The Social Media Spectacle of China’s Taiwan Military Exercises
The PLA also released a music video featuring the Taiwan military exercises, singing: “We vow to defend every river and mountain within our motherland.”
The social media spectacle surrounding the Taiwan military exercises is by no means a one-dimensional media effort, but a dynamic one where state-led propaganda and grassroots nationalism meet.
This article by Manya Koetse was commissioned and published by Lowy Institute, visit The Interpreterhere.
“The Old Witch has landed” was a much recurring phrase on Chinese social media on 2 August 2022. The so-called “Old Witch” was US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and for the entire day, anyone who was online was closely following the latest developments regarding her potential visit to Taiwan.
Up to the moment the plane touched down, Chinese bloggers and political commentators came up with different prediction scenarios as to whether Pelosi would really arrive in Taipei, how Chinese military would respond, and what such a visit might mean at a time of already strained US-China relations.
Shortly after Pelosi arrived, online livestreams covering the event stopped, and the local servers for China’s leading social media platform Weibo temporarily went down. The sense of anticipation that had dominated Weibo turned into sudden anger and frustration.
Chinese officials had repeatedly warned that China would not “sit idly by” if Pelosi would visit. One of China’s top political commentators, Hu Xijin, had even suggested that if US fighter jets would escort Pelosi’s plane into Taiwan, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would have the right to forcibly dispel or even shoot down Pelosi’s plane and the jets. Yet nothing had prevented Pelosi and her team from safely arriving in Taiwan. “Even our community guard who makes 1500 [$220] a month does a better job; if he says you can’t come in, you can’t come in,” one Weibo user wrote.
But sentiments shifted on 3 August when China’s propaganda machine started running at full speed. Chinese state media suggested that Pelosi’s visit was a strategic act by the US to meddle in Chinese internal affairs and heighten cross-strait tensions.
State broadcaster CCTV called the move a “road to ruin” and published an online post showing the characters for “China” with the middle stroke of the first character representing the number one. “In this world, there is only one China,” the slogan says. “The Motherland must be reunited, and it inevitably will be reunited,” the Chinese Communist Party-aligned newspaper People’s Dailywrote on Weibo.
CCTV posters declare: “In this world there is only one China”, with the last character 国 [meaning “nation”] incorporating the leaf-shaped island of Taiwan (Weibo).
A Chinese government white paper published this month also reiterates that Taiwan is indisputably a part of China and that “complete” reunification will be realised regardless of any attempts by “separatist forces” to prevent it.
A VISUAL BATTLEFIELD
A new wave of national pride and expressions of nationalism flooded social media after China announced countermeasures in response to Pelosi’s visit and began live-fire military drills around Taiwan.
“It’s begun!” People’s Dailyannounced on 4 August, posting an image with the slogan: “Seize the momentum to ‘surround.’” The move was applauded, with more than 115,000 likes on the post, many expressing pride in China’s “strikeback.” A typical comment said: “I believe in our motherland, I support our motherland.”
People’s Daily post on Weibo.
Various official military accounts, such as that of the Eastern Theatre Command (one of the five theatre commands of the PLA), frequently post action-packed short videos featuring cinematic music, Chinese military staff preparing for action, and military aircraft and vessels conducting exercises around the island of Taiwan.
Although the most recent military exercises were initially intended to continue until 7 August, China’s military announced new exercises around Taiwan on 8 August, followed by another round after a second US delegation visited Taiwan on 15 August.
Various official military accounts frequently post short videos featuring Chinese military preparing for action and conducting exercises around the island of Taiwan (Weibo).
Over the past two weeks, Chinese social media have become a visual battlefield. Dramatic spectacles disseminated by the government are instrumental in winning the hearts and minds of the Chinese people, while also being used as a symbol of power to intimidate so-called “separatist forces” and show off China’s military rise to the international community.
In The Camera at War, Mette Mortensen, who researches media and conflict, argues that digital visual culture has become increasingly relevant as a part of warfare, not just for recording unfolding events, but as a forceful weapon to guide public opinion and affect political debate.
The spectacle surrounding the Taiwan military exercises is by no means a one-dimensional media effort, but instead a dynamic one where state-led propaganda and grassroots nationalism meet. From TikTok to Weibo, China’s state media channels, official accounts, military bloggers, online influencers and regular online citizens engage in a collective effort to record, edit, dramatise and share the sometimes movie-like videos showing large-scale military exercises, including live-fire drills, naval deployments and ballistic missile launches.
From Fujian’s Pingtan Island, one of mainland China’s closest points to Taiwan, residents and tourists post videos of their front-row perspective of projectiles launched by the Chinese military and helicopters flying past. “I’m jealous of their view!” Chinese online users responded, with many sharing the “stunning scenes” of large-scale exercises that could be seen from the island.
This week, the Eastern Theatre Command also released a music video showing bursts of military drills, including the firing of missiles, while men sing: “Just waiting to be summoned … towards victory, no surrender, we vow to defend every river and mountain within our motherland.” (See fragment of video and other examples in Twitter thread below.)
China's military drills around Taiwan are a Chinese social media 'spectacle', besides raw footage there are also edited videos with cinematic music flying all around Weibo. Some by state media, also many by netizens. pic.twitter.com/xAypkhg6lB
Among hundreds of comments, there are many patriotic posters hoping that the developments will become more than mere spectacle: “We’re fired up,” one popular Weibo comment said: “Sooner or later, we’ll reunify.”
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Manya Koetse is the founder and editor-in-chief of whatsonweibo.com. She is a writer, public speaker, and researcher (Sinologist, MPhil) on social trends, digital developments, and new media in an ever-changing China, with a focus on Chinese society, pop culture, and gender issues. She shares her love for hotpot on hotpotambassador.com. Contact at manya@whatsonweibo.com, or follow on Twitter.
The Dutch general elections on Tuesday, 22 November 2022, resulted in a victory for the right-wing Freedom Party (PVV). The party, established in 2006, is led by the 60-year-old Dutch politician Geert Wilders who is known for his outspoken populist rhetoric and anti-establishment sentiments.
On Chinese social media, the Dutch election outcome became a topic discussed by some well-known bloggers.
The PVV secured 37 of the 150 seats in the Second Chamber, making it the largest party by a significant margin, followed by the left-wing Groen Links-PvdA (25 seats), center-right liberal VVD (24), and the brand-new centrist party NSC (20). The remaining seats were distributed among eleven other parties, each claiming between 9 and 1 seat in the Second Chamber.
Wilders’ triumph garnered international attention. As reported in 2017, the PVV’s popularity had been steadily increasing for years, drawing particular notice in Chinese media and other international publications in the wake of Trump’s victory and Brexit.
Dutch politician Wilders, referred to as Wéi’ěrdésī (维尔德斯 or 威尔德斯) in Chinese, became a recurring subject in Chinese media, with his success viewed as a harbinger for other elections across Continental Europe.
Wilders and his PVV are known for their strong anti-Islam stance, Euroskepticism, aspirations to significantly limit immigration, and populist commitment to “put the Dutch first.”
On Weibo, the well-known Chinese political commentator Hu Xijin (@胡锡进) wrote a column about Wilders’ win on November 23. Here’s a translation of Hu’s post:
“It shocked Europe, it shocked the West! The Freedom Party led by Wilders, the ‘Dutch version of Trump,’ received the most votes on Wednesday. His slogans and labels are anti-immigrant, anti-Europe, anti-Islam. The leader of the French extreme right-wing political party Le Pen immediately extended his congratulations through social media.”
“The results of the Dutch elections again show that xenophobic and intolerant political retrogressions are like cancer cells spreading across Europe and the West. However, the far-right line will not become the overwhelming new political choice in the West, as many Western societies are painfully going from side to side. Wilders also proposes that the Netherlands should stop providing weapons to the Ukraine, which goes against the mainstream European line. This is something that should be quite popular among Chinese.”
“It’s not clear yet if Wilders will actually become the premier of the Netherlands. Although his party received the most votes he only took about 37 seats of the 150 seats in the Dutch House of Representatives and will need to form a coalition government. Because it’s an extreme rightwing party, whether or not he will be able to pull allies in is hard to say. If Wilders fails, the Netherlands will not rule out a minority government.”
“Regardless, the victory of the Freedom Party is a heavy blow to Europe. There are concerns that it will become a model, that it will boost the rise of other extreme right-wing parties on the stage. In short, the West is becoming more and more chaotic and is becoming more lost.”
On Weibo, Hu Xijin’s post about Wilders received hundreds of replies, but many netizens did not agree with his stance on the victory of the Dutch right-wing party.
“You don’t represent the Chinese people,” one commenter wrote: “You just represent yourself. Don’t overstep your boundaries.”
“You’re actually so leftist underneath,” another reply said.
“Why did we witness a UK ‘Trump,’ a Brazilian ‘Trump,’ an Argentinian ‘Trump,’ a Dutch ‘Trump’?”
Among the numerous comments below Hu’s post, quite a few expressed sympathy for the populist stance advocated by PVV and Wilders. One popular comment reads, “Anti-immigration, anti-EU, anti-Islamic—sounds about right?” “Europe is waking up.”
Another person commented: “Over the past couple of years, the population of Muslim immigrants in Europe and the United States has been rapidly expanding, bringing about serious social problems when it comes to public security, employment, fertility rates, and religious beliefs etc., which has since long been a source of distress for the local population.”
Apart from Hu’s post, Chinese netizens elsewhere on Weibo have also placed Wilders’ victory in a broader geopolitical context. Blogger Xiaosunchu (@小笋初) writes, “Why did America have Trump? Why did we witness a UK ‘Trump,’ a Brazilian ‘Trump,’ an Argentinian ‘Trump,’ a Dutch ‘Trump,’ and so on – all these non-traditional, anti-establishment ‘crazy’ candidates?”
According to Xiaochunchu, the election of these kinds of political figures is a result of a so-called ‘democratic illusion’ (“民主幻觉”) in the West, in which voters are perpetually disappointed in politicians as they end up getting “a different broth but the same old medicine” (“换汤不换药”): the names may change, but the system does not, leading voters to blame themselves for picking the wrong candidates when, in reality, it’s actually deep-rooted political structures that prevent actual change from happening.
Regardless of whether others agree with Xiaochunchu’s idea that voters’ preference for unconventional political figures is linked to a ‘democratic illusion,’ many do acknowledge that ‘Trump-style’ politics represents a broader political trend that began with the election of Donald Trump in 2016.
Other bloggers called the election of different ‘Trumps’ a “new change in global democratic politics” and even labeled the current international political arena the “Trump era” (“特朗普时代”). “Who’s next?” one Weibo user wonders.
“Let’s wait and see,” other people write, “It might not be easy for him to form a cabinet.”
While the Dutch formation has begun, the world will be watching to see which parties will govern together and whether Wilders might become the next Dutch Prime Minister, and the so-called ‘next Trump.’
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The introduction of a Douyin novel feature, that would enable content creators to impose a fee for accessing their short video content, has sparked discussions across Chinese social media. Although the feature would benefit creators, many Douyin users are skeptical.
News that Chinese social media app Douyin is rolling out a new feature which allows creators to introduce a paywall for their short video content has triggered online discussions in China this week.
The feature, which made headlines on November 16, is presently in the testing phase. A number of influential content creators are now allowed to ‘paywall’ part of their video content.
Douyin is the hugely popular app by Chinese tech giant Bytedance. TikTok is the international version of the Chinese successful short video app, and although they’re often presented as being the same product, Douyin and Tiktok are actually two separate entities.
In addition to variations in content management and general usage, Douyin differs from TikTok in terms of features. Douyin previously experimented with functionalities such as charging users for accessing mini-dramas on the platform or the ability to tip content creators.
The pay-to-view feature on Douyin would require users to pay a certain fee in Douyin coins (抖币) in order to view paywalled content. One Douyin coin is equivalent to 0.1 yuan ($0,014). The platform itself takes 30% of the income as a service charge.
According to China Securities Times or STCN (证券时报网), Douyin insiders said that any short video content meeting Douyin’s requirements could be set as “pay-per-view.”
Creators, who can set their own paywall prices, should reportedly meet three criteria to qualify for the pay-to-view feature: their account cannot have any violation records for a period of 90 days, they should have at least 100,000 followers, and they have to have completed the real-name authentication process.
On Douyin and Weibo, Chinese netizens express various views on the feature. Many people do not think it would be a good idea to charge money for short videos. One video blogger (@小片片说大片) pointed out the existing challenge of persuading netizens to pay for longer videos, let alone expecting them to pay for shorter ones.
“The moment I’d need to pay money for it, I’ll delete the app,” some commenters write.
This statement appears to capture the prevailing sentiment among most internet users regarding a subscription-based Douyin environment. According to a survey conducted by the media platform Pear Video, more than 93% of respondents expressed they would not be willing to pay for short videos.
An online poll by Pear Video showed that the majority of respondents would not be willing to pay for short videos on Douyin.
“This could be a breaking point for Douyin,” one person predicts: “Other platforms could replace it.” There are more people who think it would be the end of Douyin and that other (free) short video platforms might take its place.
Some commenters, however, had their own reasons for supporting a pay-per-view function on the platform, suggesting it would help them solve their Douyin addiction. One commenter remarked, “Fantastic, this might finally help me break free from watching short videos!” Another individual responded, “Perhaps this could serve as a remedy for my procrastination.”
As discussions about the new feature trended, Douyin’s customer service responded, stating that it would eventually be up to content creators whether or not they want to activate the paid feature for their videos, and that it would be up to users whether or not they would be interested in such content – otherwise they can just swipe away.
Another social media user wrote: “There’s only one kind of video I’m willing to pay for, and it’s not on Douyin.”
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