Killed_Chinese_the_Chinese_Humor_Form_of_Xiangsheng [20 May 2023].
Sullivan, Lawrence R. and Nancy Sullivan. 2021. Historical Dictionary of Chinese Culture. New York and London: Rowman & Littlefield
Sullivan, Jonathan, and Séagh Kehoe. 2019. “Truth, Good and Beauty: The Politics of Celebrity in China.” The China Quarterly 237 (March): 241–256.
Yue, Xiao Dong. 2008. “Exploration of Chinese Humor.” Humor: International Journal of Humor Research 21 (4): 407-421.
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China Arts & Entertainment
A Joke Too Far: 3 Social Media Views on Chinese Comedian Li Haoshi Getting Canceled over PLA Pun
From Weibo to WeChat, from Douyin to Zhihu, Li Haoshi’s joke has sparked widespread conversations, and opinions vary.
Published
2 weeks agoon
May 18, 2023
There is a delicate balance between humor and controversy, and Chinese comedian Li Haoshi recently discovered the consequences of crossing that line. In a punchline that took aim at China’s People’s Liberation Army, Li found himself at the center of a significant controversy. Is Li deserving of his ensuing cancellation? On Chinese social media, opinions are divided.
A Chinese comedian’s politically incorrect joke is the topic that everyone has been talking about this week, even making international headlines.
Li Haoshi (李昊石), a comedian who performed under the stage name ‘House’ with the famous Chinese comedy company Xiao Guo company (笑果文化), recently faced accusations of making offensive remarks towards the Chinese army during one of his shows. As a result, he has been subjected to a ban on social media platforms and has also been prohibited from participating in future performances.
The show in question took place on May 13th and while the performance officially was not allowed to be filmed, some attendees recorded the particular joke that caused controversy and then exposed House on social media. According to a Zhihu user who claimed to have secretly recorded the entire show, the joke went as follows:
“Shanghai is an international metropolis where everything is aligned with international standards. After I moved to Shanghai, I adopted two stray dogs. Strictly speaking, they weren’t stray dogs. We found them on a nearby mountain, and they were wild dogs. We can’t really say we rescued them because they were at the top of the food chain in the mountains and didn’t need our help. We were more like a makeover show, experiencing city life. These two dogs were indeed the top predators on the mountain. When I first saw them, it felt like I was witnessing a wildlife documentary. The two dogs would chase a squirrel like a missile launched into the air. Normally, when you see dogs, you find them cute, and your heart melts. You think of these words. But when I saw these two dogs, only eight words flashed in my mind: ‘Good discipline, capable of winning battles’ (作风优良, 能打胜仗). They were truly exceptional. I walked proudly on the streets of Shanghai with these two dogs. The only problem was that they had so much energy. My physical fitness couldn’t keep up.”
The triggering aspect of this joke lies in the eight words “zuò fēng yōu liáng, néng dǎ shèng zhàng” (“作风优良, 能打胜仗”: “Good discipline, capable of winning battles”). This slogan has long been associated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (中国人民解放军, PLA) as a standard used to describe and motivate the army. The lines, used by Xi Jinping in 2013, are used together with another phrase, namely that of “tīng dǎng zhǐhuī” (“听党指挥”), meaning “to obey the Party’s command” or “follow the Party’s leadership,” together encapsulating the principles of the Chinese military.

“Obeying the Party’s command – Capable of winning battles – positive work ethic” – these famous phrases were used in a comical context by Chinese comedian House. (Image source).
Using the army’s slogan to describe two wild dogs is considered offensive to the PLA’s “sacred and inviolable” image.
The joke was considered such a serious faux pas that Party newspaper People’s Daily posted about it on social media platform Weibo two days later, claiming that performers in talkshows should be cautious with their words and be careful to stay within appropriate boundaries.
They also suggested that there should be consensus within the industry on where the bottom line is on which jokes can and cannot be made. People’s Daily used the phrase “tuōkǒu mò tuōguǐ, wán gěng xū yǒu dù” (“脱口莫脱轨,玩梗须有度”), which can be translated as: “Do not deviate when speaking freely, and use jokes [memes/punch lines] with moderation.”
The word used for ‘talkshow’ is tuōkǒuxiù 脱口秀, a Chinese term that literally translates to “talk show” but actually mostly refers to stand-up comedy shows and a type of popular form of entertainment in which performers showcase their humorous storytelling skills in an engaging and often improvisational manner.
Li Haosi’s controversial joke garnered more significant attention from Chinese state media. After People’s Daily initial post, they made another Weibo post addressing the issue. The post began with the hashtag “There is a sense of security called the soldier sons of the people” (#有一种安全感叫人民子弟兵#), which is a widely used phrase to describe the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and highlight the close relationship between the military and the Chinese people.

A second post by People’s Daily about the Li Haoshi controversy paid tribute to China’s PLA soldiers.
In the post, People’s Daily expressed their support for the PLA and condemned any action or statement that might be seen as disrespectful or offensive towards the military and the soldiers who serve as the guardians of the Chinese people (“人民子弟兵不容冒犯”). They tagged their post with the hashtag “People’s Daily Discusses ‘House’ Offending the Soldiers Sons of the People” (#人民日报评House冒犯人民子弟兵#), which has since received over 670 million views on Weibo.
As the controversy surrounding Li Haoshi escalated, fuelled in part by Chinese state media, it has also became a prominent topic of discussion among the general social media userbase. From Weibo to WeChat, from Douyin to Zhihu, Li Haoshi’s joke has sparked widespread conversations. Within these online discussions, there are three prominent and recurring viewpoints that we will explore here.
1: TOLERANCE & MORE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
“You ‘wolf warriors’ and ‘little pinkies’ are only good at conducting witch hunts! It is actually you who should be canceled.”
The notion of talk shows being regarded as “an art of offense” (“一种冒犯的艺术”) is widely discussed on Chinese social media these days. Evaluating the boundaries between ‘acceptable humor’ and ‘crossing the boundaries’ continues to be a topic of discussion, with some advocating for performers’ artistic freedom of expression and speech, arguing that “there is no offensive art, but all kinds of genuine art can be offensive.”
In a since-deleted WeChat article, one Chinese blogging account expressed readers’ concerns regarding the Li Haoshi controversy. A major concern raised was not just about freedom of expression for performers, but about freedom of expression within this topic itself, suggesting that the online discourse surrounding the ‘House controversy’ allows very limited space for actual debate and offers no opportunity for people to discuss the different perspectives of the story.
On Weibo, some individuals express similar concerns about the lack of nuance in the discussion. Apart from censorship or top-down control, they worry about a general discussion environment that leaves no space for opposing opinions. One person commented: “You ‘wolf warriors’ and ‘little pinkies’ are only good at conducting witch hunts! It is actually you who should be canceled.”
“The more people comment, the more extreme they get,” another person wrote. Meanwhile, the comment sections of various popular posts discussing the issue were either disabled or heavily filtered, to the extent that none of the 244 listed comments were visible.
2: CROSSING A RED LINE
“It is very simple. Making jokes is not the same as malicious slander.”
Many people do not agree with those advocating for a more tolerant approach to the Li Haoshi controversy. A seeming majority of Weibo users argue that ‘talk shows’ should not serve as a sanctuary for “inappropriate speech.” They assert that public speeches have inherent “bottom lines” that cannot be crossed. Performers should be aware of these existing red lines, and should not use their profession as an excuse to express problematic statements.
One popular blogger (@胜利主义章北海) argued that comedians are already well aware that they have certain boundaries; offending their audience would rob them of their income, and they are also careful not to insult their boss or colleagues: “They would not dare to [offend them]. They are conscious of these boundaries. So why would they dare to offend the PLA?”
Many agree with this stance: “It is very simple. Making jokes is not the same as malicious slander.”
In these online discussions, the United States is often cited as an example due to its strong emphasis on free speech. Some Chinese netizens note that even in the U.S. and other Western countries, there are also topics or jokes that would be considered off-limits and could lead to consequences such as being canceled.
The Weibo account “Xu Ji Observation” (@徐记观察, previously recognized for positive online content and the promotion of the “mass line”) mentions how some people in America were condemned for even hinting at disrespecting the military. American quarterback Tom Brady was widely criticized in 2021 after comparing playing football to military deployment, and Pete Davidson was slammed for making fun of an American representative and war veteran who had lost one eye during his deployment in Afghanistan. Both Brady and Davidson had to apologize.
Although many people agree with Xu Ji’s observation, others argue that the comparison is not entirely fair, as the consequences faced by Chinese performers who get ‘canceled’ go beyond a simple apology. In China, as exemplified by Li Haoshi’s current situation, an apology alone is unlikely to resolve the matter (read more about China’s canceled celebrities here).
3: ALWAYS HONOR OUR SOLDIERS
“”We can do without talk show hosts or celebrities, but we cannot do without our soldier sons of the people!”
There is also a large group of netizens who argue that this discussion should not be about ‘freedom’ versus ‘boundaries’ at all, but instead should focus on the mere fact that the Chinese comedian deliberately insulted the “soldier sons of the people,” and in doing so, committing a crime according to the “Heroes and Martyrs Protection Law.”
Although Chinese state media have led narratives surrounding this controversy in which they stress the ‘sacredness’ of the PLA, its mission, and duties, there are many netizens who say they feel the same. House’s joke has triggered anger among Chinese social media users who emphasize the dedication of the PLA and condemn any jokes targeting them.
In many online posts, bloggers highlight the heroic actions of the PLA in the past and, using patriotic images of soldiers with national flags, remind people about how they selflessly rescued people during the Wenchuan Earthquake or persistently guarded the South China Sea.
One popular comment said: “We can do without talk show hosts or celebrities, but we cannot do without our soldier sons of the people!”
While online discussions surrounding the Li Haoshi controversy are ongoing, Chinese authorities have concluded that the joke constitutes a legal violation. As of May 18th, House’s social media account has been suspended, he has been boycotted by the China Association of Performing Arts, and the Beijing Police have announced their intention to investigate the case due to House’s alleged “severe insult to the People’s Liberation Army during his performance, causing a highly negative societal impact.”
Furthermore, Xiao Guo, the company representing House, has received an official warning and has had over 1.35 million yuan ($190,000) in “illegal gains” confiscated, along with a fine of 13.35 million yuan ($1.8 million) imposed by the police. In response to this penalty, the company has canceled all scheduled performances in China and terminated their contract with Li Haoshi.
Read more related articles:
◼︎ “Love the Motherland” – New Moral Guidelines for Chinese Performers Come Into Force
◼︎ Chinese Comedian Li Dan under Fire for Promoting Lingerie Brand with Sexist Slogan
◼︎ Female Comedian Yang Li and the Intel Controversy
◼︎ 25 ‘Tainted Celebrities’: What Happens When Chinese Entertainers Get Canceled?
By Zilan Qian and Manya Koetse, with contributions by Miranda Barnes
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