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Pressured to get Married: For the Country and For Society

Every year, China’s bachelors and bachelorettes are dreading the return to their hometowns, as parents and family members will inescapably ask them that one question: “Why are you not married yet?”

Manya Koetse

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WHAT’S ON WEIBO ARCHIVE | PREMIUM CONTENT ARTICLE

A creative protest against social marriage pressure has reignited online discussions about the status quo of China’s unmarried adults. While some support the choice of Chinese younger adults to be in charge of their own happiness, others suggest they are too focused on personal fulfillment.

Chinese New Year and the pressure to get married: it has already become an ‘old’ topic. Every year, China’s bachelors and bachelorettes are dreading the return to their hometowns, as parents and family members will inescapably ask them that one question: “Why are you not married yet?”

This year, a group of Chinese young women protested in Shanghai against their parents pressuring them to marry, holding signs saying: “Mum, please do not force me to get married during New Year, I’m in charge of my own happiness.”

 mum!Protest in Shanghai against marriage pressure, February 4, 2015 (Qingdao News).

The women became a hot topic amongst netizens and authors, reigniting the online discussion about the status quo of China’s unmarried adults. “Coming back to your hometown saying you don’t want to be pressured into marriage is like going to the dog meat festival saying you don’t want to eat dog,” says writer Mao Li.

 

The Shengnü and Shengnan ‘problem’

 

The term ‘shengnü’ (剩女 ‘leftover woman’) has been a somewhat derogatory catch phrase in China’s media for years. It refers to women who are still single at the age of 27 or above; usually well-educated ladies who have difficulties in finding a partner that can live up to their expectations.

Their disadvantage in finding a partner relates to existing ideas in Chinese culture about the ‘ideal’ marriage age of women. A recent survey has pointed out that 50% of Chinese men already consider a women ‘left over’ when she is not married at the age of 25.

The male counterpart of the shengnü is the so-called ‘shengnan’ (剩男, ‘leftover man’). Chinese men face great difficulties in finding a bride, as Mainland China has been faced with an unbalanced male-female ratio since the 1980s. At the peak of disparity in 2004, more than 121 boys were born for every 100 girls. One explanation for this imbalance is the traditional preference for boys and sex-selective abortions since the one-child policy was introduced in 1978.

According to estimations, there currently are 20 million more men than women under the age of 30 (Luo & Sun 2014, 5; Chen 2011, 2).

The abundance of both single women and men in present-day China would suggest that there is hardly a problem: why don’t they just get married? Problematically, the majority of China’s unmarried women are twenty-somethings who live in urban areas and are at the ‘high end’ of the societal ladder (relatively high income and education), whereas the majority of the shengnan are based in rural areas and are at the ‘lower end’ (lower income/education).

Since Chinese women traditionally prefer to ‘marry up’ in terms of age, income and education, and the men usually ‘marry down’, the men and women find themselves at the wrong ends of the ladder (Ding & Xu 2015, 114).

 

China needs a babyboom

 

“Get married soon and have lots of babies,” says Huang Wenzheng, activist and one-child policy opponent (Qi 2014). China is currently facing a rapid decline in births. At the same time, the population is aging.

It is estimated that over 25% of Chinese people will be 65 years and older in 2050, leaving the burden of care to younger generations (BBC 2012). Getting Chinese bachelors and bachelorettes to marry and produce children has thus gone beyond the wish for a wedding banquet and cute grandchildren – it has become an important matter to society.

According to recent statistics, 80% of China’s bachelors and bachelorettes over the age of 24 experience pressure by their families to get married when they go home for the holiday period. The festival is now even nicknamed the “marriage pressure holiday” (催婚假期).

122316309_21nParents looking for a suitable partner for their single sons and daughter (Xinhua). 

After Chinese New Year, there generally is a 40% increase in blind dates. These meetings are often arranged by the parents, who attend ‘blind date events’ for their single sons or daughters. Many parents gather in public parks over the weekend, carrying banners with the picture and details of their unmarried child in the hopes of finding a suitable marriage partner for them.

 

“Don’t oppose to marriage pressure if you’re a loser”

 

Well-known scholar Yang Zao (杨早) responds to this topic on Tencent’s Dajia (‘Everybody’, a media platform for authors), with an essay titled “Pressured to Get Married: For the Country, For Society” (为了国家,为了社会,逼你结婚). Yang is the third author to discuss the New Year’s marriage pressure and the Shanghai girls who want to take their love life into their own hands. The other two columns are by female writer Mao Li (毛利), who wrote an essay titled “Prove You’re Not a Loser Before Opposing Marriage Pressure” (反逼婚,先证明你不是废物), and columnist Zhang Shi (张石), whose piece is called “China’s ‘Pressured-Married’ and Japan’s ‘Non-Married””(中国的“逼婚”和日本的“不婚”). Yang analyses the current debate on marriage, wondering if it is so controversial because society is pressuring it more or because unmarried adults are opposing it more.

Parents put more pressure on their children to get married, and children increasingly oppose it, says Mao Li. According to her, both sides make sense, but it is the children who have to explain their point-of-view; why would their parents understand them?

Those who were born in the 1980s and 1990s come from completely different times than their mothers and fathers, who suffered many hardships to get where they are today. Mao Li compares the way they raised their children to a farmer raising his crops: planting seeds, watering the fields and creating the right environment to grow. Now that the children are grown up and have left the family home, the logical step for them would be to get married – after all, their parents worked hard to build the right conditions for them to do so. They should not be surprised when their parents urge them to get settled. 

“Coming back to your hometown saying you oppose to marriage pressure is like coming to the dog meat festival saying you oppose to eating dog,” Mao says: “You can’t expect people to comprehend it.” According to Mao, children can only oppose marriage pressure when they are completely independent. They cannot oppose marriage and still cling to their parents for financial support. “Prove you’re not a loser before opposing marriage pressure,” she says.

Writer Zhang Shi approaches the issue from another perspective; that of society. In Japan, fertility rates have sharply decreased. While society is ageing, the lack of young workers causes economic problems.

In order not to end up with the same problems as Japan, China has to get the marriages coming and birth rates going, argues Zhang. Parents who are forcing their children to get married are actually contributing to society, says Zhang: it is ‘warm advice’, not cold pressure. In an age of declining birthrates, urging people to have babies is a “social responsibility”.

 

“For the country, for society, for parents, can’t you let go a bit of ‘personal happiness’?”

 

The pressure to get married is ingrained in social ideology and China’s traditional family ethics, says Yang Zao. The problems that now emerge within society come from a clash between individualist and collectivist values.

Chinese society cannot be a perfect mix of both individualism and collectivism, according to Yang: “It is either one, and both will have downsides.” If China wants a liberal, individual-focused society, then its “evils” will have to be accepted too: some people will marry late, some will not marry at all, some will not have kids, others will go job-hopping, some people move from city to city and never settle down. Such a society will also generate low birth rates and an ageing society.

In a collective, family-focused society, the aging crisis and declining birth rates could be halted. Parents would not have to go to public parks to search for suitable partners for their unmarried kids. “For the country, for society, for parents, can’t you let go a bit of personal happiness’?”, says Yang. After all, isn’t marriage key to solving China’s present-day problems?

Since 1950, marriage officially is a ‘freedom of choice’ in Mainland China. Nevertheless, marriage in China still seems to involve more than two people: it is a get-together of two families with societal backing.

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One Weibo user says: “The shengnü do not have an individual problem; they are a problem because society at large believes they have a problem – this is why it is a ‘problem’.”

No matter what the ‘nation’, ‘society’, or parents think, the protesting Shanghai girls are positive about their future: it is in their hands, and in their hands alone.

– by Manya Koetse

 

References

BBC. 2012. “Ageing China: Changes and Challenges.” BBC News, 19 September http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19630110 (16.10.12).

Chen, Zhou. 2011. “The Embodiment of Transforming Gender and Class: Shengnü and Their Media Representations in Contemporary China.” Master’s thesis, University of Kansas.

Ding, Min and Jie Xu. 2015. The Chinese Way. Routledge: New York.

Luo, Wei, and Zhen Sun. 2014. “Are You the One? China’s TV Dating Shows and the Sheng Nü’s Predicament.” Feminist Media Studies, October: 1–18.

Mao Li 毛利. “想反逼婚,先证明你不是废物” [Prove You’re Not a Loser Before Opposing Marriage Pressure]. Dajia, 11 February http://dajia.qq.com/blog/466362096792665 [24.2.15].

Qi, 2014. “Baby Boom or Economy Bust.” The Wall Street Journal, 2 September http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/09/02/baby-boom-or-economy-bust-stern-warnings-about-chinas-falling-fertility-rate/ [24.2.15].

Yang Zao 杨早. 2015. “为了国家,为了社会,逼你结婚”  [Pressured to Get Married: For the Country, For Society]. Dajia, 17 February http://dajia.qq.com/blog/431261063359665 [24.2.15].

Zhang Shi 张石. 2015. “中国的“逼婚”和日本的“不婚” [China’s ‘Pressured-Married’ and Japan’s ‘Non-Married’]. Dajia, 16 February http://dajia.qq.com/blog/462372023502987 [24.2.15].

Image by Tencent Dajia, 2015. 

 

 
©2014 Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.

Manya is the founder and editor-in-chief of What's on Weibo, offering independent analysis of social trends, online media, and digital culture in China for over a decade. Subscribe to gain access to content, including the Weibo Watch newsletter, which provides deeper insights into the China trends that matter. More about Manya at manyakoetse.com or follow on X.

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China Digital

From “Public Megaphone” to “National Watercooler”: Casper Wichmann on Weibo’s Role in Digital China

With Weibo now 15 years old, we asked Sinologist Wichmann about its evolving role in shaping public opinion, its key moments, and whether it can remain a major platform for public discourse in China’s increasingly crowded digital landscape.

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WHAT’S ON WEIBO CHAPTER: 15 YEARS OF WEIBO

Over the years, Weibo has undergone significant changes in both its political and social functions. Sinologist and China correspondent Casper Wichmann explored Weibo extensively in his academic research during the platform’s early years. Now, he reflects on its evolution and current role in China’s digital landscape.

Over the past fifteen years, the Chinese social media platform Weibo has been a popular and extensively studied subject in academic research, inspiring countless studies across various disciplines.

In the initial years after the founding of Weibo (read all about Weibo’s founding in this deep dive), Danish Sinologist and China correspondent Casper Wichmann, focused on Chinese digital platforms, dedicated his MA research to studying Sina Weibo as a new public sphere on the Chinese internet. Now that more than a decade has passed, it’s time to reflect on how Weibo has changed and why this matters.

Before Casper shares his observation, some key points from his thesis “Sina Weibo as New Public Sphere.” (For those interested, here is a link to the pdf):

➡️ Wichmann’s thesis (2012) analyzed how the Chinese microblogging platform Sina Weibo serves as a “public sphere” in China, providing a new space for citizens to share information and voice public opinion. Using frameworks like Jürgen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere, Johan Lagerkvist’s concept of ideotainment (blending Party propaganda with entertainment to build legitimacy), and Andrew Mertha’s fragmented authoritarianism (how political pluralization affects policy in China), the thesis explored how Sina Weibo functions as an independent media platform while working alongside traditional media. It examined how public opinion is formed on the platform and the significant influence of both traditional media and the Chinese Party-State.

➡️ The Party-State’s relationship with Sina Weibo is complex, balancing censorship with strategic allowances to monitor public opinion, address corruption, and maintain its legitimacy. Through case studies like the Wenzhou train crash and the Bo Xilai scandal, the thesis illustrated how Sina Weibo can amplify public opinion while also showcasing the Party-State’s ultimate control over discourse.

➡️ While Sina Weibo enables public engagement and amplifies citizens’ voices, Wichmann concluded that its role as a public sphere is limited or “incomplete” due to censorship by the Chinese Party-State, which also hape discourse, use the platform for propaganda, and influences its operations and moderation.

➡️ Wichmann predicted that Sina Weibo would increasingly become a “battlefield of public opinion,” where Chinese citizens and the Party-State would compete to control narratives and influence within this digital space.

With Weibo now 15 years old, we asked Wichmann about three things:
📌 Weibo’s evolving role in shaping public opinion: Has it become more or less effective, and has its social impact shifted? Which news stories highlight Weibo’s continued relevance or its changing influence?
📌 Changing government strategies on the Weibo platform: What pivotal moments stand out when Weibo emerged as a political tool?
📌 Weibo’s present & future in a crowded digital landscape: Can it still compete as a major platform for public discourse, or is it transitioning into a new role altogether?

 

Casper Wichmann

Sinologist, China Correspondent

Casper Wichmann is a Danish Sinologist with an MA degree in China studies from the University of Copenhagen. He wrote his MA thesis on Sina Weibo in 2012 and has especially had an interest in Chinese politics, tech and social media, among many other topics. Since 2023 he has been based in Beijing as the Asia & China correspondent for Danish news media, TV 2 Denmark.

Since 2023 he has been based in Beijing as the Asia & China correspondent for Danish news media, TV 2 Denmark.

📌Weibo’s Role in Shaping Public Opinion

“15 years is a very long time anywhere in the world, but particularly so in China. If you look at how the country has changed as a whole in those past years, it is inevitable that Weibo has also transformed.

One of the biggest things is of course censorship.

I worked on my thesis in the first half of 2012 and handed it in early September that year, and a lot was happening at the time when it comes to China’s online developments. I remember that I even wrote a disclaimer in the very beginning that the whole paper might be obsolete at the time of reading, because you had a sense of where the Chinese government were moving in terms of control.

As it turned out, the government started cracking down on the influential Weibo accounts (‘大Vs’ – big, verified accounts) not long after, and also introduced laws to stop the spread of rumors. This, in turn, also paved the way for WeChat’s rise to prominence. You now have a lot of different platforms and apps on the internet in China for debate and shaping public opinion.

 

“I still believe that you cannot overlook or understate Weibo’s role as the ‘watercooler’ of China.”

 

That said, I still believe that you cannot overlook or understate Weibo’s role as the ‘watercooler’ of China where everybody comes together to talk about current affairs.

In my thesis, I argued that Sina Weibo could be seen as a Habermasian public sphere—an incomplete one—where Chinese citizens can come together and, to a large extent, freely debate information and public opinion. Even though the censorship regime has become far more effective and sophisticated, coupled with increased self-censorship, I still think that conclusion holds true 15 years after Weibo’s launch.

It is an open platform—censorship and control aside—where everyone can read, participate in conversations, and share information with the click of a button. This is clearly demonstrated by the way What’s on Weibo has highlighted many important topics over the years that sparked national debates thanks to Weibo. Additionally, can any foreign brand aiming to succeed in the Chinese market afford to completely ignore Weibo? That would be unthinkable!

 

“Foreign brands can quickly find themselves caught in massive controversies because Weibo still acts as a public megaphone”

 

In terms of its effectiveness in shaping public opinion, I think that depends on how we look at it. For instance, foreign brands can quickly find themselves caught in massive controversies because Weibo still acts as a public megaphone. Just think of the scandals involving Dolce & Gabbana (2018), H&M (2021), or Dior (2022), to name a few.

Still from the promotional D&G video that was deemed racist in China, causing major controversy in 2018 (whatsonweibo).  

There are also examples like the Tianjin explosion in 2015, which quickly became national news and sparked public debate, largely thanks to Weibo—despite the aforementioned censorship measures.

The enormous Tianjin explosions took place on August 12, injuring hundreds of people. Many people only learnt of the news through social media rather than traditional news outlets, which initially did not report the blasts.

Another example is the tragic death of Dr. Li Wenliang, the COVID-19 whistleblower, where netizens mourned his passing while venting their frustrations on Weibo.

Lastly, the spread of the “Voices of April” video—a compilation of real audio snippets capturing Shanghai residents’ struggles during the Covid crisis in April 2022—is another notable example of Chinese netizens overwhelming censorship by reaching critical mass. While this occurred across various platforms, Weibo played a key role due to its nature as a public space for discussion.

All in all, Weibo is still a very important and effective platform on the Internet in China for public discussions, debates, and shaping public opinion. However, it is also up against a censorship regime that has evolved and continues to evolve alongside it. That said, one should never underestimate the creativity of Chinese netizens.”

 
📌Government Strategies and Control on Weibo
 

“In the early years of Weibo, some Chinese politicians and overseers found use of Weibo as a political tool. A specific example I included in my thesis was the drama surrounding the political downfall of Bo Xilai, then party secretary of Chongqing and a rising princeling within the Party, and the Wang Lijun scandal.

There seemed to be considerable evidence that netizens on Weibo were allowed for a long time to criticize and slander Bo Xilai before censorship eventually stepped in. There is no doubt that this made it easier for the Party leadership to oust Bo Xilai following the high-profile corruption case.

 

“As a tool to gauge public opinion, Weibo also enables authorities to monitor potential issues and nip them in the bud before they escalate into major problems”

 

I also think that Weibo’s importance as a tool for the Chinese government to gauge public opinion and sentiment should not be underestimated. It enables authorities to monitor potential issues and nip them in the bud before they escalate into major problems. It also facilitates public scrutiny of lower-level officials and governance within the Chinese system (舆论监督 yúlùn jiāndū, “supervision by public opinion”, also see CMP).

Bo Xilai during his trial.

Another important point is that the government and Party seem to have learned that it is often safer to let people debate, complain, and vent online, as it can give them a sense of being heard and allow them to release frustrations without escalating into physical demonstrations. Of course, there are exceptions where such online discourse also leads to physical protests.

There is also the aspect of how long Chinese netizens can maintain focus on a specific topic. For example, the Tianjin explosion I mentioned earlier quickly became a national debate, but over time it shifted back to being a local issue as Weibo users moved on to other topics. I have no doubt that the Chinese government has increasingly learned to use this dynamic to their advantage. It would be fascinating to study which types of topics reach the top trending lists, how long they stay there, how they are censored, and what topics eventually replace them.”

 
📌Weibo’s Business and China’s Competitive Digital Landscape
 

“It really says a lot about Weibo that it has managed to remain significant in China’s digital landscape, even after the rise of other major platforms, including WeChat, and despite the strict regulations and major crackdowns on the platform.

For example, WeChat experienced a surge in active users after the 2012 crackdown, as many felt Weibo had become boring due to key opinion leaders being increasingly cautious of censorship.

 

“Platforms in China are competing to capture as much of Chinese netizens’ time and attention as possible.”

 

Nowadays, there is a growing number of newer and more exciting apps and platforms in China, all competing to capture as many hours, minutes, and seconds of Chinese netizens’ attention as possible. However, I believe Weibo’s unique usage and role in the digital ecosystem are hard to replicate.

To reiterate, the platform’s “national watercooler” aspect—where everyone can check in, get a sense of what the rest of the country is talking about, and join the conversation themselves—should not be underestimated.

That said, Weibo still needs to consistently provide a service and product that Chinese users feel offers them real value. If it can continue to do so, I don’t see Weibo becoming irrelevant anytime soon.”🔚

 
To read more about the evolution of Weibo, also read: “15 Years of Weibo: The Evolution of China’s Social Media Giant

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China ACG Culture

“Black Myth: Wukong”: From Gaming Screens to the CMG Spring Festival Gala?

Manya Koetse

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FROM THE WEIBO WATCH PREMIUM NEWSLETTER

Is Chinese game sensation ‘Black Myth Wukong’ making a jump from gaming screens to the CMG Spring Festival Gala? There’s already some online excitement over a potential performance at the biggest liveshow of the year.

The countdown to the most-watched show of the year has begun. On January 29, the Year of the Snake will be celebrated across China, and as always, the CMG Spring Festival Gala, broadcast on CCTV1, will air on the night leading up to midnight on January 28.

Rehearsals for the show began last week, sparking rumors and discussions about the must-watch performances this year. Soon, the hashtag “Black Myth: Wukong – From New Year’s Gala to Spring Festival Gala” (#黑神话悟空从跨晚到春晚#) became a topic of discussion on Weibo, following rumors that the Gala will feature a performance based on the hugely popular game Black Myth: Wukong.

Three weeks ago, a 16-minute-long Black Myth: Wukong performance already was a major highlight of Bilibili’s 2024 New Year’s Gala (B站跨年晚会). The show featured stunning visuals from the game, anime-inspired elements, special effects, spectacular stage design, and live song-and-dance performances. It was such a hit that many viewers said it brought them to tears. You can watch that show on YouTube here.

While it’s unlikely that the entire 16-minute performance will be included in the Spring Festival Gala (it’s a long 4-hour show but maintains a very fast pace), it seems highly possible that a highlight segment of the performance could make its way to the show.

Recently, Black Myth: Wukong was crowned 2024’s Game of the Year at the Steam Awards. The game is nothing short of a sensation. Officially released on August 20, 2024, it topped the international gaming platform Steam’s “Most Played” list within hours of its launch. Developed by Game Science, a studio founded by former Tencent employees, Black Myth: Wukong draws inspiration from the classic Chinese novel Journey to the West. This legendary tale of heroes and demons follows the supernatural monkey Sun Wukong as he accompanies the Tang Dynasty monk Xuanzang on a pilgrimage to India to retrieve Buddhist scriptures. The game, however, focuses on Sun Wukong’s story after this iconic journey.

The success of Black Myth: Wukong cannot be overstated—I’ve also not seen a Chinese video game be this hugely popular on social media over the past decade. Beyond being a blockbuster game it is now widely regarded as an impactful Chinese pop cultural export that showcases Chinese culture, history, and traditions. Its massive success has made anything associated with it go viral—for example, a merchandise collaboration with Luckin Coffee sold out instantly.

If Black Myth: Wukong does indeed become part of the Spring Festival Gala, it will likely be one of the most talked-about and celebrated segments of the show. If it does not come on, which we would be a shame, we can still see a Black Myth performance at the pre-recorded Fujian Spring Festival Gala, which will air on January 29.

Lastly, if you’re not into video games and not that interested in watching the show, I still highly recommend that you check out the game’s music. You can find it on Spotify (link to album). It will also give you a sense of the unique beauty of Black Myth: Wukong that you might appreciate—I certainly do.

By Manya Koetse

(follow on X, LinkedIn, or Instagram)

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