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The Russia-Ukraine War in Chinese Online Media (LAC Short)

A shifting focus on other issues that are framed within Chinese news narratives of the Russia-Ukraine war.

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This article was commissioned by Leiden Asia Center. See the original publication here.

As the Russian-Ukraine conflict shows no signs of de-escalation and over two million people have now fled Ukraine, there is a heightened international media focus on Chinese responses to the war.

While the developments in Ukraine are a major topic in Chinese newspapers, on its social media sites, and in its press briefings, the Russia-Ukrainian war – which is commonly referred to as Russia’s “special military operation” – is placed within a specific Chinese narrative.

Recent themes surrounding the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Chinese online media show how the war is framed by news outlets and bloggers when it comes to China’s role in it, shifting the narrative from Beijing’s responsibility to Washington’s irresponsibility.

Within that news narrative, emphasis is placed on the role of the United States, its Western allies, and Chinese resistance against the ‘Cold War mentality’ that allegedly fueled the current crisis. Some themes are recurring in the Chinese media, where today’s violent conflict in Ukraine is also used to reflect on the past and future of China-West relations. In light of the recent developments, NATO’s bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (1999) became a topic of focus again, together with discussions on what the Ukraine war could mean for Taiwan. In this article, we will explore some of the trends dominating Chinese media discussions within the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

 

“NATO Owes Blood Debt to China”

 

On February 24th, when people around the world were closely following the latest developments of Russia’s full-scale assault on Ukraine, two hashtags went trending on Chinese social media: “The NATO Still Owes Blood Debt to China” (#北约至今还欠中国一笔血债#) and “The US is Not Qualified to Tell China How to Act” (#美方没资格来告诉中方怎么做#).

These hashtags were promoted on Sina Weibo, one of China’s biggest social media platforms, by state media outlet People’s Daily, receiving over 1.2 billion and 650 million views respectively.

Online poster published by People’s Daily reiterating the words of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson that the United States is not qualified to tell the Chinese side on how to act in light of national sovereignty and territorial integrity (source: People’s Daily, Weibo).

The sentences came up during the February 24th press conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which spokesperson Hua Chunying answered various questions relating to the situation in Ukraine. One of them, posed by a CCTV reporter, referred to comments made by US State Department spokesperson Ned Price, who suggested that China has an obligation to urge Russia to “back down” to de-escalate the situation.

Hua Chunying responded by mentioning China’s recent history of humiliation at the hands of Western powers, saying that “the US is in no position to tell China off.” Hua brought up the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia, which killed three Chinese journalists, stating: “NATO still owes the Chinese people a debt of blood.”

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson condemned the United States for its history of continuous overseas military operations and claimed that China still faces “a realistic threat” from the U.S. and its allies today. Joining Western ‘bloc politics’ in condemning Russia is not something China is interested in doing, she concluded. One video of Hua Chunying’s remarks received over two million ‘likes’ on the Weibo platform.

How this specific moment of the press conference was singled out and highlighted by Chinese state media set the tone for the way in which the Russia-Ukraine conflict is framed by official media when it comes to China’s role in it, shifting the narrative from Beijing’s responsibility to Washington’s irresponsibility.

The China Daily frontpage of February 24th literally mentioned how the “irresponsible” United States was “adding fuel to the Ukraine crisis” and accused Washington of aggravating tensions and creating panic on the Ukraine issue. The Jiefang Daily reiterated that same message, meanwhile stressing that China has acted as a responsible leader in avoiding incitement of war (Mo 2022, 1; Liao Qin 2022, 5).

Cartoon published on the English-language site of Chinese state-run media outlet Global Times, by Global Times cartoonist Liu Rui (source link).

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, videos showing footage of the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade started circulating online. The influential online news portal Guancha.cn was one of the accounts sharing a short video showing footage of the aftermath of the deadly bombing by the U.S. government, which claimed its intention had been to bomb a Yugoslav arms agency (Parsons & Xu 2001: 51). “We can never forget this day,” Guancha.cn wrote, and soon there were bloggers creating new content on the Belgrade incident explaining why the NATO owed the Chinese people and why the U.S. has no right to pressure China in how to act.

Screenshots from online info sheets explaining “What is NATO’s blood debt to China?” by well-known comic blogger @赛雷三分钟 (link to Weibo source).

This trending topic is telling for how the Russia-Ukraine conflict comes up in Chinese news coverage and on Chinese social media, with many reports and discussions about the situation actually not focusing on what is happening on the ground in Ukraine, but instead focusing on other issues that are framed within Chinese news narratives of the Russia-Ukraine war.

The NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia is one example. The status of Taiwan is another larger recurring topic discussed within the context of the Ukraine conflict.

 

“Today’s Ukraine, Tomorrow’s Taiwan?”

 

Soon after the Russian invasion of Ukraine became a reality, Chinese social media users began drawing comparisons between the Taiwan situation and the Ukrainian developments.

“Today’s Ukraine, tomorrow’s Taiwan?” is a phrase that is going around Chinese media a lot these days. On the one hand, many online commenters see the rapid invasion of Ukraine as a warning to Taiwanese that the situation in Taiwan could change within a time frame of just a few days. One meme making its rounds showed a pig called “Taiwan” watching another pig, “Ukraine”, get slaughtered.

A meme circulating on social media shows a pig “Taiwan” watching the slaughtering of another pig “Ukraine.”

Other bloggers see the developments in Ukraine as a warning to mainland Chinese that the West could influence and trigger conflict, and that they could send weapons or provide military support to Taiwan if mainland China would employ force to realize a ‘reunification’ with Taiwan.

Although Chinese authorities have stated that it would be unwise to draw parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan, online conversations comparing the two are ongoing. The search index of Baidu, China’s most popular search engine, clearly shows how web search queries for ‘Taiwan’ peaked at the same time when searches for the term ‘Russia-Ukraine Conflict’ also exploded (see image below).

Baidu Index trend search tool, screenshot via author.

This trend is also fueled by Chinese state media reports about Taiwan. On February 26th, the Global Times news outlet reported that the US Navy destroyer Ralph Johnson was passing through the sensitive Taiwan Strait. Although American officials called the passage “routine” (the warship also sailed through the Taiwan Strait in previous years), the move was presented as a provocative one by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs during a press conference on March 1st.

Following more discussions on Taiwan in the light of Ukraine developments, China Central Television News (CCTV) initiated the hashtag “The Hope for Taiwan’s Future Lies in Achieving National Reunification” (#台湾的前途希望在于实现国家统一#) after Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi addressed the issue during a March 7 press conference.

Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs once again stressed how Ukraine and Taiwan could not be compared because of Taiwan’s status as “an inalienable part of China’s territory” that will eventually be reunified with the mainland, the address inescapably added to the incorporation of the Ukraine issue into a specific Chinese narrative, triggering more discussions on the differences and similarities between Ukraine’s today and Taiwan’s tomorrow.

 

“If You’re Anti-War, You Must Be Anti-American”

 

One other trend that has been clearly visible in Chinese social media discussions regarding the Ukraine conflict is the perceived dichotomy between being ‘anti-war’ and ‘anti-American.’

Although there certainly is public sympathy for the victims of this conflict, Chinese social media is seeing a growing trend of people opposing the anti-war movement, calling them hypocritical and naive for raising their voices to call out this war while they perhaps were not as vocal in condemning other conflicts. According to this reasoning, strong anti-war opponents are labeled as being ‘pro-American.’

One popular science blogger (12+ million followers) on Weibo nicknamed Occam’s Razor (@奥卡姆剃刀) posted a meme (image below) on February 27th, writing:

“Some people are bitterly bashing Russia while self-righteously preaching against the war. Of course, it is correct to be anti-war, and everyone should defend world peace. But you should ask them: were you also anti-war when the United States invaded Iran, Iraq, Panama, Libya, Yugoslavia, or Afghanistan?”

One meme shared on social media, showing a person with “no expression” when the U.S. drops bombs on Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Libya, and shouting “I’m Anti-War!!” in the last picture when Russia attacks Ukraine.

The idea that anti-war advocates have a hidden agenda if they are not also speaking out against the United States is visible in countless of posts and videos, not just on Chinese social media site Weibo but also on other popular platforms such as Bilibili and Douyin, where catchy slogans such as “If you’re anti-war but not anti-American, you’re up to no good [you have ulterior motives]” (“反战不反美,心里都有鬼”) and “If you’re anti-war and not anti-American, you are inhumane” (“反战不反美就是反人类”) are ubiquitous.

Over the past years, China’s online media environment has seen several waves of anti-Americanism. In the fall of 2021, China’s epic war movie The Battle at Lake Changjin became a major success. The film, that shows how Chinese troops were severely underestimated by the U.N. forces during the Korean war, came at a time of heightened U.S.-China tensions. According to one of the scriptwriters, the film was supposed to convey that “the Chinese are not to be messed with” (Koetse 2021). It sent out the message that China had to enter the war to fight the ‘imperialist’ United States and its allies as these foreign forces, who looked down on them, would otherwise expand all the way to the doorstep of China and endanger the peaceful development of their newly established nation.

Many Chinese are now also suggesting that the Ukraine conflict is like “China’s Korean War for Russia.” One political cartoon shared on social media titled “Western Public Opinion” shows a zoomed-in image of a big scary bear (“Russia”) and a small, frightened man (“Ukraine”) on a television screen. The scene below shows the full scene, revealing how the small “Ukraine” man, backed by three helpers (“U.S.”, “NATO,” and “Britain”), is poking at the mother bear (“Russia”) who is protecting her cubs in her den.

This adapted cartoon was shared on Weibo, original cartoon is by Pusang Gala and is titled “Narrative vs Reality” (artist page on Facebook).

Online anti-American sentiments are also fueled by Chinese media reports highlighting how other Asian countries supposedly criticize the West and support Russia. When Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan lashed out in response to foreign pressure pushing Pakistan to condemn Russia – asking “What do you think of us? Are we your slaves?” – Chinese media outlet Guancha.cn was quick to turn the topic into a social media hashtag (“Pakistan Asks: Are We a Slave to the West?”). Similarly, the state-run Global Times promoted one of its articles about Indian social media users showing their support for Putin (hashtag: “Great Number of Indian Web Users Strongly Support Russia”).

Meanwhile, the English-language Global Times Twitter account posted a photo of India allegedly lighting up one of its landmark buildings, the Qutub Minar, in support of Russia. The tweet turned out to be misleading, as the Qutub Minar was illuminated on the occasion of Jan Aushadhi Diwas to generate awareness about the usages of generic medicines.

Tweet by Global Times, screenshot by author.

On March 8, as the war between Russia and Ukraine entered day 13, one of the top trending topics on Chinese social media was not the two million people who have fled the war, but the alleged uncovering of 26 U.S. military biological laboratories in Ukraine (hashtag: “The 26 American Biolabs in Ukraine Are Just Tip of Iceberg”).

During a press briefing, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Zhao Lijian expressed concern over the alleged existence of many U.S. biological labs in Ukraine and elsewhere, and questioned the intentions behind running them. According to Bloomberg News, the Chinese accusations of the American military operating ‘dangerous’ biolabs mirrored Russian diversion tactics to justify the Russian invasion. But on Weibo, the topic was viewed over 180 million times within hours and led to countless of comments from Chinese web users condemning the U.S. and demanding answers about the truth behind these biological laboratories.

The Russia-Ukraine war is dominating Chinese online media, without zooming in on what exactly is taking place on the battlegrounds today. In the end, the main framework that Chinese media outlets and bloggers are using to make sense of the Russia-Ukrainian conflict might have much more to do with Beijing’s own strategic ambitions in a changing international community than it has to do with Moscow or Kyiv. Strengthening that news frame is the narrative of China’s painful memories of humiliation at the hands of the very same Western powers that are now trying to get China on their side.

By Manya Koetse

(follow on X, LinkedIn, or Instagram)

 
REFERENCES*

• Koetse, Manya. 2021. “The Unforgotten Victory: Why ‘The Battle at Lake Changjin’ Is One of China’s Biggest Films Yet.” What’s on Weibo, November 4 https://www.whatsonweibo.com/the-unforgotten-victory-why-the-battle-at-lake -changjin-is-one-of-chinas-biggest-films-yet/ [7.3.22].

• Liao Qin. 2022. “The Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict on World Patterns [俄乌冲突 对世界格局影响几何].” (In Chinese). Jiefang Daily, February 25: page 5.

• Mo Jingxi. 2022. “US adding fuel to Ukraine crisis ‘irresponsible.’” China Daily Hong Kong, February 24: page 1.

• Parsons, Paul and Xu Xiaoge. 2001. “New Framing of the Chinese Embassy Bombing by the People’s Daily and the New York Times.” Asian Journal of Communication 11 (1): 51- 67.

*All other sources are linked to within the text, both in Chinese and English language.

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Chapter Dive

The “Are You Dead Yet?” Phenomenon: How a Dark Satire Became China’s #1 Paid App

A virtual Viagra for a pressured generation? The real story behind China’s latest viral app.

Manya Koetse

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From censored joke to state-friendly app, ‘Are You Dead Yet?’ has traveled a long road before reaching the top of China’s paid app charts this week. While marketed as a tool for those living alone to check in with emergency contacts, the app’s viral success actually isn’t all about its features.

It is undoubtedly the most unexpected app to go viral in 2026, and the year has only just started. “Are You Dead?” or “Dead Yet?” (死了么, Sǐleme) is the name of the daily check-in app that surged to the No. 1 spot on Apple’s paid app chart in China on January 10–11, quickly becoming a widely discussed topic on Chinese social media. It has since become a top-searched topic on the Q&A platform Zhihu and beyond, and by now, you may even have noticed it appearing on your local news website.

For many Chinese who first encountered the app, its name caused unease. In China, casually invoking words associated with death is generally considered taboo, seen as causing bad luck. It was therefore especially noteworthy to see state media outlets covering the trend. The fact that the name plays on China’s popular food delivery platform Ele.me (饿了么, “Hungry Yet?”), a household name, may also have softened the linguistic sensitivity.

Beyond the name, attention soon shifted to the broader social undercurrents and collective anxieties reflected in the app’s sudden popularity.

 
🔹 “A More Reassuring Solo Living Experience”
 

Are You Dead Yet? is a basic app designed as a safety tool for people living alone, allowing them to “check in” with loved ones. The Chinese app has been available on Apple’s App Store since 2025 and currently costs 8 yuan (US$1.15) to download.

The app is very straightforward and does not require registration or login. Users simply enter their name and an emergency contact’s email address. Each day, they tap a button to virtually “check in.”

If a user fails to check in for two consecutive days, the system automatically sends an email notification to the designated emergency contact the following day, prompting them to check on the user’s safety.

The app was created by Guo Mengchu (郭孟初) and two of his Gen Z friends from Zhengzhou, all born after 1995. Together, they founded the company Moonlight Technology (月境技术服务有限公司) in March 2025, with a registered capital of 100,000 yuan (US$14,300). The app was reportedly developed in just a few weeks at a cost of approximately 1,000 yuan (around US$143).

In the text introducing the Dead Yet? app, the makers write that the app is specifically intended to “build seamless security protection for a more reassuring solo living experience” (“构建无感化安全防护,让独处生活更安心”).

 
🔹 The Rise of China’s Solo-Living Households
 

The number of solo households in China has skyrocketed over the past three decades. In the mid-1990s, only 5.9% of households in China were one-person households. By 2011, that number had nearly tripled from 19 million to 59 million, accounting for nearly 15% of China’s households.1,2 By now, the number is bigger than ever: single-person households account for over 25% of all family households.3

These roughly 125 million single-person households are partly the result of China’s rapidly aging society, along with its one-child policy. With longer life expectancies and record-low birth rates, more elderly people, especially widowed women, are living alone without their (grand)children.

China’s massive urban-rural migration, along with housing reforms that have adapted to solo-living preferences, has also contributed to the fact that China is now seeing more one-person households than ever before. By 2030, the number may exceed 150 million.

But other demographic shifts play an increasingly important role: Chinese adults are postponing marriage or not getting married at all, while divorce rates are rising. Over the past few years, Chinese authorities have introduced various measures to encourage marriage and childbirth, from relaxed registration rules to offering benefits, yet a definitive solution to combat China’s declining birth rates remains elusive.

 
🔹 A “Lonely Death”: Kodokushi in China
 

Especially for China’s post-90s generation, remaining unmarried and childless is often a personal choice. On apps like Xiaohongshu, you’ll find hundreds of posts about single lifestyles, embracing solitude (享受孤独感), and “anti-marriage ideology” (不婚主义). (A few years back, feminist online movements promoting such lifestyles actually saw a major crackdown.)

Although there are clear advantages to solo living—for both younger people and the elderly—there are also definite downsides. Chinese adults who live alone are more likely to feel lonely and less satisfied with their lives 4, especially in a social context that strongly prioritizes family.

Closely tied to this loneliness are concerns about dying alone.

In Japan, where this issue has drawn attention since the 1990s, there is a term for it: kodokushi (孤独死), pronounced in Chinese as gūdúsǐ. Over the years, several cases of people dying alone in their apartments have triggered broader social anxiety around this idea of a “lonely death.”

One case that received major attention in 2024 involved a 33-year-old woman from a small village in Ningxia who died alone in her studio apartment in Xianyang. She had been studying for civil service exams and relied on family support for rent and food. Her body was not discovered for a long time, and by the time it was found, it had decomposed to the point of being unrecognizable.

Another case occurred in Shanghai in 2025. When a 46-year-old woman who lived alone passed away, the neighborhood committee was unable to locate any heirs or anyone to handle her posthumous affairs. The story prompted media coverage on how such situations are dealt with, but it drew particular attention because cases like this had previously been rare, stirring a sense of broader social unease.

 
🔹 The Sensitive Origins of “Dead Yet?”
 

Knowing all this, is there actually a practical need for an app like Dead Yet? in China? Not really.

China has a thriving online environment, and its most popular social media apps are used daily by people of all ages and backgrounds, across urban and rural areas alike. There are already countless ways to stay in touch. WeChat alone has 1.37 billion monthly active users. In theory (even for seniors) sending a simple thumbs-up emoji to an emergency contact would be just as easy as clocking in to the Dead Yet? app.

The app’s viral success, then, is not really about its functionality. Nor is it primarily about elderly people fearing a lonesome death. Instead, it speaks to the dark humor of younger adults who feel overwhelmed by pressure, social anxiety, and a pervasive sense of being unseen—so much so that they half-jokingly wonder whether anyone would even notice if they collapsed amid demanding work cultures and family expectations.

And this idea is not new.

After some online digging, I found that the app’s name had already gone viral more than two years earlier.

That earlier viral moment began with a Zhihu post titled “If you don’t get married and don’t have children, what happens if you die at home in old age?” (“不结婚不生孩子,老后死在家中怎么办”). Among the 1,595 replies, the top commenter, Xue Wen Feng Luo (雪吻枫落), whose response received 8,007 likes, wrote:

💬 “You could develop an app called “Dead Yet?” (死了么). One click to have someone come collect the body and handle the funeral arrangements.”

The original post that started it all. That humorous comment was the initial play on words linked to food delivery app Eleme (饿了么).

Two days later, on October 8, 2023, comedy creator Li Songyu (李松宇, @摆货小天才), also part of the post-90s generation, released a video responding to the comment.

In it, he presented a mock version of the app on his phone: its logo a small ghost vaguely resembling the Ele.me icon, and its interface showing some similarities to ride-hailing apps like Uber or Didi.

In the video, Li says:

🗯️ “Are You Dead Yet?’ I’ve already designed the app for you. (…) The app is linked to your smart bracelet. Once it fails to detect the user’s pulse, someone will immediately come to collect the body. Humanized service. You can choose your preferred helper for your final crossing, personalize the background music for cremation and burial, and even set the furnace temperature so you can enter the oven with peace of mind. Big-data matching is used to connect people who might have known each other in life, followed by AI-assisted cemetery matching for the afterlife traffic ecosystem—you’ll never feel alone again. After burial, all content on your phone is automatically formatted to protect user privacy and eliminate worries about what comes after. There’s a seven-day no-reason refund, almost zero negative reviews, and even an ‘Afterlife Package’ with installment payments. Invite friends to visit the grave and have them help repay the debt. And if not everything turns to ashes properly, or if you’re dissatisfied with the shape of the remains, you can invite friends to burn them again and get the second headstone at half price! How about that? Tempted?

The original “Sileme” or “Dead Yet” app idea, October 2023.

The video went viral, drew media coverage (one report called the concept and design of the “Are You Dead?” app “unprecedented”), and sparked widespread discussion. Although viewers clearly understood that the idea—one click and someone arrives to collect the body and arrange the funeral—was a joke, it nevertheless struck a chord.

Many saw the video as a glimpse into China’s future, arguing that with extremely low birth rates and a rapidly aging society, such business ideas might one day become feasible. Some people pointed to Japan’s growing problem of elderly people dying alone, suggesting that China may come to face similar challenges. At the same time, it also sparked concerns about increasing social isolation.

Despite its popularity, both the video and the trending hashtag “Dead Yet App” (#死了么APP#) were taken offline. A comedy podcast episode discussing the concept—“Did Someone Really Create the ‘Dead Yet’ App?” (真的有人做出了“死了么”APP?), released on October 10, 2023 by host Liuliu (主播六六)—was also removed.

According to Li Songyu himself, the video went offline within 48 hours “for reasons beyond one’s control” (“出于不可抗因素”), a phrase often used to avoid explicitly referring to top-down decisions or censorship.

It is not hard to guess why the darkly humorous Dead Yet? concept disappeared. And it wasn’t only because of crude jokes or the sensitivities surrounding death.

The video appeared less than a year after the end of China’s stringent zero-Covid policies, which had been preceded by protests. In both early and late 2023, Covid infections were widespread and hospitals were overcrowded. It was therefore a particularly sensitive moment to joke about bodies, afterlife logistics, and people being “taken away.”

Moreover, 2023 was a year in which state media strongly emphasized “positive energy,” promoting stories of heroism, self-sacrifice, and resilience in the face of hardship. It was not a time to dwell on death, and certainly not through humor.

 
🔹 Why a Censored Idea Became a ‘State-Friendly’ App
 

In 2025, things looked very different. Just weeks after the current Dead Yet? app was developed, it was released on the App Store on June 10, 2025. Not only was its name identical to the app “introduced” by Li in 2023, but its logo was also a clear lookalike.

The 2023 logo and 2025 “Dead Yet?” logo’s.

Although Li Songyu published a video this week explaining that he and his team were the original creators of the Dead Yet? concept and that they had planned to develop a real app before the idea was censored (without ever registering the trademark), app creator Guo Mengchu has simply stated that the inspiration for their app came “from the internet.”

In the same interview, Guo also emphasized that the app’s sudden rise was entirely organic, with the whole process of “going viral,” from ordinary users to content creators to mainstream media, taking about a day and a half.5

However, the app’s actual track record suggests a much bumpier journey.6 Since its launch, it has been taken down once and was reportedly removed from the App Store rankings three times. Such removals commonly occur due to suspected artificial download inflation, ranking manipulation, or other compliance-related issues.

After the most recent delisting on December 15, 2025, the app returned to the App Store on December 25—and only then did it finally have its breakthrough moment.

📌 Looking at how online discussions unfolded around the app, it becomes clear that, just as in 2023, the idea of relying on technology to ensure someone will notice if you die strongly resonates with people. Many users also seem to have downloaded it simply as a quirky app to try out. Once curiosity set in, the snowball quickly started rolling.

📌 But Chinese state media have also played a significant role in amplifying the story. Outlets ranging from Xinhua (新华) and China Daily (中国日报) to Global Times (环球时报) have all reported on the app’s rise and subsequent developments.

🔎 Why was Li Songyu’s Dead Yet? app idea not allowed to remain online, while Guo’s version has been able to thrive? The difference lies not only in timing, but also in tone. Li’s original concept leaned more clearly toward implicit social critique & satire. Guo’s app, by contrast, has been framed — and received — with far less overt sarcasm. While many netizens may still interpret it as dark humor, within official narratives it aligns more neatly with the family-focused social discourse, and perhaps even functions as an implicit warning: if you end up alone, you may literally need an app to ensure you do not die unnoticed.

In this way, the young creators of the new app are, perhaps inadvertently, contributing to an ongoing official effort in media discourse and local initiatives to encourage Chinese single adults to settle down and start a family. For them, however, it is a business opportunity: more than sixty investors have already expressed interest in the app.

Funnily enough, many single men and women actually hope to use the app to support their lifestyle. When, during the upcoming Chinese New Year, parents start nagging about when they will settle down, and warn that they might otherwise die alone, they can now reply that they’ve already got an app for that.

 
🔹 What’s in a Name?
 

Over the past few days, much of the discussion has centered on the app’s name, which is what drew attention to it in the first place. As interest in the app surged, fueled by international media coverage, criticism of the name also grew. Some found it too blunt, while public commentators such as Hu Xijin openly suggested that it be changed.

Considering that the mention of death itself carries online sensitivities in China, it’s possible that there’s been some criticism from internet regulators, and the Ele.me platform also might not be too pleased with the name’s resemblance.

Whatever the exact reasons, the app’s creators announced on January 13 that they would abandon the original name and rebrand the app as its international name ‘Demumu’ (De derived from death, the rest intentionally sounds like ‘Labubu’).

This marked a notable shift in stance: just two days earlier, one of the app’s creators had stated that they had not received any formal requests from authorities to change the name and had shown no apparent intention of doing so.

Most commenters felt that without the original name, the app doesn’t make sense. “As young people, we don’t care so much about taboo words,” one commenter wrote: “Without this name, the app’s hype will be over.”

On January 14, the creators then made another U-turn and invited app users to think of a new name themselves, rewarding the first user who proposes the chosen name with a 666 yuan reward ($95).

The naming hurdles suggest the makers are quite overwhelmed by all the attention. At the same time, dozens of competing apps have already appeared. One of them, launched just a day after Are You Dead Yet? went viral, is “Are You Still Alive?” (活了么), which offers similar basic functions but is free.

This new wave of similar apps has also led more people to wonder how effective these tools really are once the quirkiness wears off. One Weibo blogger wrote:

💬 “I really don’t understand why this app went viral. You can only check in daily, and you need to miss two consecutive check-in days for the emergency contact to be alerted. That means, if something actually happens, someone will only come after three days!! You’ll be rotting away in your home!!

Others also suggested that it is clear the app was designed by younger people—the elderly users who might need it most would likely forget to check in on a daily basis.

 
🔹 Why “Dead Yet?” Is Like Viagra for a Pressured Generation
 

Amid the flood of Chinese media coverage, one commentary by the Chinese media platform Yicai7 stands out for pinpointing what truly lies behind the app’s popularity.

The author of the piece “Behind the Viral Rise of the ‘Dead Yet’ App” (in Chinese) argues that the app did not win users over because of its practical utility. Its main users are young people for whom premature death is an extremely low-probability event. They are clearly not downloading the app because they genuinely fear that “no one would know if they died,” nor are they likely to check in daily for such a tiny risk.

Since the app is clearly being embraced by users that do not belong to the actual target group, it must be providing some unexpected value.

💊 The author compares this unplanned function of the app to how Viagra was originally developed to treat heart disease. In this case, app users say that interacting with Dead Yet? feels like a lighthearted joke shared between close friends, offering a sense of social empathy and emotional release in a way that does not feel pressured.

Because the pressure—that’s the problem. Yicai describes just how multidimensional the pressures facing many young adults in China today can be: there is the economic challenge of the never-ending rat race dubbed “involution” along with uncertainty in the job market; there’s the “996” extreme work culture across various industries, leaving little room for private life; traditional family expectations that clash with housing and childcare costs that many find unattainable; and the world of WeChat and other social media, which can further intensify peer pressure and anxiety.

Of course, a lot has been written about these issues through the years. But do people really get it?

According to Yicai, there’s not enough understanding or support for the kinds of challenges young people face in China today. Even worse, older generations’ own past experiences often impose additional burdens on younger people, who keep running up against traditional notions while receiving inadequate support in areas such as education, employment, housing, marriage, family life, and even healthcare.

The author describes the unexpected viral success of Dead Yet? as a mirror with a message:

💬 “The viral popularity of ‘Are You Dead?’ seems like a darkly humorous social metaphor, reminding us to pay attention to the living conditions and inner worlds of today’s youth. For the young people downloading the app, what they need clearly isn’t a functional safety application, it’s a signal that what they really need is to be seen and to be understood—a warm embrace from society.

Will the Dead Yet? app survive its name change? Is there a future for Demumu, or whatever it will end up being called? As it is now—the basic app with check-in and email or SMS functions—it might not keep thriving beyond the hype. If it doesn’t, it has at least already fulfilled an important function: showing us that in a highly digitalized, stressful, and often isolating society where AI and social media play an increasingly major role, many people yearn for the simple reassurance of being noticed, mixed with a shared delight in dark humor. Just a little light to shine on us, to remind us that we’re not dead yet.

By Manya Koetse
(follow on X, LinkedIn, or Instagram)

Thanks to Ruixin Zhang & Miranda Barnes for additional research

1 Wei-Jun Jean Yeung and Adam Ka-Lok Cheung. 2013. “Living Alone in China: Historical Trends, Spatial Distribution, and Determinants.”
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Living-Alone-in-China-%3A-Historical-trend-%2C-Spatial-Yeung-Cheung/8df22ddeb54258d893ad4702124066b241bbdf8d.
2 Wei-Jun Jean Yeung and Adam Ka-Lok Cheung. 2015. “Temporal-Spatial Patterns of One-Person Households in China, 1982–2005.” Demographic Research 32: 1103–1134.
3 Li Jinlei (李金磊). 2022. “China’s One-Person Households Exceed 125 Million: Why Are More People Living Alone?”[中国新观察|中国一人户数量超1.25亿!独居者为何越来越多?]. China News Service (中国新闻网), January 14, 2022. https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cj/2022/01-14/9652147.shtml (accessed January 13, 2026).
4 Danan Gu, Qiushi Feng, and Wei-Jun Jean Yeung. 2019. “Reciprocal Dynamics of Solo Living and Health Among Older Adults in Contemporary China.”
The Journals of Gerontology: Series B 74 (8): 1441–1452. https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gby140.
5 Wang Fang (王方). 2026. “‘How We Went Viral: The Founder of the ‘Dead Yet?’ App Speaks Out’” [‘死了么’创始人亲述:我们是如何爆红的]. Pencil Way (铅笔道), interview with Guo (郭先生), published via 36Kr (36氪), January 13, 2026. https://www.36kr.com/p/3637294130922754 (accessed January 13, 2026).
6 Lü Qian (吕倩). 2026. “‘Am I Dead?’ App Price Raised from 1 Yuan to 8 Yuan, Previously Removed from Apple App Store Rankings Multiple Times”
[‘死了么从一元涨至八元,曾被苹果AppStore多次清榜’]. Diyi Caijing (第一财经), January 11, 2026. https://www.yicai.com/news/102997938.html (accessed January 14, 2026).
7 First Financial/Yicai (第一财经). 2026. “Behind the Viral Rise of the ‘Am I Dead?’ App: Young People Need a Hug” [‘死了么爆火背后,年轻人需要一个拥抱’]. Official account article, January 12, 2026. https://www.toutiao.com/article/7594671238464569899/ (accessed January 14, 2026).

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China Media

China’s “AFP Filter” Meme: How Netizens Turned a Western Media Lens into Online Patriotism

Chinese netizens embraced a supposed “demonizing” Western gaze in AFP photos and made it their own.

Ruixin Zhang

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For a long time, Chinese netizens have criticized how photography of Chinese news events by Western outlets—from BBC and CNN to AFP—makes China look more gloomy or intimidating. During this year’s military parade, the so-called “AFP filter” once again became a hot topic—and perhaps not in the way you’d expect.

In the past week following the military parade, Chinese social media remained filled with discussions about the much-anticipated September 3 V-Day parade, a spectacle that had been hyped for weeks and watched by millions across the country.

That morning, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, accompanied by his wife Peng Liyuan, welcomed international guests on the red carpet. When Xi arrived at Tiananmen Square alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, office phone calls across the country quieted, and school classes paused to tune in to one of China’s largest-ever military parades along Chang’an Avenue in Beijing, held to commemorate China’s victory over Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II.

As tanks rolled and jets thundered overhead, and state media outlets such as People’s Daily and Xinhua livestreamed the entire event, many different details—from what happened on Tiananmen Square to who attended, and what happened before and after, both online and offline—captured the attention of netizens.

Amid all the discussions online, one particularly hot conversation was about the visual coverage of the event, and focused on AFP (法新社), Agence France Press, the global news agency headquartered in Paris.

Typing “AFP” (法新社) into Weibo in the days after the parade pulled up a long list of hashtags:

  • Has AFP released their shots yet?
  • V-Day Parade through AFP’s lens
  • AFP’s god-tier photo
  • Did AFP show up for the parade?

 
The fixation may seem odd—why would Chinese netizens care so much about a French news agency?

Popular queries centered on AFP.

The story actually goes back to 2022.

In July of that year, on the anniversary of the Communist Party’s founding, one Weibo influencer (@Jokielicious) noted that while domestic photographers portrayed the celebrations as bright and triumphant, she personally preferred the darker, almost menacing image of Beijing captured by Western journalists. In her view, through their lens, China appeared more powerful—even a little terrifying.

The original post.

The post went viral. Soon, netizens began comparing more of China’s state media photos with those from Western outlets. One photo in particular stood out: Xinhua’s casual, cheerful shot of Chinese soldiers contrasted sharply with AFP’s cold, almost cinematic frame.

Same event, different vibe. Chinese social media users compared these photos of Xinhua (top) versus AFP (down). AFP photo shot by Fred Dufour.

Netizens joked that Xinhua had made the celebration look like the opening of a new hotel, while AFP had cast it as “the dawn of an empire.”

Gradually, what began as a dig at the bad aesthetics of state media turned into something else: a subtle shift in how Chinese netizens were rethinking their country’s international image.

Under the hashtag #ChinaThroughOthersLens (#老中他拍), netizens shared images of China as seen through the lenses of various Western media outlets.

This wasn’t the first time such talk had appeared. In the early days of the Chinese internet, people often spoke of the so-called “BBC filter.” The idea was that the BBC habitually put footage of China under a grayish filter, making its visuals give off a vibe of repression and doom, which many felt was at odds with the actual vibrancy on the ground. To them, it was proof that the West was bent on painting China as backward and gloomy.

These discussions have continued in recent years.

For example, on Weibo there were debates about a photo of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, shot by Peter Thomas for Reuters, and used in various Western media reports about Wuhan and Covid as early as 2021. The top image shows the photographer’s vantage point.

“Looks like a cockroach in the gutter,” one popular comment described it.

Top image by Chinese media, lower image by Peter Thomas/Reuters, and was used in various Western media reports about Wuhan and Covid since as early as 2021.

Another example is the alleged “smog filter” applied by Western media outlets to Beijing skies during the China visit of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in 2024.

The alleged “smog filter” applied to Beijing skies during Blinken’s visit. Top image: Chinese media. Middle: BBC. Lower: Washington Post.

AFP, meanwhile, seemed to offer a different kind of ‘distortion.’

Netizens said AFP’s photos often had a low-saturation, high-contrast, solemn tone, with wide angles that made the scenes feel oppressive yet majestic. Over time, any photo with that look—whether taken by AFP or not—was dubbed the “AFP filter” (法新社滤镜).

AFP has clarified multiple times that many of the viral examples weren’t even theirs—or that they were, but had been altered with an extra dark filter. They also refuted claims that AFP had published a photo series of Chinese soldiers titled “Dawn of Empire” to discredit China’s army.

AFP refuted claims that their photos discredited the Chinese army.

Nevertheless, the “AFP filter” label stuck. It became shorthand for a Western gaze that cast China not as impoverished or broken—as some claimed the “BBC filter” did—but as formidable, like a looming supervillain.

One running joke summed it up neatly: domestic shots are the festive version; Western shots are the red-tyrant version. And increasingly, netizens admitted they preferred the latter, commenting that while AFP shots often emphasize red to suggest authoritarianism, they actually like the red and what it stands for.

So, when this year’s V-Day came around, many were eager to see how AFP and other Western outlets would frame China as the dark, dangerous empire.

But when the photos dropped, the reaction was muted. They looked average. Some called them “disappointing.” “Where are the dark angles? Not doing it this time?” one blogger wondered. “Where’s the AFP hotline? I’d like to file a complaint!”

“Xinhua actually beat you this time,” some commented on AFP’s official Weibo account. Others agreed, putting the AFP photos and Xinhua photos side by side.

AFP photos on the left versus Xinhua photos on the right.

To make up for the letdown, people began editing the photos themselves—darkening the tones, adding dramatic shadows, and proudly labeling them with the tag “AFP filter” or calling it “The September 3rd Military Parade Through a AFP Lens” (法新社滤镜下的9.3阅兵). “Now that’s the right vibe,” they said: “I fixed it for you!”

Netizen @哔哔机 “AFP-fied” photos of the military parade by AFP.

Official media quickly picked up on the trend. Xinhua rolled out its own hashtags—#XinhuaAlwaysDeliversEpicShots (#新华社必出神图的决心#) and #XinhuaWins (#新华社秒了#)—and positioned itself as the true master of a new aesthetic narrative.

The message was clear: China no longer needs the Western gaze to frame itself as powerful or intimidating; it can do that on its own.

The “AFP v Xinhua” contest, the online movement to “AFP-ify” visuals, and the Chinese fandom around AFP’s moodier shots may have been wrapped in jokes and memes, but they also pointed to something deeper: the once “demonized” image of China that Western media pushed as threatening is now not only accepted by Chinese netizens, it’s embraced. Many have made it part of a confident, playful form of online patriotism, applauding the idea of being seen by the West as fearsome, even villainous, believing it amplifies China’s global authority.

As one netizen wrote: “I like it when we look like we crawl straight into their nightmares.”

Chinese journalist Kai Lei (@凯雷) suggested that these kinds of trends showed how the Chinese public plays an increasingly proactive role in shaping China’s global image.

By now, the AFP meme has become so strong that it doesn’t even require AFP anymore. Ultra-dramatic shots are simply called “AFP-level photos” (法新社级别).

For now, as many are enjoying the “afterglow” of the military parade, their appreciation for the AFP-style only seems to grow. As one Weibo user summed it up: “AFP tried to create a sense of oppression with dark, low-angle shots, but instead only strengthened the Chinese military’s aura of majesty.”

 
By Ruixin Zhang and Manya Koetse
 

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