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“Invincible Russia”? Putin’s Speech Discussed on Chinese Social Media

“We should support peace talks, and oppose America adding fuel to the fire,” one top commenter on Weibo wrote after Putin’s speech.

Manya Koetse

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Putin’s speech on Tuesday, the annual address to the Federal Assembly in Moscow, has triggered online discussions about Russia, the Ukraine war, and China’s position.

The speech that Russian President Putin delivered in Moscow has become a trending topic on Chinese social media. In the hot search lists on the Weibo app, the state-of-the-nation address even became one of the most popular hashtags on Tuesday (#普京国情咨文建华#).

In his lengthy speech, Putin portrayed the United States as an evil and aggressive global power, stating that its military actions have caused the deaths of thousands of people since 2001 and that the U.S. and other Western nations, along with Ukraine, are to blame for the ongoing war.

Early on in his address, Putin suggested that, even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it was already the goal of Western leaders to destabilize Russia and make the Russian people suffer. “They don’t care about the world,” he said, claiming Western people were used as “tools of lies,” just as Ukraine was being exploited as an “anti-Russian tool” and “launch pad” against Russia:

The Western elites do not hide their goal of defeating Russia. They want to take us off the map. They want to turn a local conflict into a global confrontation. And this is how we understand this, and we will respond adequately. Because this is now about the very existence of our country. But they cannot ignore the fact that Russia cannot be defeated on the battlefield, so they are waging increasingly aggressive information attacks.”

The Russian leader blamed the West for creating a “spiritual catastrophe” by “distorting truths,” “attacking Russian culture” and the “orthodox church.” He stressed that Russian faith is the faith of the country, criticizing how the holy texts’ teachings on the family as a union between woman and man have become “increasingly doubted” in the West, where the Church of England is now considering the idea of a “gender-neutral God.” He said: “They don’t know what they’re doing, what can we say, may God forgive them.”

The later parts of Putin’s address were very much focused on Russia and its future, including its economy, education, infrastructure, the strengthening of the state and Russian culture – overall, painting a picture of a strong and confident Russia.

In line with that discourse of a Russia that would “fully count on its own potential,” Putin also stated that Russia would suspend the last nuclear treaty with the United States.

 

“Not a single country in the world is invincible.”

 

On Weibo, multiple hashtags related to Putin’s speech are making their rounds. One of them is “Putin States Russia is Invincible” (#普京称俄罗斯是不可战胜的#), initiated by state media outlet Global Times, and “Putin Reiterates That Ukraine Provoked the War” (#普京重申是乌克兰挑起战争#) or “Putin Says the West Started the War” (#普京称是西方发动战争#).

Another hashtag, also hosted by Global Times, was about Russia suspending its participation in the New START treaty (#普京宣布俄暂停参与新削减战略武器条约#).

Most of the comment sections of the threads dedicated to Putin’s speech on Weibo only allow selected comments to appear. One post by Global Times about Putin’s claims that it is “the West” that started the war had over 400 replies, yet only a few were displayed.

Nevertheless, from the hundreds of comments across Weibo underneath the many different new posts – some using creative language and word jokes, – it becomes apparent that Weibo commenters are very roughly separated into three groups when it comes to Putin’s speech: those who support Putin’s words and make pro-Russian remarks, mainly in the context of anti-Americanism; those who do not pick sides but just want the war to end (without China getting involved); and those who joke about Putin and Russia’s alleged desperate attempts to bring out the glow despite its fading victory. The latter group is not necessarily anti-Russian, but they also do not have confidence in Russia’s military power (also read: Why Russia Is Nicknamed the “Weak Goose” on Chinese Social Media.)

“There’s not a single country in the world that is invincible,” one Weibo user wrote, with others suggesting that Russia is “crying without tears” and is tightly embracing its nuclear weapons because they are losing the war.

“He’s becoming as comical as Trump now,” another commenter said about Putin. Meanwhile, a topic about Donald Trump claiming he could solve the Russia-Ukraine war “in 24 Hours” also attracted attention on Chinese social media (#特朗普称能24小时解决俄乌冲突#).

“It’s funny, when the Russia-Ukraine war just started, so many people were supporting Russia, but I can see they are changing direction now,” another blogger wrote.

 

“Who you support and who you oppose all depends on who our enemy is. The United States is now our enemy. So do we support Russia or Ukraine?”

 

The Russian Embassy in China also posted about the speech on their Weibo account, highlighting Putin’s comments blaming the United States for starting the war. Most of the comments replying to that post were in support of Russia and expressed anti-American sentiments. “American hegemony and their plundering are the source of all chaos in the world,” one typical comment said.

“The enemy of our enemy is our friend,” one Shandong-based blogger (@大风吹奏) wrote: “The friends of the enemy are our enemies. This is the plain and simple logic of the ordinary people. So who you support and who you oppose all depends on who our enemy is. The United States is now our enemy. So do we support Russia or Ukraine? It’s self-evident.”

This week, US Secretary Antony Blinken met with Chinese top diplomat Wang Yi at the Munich Security Conference. Afterward, Blinken expressed concerns over Chinese companies supporting Russia and China potentially supplying weapons to Russia in the near future.

On Monday, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Wang Wenbin (汪文斌) responded, saying that the one providing weapons to the battlefield was the United States, and not China (“向战场源源不断提供武器的是美方而不是中方”). Wang Yi also had a meeting with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba on the margins of the Munich Security Conference.

At the same time, U.S. President Biden made an unannounced visit to Ukraine and met with President Zelensky for first time since the start of the war. During the visit, Biden vowed that the US will back Ukraine in its fight against Russia for “as long as it takes.”

According to Chinese political commentator Hu Xijin (胡锡进), who wrote a column about Putin’s speech on his Weibo account, the spotlight appearance of both Putin and Biden showed the stark difference between the 70-year-old “quick-witted and eloquent” Putin and the 80-year-old seemingly “confused” Biden.

But Hu Xijin wrote that the outcome of the Ukrainian war is still very much up in the air, and that it is important for China to stay out of it. Instead of being forced to pick a side in the conflict, China should keep advocating for righteousness and justice and focus on its own development.

Hu’s stance is very much in line with the official narrative on China’s position in the Ukraine war. Although it may officially be “neutral” when it comes to the Russia-Ukraine War, it is not neutral when it comes to the United States and the role it plays on the world stage today.

On February 20, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a report titled “the US Hegemony and Its Perils” (“美国的霸权霸道霸凌及其危害”), in which it condemned the U.S. for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and instigating “color revolutions” and regional conflicts. The report also suggested that in Ukraine, as well as in other countries, United States is “repeating its tactics” of waging proxy wars (see English version/Chinese version).

Regarding Putin’s speech: besides the openly pro-Russian comments and the more neutral ones, there are very few social media comments on Weibo at the time of writing that are strongly opposing Russia. There are also little to none that are in favor of China getting involved in this war.

“We should support peace talks, and oppose America adding fuel to the fire,” one top commenter on Weibo replied, with another saying: “Oppose war, choose peace, stay neutral.”

Many netizens say they just want the war to end. “Know when to stop, world peace now,” one person wrote. “Wake me up when World War Three is over.”

One US-based Weibo user wrote: “They’ve been fighting for a year, enough already, let there be peace.”

By Manya Koetse 

with contributions by Miranda Barnes

 

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Manya is the founder and editor-in-chief of What's on Weibo, offering independent analysis of social trends, online media, and digital culture in China for over a decade. Subscribe to gain access to content, including the Weibo Watch newsletter, which provides deeper insights into the China trends that matter. More about Manya at manyakoetse.com or follow on X.

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China Media

China’s “AFP Filter” Meme: How Netizens Turned a Western Media Lens into Online Patriotism

Chinese netizens embraced a supposed “demonizing” Western gaze in AFP photos and made it their own.

Ruixin Zhang

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For a long time, Chinese netizens have criticized how photography of Chinese news events by Western outlets—from BBC and CNN to AFP—makes China look more gloomy or intimidating. During this year’s military parade, the so-called “AFP filter” once again became a hot topic—and perhaps not in the way you’d expect.

In the past week following the military parade, Chinese social media remained filled with discussions about the much-anticipated September 3 V-Day parade, a spectacle that had been hyped for weeks and watched by millions across the country.

That morning, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, accompanied by his wife Peng Liyuan, welcomed international guests on the red carpet. When Xi arrived at Tiananmen Square alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, office phone calls across the country quieted, and school classes paused to tune in to one of China’s largest-ever military parades along Chang’an Avenue in Beijing, held to commemorate China’s victory over Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II.

As tanks rolled and jets thundered overhead, and state media outlets such as People’s Daily and Xinhua livestreamed the entire event, many different details—from what happened on Tiananmen Square to who attended, and what happened before and after, both online and offline—captured the attention of netizens.

Amid all the discussions online, one particularly hot conversation was about the visual coverage of the event, and focused on AFP (法新社), Agence France Press, the global news agency headquartered in Paris.

Typing “AFP” (法新社) into Weibo in the days after the parade pulled up a long list of hashtags:

  • Has AFP released their shots yet?
  • V-Day Parade through AFP’s lens
  • AFP’s god-tier photo
  • Did AFP show up for the parade?

 
The fixation may seem odd—why would Chinese netizens care so much about a French news agency?

Popular queries centered on AFP.

The story actually goes back to 2022.

In July of that year, on the anniversary of the Communist Party’s founding, one Weibo influencer (@Jokielicious) noted that while domestic photographers portrayed the celebrations as bright and triumphant, she personally preferred the darker, almost menacing image of Beijing captured by Western journalists. In her view, through their lens, China appeared more powerful—even a little terrifying.

The original post.

The post went viral. Soon, netizens began comparing more of China’s state media photos with those from Western outlets. One photo in particular stood out: Xinhua’s casual, cheerful shot of Chinese soldiers contrasted sharply with AFP’s cold, almost cinematic frame.

Same event, different vibe. Chinese social media users compared these photos of Xinhua (top) versus AFP (down). AFP photo shot by Fred Dufour.

Netizens joked that Xinhua had made the celebration look like the opening of a new hotel, while AFP had cast it as “the dawn of an empire.”

Gradually, what began as a dig at the bad aesthetics of state media turned into something else: a subtle shift in how Chinese netizens were rethinking their country’s international image.

Under the hashtag #ChinaThroughOthersLens (#老中他拍), netizens shared images of China as seen through the lenses of various Western media outlets.

This wasn’t the first time such talk had appeared. In the early days of the Chinese internet, people often spoke of the so-called “BBC filter.” The idea was that the BBC habitually put footage of China under a grayish filter, making its visuals give off a vibe of repression and doom, which many felt was at odds with the actual vibrancy on the ground. To them, it was proof that the West was bent on painting China as backward and gloomy.

These discussions have continued in recent years.

For example, on Weibo there were debates about a photo of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, shot by Peter Thomas for Reuters, and used in various Western media reports about Wuhan and Covid as early as 2021. The top image shows the photographer’s vantage point.

“Looks like a cockroach in the gutter,” one popular comment described it.

Top image by Chinese media, lower image by Peter Thomas/Reuters, and was used in various Western media reports about Wuhan and Covid since as early as 2021.

Another example is the alleged “smog filter” applied by Western media outlets to Beijing skies during the China visit of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in 2024.

The alleged “smog filter” applied to Beijing skies during Blinken’s visit. Top image: Chinese media. Middle: BBC. Lower: Washington Post.

AFP, meanwhile, seemed to offer a different kind of ‘distortion.’

Netizens said AFP’s photos often had a low-saturation, high-contrast, solemn tone, with wide angles that made the scenes feel oppressive yet majestic. Over time, any photo with that look—whether taken by AFP or not—was dubbed the “AFP filter” (法新社滤镜).

AFP has clarified multiple times that many of the viral examples weren’t even theirs—or that they were, but had been altered with an extra dark filter. They also refuted claims that AFP had published a photo series of Chinese soldiers titled “Dawn of Empire” to discredit China’s army.

AFP refuted claims that their photos discredited the Chinese army.

Nevertheless, the “AFP filter” label stuck. It became shorthand for a Western gaze that cast China not as impoverished or broken—as some claimed the “BBC filter” did—but as formidable, like a looming supervillain.

One running joke summed it up neatly: domestic shots are the festive version; Western shots are the red-tyrant version. And increasingly, netizens admitted they preferred the latter, commenting that while AFP shots often emphasize red to suggest authoritarianism, they actually like the red and what it stands for.

So, when this year’s V-Day came around, many were eager to see how AFP and other Western outlets would frame China as the dark, dangerous empire.

But when the photos dropped, the reaction was muted. They looked average. Some called them “disappointing.” “Where are the dark angles? Not doing it this time?” one blogger wondered. “Where’s the AFP hotline? I’d like to file a complaint!”

“Xinhua actually beat you this time,” some commented on AFP’s official Weibo account. Others agreed, putting the AFP photos and Xinhua photos side by side.

AFP photos on the left versus Xinhua photos on the right.

To make up for the letdown, people began editing the photos themselves—darkening the tones, adding dramatic shadows, and proudly labeling them with the tag “AFP filter” or calling it “The September 3rd Military Parade Through a AFP Lens” (法新社滤镜下的9.3阅兵). “Now that’s the right vibe,” they said: “I fixed it for you!”

Netizen @哔哔机 “AFP-fied” photos of the military parade by AFP.

Official media quickly picked up on the trend. Xinhua rolled out its own hashtags—#XinhuaAlwaysDeliversEpicShots (#新华社必出神图的决心#) and #XinhuaWins (#新华社秒了#)—and positioned itself as the true master of a new aesthetic narrative.

The message was clear: China no longer needs the Western gaze to frame itself as powerful or intimidating; it can do that on its own.

The “AFP v Xinhua” contest, the online movement to “AFP-ify” visuals, and the Chinese fandom around AFP’s moodier shots may have been wrapped in jokes and memes, but they also pointed to something deeper: the once “demonized” image of China that Western media pushed as threatening is now not only accepted by Chinese netizens, it’s embraced. Many have made it part of a confident, playful form of online patriotism, applauding the idea of being seen by the West as fearsome, even villainous, believing it amplifies China’s global authority.

As one netizen wrote: “I like it when we look like we crawl straight into their nightmares.”

Chinese journalist Kai Lei (@凯雷) suggested that these kinds of trends showed how the Chinese public plays an increasingly proactive role in shaping China’s global image.

By now, the AFP meme has become so strong that it doesn’t even require AFP anymore. Ultra-dramatic shots are simply called “AFP-level photos” (法新社级别).

For now, as many are enjoying the “afterglow” of the military parade, their appreciation for the AFP-style only seems to grow. As one Weibo user summed it up: “AFP tried to create a sense of oppression with dark, low-angle shots, but instead only strengthened the Chinese military’s aura of majesty.”

 
By Ruixin Zhang and Manya Koetse
 

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Chapter Dive

Yearnings, Dreamcore, and the Rise of AI Nostalgia in China

From China’s first soap opera Yearnings to the rise of AI-fueled nostalgia.

Manya Koetse

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The year is 1990, and the streets of Beijing’s Fangshan District are eerily quiet. You can almost hear a pin drop in the petrochemical town, as tens of thousands of workers and their families huddle around their televisions, all tuned to the same channel for something groundbreaking: China’s very first soap opera, Yearnings (渴望 Kěwàng).

Yearnings tells the story of Liu Huifang (刘慧芳), a female factory worker from a traditional working-class family in Beijing, and her unlikely marriage to university graduate Wang Husheng (王沪生), who comes from a family of intellectuals. When Liu finds an abandoned baby girl, she adopts her and raises her as her own, against her husband’s wishes.

The couple is unaware that the foundling is actually the illegitimate child of Wang’s snobbish sister, Yaru. After Liu and Wang have a biological son, the marriage comes under further pressure, eventually leading to divorce. Liu is left as a single mother, raising two children on her own.

Still from Yearnings, via OurChinaStory.

Drawing inspiration from foreign dubbed television shows, Yearnings was produced as China’s first truly domestic, long-form indoor television drama. Spanning 50 episodes, the series traces a timeline from the onset of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s through to the late 1980s—one of the most turbulent periods in modern Chinese history.

Before the series aired nationally on CCTV and achieved record viewership, the first station to air Yearnings in the Beijing region was the Yanshan Petrochemical TV Station (燕山石化电视台), China’s first major factory TV station (厂办电视台) located in Fangshan District.

Here, in this town of over 100,000, Yearnings garnered an astonishing and unprecedented 98% audience share. The series was truly groundbreaking and became a national sensation—not just because it was China’s first long-form television drama, or because it was a locally produced drama that challenged the long-standing monopoly of state broadcaster CCTV, but because Yearnings marked a major shift in television storytelling.

Until then, Chinese TV stories had always revolved around communist propaganda, or featured great heroes of the revolution. Yearnings, on the other hand, was devoid of political content and focused on the hopes and dreams of ordinary people and their everyday struggles—love, desire, marital tension, single motherhood—topics that had never before been so openly portrayed on Chinese television.

The show’s creators had perfectly tapped into what was changing: the Communist Party was slowly withdrawing from private life, and people were beginning to see themselves less defined by their work unit and more by their home life—as consumers, as partners and parents, as citizens of a new China filled with aspirations for the future. Yearnings’ storyline was a reflection of that.

 

Chinese-Style “Nostalgia Core”

 

Yearnings marked a cultural turning point, coinciding with the rapid spread of TV sets in Chinese households. In 1992, economic reforms triggered a new era in which Chinese media became increasingly commercialized and thriving, before the arrival of the internet, social media, and AI tools once again changed everything.

Today, Yearnings still is a topic that often comes up in Chinese online media. On apps like Douyin, old scenes from Yearnings are reposted and receive thousands of shares.

📌 It’s emblematic of a broader trend in which more netizens are turning to “nostalgia-core.” In Chinese, this trend is known as “中式梦核” (Zhōngshì Mènghé), which literally means “Chinese-style dreamcore.”

Dreamcore is an internet aesthetic and visual style—popular in online communities like Tumblr and Reddit—that blends elements of nostalgia, surrealism, and subconscious imagery. Mixing retro images with fantasy, it evokes a sense of familiarity, yet often feels unsettling and deserted.

The Chinese-style dreamcore (中式梦核), which has become increasingly popular on platforms like Bilibili since 2023-2024, is different from its Western counterpart in how it incorporates distinctly Chinese elements and specifically evokes the childhood experiences of the millennial generation. Content tagged as “Chinese-style dreamcore” on Chinese social media is often also labeled with terms like “nostalgia” (怀旧), “childhood memories” (童年回忆), “when we were little” (小时候), and “Millennial Dream” (千禧梦).

According to the blogging account Yatong Local Life Observer (娅桐本地生活观察), the focus on the millennial childhood can be explained because the formative years of this generation coincided with a decade of rapid social change in China —leaving little in today’s modern cities that still evokes that era.

🌀 Of course, millennials in the West also frequently look back at their childhood and teenage years, particularly the 1980s and 1990s—a trend also embraced by Gen Z, who romanticize these years through media and fashion. In China, however, Gen Z is at the forefront of the “nostalgia-core” trend, reflecting on the 1990s and early 2000s as a distant, almost dreamlike past. This sense of distance is heightened by China’s staggering pace of transformation, modernization, and digitalization over the past decades, which has made even the recent past feel remote and irretrievable.

🌀 Another factor contributing to the trend is that China’s younger generations are caught in a rat race of academic and professional competition, often feeling overwhelmed by the fast pace of life and the weight of societal expectations. In this high-pressure environment—captured by the concept of “involution” (内卷)—young people develop various coping mechanisms, and digital escapism, including nostalgia-core, is one of them. It’s like a cyber-utopia (赛博乌托邦).

🌀 Due to the rise of AI tools available to the general public, Chinese-style nostalgia core has hit the mainstream because it’s now possible for all social media users to create their own nostalgic videos and images—bringing back the 1990s and early 2000s through AI-generated tools, either by making real videos appear more nostalgic or by creating entirely fictional videos or images that recreate scenes from those days.

So what are we seeing? There are images and videos of stickers kids used to love, visuals showing old classrooms, furniture, and children playing outside, accompanied by captions such as “we’re already so far apart from our childhood years” (example).

Images displayed in Chinese Dreamcore.

And notably, there are videos and images showing family and friends gathering around those old big TVs as a cultural, ritualized activity (see some examples here).

Stills from ‘nostalgia core’ videos.

These kinds of AI-generated videos depict a pre-mobile-era family life, where families and communities would gather around the TV—both inside and outside—from classrooms to family homes. The wind blows through the windows, neighbors crack sunflower seeds, and children play on the ground. Ironically, it’s AI that is bringing back the memories of a society that was not yet digitalized.

Nowadays, with dozens of short video apps, streaming platforms, and livestream culture fully mainstream in China—and AI algorithms personalizing feeds to the extreme—it sometimes feels like everyone’s on a different channel, quite literally.

In times like these, people long for an era when life seemed less complicated—when, instead of everyone staring at their own screens, families and neighbors gathered around one screen together.

There’s not just irony in the fact that it took AI for netizens to visualize their longing for a bygone era; there’s also a deeper irony in how Yearnings once represented a time when people were looking forward to the future—only to find that the future is now looking back, yearning for the days of Yearnings.

It seems we’re always looking back, reminiscing about the years behind us with a touch of nostalgia. We’re more digitalized than ever, yet somehow less connected. We yearn for a time when everyone was watching the same screen, at the same time, together, just like in 1990. Perhaps it’s time for another Yearnings.

By Manya Koetse

(follow on X, LinkedIn, or Instagram)

 

Sources (other sources included in hyperlinks)

Koetse, Manya. 2016. “From Woman Warrior to Good Wife – Confucian Influences on the Portrayal of Women in China’s Television Drama.” In Stefania Travagnin (ed), Religion and Media in China. New York: Routledge.

Rofel, Lisa B. 1994. Yearnings: Televisual Love and Melodramatic Politics in Contemporary China. American Ethnologist 21(4):700-722.

Wang, Dan (汪丹). 2018. “《渴望》的艺术价值” [The Artistic Value of Yearnings].” Originally published in Beijing Daily (北京日报), October 12, 2018. Reprinted in Digest News (文摘报), October 20, 06 edition. Also see Sohu: 当年红遍大江南北的《渴望》.

Wang Min and Arvind Singhal. 1992. “Kewang, a Chinese television soap opera with a message.” Gazette 49: 177-192.

Zhuge Kanwu. 2021. “重温1990《渴望》:苦得“刘慧芳”希望被导演写“死” [Revisiting 1990’s Yearnings: The Suffering Liu Huifang Hoped to Be Written Off by the Director]. Zhuge Dushu Wu (诸葛读书屋), January 22. https://wapbaike.baidu.com/tashuo/browse/content?id=b699ee532cf79f862bfa14ad.

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