China Insight
Follow the Leaders: These Are All the Members of China’s 20th Central Committee & Politburo Standing Committee
Full list of names including the members of China’s new 20th Central Committee, the Politburo, and its Standing Committee.
Published
4 years agoon
PREMIUM CONTENT ARTICLE
Which Party members will lead China in the next five years? These are the names you need to know: all the full members of China’s new Central Committee, the Politburo, and its Standing Committee.
The 20th Party Congress has concluded and China’s new leadership for the next five years has been revealed. All of the new full and alternate members of the 20th Central Committee were announced on October 22 and a day later, on October 23rd, the new seven-member Politburo Standing Committee was unveiled.
As was widely expected, Xi Jinping will continue his third five-year term as leader.
The lists with new member names went trending on Chinese social media. On Weibo alone, the hashtag “20th Central Committee Members List” (#二十届中央委员会委员名单#) received a staggering 580 million clicks within two days time. There were also other trending hashtags during the weekend of the closing session of the 20th Party Congress, such as “The Resumes of the New Politburo Standing Committee Members” (#新一届中央政治局常委简历#).
The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (中国共产党中央委员会) is, theoretically, the highest authority within the Party pyramid, and its members (generally 170-205 full members) are nominally elected every five years by the National Party Congress. It is the primary authority of the Central Committee to elect the Politburo (中国共产党中央政治局), which actually is the top decision-making body in the Party (21-25 members).
Among the members of the Politburo are those of the Standing Committee (中国共产党中央政治局常务委员会), which basically is the core leadership of the Party (generally 5-11 members, including the Party General Secretary). This is the list of names that everyone has been mostly waiting to see this week.
Here, we will list the member names of China’s new 20th Central Committee, the Politburo, and its Standing Committee. We have put them in alphabetical order, based on the first letter of their written in pinyin, and have included all names in characters.
The 20th Central Committee (Full Members)
Noteworthy:
– The 19th Central Committee was composed of 204 full members (among them only 10 women), this 20th Central Committee list contains 205 full members and 11 of them are women.
– Nine of these members come from a minority ethnic group, including one Uyghur.
– Premier Li Keqiang and the head of the National People’s Congress, Li Zhanshu, the second- and third-highest ranking officials in the party, have not been included, neither have Wang Yang, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference chairman and Vice-Premier Han Zheng.
Abbreviations:
– CMC = Central Military Commission
– CPC = Communist Party of China
– CSSC = China State Shipbuilding Corporation
– PLA = People’s Liberation Army
(The 171 alternate members of the 20th Central Committee, who do not have voting rights, have not been listed here).
1. Bate’er 巴特尔 (Mongolian) (Vice Chairperson of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference)
2. Cai Jianjiang 蔡剑江 (Director of the Office of the Central Air Traffic Management Commission)
3. Cai Qi 蔡奇 (New Politburo Standing Committee member, Party Secretary of Beijing)
4. Chang Dingqiu 常丁求 (PLA General, Commander of PLA Air Force)
5. Chen Gang 陈刚 (Party Secretary of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions)
6. Chen Jining 陈吉宁 (New Politburo member, Deputy Party Secretary, Mayor of Beijing)
7. Chen Min’er 陈敏尔 (18th-20th Politburo member, Party Chief of Chongqing)
8. Chen Wenqing 陈文清 (New Politburo member, Ministry of State Security Minister, Party Secretary)
9. Chen Xiaojiang 陈小江 (Executive Deputy Head of the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee)
10. Chen Xu 陈旭 (female) (Deputy Head of the CPC United Front Work Department, Director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office)
11. Chen Yixin 陈一新 (Secretary-General of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission)
12. Cheng Lihua 程丽华 (female) (Deputy Secretary of Anhui Provincial Party Committee)
13. Ding Xuedong 丁学东 (Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China)
14. Ding Xuexiang 丁薛祥 (New Politburo Standing Committee member, a senior aide to Xi Jinping)
15. Dong Jun 董军 (PLA Admiral, Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy)
16. Erkin Tuniyaz 艾尔肯·吐尼亚孜 (Uyghur) (Chairman of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region)
17. Feng Fei 冯飞 (Governor of Hainan)
18. Fu Hua 傅华 (President of Xinhua News Agency)
19. Gao Xiang 高翔 (Vice President, Deputy Secretary of the Party core group of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
20. Gao Zhidan 高志丹 (Director of the State General Administration of Sports)
21. Gong Zheng 龚正 (Mayor and Deputy Communist Party Secretary of Shanghai Municipality)
22. Guo Puzheng 郭普校 (Political Commissar to the PLA Air Force)
23. Han Jun 韩俊 (Governor of Jilin Province)
24. Han Wenxiu 韩文秀 (Deputy Director, Research Office of the State Council)
25. Hao Peng 郝鹏 (Chairman and Party Committee Secretary of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission)
26. He Hongjun 何宏军 (PLA Lieutenant General)
27. He Junke 贺军科 (First Secretary of the Communist Youth League of China)
28. He Lifeng 何立峰 (New Politburo member, head of the National Development and Reform Commission)
29. He Rong (female) 贺荣 (Deputy Chief Justice, Executive Vice president of the Supreme People’s Court of China)
30. He Weidong 何卫东 (New Politburo member, Commander of the CMC’s Joint Command Centre)
31. Hou Jianguo 侯建国 (former President of the University of Science and Technology of China)
32. Hou Kai 侯凯 (Member of Standing Committee of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Auditor General of the National Audit Office)
33. Hu Changsheng 胡昌升 (Governor of Heilongjiang)
34. Hu Chunhua 胡春华 (former Politburo member, Vice Premier of the People’s Republic of China)
35. Hu Henghua 胡衡华 (Deputy Party Secretary and Mayor of Chongqing)
36. Hu Heping 胡和平 (Party Secretary of Ministry of Culture and Tourism)
37. Hu Yuting 胡玉亭 (Deputy Secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Committee)
38. Hu Zhongming 胡中明 (PLA Vice Admiral, Chief of Staff of the PLA Navy)
39. Huai Jinpeng 怀进鹏 (Party Secretary of the China Association for Science and Technology)
40. Huang Jianfa 黄建发 (Deputy Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee)
41. Huang Kunming 黄坤明 (19th/20th Politburo member, head of the CPC Publicity Department)
42. Huang Ming 黄铭 (PLA Lieutenant General, Chief of Staff of the PLA)
43. Huang Qiang 黄强 (Governor of Sichuan Province)
44. Huang Shouhong 黄守宏 (Director of the State Council Research Office)
45. Huang Xiaowei 黄晓薇 (female) (Party Decretary of the All-China Women’s Federation)
46. Jin Xiangjun 金湘军 (Deputy Mayor of Tianjin)
47. Jin Zhuanglong 金壮龙 (Minister of Industry and Information Technology)
48. Jing Junhai 景俊海 (Governor of Jilin)
49. Ju Qiansheng 巨乾生 (PLA General, Commander of the PLA Strategic Support Force)
50. Lan Fo’an 蓝佛安 (Governor of Shanxi)
51. Lan Tianli 蓝天立 (Zhuang ethnic group) (Chairman, Deputy Party Chief of Guangxi)
52. Lei Fanpei 雷凡培 (former Party Secretary, Chairman of CSSC)
53. Li Bingjun 李炳军 (Governor of Guizhou Province)
54. Li Fengbiao 李凤彪 (PLA General, Political commissar of the Western Theater Command)
55. Li Ganjie 李干杰 (New Politburo member, Party Secretary of Shandong)
56. Li Guoying 李国英 (Governor of Anhui province)
57. Li Hongzhong 李鸿忠 (also 19th/20th Politburo member, Tianjin Party Secretary)
58. Li Lecheng 李乐成 (Governor of Liaoning)
59. Li Qiang 李强 (New Politburo Standing Committee member, 19th/20th Politburo member and Party Secretary of Shanghai)
60. Li Qiaoming 李桥铭 (PLA General, former commander of the Northern Theater Command)
61. Li Shangfu 李尚福 (PLA General, Head of the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission)
62. Li Shulei 李书磊 (New Politburo member, Executive Deputy Head of the Publicity Department)
63. Li Wei 李伟 (former Director of the Development Research Center of the State Council)
64. Li Xi 李希 (New Politburo Standing Committee member, 19th/20th Politburo member and Party Secretary of Guangdong, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection)
65. Li Xiaohong 李晓红 (President of the Chinese Academy of Engineering)
66. Li Xiaoxin 李小新 (female) (Vice Minister of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee (ODCPC)
67. Li Yi 李屹 (Party branch Secretary, Vice president of China Federation of Literary and Art Circles)
68. Li Yifei 李邑飞 (Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region)
69. Li Yuchao 李玉超 (PLA General, Commander of PLA Rocket Force)
70. Liang Huiling 梁惠玲 (female) (Chair of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives)
71. Liang Yanshun 梁言顺 (Party Secretary of Ningxia)
72. Lin Wu 林武 (Party Secretary of Shanxi)
73. Lin Xiangyang 林向阳 (PLA General, Commander of Eastern Theater Command)
74. Liu Faqing 刘发庆 (PLA Lieutenant General, Secretary-General of National Defense Mobilization Commission)
75. Liu Guozhong 刘国中 (New Politburo Member, Party Secretary of Shaanxi)
76. Liu Haixing 刘海星 (Deputy Director in the Office of the National Security Commission)
77. Liu Jianchao 刘建超 (Director of the International Liaison Department of the CPC)
78. Liu Jinguo 刘金国 (Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection)
79. Liu Junchen 刘俊臣 (Deputy Secretary of Party Organs Working Committee)
80. Liu Ning 刘宁 (Party Secretary of Guangxi)
81. Liu Qingsong 刘青松 (PLA Admiral, Political Commissar of the Northern Theater Command)
82. Liu Wei 刘伟 (Chairman of the CPPCC Henan Committee)
83. Liu Xiaoming 刘小明 (former Ambassador of China to the United Kingdom)
84. Liu Zhenli 刘振立 (PLA General, Commander of the PLA Ground Force)
85. Lou Yangsheng 楼阳生 (Party Secretary of Henan Province)
86. Lu Hao 陆昊 (Party Branch Secretary of Development Research Center of the State Council)
87. Lu Zhiyuan 陆治原 (Deputy Secretary of Shandong Provincial Committee, Secretary of Qingdao Municipal Committee)
88. Luo Wen 罗文 (Head of China’s State General Administration for Market Regulation)
89. Ma Xiaowei马晓伟 (National Health Commission Director, Vice President of the Red Cross Society of China)
90. Ma Xingrui 马兴瑞 (New Politburo member, Xinjiang Party Secretary, former Guangdong governor)
91. Mao Weiming 毛伟明 (Governor of Hunan Province)
92. Meng Fanli 孟凡利 (Party Secretary of Shenzhen, Deputy Party Secretary of Guangdong)
93. Meng Xiangfeng 孟祥锋 (Executive Deputy Director of the General Office of CPC)
94. Miao Hua 苗华 (19th/20th CC, Admiral of the Chinese PLA Navy, Director of Political Work Department of Central Military Commission)
95. Ni Hong 倪虹 (Minister of Housing and Urban-Rural Development)
96. Ni Yuefeng 倪岳 峰 (Party Secretary of Hebei)
97. Nurlan Abelmanjen 努尔兰·阿不都满金 (Kazakh) (Chairman of the Xinjiang Regional Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference)
98. Pan Yue 潘岳 (Minister of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission)
99. Pei Jinjia 裴金佳 (Minister of Veterans Affairs)
100. Qi Yu 齐玉 (Secretary of the CPC Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
101. Qin Gang 秦刚 (Chinese Ambassador to the United States)
102. Qin Shutong 秦树桐 (PLA General, Political Commissar of the PLA Ground Force)
103. Qu Qingshan 曲青山 (President of the Institute of Party History and Literature of the Central Committee of CPC)
104. Ren Zhenhe 任振鹤 (Tujia ethnic group) (Governor of Gansu Province)
105. Shen Chunyao 沈春耀 (Chairperson of the Legislative Affairs Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress)
106. Shen Haixiong 慎海雄 (Propaganda Chief of Guangdong Province)
107. Shen Xiaoming 沈晓明 (former Governor of Hainan)
108. Shen Yiqing 谌贻琴 (female, Bai ethnic group) (Communist Party Secretary of Guizhou)
109. Shen Yueyue 沈跃跃 (female) (President of the All-China Women’s Federation)
110. Shi Taifeng 石泰峰 (New Politburo member, President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
111. Sun Jinlong 孙金龙 (Party Branch Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps)
112. Sun Shaocheng 孙绍骋 (Party Secretary of Inner Mongolia)
113. Tang Dengjie 唐登杰 (Minister of Civil Affairs)
114. Tang Renjian 唐仁健 (Governor of Gansu Province)
115. Tie Ning 铁凝 (female) (President of the China Writers Association)
116. Tong Jianming 童建明 (Grand Prosecutor and first Deputy Prosecutor General of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate)
117. Tuo Zhen 庹震 (President of the People’s Daily)
118. Wan Lijun 万立骏 (researcher, former President of the University of Science and Technology of China)
119. Wang Chunning 王春宁 (PLA General, Commander of the People’s Armed Police)
120. Wang Dongming 王东明 (Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee, Chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions)
121. Wang Guanghua 王广华 (Minister of Natural Resources)
122. Wang Haijiang (PLA General, Commander of Western Theater Command)
123. Wang Hao 王浩 (Governor of Zhejiang)
124. Wang Huning 王沪宁 (Politburo Standing Committee since 2017, 19th/20th Politburo member, First Secretary of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party)
125. Wang Junzheng 王君正 (Communist Party Secretary of Tibet)
126. Wang Kai 王凯 (Governor of Henan Province)
127. Wang Kai 王凯 (Lieutenant General of the PLA)
128. Wang Lixia 王莉霞 (female, Mongolian) (Deputy Party Chief, Party branch Secretary, Chairwoman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region)
129. Wang Menghui 王蒙徽 (Communist Party Secretary of Hubei)
130. Wang Ning 王宁 (Party Secretary of Yunnan)
131. Wang Peng 王鹏 (Vice President and Chief of Education of the People’s Liberation Army National Defence University)
132. Wang Qiang 王强 (PLA General, Commander of the North Sea Fleet)
133. Wang Qingxian 王清宪 (Governor of Anhui)
134. Wang Renhua 王仁华 (Vice Admiral of the PLA, Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Central Military Commission)
135. Wang Shouwen 王受文 (China International Trade Representative, Vice Minister of Commerce)
136. Wang Weizhong 王伟中 (Deputy Party Secretary, Governor of Guangdong)
137. Wang Wenquan 王文全 (Political Commissar of the Joint Logistics Support Unit of the Central Military Commission)
138. Wang Wentao 王文涛 (Minister of Commerce)
139. Wang Xiangxi 王祥喜 (Minister of Emergency Management)
140. Wang Xiaohong 王小洪 (Party Secretary, Minister of Public Security)
141. Wang Xiaohui 王晓晖 (Party Secretary of Sichuan)
142. Wang Xiubin 王秀斌 (PLA General, Commander of the Southern Theater Command)
143. Wang Yi 王毅 (New Politburo member, State Councillor and Foreign Minister)
144. Wang Yong 王勇 (Chinese State Councilor)
145. Wang Yubo 王予波 (Governor of Yunnan Province)
146. Wang Zhengpu 王正谱 (Governor of Hebei)
147. Wang Zhijun 王志军 (Vice Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology)
148. Wang Zhonglin 王忠林 (Governor of Hubei)
149. Wu Hansheng 吴汉圣 (Deputy Secretary of Work Committee of Central Government in charge of Daily Work)
150. Wu Xiaojun 吴晓军 (Governor of Qinghai)
151. Wu Yanan 吴亚男 (General of the PLA, Commander of the Central Theater Command)
152. Wu Zhenglong 吴政隆 (Secretary of Jiangsu)
153. Xi Jinping 习近平 (General Secretary of the Party, President PRC, Chairman of the Central Military Commission)
154. Xiao Jie 肖捷 (State Councilor, Secretary General of the State Council)
155. Xiao Pei 肖培 (Deputy Secretary of the CPC Committee for Discipline and Inspection)
156. Xie Chuntao 谢春涛 (Vice President of the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party)
157. Xin Changxing 信长星 (Party Secretary of Qinghai)
158. Xu Deqing 徐德清 (General of PLA, Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command)
159. Xu Kunlin 许昆林 (Governor of Jiangsu)
160. Xu Lin 徐麟 (Director of the National Radio and Television Administration)
161. Xu Qiling 徐起零 (General of the PLA)
162. Xu Qin 许勤 (Former Governor of Hebei)
163. Xu Xisheng 徐西盛 (Political Commissar of Southern Theater Command Air Force)
164. Xu Xueqiang 许学强 (General of the PLA, President of PLA National Defence University)
165. Xu Zhongbo 徐忠波 (PLA General, Political Commissar of PLA Army Rocket Force)
166. Yan Jinhai (Tibetan) (Chairman of Tibet Autonomous Region)
167. Yang Cheng 杨诚 (Lieutenant General of the PLA, Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Military District)
168. Yang Xuejun 杨学军 (President of the PLA Academy of Military Science)
169. Yang Zhiliang 杨志亮 (Vice Admiral of the PLA Navy, Political Commissar of the South Sea Fleet)
170. Ye Jianchun 叶建春 (Governor of Jiangxi)
171. Yi Huiman 易会满 (Head of the China Securities and Regulatory Commission)
172. Yi Lianhong 易炼红 (Party Secretary of Jiangxi)
173. Yin Hejun 阴和俊 (Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the Chinese Academy of Sciences)
174. Yin Hong 尹弘 (former Governor of Henan Province)
175. Yin Li 尹力 (New Politburo member / Communist Party Secretary of Fujian)
176. Yin Yong 殷勇 (Deputy Prosecutor-General of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate)
177. Ying Yong (deputy party chief of the municipality of Beijing and a former deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China)
178. Yu Jianhua 俞建华 (Head of the General Administration of Customs)
179. Yu Qingjiang 俞庆江 (Lieutenant General of the PLA Air Force, Chief of Staff of PLA)
180. Yuan Huazhi 袁华智 (Admiral and Political Commissar of the PLA)
181. Yuan Jiajun 袁家军 (New Politburo member, Zhejiang Party Secretary)
182. Zhang Gong 张工 (Mayor of Tianjin)
183. Zhang Guoqing 张国清 (New Politburo member, Party Secretary of Liaoning)
184. Zhang Hongbing 张红兵 (PLA Political Commissar)
185. Zhang Hongsen 张宏森 (Party Branch Secretary of China Writers Association)
186. Zhang Jun 张军 (Procurator-General of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate)
187. Zhang Lin 张林 (Head of the Logistic Support Department of the Central Military Commission)
188. Zhang Qingwei 张庆伟 (Secretary of Hunan, former Governor of Hebei)
189. Zhang Shengmin 张升民 (Secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission of PLA)
190. Zhang Youxia 张又侠 (19th/20th Politburo member, General in the PLA, second-ranked Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission)
191. Zhang Yupu 张雨浦 (Hui) (Chairman of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region)
192. Zhang Yuzhuo 张玉卓 (Party branch secretary of the China Association for Science and Technology)
193. Zhao Gang 赵刚 (Member Standing Committee of Zaozhuang Municipal Committee)
194. Zhao Leji 赵乐际 (Politburo member since 2012, secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, former Head of the CPC Organization Department)
195. Zhao Long 赵龙 (Governor of Fujian)
196. Zhao Xiaozhe 赵晓哲 (Vice Admiral of PLA and Director of Science and Technology Committee of the Central Military Commission)
197. Zhao Yide 赵一德 (Governor of Shaanxi, former Governor/Deputy Secretary of Hebei)
198. Zheng Shanjie 郑栅洁 (Governor/Deputy Party Secretary of Zhejiang and Party Secretary of Ningbo)
199. Zheng Xincong 郑新聪 (Director of Liaison Office in Macau, former Deputy Governor Fujian)
200. Zhong Shaojun 钟绍军 (aide of Xi Jinping, Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission of People’s Liberation Army)
201. Zhou Naixiang 周乃翔 (Governor of Shandong)
202. Zhou Qiang 周强 (Chief Justice and President of the Supreme People’s Court of China)
203. Zhou Zuyi 周祖翼 (Minister of Human Resources and Social Security)
204. Zhuang Rongwen 庄荣文 (Director of the Cyberspace Administration of China)
205. Zou Jiayi 邹加怡 (female) (Vice Minister of the Ministry of Finance)
20th Politburo Members
Noteworthy:
– For the first time in 25 years, there are no female members in this list.
1. Cai Qi 蔡奇 (New Politburo Standing Committee member, Party Secretary of Beijing)
2. Chen Jining 陈吉宁 (New Politburo member, Deputy Party Secretary and mayor of Beijing)
3. Chen Min’er 陈敏尔 (18th-20th Politburo member and party chief of Chongqing)
4. Chen Wenqing 陈文清 (New Politburo member, Ministry of State Security Minister&Party Secretary)
5. Ding Xuexiang 丁薛祥 (New Politburo Standing Committee member, a senior aide to Xi Jinping)
6. He Lifeng 何立峰 (New Politburo member, head of the National Development and Reform Commission)
7. He Weidong 何卫东 (New Politburo member, Commander of the CMC’s Joint Command Centre)
8. Huang Kunming 黄坤明 (19th/20th Politburo member, head of the CPC Publicity Department)
9. Li Ganjie 李干杰 (New Politburo member, Party Secretary of Shandong)
10. Li Hongzhong 李鸿忠 (also 19th/20th Politburo member, Tianjin Party Secretary)
11. Li Qiang 李强 (New Politburo Standing Committee member, 19th/20th Politburo member and Party Secretary of Shanghai)
12. Li Shulei 李书磊 (New Politburo member, Executive Deputy Head of the Publicity Department)
13. Li Xi 李希 (New Politburo Standing Committee member, 19th/20th Politburo member and Party Secretary of Guangdong, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection)
14. Liu Guozhong 刘国中 (New Politburo Member, Party Secretary of Shaanxi)
15. Ma Xingrui 马兴瑞 (New Politburo member, Xinjiang Party Secretary, former Guangdong governor)
16. Shi Taifeng 石泰峰 (New Politburo member, President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
17. Wang Huning 王沪宁 (Politburo Standing Committee since 2017, 19th/20th Politburo member, First Secretary of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party)
18. Wang Yi 王毅 (New Politburo member, State Councillor and Foreign Minister)
19. Xi Jinping 习近平 (General Secretary of the Party, President PRC, Chairman of the Central Military Commission)
20. Yin Li 尹力 (New Politburo member, Party Secretary of Fujian)
21. Yuan Jiajun 袁家军 (New Politburo member, Zhejiang Party Secretary)
22. Zhang Guoqing 张国清 (New Politburo member, Party Secretary of Liaoning)
23. Zhang Youxia 张又侠 (19th/20th Politburo member, General in the PLA, second-ranked Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission)
24. Zhao Leji 赵乐际 (Politburo member since 2012, secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, former Head of the CPC Organization Department)
20th Politburo Standing Committee
Noteworthy:
– Four of the members are new to the Standing Committee.
– Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, Wang Qishan, and Li Zhanshu are gone from the Standing Committee.
– No female members – there never have been in the Standing Committee.
1. Cai Qi 蔡奇 (New Politburo Standing Committee member, Party Secretary of Beijing)
2. Ding Xuexiang 丁薛祥 (New Politburo Standing Committee member, a senior aide to Xi Jinping)
3. Li Qiang 李强 (New Politburo Standing Committee member, 19th/20th Politburo member and Party Secretary of Shanghai)
4. Li Xi 李希 (New Politburo Standing Committee member, 19th/20th Politburo member and Party Secretary of Guangdong, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection)
5. Xi Jinping 习近平 (General Secretary of the Party, President PRC, Chairman of the Central Military Commission)
6. Wang Huning 王沪宁 (Politburo Standing Committee since 2017, 19th/20th Politburo member, First Secretary of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party)
7. Zhao Leji 赵乐际 (Politburo member since 2012, secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, former Head of the CPC Organization Department)
For more about the Party Congress, check our other articles here.
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By Manya Koetse
Sources (other sources linked to inside text)
Reuters. 2022. “Factbox: China’s new elite Communist Party leadership.” Reuters, Oct 23 https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-new-elite-communist-party-leadership-2022-10-23/ [Oct 23 2022].
Sullivan, Lawrence R. 2012. Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press. See page: 3-43, 208.
Saich, Tony. 2004. Governance and Politics of China. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. See page: 97.
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Manya Koetse is a sinologist, writer, and public speaker specializing in China’s social trends, digital culture, and online media ecosystems. She founded What’s on Weibo in 2013 and now runs the Eye on Digital China newsletter. Learn more at manyakoetse.com or follow her on X, Instagram, or LinkedIn.
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Is this the real life? Is this just fantasy? In the fast-growing world of China’s AI microdramas, even virtual actors can’t escape reality. As production companies turn them into idols, audiences are voicing discomfort, while the future for human actors looks increasingly uncertain.
– By Ruixin Zhang and Manya Koetse
For Chinese audiences, AI in film and television is nothing new. In the fall of 2023, the first fully AI digital performer in a Chinese domestic drama, the character Erzhuang (二壮) in I Am Nobody (异人之下) sparked debate on Chinese social media.
Some fans, due to Erzhuang’s convincing northeastern Chinese dialect and natural expressions, almost couldn’t believe she wasn’t a real actress.

Erzhuang in I Am Nobody (异人之下) in 2023.
But Erzhuang was just the beginning.
In 2024, China Mythology (中国神话) was promoted by state media as China’s first fully AI-produced short drama series.
A year later, In My Heart, You Are One of a Kind (在我心中,你是独一无二) premiered as Hong Kong’s very first AI-generated short drama, a youth campus romance that sparked further discussion about whether AI actors could actually replace human actors.

From the two AI dramas from 2024 and 2025: China Mythology and In My Heart, You Are One of a Kind.
Those discussions were reignited in late March of this year when Shanghai-based production company Yaoke Media (耀客传媒) introduced two newly signed AI actors, Qin Lingyue (秦凌岳) and Lin Xiyan (林汐颜), who’ll be starring in the fantasy short drama Qinling (秦岭).

Qin Lingyue (秦凌岳) and Lin Xiyan (林汐颜)
Unlike earlier AI figures in microdramas, this high-profile ‘signing’ marks a shift: the company plans to develop these characters as independent IPs, much like human actors. In other words, they are to attract fans both through their on-screen performances and their off-screen ‘personalities.’
Soon after, the two AI actors created their own social media accounts on Douyin and Xiaohongshu, and began cultivating a sense of authenticity and ‘liveness’ (活人感).

A real-looking social media profile.
But as these digital performers and real actors become harder to distinguish, audience discomfort is growing, too.
The Rise of AI Microdramas
In China’s microdrama market, AI is already playing a dominant role, with “AI dramas” (AI剧 or AI短剧) standing out as a distinct creative category within the broader industry.
Microdramas, also simply known as short dramas, have been around in China for at least a decade, but have become especially popular in recent years due to their vertical, ultra-short formats, designed for quick mobile viewing and easy ‘binge watching.’ Microdramas typically run for 60 to 100 episodes, but with each episode lasting just one to three minutes, an entire season can be watched in an hour or two.
That format also makes the industry particularly well-suited to AI. It is large, fast-moving, and often operates on limited budgets, with productions turning around quickly. In this environment, using AI-generated effects and AI actors simply makes sense. This is very different from traditional drama production, which typically involves longer timelines, higher budgets, well-known actors, and less room for experimentation.
“AI is no longer just an add-on in China’s drama sector—it is an integral part of the production process”
As a result, AI is no longer just an add-on in China’s short drama sector—it is becoming an integral part of the production process, with digital actors helping to improve efficiency and reduce costs. With the launch of Bytedance’s Seedance 2.0, production costs for AI-generated videos have dropped significantly, further boosting the growth of AI microdramas.
The scale of this shift is already clear: AI microdramas are now often outpacing live-action productions on trending charts. In 2025 alone, one Zhejiang-based production company (刚刚好影视) released 229 AI micro-dramas, generating over 513 million views.
According to Sixth Tone, short dramas featuring AI actors already represented approximately 40% of the top 100 animated short dramas in January 2026.
Turning AI Actors into Real Idols
With AI and microdramas entering a kind of symbiosis, virtual actors are no longer disposable, one-off creations. They are evolving into continuous, persona-driven figures, often designed to resemble real celebrities—much like “fandom-driven actors” (流量演员), whose core function is to monetize fan attachment and sell fantasies rather than just act.
According to Yaoke Media, their plans for Qin Lingyue and Lin Xiyan are similar to those of idol models: they are expected to interact with fans, appear in multiple productions, and eventually become monetizable assets through brand endorsements and image licensing.
This also means they will likely take on the full spectrum of idol labor, including promotional events, fan service, and carefully manufactured on-screen chemistry—sometimes even “queerbaiting” (卖腐). (There’s no perfect English equivalent, but the term refers to deliberately staging romantic interactions between two male characters aimed in particular at a female “danmei” fans or “rotten girls” audiences who like indulging in such fantasies.)
In one AI costume drama, behind-the-scenes clips showed the lead actor and actress “live-streaming” together, answering fan questions, and deliberately hyping up their on-screen chemistry.

“Behind the scenes” livestream screenshots by AI actors.
Such human-coded content is now increasingly becoming an important part of the AI microdrama industry.
Some of these online videos also show the supposed perspective of “fans” and “staff” watching the actors walk around or interacting with them, creating a simulated world that some netizens feel is pushing a sense of “realness,” with comments like: “Please don’t force AI to act so human-like.”
“AI actors featuring in AI dramas that are watched by AI audiences, it’s the perfect closed loop”
For the same AI costume drama, some clips even mimic the perspective of ‘fansite admins’ (站姐)—dedicated fan photographers who typically capture and share candid, off-stage footage of real stars.

In one vlog by a supposed prop assistant, she appears as an overworked but witty crew member, taking viewers around the set, chatting with the leads, buying them coffee, and even stepping in as an extra.

“Behind the scenes” of an AI microdrama.
These glimpses of everyday, behind-the-scenes life all feel oddly real, but everything is AI-generated: the actors, the sets, the audience interactions, the staff, even the paparazzi (see example videos here and here).
For ordinary audiences, it is striking how deeply AI has already penetrated the film & television industry. Beyond criticisms of stiff expressions and rigid aesthetics, many netizens describe the new phenomenon as “uncanny” or “just too real😨.”
With AI actors now realistic enough to pass as human at a glance, but with small details like emotional expression still being off, that gap between being almost human but not quite creates a sense of discomfort among viewers, who dub these AI actors ‘stuffed monsters’ (缝合怪) or ‘stitched-together corpses’ (尸块).
More than the actors, it’s the entire ecosystem around them that makes us believe we’re watching “candid moments” of something that is not even alive. Screenwriter Wang Hailin (汪海林) was sarcastically commented on Weibo: “AI actors featuring in AI dramas that are watched by AI audiences 👍, it’s a perfect closed loop.”
‘Borrowing’ Facial Features
Besides the simulated “aliveness” of digital performers, another controversial issue surrounding the recent rise of China’s AI actors is whether these creations infringe on portrait rights. Since the debut of Qin Lingyue and Lin Xiyan, these AI figures have been criticized for appearing to use facial features from multiple real actors.
As online discussions intensify, more AI actors in microdramas have been found to resemble real celebrities. Fans of beloved Chinese celebrities such as Dilraba Dilmurat (迪丽热巴) and Xiao Zhan (肖战) have taken to Weibo to protest this kind of “face swapping” (AI换脸) and demand protection of their idols’ likenesses.

An “AI face swap” (AI换脸): an AI actor on the left, Xiao Zhan on the right.
Yaoke responded that these images were “derived from massive datasets on the internet” and did not replicate any specific individual’s features.
This only fueled further backlash. To many, the use of “massive data” suggests that anyone, celebrity or ordinary person, could potentially have their image appropriated.
“The vlogger discovered the face swap infringement after a friend recognized his face while watching the AI drama”
In related recent trending news, a Chinese content creator (白菜汉服妆造), who typically wears traditional Chinese clothing in his videos, accused Hongguo (红果短剧), ByteDance’s short drama platform, of using his likeness without authorization to create a greedy villain in the AI-generated drama Taohua Zan (桃花簪).

On the left: greedy villain in the AI-generated drama Taohua Zan. On the right: Chinese content creator (白菜汉服妆造).
The vlogger discovered the face swap infringement after a friend recognized his face while watching the drama. The series was later taken offline.
One problem is that legal frameworks around AI lag behind technological development: by the time victims try to fight back legally, the technology has already moved on, making enforcement almost impossible.
Better Than the Real Thing?
Despite the backlash against the AI-fication of China’s short drama industry, some netizens are more optimistic about its development.
One blogger recently noted that as many people have already formed near friendship-like emotional dependencies on chatbots like ChatGPT—initially seen as cold technological tools—it is entirely possible that audiences will also develop genuine attachment to AI actors.
Current limitations that still make AI actors feel stiff, such as robotic voices or unnatural expressions, will likely diminish as the technology continues to improve.
Some call binging on AI short dramas their “guilty pleasure,” just to watch the AI actors perform. As one Weibo user wrote: “The female characters are just so beautiful—seriously, unbelievably beautiful. And they’re becoming more and more realistic: their facial expressions, especially the way their mouths move, are incredibly precise. Even the makeup looks stylish, and the hair feels very real. I honestly find myself wondering what eyeshadow and mascara they’re using.”
But support for AI performers in China’s drama industry is not limited to guilty pleasures and tech enthusiasts. For some, it also reflects a broader weariness with the perceived lack of quality among human actors.
“If the performances of real actors are already no better than AI, why not use AI actors instead?”
China’s film and television industry’s strong focus on fandom culture and good-looking idols, combined with limited budgets and a lack of formal training, has produced a wave of actors who are widely criticized for poor acting and a lack of professionalism. They are also frequently caught up in controversies, from refusing to memorize lines to relying heavily on green-screen acting.
These criticisms intensified during the 2021 major scandal involving former drama actress Zheng Shuang (郑爽), who had long faced criticism over her acting. A leaked recording at the time revealed she was earning a staggering 2.08 million RMB per day (roughly $320,000 then). Since then, “2.08 million” (208万) has become a derogatory label for fandom-driven actors who get high pays despite low-quality performances.
Amid weak acting and a distorted pay structure, many viewers have been calling for change. A common sentiment is: if their performances are already no better than AI, why not use AI actors, and give real actors a sense of crisis?
From Cancel Culture to AI Actors
But will the use of AI actors actually push the industry to improve human actors, or simply replace them?
Some Chinese industry insiders remain optimistic, arguing that AI can never fully replicate the nuance of human emotion. Among those who have spoken out are A-list actors such as Zhang Ruoyun (张若昀) and Feng Yuanzheng (冯远征), president of the Beijing People’s Art Theatre.
Others, however, are less optimistic.
“China’s “cancel culture” will eventually make AI actors an increasingly attractive bet for industry investors”
Agan Jackie (阿甘Jackie), a streamer working in the film industry, pointed out in a recent podcast that China’s “cancel culture” will eventually make AI actors an increasingly attractive bet for industry investors.
Although there’s “cancel culture” in the Western entertainment industry as well, the moral bar for Chinese celebrities is exceptionally high: anything from tax evasion to littering, simply being rude to fans could destroy an actor’s commercial value. The superstar Fan Bingbing (范冰冰), for example, disappeared from public view after a tax evasion scandal. Even after repaying her debts, she is still effectively banned from mainland productions.
China’s cancel culture is also closely tied to political red lines. One remark or move – intended or not – could end a career overnight. Zhang Zhehan (张哲瀚), an actor who quickly rose to fame a few years ago, vanished from the industry after photos surfaced of him posing near the Japanese Yasukuni Shrine.
For production companies and streaming platforms, such unpredictability creates a high-investment, high-risk environment. “Scandal-proof” AI actors offer a low-risk substitute.
This perhaps also plays a major role in why major streaming platforms such as Tencent and iQiyi are now promoting or encouraging the use of AI actors through AI feature film experiments, with the first fully AI-generated commercial blockbusters expected to be released later this year.
A Glimpse into the Future
At the recent China TV Drama Production Industry Conference, it became clear that the industry is undergoing something of an earthquake, with major changes ahead: while top actors will continue to function as traffic drivers, demand for human actors is expected to decline, and much of the mid- and lower-tier acting segment (such as extras and body doubles, but also voice actors) could largely disappear as it becomes replaceable by AI.
The microdrama industry, already heavily infiltrated by AI, offers a glimpse of the future of the broader TV and film industry when it comes to digital performers.
Microdrama actress Zhou Ye (周野) recently said that her pay has been slashed by 50% since AI-driven microdramas flooded the market, leaving many more actors jobless. For the 140,000 registered extras at Hengdian World Studios, China’s largest filming base, these developments could have far-reaching consequences.
Sometimes, these actors even sign away their fate—quite literally—as some companies now require “AI authorization” clauses as a condition of employment, effectively selling their digital likeness just to get a job. Companies can then create AI actors based on real individuals. Chinese talent management company Yuxiao Media (聿潇传媒) has introduced six such AI actors, directly modeled on real performers.
“The microdrama industry, already heavily infiltrated by AI, offers a glimpse of the future of the broader TV and film industry when it comes to digital performers”
One of these, influencer Han Anran (韩安冉), openly stated during a livestream that she had sold her likeness rights for AI creation. Playing into public criticism of her acting and heavily altered appearance, she said this was the best way to monetize her image. She even wondered that if her AI doppelganger were ever to win an award, whether she or the AI should go on stage to accept it.

Han Anran (韩安冉) on the left and the AI actress modeled after her on the right.
Perhaps nobody likes to see ordinary actors’ livelihoods being taken over by AI. But despite concerns about shrinking job opportunities, China is unlikely to see Hollywood-like strikes, as it lacks unions or organizations comparable to SAG-AFTRA or the AFL-CIO, which focus on labor representation beyond awards and industry guidelines.
For now, the only collective pushback against the full “AI-fication” of the industry comes from Chinese netizens themselves: boycotting platforms and production companies using AI actors, and voting with their views. Ultimately, only when public demand for realness becomes strong enough to threaten profits—or when laws finally catch up—will there be a sense of security for the people behind the screen—the real ones.
By Ruixin Zhang, with editing and additional context by Manya Koetse
©2026 Eye on Digital China/Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.
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Hasan Piker’s China Trip & the Unexpected Journey of a Chinese School Uniform to Angola
Hasan Piker’s controversial China tour, a Chinese school uniform resurfaces in Africa, a new winter hotspot, why Chinese elites ‘run’ to Tokyo, and more.
Published
6 months agoon
November 21, 2025
🌊 Signals — Week 47 (2025)
Part of Eye on Digital China, Signals highlights slower trends and online currents behind the daily scroll. This edition was sent to paid subscribers — subscribe to receive the next issue in your inbox.
Welcome to another edition of Eye on Digital China. Different from the China Trend Watch (check the latest one here if you missed it), this edition, part of the new Signals series, is about the slower side of China’s social media: the recurring themes and underlying shifts that signal broader trends beyond the quick daily headlines. Together with the deeper dives, the three combined aim to give you clear updates and a fuller overview of what’s happening in China’s online conversations & digital spaces.
For the coming two weeks, I’ll be traveling from Beijing to Chongqing and beyond (more on that soon) so please bear with me if my posting frequency dips a little. I’ll be sure to pick it up again soon and will do my best to keep you updated along the way. In the meantime, if you know of a must-try hotpot in Chongqing, please do let me know.
In this newsletter: Hasan Piker’s controversial China tour, a Chinese school uniform in Angola, a new winter hotspot, discussions on what happens to your Wechat after you die, why Chinese elites rùn to Tokyo, and more. Let’s dive in.
- 💰 The richest woman in China, according to the latest list by Hurun Research Institute, is the “queen of pharmaceuticals” Zhong Huijuan (钟慧娟) who has accumulated 141 billion yuan (over 19 billion USD). Women account for over 22% of Chinese billionaires (those with more than 5 billion RMB), underscoring China’s globally leading position in producing wealthy female entrepreneurs.
- 🧩 What happens to your WeChat after you die? A user who registered for NetEase Music with a newly reassigned phone number unexpectedly gained access to the late singer Coco Lee’s (李玟) account, as the number had originally belonged to her. The incident has reignited debate over how digital accounts should be handled after death, prompting platforms like NetEase and Tencent to reconsider policies on long-inactive accounts and take stronger measures to protect them.
- 📱 Although millions of viewers swoon over micro-dramas with fantasy storylines where rich, powerful men win over the “girl next door” through money and status, Chinese regulators are now stepping in to curb exaggerated plots featuring the so-called “dominant CEO” (霸道总裁) archetype, signaling stricter oversight for the booming short drama market.
- ☕ A popular Beijing coffee chain calling itself “People’s Cafe” (人民咖啡馆), with its style and logo evoking nationalist visual nostalgia, has changed its name after facing criticism for building its brand – including pricey coffee and merchandise – on Mao era and state-media political connotations. The cafe is now ‘Yachao People’s Cafe’ (要潮人民咖啡馆).
- 👀 Parents were recently shocked to see erotic ads appear on the Chinese nursery rhymes and children’s learning app BabyBus (宝宝巴士), which is meant for kids ages 0–8. BabyBus has since apologized, but the incident has sparked discussions about how to keep children safe from such content.
- 🧧The 2026 holiday schedule has continued to be a big topic of conversation as it includes a 9-day long Spring Festival break (from February 15 to February 23), making it the longest Lunar New Year holiday on record. The move not only gives people more time for family reunions, but also gives a huge boost to the domestic travel industry.
Hasan Piker’s Chinese Tour & The US–China Content Honeymoon

Livestreamer Hasan Piker during his visit to Tiananmen Square flag-rising ceremony.
It’s not time for the end-of-year overviews just yet – but I’ll already say that 2025 was the US–China ‘honeymoon’ year for content creation. It’s when China became “cool,” appealing, and eye-grabbing for young Western social media users, particularly Americans. The recent China trip of the prominent American online streamer Hasan Piker fits into that context.
This left-wing political commentator also known as ‘HasanAbi’ (3 million followers on Twitch, recently profiled by the New York Times) arrived in China for a two-week trip on November 11.

Piker screenshot from the interview with CGTN, published on CGTN.
His visit has been controversial on English-language social media, especially because Piker, known for his criticism of America (which he calls imperialist), has been overly praising China: calling himself “full Chinese,” waving the Chinese flag, joining state media outlet CGTN for an interview on China and the US, and gloating over a first-edition copy of Quotations from Chairman Mao (the Little Red Book). He portrays China as heavily misrepresented in the West and as a country the United States should learn from.

Hasan Piker did an interview with CGTN, posing with Li Jingjing 李菁菁.
During his livestreaming tour, Hasan, who is nicknamed “lemonbro” (柠檬哥) by Chinese netizens, also joined Chinese platforms Bilibili and Xiaohongshu.
But despite all the talk about Piker in the American online media sphere, online conversations, clicks, and views within China are underwhelming. As of now, he has around 24,000 followers on Bilibili, and he’s barely a topic of conversation on mainstream feeds.
Piker’s visit stands in stark contrast to that of American YouTuber IShowSpeed (Darren Watkins), who toured China in March. With lengthy livestreams from Beijing to Chongqing, his popularity exploded in China, where he came to be seen by many as a representative of cultural diplomacy.

IShowspeed in China, March 2025.
IShowSpeed’s success followed another peak moment in online US–China cultural exchange. In January 2025, waves of foreign TikTok users and popular creators migrated to the Chinese lifestyle app Xiaohongshu amid the looming TikTok ban.
Initially, the mass migration of American users to Xiaohongshu was a symbolic protest against Trump and US policies. In a playful act of political defiance, they downloaded Xiaohongshu to show they weren’t scared of government warnings about Chinese data collection. (For clarity: while TikTok is a made-in-China app, it is not accessible inside mainland China, where Douyin is the domestic version run by the same parent company).
The influx of foreigners — who were quickly nicknamed “TikTok refugees” — soon turned into a moment of cultural celebration. As American creators introduced themselves, Chinese users welcomed them warmly, eager to practice English and teach newcomers how to navigate the app. Discussions about language, culture, and societal differences flourished. Before long, “TikTok refugees” and “Xiaohongshu natives” were collaborating on homework assignments, swapping recipes, and bonding through humor. It was a rare moment of social media doing what we hope it can do: connect people, build bridges, and replace prejudice with curiosity.
Some of that same enthusiasm was also visible during IShowSpeed’s China tour. Despite the tour inevitably getting entangled with political and commercial interests, much of it was simply about an American boy swept up in the high energy of China’s vibrant cities and everything they offer.
Different from IShowSpeed, who is known for his meme-worthy online presence, Piker is primarily known for his radical political views. His China enthusiasm feels driven less by cultural curiosity and more by his critique of America.
Because of his stances — such as describing the US as a police state — it’s easy for Western critics to accuse him of hypocrisy in praising China, especially after a brief run-in with security police while livestreaming at Tiananmen Square.
Seen in broader context, Piker’s China trip reflects a shift in how China is used in American online discourse.
Before, it was Chinese ‘public intellectuals’ (公知) who praised the US as a ‘lighthouse country’ (灯塔国), a beacon of democracy, to indirectly critique China and promote a Western modernization model. Later, Chinese online influencers showcased their lives abroad to emphasize how much ‘brighter the moon’ was outside China.
In the post-Covid years, the current reversed: Western content creators, from TikTok influencers to political commentators, increasingly use China to make arguments that are fundamentally about America.
Between these cycles, authentic cultural curiosity gets pushed to the sidelines. The TikTok-refugee moment in early January may have been the closest we’ve come in years: a brief window where Chinese and American users met each other with curiosity, camaraderie, and creativity.
Hasan’s tour, in contrast, reflects a newer phase, one where China is increasingly used as a stage for Western political identity rather than a complex and diverse country to understand on its own terms. I think the honeymoon phase is over.
“Liu Sihan, Your School Uniform Ended Up in Angola”: China’s Second-Hand Clothing in Africa

A Chinese school uniform went viral after a Chinese social media user spotted it in Angola.
“Liu Sihan, your schooluniform is hot in Africa” (刘思涵你的校服在非洲火了) is a sentence that unexpectedly trended after a Chinese blogger named Xiao Le (小乐) shared a video of a schoolkid in Angola wearing a Chinese second-hand uniform from Qingdao Xushuilu Primary School, that had the nametag Liu Sihan on it.
The topic sparked discussions about what actually happens to clothing after it’s donated, and many people were surprised to learn how widely Chinese discarded clothing circulates in parts of Africa.
Liu Sihan’s mother, whose daughter is now a 9th grader in Qingdao, had previously donated the uniform to a community clothing donation box (社区旧衣回收箱) after Liu outgrew it. She intended it to help someone in need, never imagining it to travel all the way to Africa.
In light of this story, one netizen shared a video showing a local African market selling all kinds of Chinese school items, including backpacks, and people wearing clothing once belonging to workers for Chinese delivery platforms. “In Africa, you can see school uniforms from all parts of China, and even Meituan and Eleme outfits,” one blogger wrote.
When it comes to second-hand clothing trade, we know much more about Europe–Africa and US–Africa flows than about Chinese exports, and it seems there haven’t been many studies on this specific topic yet. Still, alongside China’s rapid economic transformations, the rise of fast fashion, and the fact that China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of textiles, the country now has an enormous abundance of second-hand clothing.
According to a 2023 study by Wu et al. (link), China still has a long way to go in sustainable clothing disposal. Around 40% of Chinese consumers either keep unwanted clothes at home or throw them away.
But there may be a shift underway. Donation options are expanding quickly, from government bins to brand programs, and from second-hand stores to online platforms that offer at-home pickup.

Chinese social media users posting images of school/work uniforms from China worn by Africans.
As awareness grows around the benefits of donating clothing (reducing waste, supporting sustainability, and the emotional satisfaction of giving), donation rates may rise significantly. The story of Liu Sihan’s uniform, which many found amusing, might even encourage more people to donate. And if that happens, scenes of African children (and adults) wearing Chinese-donated clothes may become much more common than they now are.
Laojunshan: New Hotspot in Cold Winter

Images from Xiaohongshu, 背包里的星子, 旅行定制师小漾
Go to Zibo for BBQ, go to Tianshui for malatang, go to Harbin for the Ice Festival, cycle to Kaifeng for soup dumplings, or head to Dunhuang to ride a camel — over recent years, a number of Chinese domestic destinations have turned into viral hotspots, boosted by online marketing initiatives and Xiaohongshu influencers.
This year, Laojunshan is among the places climbing the trending lists as a must-visit spot for its spectacular snow-covered landscapes that remind many of classical Chinese paintings. Laojunshan (老君山), a scenic mountain in Henan Province, is attracting more domestic tourists for winter excursions.
Xiaohongshu is filled with travel tips: how to get there from Luoyang station (by bus), and the best times of day to catch the snow in perfect light (7–9 AM or around 6–6:30 PM).
With Laojunshan, we see a familiar pattern: local tourism bureaus, state media, and influencers collectively driving new waves of visitors to the area, bringing crucial revenue to local industries during what would otherwise be slower winter months.
WeChat New Features & Hong Kong Police on Douyin
🟦 WeChat has been gradually rolling out a new feature that allows users to recall a batch of messages all at once, which saves you the frantic effort of deleting each message individually after realizing you sent them to the wrong group (or just regret a late-night rant). Many users are welcoming the update, along with another feature that lets you delete a contact without wiping the entire chat history. This is useful for anyone who wants to preserve evidence of what happened before cutting ties.

🟦The Hong Kong Police Force recently celebrated its two-year anniversary on Douyin (the Chinese version of TikTok), having accumulated nearly 5 million followers during that time. To mark the occasion, they invited actor Simon Yam to record a commemorative video for their channel (@香港警察). The presence of the Hong Kong Police on the Chinese app — and the approachable, meme-friendly way they’ve chosen to engage with younger mainland audiences — is yet another signal of Hong Kong institutions’ strategic alignment with mainland China’s digital infrastructure, a shift that has been gradually taking place. The anniversary video proved popular on Douyin, attracting thousands of likes and comments.
Why Chinese Elite Rùn to Japan (by ChinaTalk)

Over the past week, Japan has been trending every single day on Chinese social media in light of escalating bilateral tensions after Japanese PM Takaichi made remarks about Taiwan that China views as a direct military threat. The diplomatic freeze is triggering all kinds of trends, from rising anti-Japanese sentiment online and a ban on Japanese seafood imports to Chinese authorities warning citizens not to travel to Japan.
You’d think Chinese people would want to be anywhere but Japan right now — but the reality is far more nuanced.
In a recent feature in ChinaTalk, Jordan Schneider interviewed Japanese journalist & researcher Takehiro Masutomo (舛友雄大) who has just published a book about Japan’s new Chinese diaspora, explaining what draws Chinese dissidents, intellectuals, billionaires, and middle-class families to Tokyo.
The book is titled Run Ri: 潤日 Following the Footsteps of Elite Chinese Escaping to Japan (only available in Japanese and Traditional Chinese for now). (The word Rùn 润/潤, by the way, is Chinese online slang and meme expresses the desire to escape the country.)
A very interesting read on how Chinese communities are settling in Japan, a place they see as freer than Hong Kong and safer than the U.S., and one they’re surprisingly optimistic about — even more so than the Japanese themselves.
Thanks for reading this Eye on Digital China Signals. For fast-moving trends and deeper dives, keep an eye on the upcoming newsletters.
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Many thanks to Miranda Barnes for helping curate some of the topics in this edition.
— Manya
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