According to a national large-scale survey, people in Lhasa, Tibet, were among the China’s happiest in 2016. This is the outcome of the annual “China Economic Life Survey” (中国经济生活大调查) by CCTV2.
China’s state broadcaster made a top 10 of China’s “happiest cities” based on multiple indicators, including family, marriage, health, social security, income, and more (People’s Daily).
The “China Economic Life Survey” program was broadcasted on CCTV2 on March 7.
These were China’s happiest cities according to the list:
拉萨 1.Lhasa (Tibet Autonomous Region)
成都 2.Chengdu (Sichuan province)
长春 3.Changchun (Jilin province)
银川 4.Yinchuan (Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region)
天津 5.Tianjin (Municipality)
合肥 6.Hefei, Anhui Province
长沙 7.Changsha, Hunan province
武汉 8.Wuhan, Hubei province
海口 9.Haikou, Hainan province
石家庄 10.Shijiazhuang, Hebei province
According to the poll, 76.12% of the survey’s participants in Lhasa indicated they were overall content, with 59.18% of the participants indicating they were “happy”, and 16.94% indicating they were “very happy.”
The main factors determining happiness for the people in Lhasa were family relations (62.12%), marriage & emotional life（52.31%), and health (46.92%). With 36,15%, income was ranked less important.
“Are Tibetans happy? There’s no way of knowing.”
CCTV first started its annual ‘Happiness Index’ in 2007, and since Lhasa has come out as the happiest city over half a dozen times. This result has led to cynicism in English language media; Tibet does not exactly hold the reputation of the happiest place, and some say the survey is undoubtedly flawed in multiple ways, as there no mention of civil rights, or rights to religious freedom.
In 2009, historian Ian Buruma wrote: “The Chinese government says Tibetans are happy. But without a free press and the right to vote, there is no way of knowing this. Sporadic acts of collective violence, followed by equally violent oppression, suggest that many are not.”
Séagh Kehoe, researcher on Tibetan identity issues at University of Nottingham, takes a similar stance and told What’s on Weibo that this annual survey presenting Lhasa as the happiest city in China is “powerful propaganda, effectively erasing any notion among Han Chinese that Tibetans might be unhappy, frustrated or facing extreme oppression within their homeland.”
Kehoe says: “It reaffirms a very particular message about Han Chinese bringing both modernity and happiness to Tibet, and Tibetans being extremely grateful for ‘Big Brother Han’ guiding them out of a ‘backward’ past and into a ‘golden era.'”
“The so-called Lhasa people she interviewed were all Han Chinese, leaving the impression that Lhasa had already turned into a harmonious Han city.”
Tibet blogger and activist Woeser also responded to the survey in 2011, describing how she first reacted when she heard about Lhasa’s status as China’s happiest city: “I laughed and asked back, living under gunpoint day and night, being followed by snipers even when going to the temple to pray, how can there be any sense of happiness?”
In her column, she suggests that the outcome of the CCTV survey is not necessarily invalid, but that it is biased in that it represents the Han Chinese living in Tibet. About 2008 she writes:
“I still remember the journalist from Phoenix TV, Hong Kong, who was standing in the streets of Lhasa on the fifth day after March 14, boasting that life in the city had already returned to normal; yet the so-called Lhasa people she interviewed were in fact all Han Chinese, thus leaving the impression that Lhasa had already turned into a harmonious Han city. This journalist was obviously being very selective. She did not take notice of Tibetans living in Lhasa; instead she portrayed the Han Chinese she interviewed as indigenous Lhasa people. This is why I think that perhaps those “Lhasa people” who are the “happiest” according to the CCTV survey are not actually Tibetans.”
The number of Han Chinese, China’s dominant ethnic group, has been on the rise in Tibet since the last number of decades. Although Tibetans still account for 90% of the permanent population of the TAR (Tibet Autonomous Region), 22% of the inhabitant of capital Lhasa are now Han Chinese (Economist 2016).
“It is time for the Western politicians and media to change their way of thinking on Tibet.”
Chinese media, on the other hand, have a completely different view on the issue. In an article from 2009, state media outlet China Daily argues that it is time “for the Western politicians and media to change their way of thinking on Tibet.”
The author states that Western politicians and media simply “refuse to change their outlook” on Tibet, blindly sticking to the idea that China is “an oppressive and negative power” in the region. The fact that the Tibetan population has seen an enormous growth in earnings, levels of education, life expectancy, etc., seems to “mean nothing to some Western countries and people.”
On Weibo, many people seem unsurprised that Lhasa has topped China’s “happy cities” list again: “The people of Lhasa are indeed very happy,” a young woman from Sichuan (@叫我小严姐姐) says: “The government is investing a lot of money there.”
This year, the development of Tibet was again presented as a core issue when China’s premier Li Keqiang promised to intensify efforts in the region’s poverty alleviation at the National People’s Congress.
Another woman writes: “Yes, I am from Lhasa and I am indeed happy.”
Yet, many people do think the poll must be inaccurate because they are surprised that the city of Wuhan is included in the list. One commenter says: “That Wuhan is included is so weird. The prices are high and the wages are low there!”
“Is this some other Wuhan?! Because the Wuhan I know has been raising its prices while keeping the earnings low,” other commenters also say. Wuhan is the capital of Hubei province. Despite the fact that many netizens express their dissatisfaction about the city, it ranked number 8 in the CCTV poll.
There are also people who take the matter about happiness in China’s cities more philosophical: “Happy people will be happy anywhere, unhappy people will still be unhappy even if they’re in a happy place,” one person says.
Another commenter writes: “If you’re happy or not is something only you know. As they say, happiness is like water, it can change temperature every day (幸福如饮水, 冷暖自知).”
Photos by Jessica Lia, Tibet.
Sources / Further Reading
Bo, Zhijue. 2010. China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization. Singapore: World Scientific.
Buruma, Ian. 2011. “Are Tibetans happy? There’s no way of knowing” The Globe And Mail, April 9 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/are-tibetans-happy-theres-no-way-of-knowing/article4284229/ [13.3.17].
He, Rulong. 2009. “Changes some people don’t want to see in Tibet.” China Daily, Nov 4 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-04/11/content_7668187.htm [14.3.17].
Economist. 2016. “Tibet: The plateau, unpacified.” The Economist Sep 17 http://www.economist.com/news/china/21707220-tibetans-culture-changing-their-own-will-well-force-plateau-unpacified [13.3.17].
People’s Daily. 2017. “Lhasa tops China’s happiest cities in 2016: CCTV poll.” People’s Daily, March 9 http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0309/c90000-9188001.html [12.3.17].
Woeser. 2011. “CCTV Says Lhasa People Are ‘Happiest’ By Woeser.” High Peaks Pure Earth, February 2 http://highpeakspureearth.com/2011/cctv-says-lhasa-people-are-happiest-by-woeser/ [14.3.17].
©2017 Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at email@example.com.
Gamifying Propaganda: Everything You Need to Know about China’s ‘Study Xi’ App
Scoring points by doing Xi-focused quizzes and watching ‘Xi Time’ news: this app takes propaganda to a whole other level.
On January 1st, the Xué Xí Qiáng Guó app was launched on various Chinese app stores. The app is an initiative by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and is linked to the xuexi.cn platform, which was first set up in 2018.
The app has been making headlines in Chinese and English-language media this week. The BBC referred to the app as a “little red book,” and reported that members of the ruling Communist Party, as well as state-owned company employees who are not Party members, have allegedly been required to download and use it on a daily basis (Feb 15).
The Guardian reported that government officials in Fujian province and Qingdao city held workshops last month stressing the political importance of the app, and directing local leaders to promote the app across government departments (Feb 15).
Although some reports claim that the app is making its way to top lists of most downloaded apps in China, it only scored a position 72 in the top 100 list of popular Chinese app store 360app at time of writing. The app store does state that the app has been downloaded 76.99 million times, with app users rating it with 2,5 stars out of 5. The app is only available in Chinese, and is not available from the Google Play store or Apple stores outside of China.
The app’s name (学习强国) is translated as the ‘Study Xi Strong Country’ app in various English-language media reports, but a more suitable translation would perhaps be ‘Study Xi, Strengthen China.’1 There’s a wordplay in the name, since the Mandarin word for ‘studying’ is ‘xuéxí’ which also incorporates the name of Xi, and in this context means both ‘Studying’ as well as ‘Study Xi.’
The main slogan of the ‘Study Xi’ app is one of Xi’s own sayings: “Dreams start with studying, careers start from doing” (“梦想从学习开始，事业从实践起步”, loose translation). Both the idea of ‘Dreams’ and of ‘Studying’ are concepts that are consistently promoted in the Xi era, with the idea that the common dream of the people is the ‘Chinese Dream’ of bringing about the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Within this Chinese dream, studying is generally promoted as a “secret weapon” that will strengthen the Party and the nation (Xiao 2016).
A Multi-Functional Propaganda Tool
So what is the ‘Study Xi, Strengthen China’ app? It basically is a multi-functional educational platform that offers users various ways to study Xi Jinping Thought, Party history, Chinese culture, history, and much more. Once people are registered on the app, they can also access the platform via PC.
An important part of the app is its news feed: its home page features “recommended” reads that all focus on Xi Jinping and the Party. Another major feature is its ‘quiz’ page: every week, there are different quizzes that users can do, relating to all sorts of things, from Party ideology to famous Chinese poems.
We’ve listed some of the app’s functions below. It is much more than a media app alone; it also has a social function, that allows users to connect with friends, message them, call them, and even send them ‘red envelopes’ (money presents).
The ‘red envelope’ function is made possible through Alipay, the online payment platform that is owned by Ant Financial Services Group, an affiliate company of the Chinese Alibaba Group.
One way for users to verify their identity on the app is also by linking it to their Alipay account. Various media reports also claim that the app is linked to Alibaba’s Ding Ding platform, an enterprise chat app that has a multitude of functions, many of which are also incorparated in the ‘Study Xi’ app (for more about Ding Ding, see our article here).
Given the cooperation with Alibaba, it is perhaps not surprising that upon registering for the app with just my phone number, it already knew my nickname without me putting it in. The app also listed an old smartphone I used some two years ago as a “frequently used” device, although I had just downloaded the app the day before and had never registered for it before.
So I just registered for the first time for the new “Study Xi Strong Country” app, which requires a phone number. It then told me “hi manyapan,” and that this phonenumber was already registered for the app. I’ve never registered before and never put in my manyapan nickname. 🤔 pic.twitter.com/8WQWq3D46T
— Manya Koetse (@manyapan) 16 februari 2019
“Study Xi” app day two. Not only did the app know my nickname upon registering for 1st time, it also lists a HTC phone I used some two years ago under “frequently used devices.” Most likely imports data from Alipay app. pic.twitter.com/qQ9Sdgk3Fp
— Manya Koetse (@manyapan) 17 februari 2019
Twitter user @yanshitou12 also noted that, upon using a friend’s number to register for the app, her Ding Ding conversations were automatically loaded into the chat history, suggesting that Alibaba’s Ding Ding is indeed fully integrated with the app.
My phone cn number expired, so I used friend’s number. The app automatically loaded her conversation history from the app 针针, on my phone, without even asking
— 盐石头 (@yanshitou12) 16 februari 2019
Like Ding Ding, the ‘Study Xi’ app also allows users to set up conference calls, send ‘self-deleting’ chats (like Snapchat), and use the app’s calendar function. Its many practical functions make this an app that is especially convenient for China’s 89,5 million Party members to stay close to the Party and its activities.
How to Score with Xi
The app’s most noteworthy and perhaps also most appealing feature is its scoring system, since it turns studying Party ideology and Xi Jinping Thought into a game.
Those who accumulate enough points can get an item from the app’s ‘prize shop.’ There are also contests which users can join to compete over a Huawei tablet or other items.
One Weibo user shared that she had just received her Modern Chinese Dictionary by mail through the app’s ‘gift shop,’ another person expressed her surprise that a delivery man came to deliver her prize at her door. “Thank you, Propaganda Department!”, she wrote.
The score system works as follows:
- Upon registering for the app, you receive 1 point.
- For every article or essay one reads, you get 1 point (one per article, does not work with articles that have already been viewed before).
- For every video you watch you get 1 point (the same video won’t be credited with an extra point if you see it twice).
- The time you spend on the app is also rewarded with points: for every 4 minutes of reading, you get 1 point (max 8 points per day).
- For every 5 minutes of watching a video, you get 1 point (max 8 points per day).
- You get 1 point for “subscribing” to a media account, which will then show up in your news feed.
- If you share two articles with friends, you get 1 point.
- You get 1 point for every two articles or essays you ‘save’ within the app.
- If you score 100% on a quiz, you get 10 points.
What is quite remarkable about the app, is that it encourages users to ‘Study Xi’ at particular times of the day. The morning 6:00-8:30 timeframe, along with the 12:00-14:00 slot and evening 20:00-22:30 times, are designated as so-called “active time slots” during which users can score double points for their activities. Within these time slots, reading an article would, for example, grant a user 2 points instead of 1.
This signals that, in line with good working morale, people are supposed to look into the app during their morning commute, their lunch break, and before bedtime, and are indirectly discouraged from using it during (office) working hours.
The points that are scored on the app will be valid for two years.
On Weibo, some netizens are quite serious about the ‘gaming’ aspect of this app, and have already found ways to cheat the system. They share tips and tricks on how to score within the app: points are credited within 10 seconds of clicking an article, for example, and watching videos can be easily rewarded with a point if one immediately scrolls to the end.
Through the PC version of the app, it is easy to let certain videos play while scrolling the internet, basically earning points without actually watching the videos.
“Thanks,” many commenters reply to these cheating tricks: “Just what I was looking for.” “I already received 50 points in one day!”
A Library in Your Pocket: Media, Books, Movies
The ‘Study Xi’ app focuses on some dozen media outlets that users can subscribe to and which also show up in the ‘recommended’ homepage feed.
Incorporated in the app are state media outlets China Daily (中国日报网), People’s Daily (人民网), Xinhua (新华), Qiushi Journal (求是网), China Military Web (中国军网), Economic Daily (经济日报), and others.
The app also incorporates local ‘Study Xi’ platforms, from Hubei to Jiangxi, from Shandong to Fujian.
Besides these media, the app also has TV channels people can watch videos on, from CCTV News to a special ‘Xi Time’ news programme, to various TV dramas, including Turbulence of the Mu Clan (木府风云) and Romance of Our Parents (父母爱情).
There is also a movie section within the app, where users can watch classics such as The Long March (长征), The Founding Ceremony of the Nation (开国大典), films on Deng Xiaoping or Zhou Enlai, and various movies that focus on the Second Sino-Japanese War.
The ‘Study Xi’ library section grants users access to dozens of books. On the desktop version, the library is shown as an actual office, where you can click on the books that are displayed on the shelves and read them.
Some books are those by Xi Jinping, including The Governance of China (习近平谈治国理政), but there are also books by the famous Chinese author Lu Xun, or the 20th-century classic Rickshaw Boy by Lao She, and various works on calligraphy and poetry.
There is also an entire section of books available from a whole range of topics varying from astronomy to maths, biology, and geography. The books are available for online reading in pdf.
In general, you could say that the selection of media, videos, and books all fall into the categories of Chinese traditional culture and canonical literature, historical themes, science and technology, and the political themes of Party ideology and the Xi Jinping Thought that focuses on ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (中国特色社会主义).
Those who read enough state media and Party articles will easily be able to do the quizzes and weekly questions in the app. Besides the standard ideological questions, it also draws from popular culture; I came across a question that used a trailer of China’s latest sci-fi movie The Wandering Earth that needed to be watched in order to complete the question.
Propaganda in the Xi Era
So how popular is the app, really? If the headlines in Chinese and non-Chinese media are to be believed, the majority of Chinese internet users are getting hooked on the app. That picture is perhaps the rose-colored one the Party would like to envision, but judging from social media comments and app ratings, reactions have been somewhat lukewarm.
On Weibo, there are some commenters who are sharing their 1000-point status on the app, or who say they enjoy looking into the app right before sleeping.
Dozens of commenters indicate that they have to assist their parents in using the app, or that it is not them, but their parents who are ‘hooked’ on the app – the majority of Weibo users are in the 20-35 years age group.
There are local trainings on making (older) Party members more familiar with the app, how to download it and how to use it. A local Chongqing community Weibo account recently posted the pictures below of their ‘Study Xi’ gathering.
On social media, some commenters complain about the fact that the Chinese Apple store has turned off the review comment sections on the app, despite the fact that it allegedly scored a number one spot in its “educational app” section.
Then there are also quite some commenters who say they often use the app: the score matters to them. In a time when everything is mobile, and online gaming is booming, it seems that ‘Study Xi, Strengthen China’ has made its app all the more relevant by adding the scoring element.
In doing so, the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party is continuing on the same route it has taken for the past couple of years, which shows a clear break with the propaganda machine before the Xi era.
Not only does the propaganda in the Xi era strengthen the idea of Xi as a political idol, it also fully embraces the Internet, the online media environment, and its related pop culture in doing so (also see Chang & Ren 2018).
Since 2017, various noteworthy propaganda moments, such as the 2017 Xi Clapping Game, the cartoonification of Xi, or the One Belt, One Road media publicity hype, all point in the same direction, namely that the Party propaganda will use the modes of communication and technology that are most popular among China’s (younger) online population to reach their audiences.
For now, I am still stuck below 50 points on the ‘Study Xi’ app. The scoring element is powerful: I feel triggered to get my score up. Maybe watch a few more videos, do better on the quiz, and read some more state media articles. I might just be tempted to go back for some more Xi-studies.
Chang, J., & Ren, H. 2018. “The powerful image and the imagination of power: the ‘new visual turn’ of the CPC’s propaganda strategy since its 18th National Congress in 2012. Asian Journal of Communication, 28(1), 1–19.
Xiao Junhua 肖君华. 2016. “Dreams Start with Learning – Studying General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Important Discourse on Learning [梦想从学习开始——学习习近平总书记关于学习的重要论述]” Guangming Daily, via CPC News, 7 July http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0707/c376186-28531506.html [18.1.19].
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Mimeng and ‘Self-Media’ under Attack for Promoting Fake News Stories to Chinese Readers
Chinese ‘zimeiti’ or ‘self media’ have become a topic of discussion after this Mimeng scandal.
It was one of the most-discussed topics on Weibo and WeChat right before the Chinese New Year: the scandal involving Chinese blogging account ‘Mimeng’ (咪蒙), which sparked discussions on Mimeng herself and on the regulation and responsibility of ‘we media’ accounts on the Chinese internet.
Who or what is ‘Mimeng’? First and foremost, Mimeng is an online social media account with an enormous fanbase: 13 million followers on WeChat, 2.6 followers on Weibo.
The person behind the Mimeng blogging account is Ma Ling (马凌), a Chinese female author and Literature graduate who was born in 1976 in Sichuan’s Nanchong.
Over the past few years, ‘Mimeng’ has grown into a so-called ‘we media’ or ‘self media’ platform (zimeiti 自媒体), referring to private, independent, online publishing accounts that get their content across through blogs, podcasts, and other online channels. Mimeng is now more than Ma Ling alone: there’s an entire team behind it.
Mimeng has been controversial for years because of its clickbait titles and controversial stances on various issues. The topics most addressed in Mimeng’s publications are relationships between men and women, love, marriage, quarreling, and extramarital affairs.
Previous articles published by Mimeng, who is a self-labeled ‘feminist’ (and often mocked for it), include titles such as “This Is Why You’re Poor,” “Jealously Means Progress,” “I Love Money, It’s True,” “Men Don’t Cheat for Sex,” or “How to Kill Your Wife.”
Besides its content, there are also other reasons why Mimeng has triggered controversy in the past. The fact that Mimeng charges a staggering amount of money to advertisers, for example, is also something that previously became a topic of discussion – Mimeng allegedly charges some 750,000 yuan ($113,000) for a post mention.
SELLING FAKE STORIES
“As an influential We Media source, we must take on our social responsibility”
This time, however, Mimeng is hit by the biggest controversy thus far. The media group is under attack after publishing a story that turned out to be (partly) fabricated. The story was published on a WeChat account called Talented Limited Youth (才华有限青年), which is registered under the same legal entity as Mimeng. Its primary author, according to Sixth Tone, is a former intern of Ma Ling called Yang Yueduo.
The publication in question is a long story titled “The Death of a Top Scorer from a Poor Family” (“一个出身寒门的状元之死”) which allegedly portrayed the short life of the author’s old classmate: a young, bright mind, born in an impoverished family in Sichuan province. In the story, the protagonist did all he could to create a better life for him and his family.
He studied hard, got the best university entrance score of his city, and successfully graduated from university. But despite his efforts to start a life in the big city, he failed to succeed and tragically died of cancer at the young age of 24.
Shortly after publication, the moving and tragic story went viral on social media. However, several details made online readers doubt the story’s authenticity. It did not take long before readers proved that several aspects of the story were indeed untrue.
In light of the fake news allegations, Talented Limited Youth quickly deleted the story from WeChat. They also issued a statement defending the story’s authenticity, explaining that for privacy reasons, various details of the story were altered. According to Beijing News, Talented Limited Youth was then banned from posting on WeChat for 60 days.
In response to the allegations, Mimeng offered its “sincerest apologies” on Weibo on February 1st, saying: “The Mimeng Group has decided to completely withdraw from Weibo and take a two-month break from WeChat. We will use that time to carry out serious and profound self-reflection.” The post continued saying that “as an influential We Media source, we must take on our social responsibility and pass on positive energy and values.”
The announcement went trending under the hashtag “Mimeng Shuts Down Weibo Indefinitely” (#咪蒙微博永久关停#), which has received over 210 million views at time of writing.
POISONED CHICKEN SOUP
“Mimeng, for you, patriotism is only business”
On social media, there is a clear divide between those who support and oppose Mimeng. While some are calling for a “complete shutdown” of Mimeng, there are also those who say they will keep on following Mimeng and that they enjoy their publications.
The controversial Mimeng account has even brought about a so-called “Following Mimeng Rate” (含咪率), a number based on how many of your WeChat friends are following Mimeng‘s public WeChat account (by checking Mimeng’s account on WeChat, WeChat users can see how many of their friends are following this account).
Mimeng opposers allege that the more friends you have that follow the Miming account, the more likely you are “to fail in life.”
The official Weibo account of the Jiangsu Public Security’s Bureau of ‘Internet Safety’ (@江苏网警) is also a clear Mimeng opposer. Last week, they lashed out against Mimeng in a post titled “Mimeng, for you, patriotism is only business.”
The post hints at Mimeng’s inconsistent stance on patriotism, and it included screenshots from two earlier Mimeng posts from 2013 and 2016, one in which patriotism is referred to as a kind of “forced love,” and the other one saying: “I’ll love my country forever, its greatness will forever move me to tears.”
The post by the Jiangsu Bureau itself then also blew up on Weibo, with the hashtag “Jiangsu Internet Police calls out Mimeng” (#江苏网警点名咪蒙#) soon gaining over 210 million views. In the comment sections, many people criticize Mimeng for “deceiving people,” “promoting negative values” and “using anything to get clicks.”
One person wrote: “These self-regulated media only care about making money, they have no sense of social responsibility.”
Others said that the fake news story was nothing but ‘poisoned chicken soup’ (毒鸡汤).
This is a term that is often used to describe Mimeng’s content, and that of other self-media accounts, meaning that from the outside, it looks like “feel-good content” or “chicken soup [for the soul]” while it is actually ‘poisonous’ content with a marketing strategy or money-making machine behind it.
“Self- media cannot become a spiritual pyramid scheme”
The Mimeng case has led to discussions in Chinese media on the status of ‘we media’ or ‘self-media’ platforms and their influence.
People’s Daily responded to the Mimeng scandal with a post on February 1st titled “Self-media Cannot Become a Spiritual Pyramid Scheme” (“自媒体不能搞成精神传销”), which argued that unless self-media accounts such as Mimeng actually work on establishing “healthy social values,” their apologies are only a way to temporarily dodge negative public attention.
In late January, Chongqing Internet authorities launched an investigation into 48 ‘self-media’ accounts, suspending two for spreading “fake news.”
State media outlet China News published an article, also this week, that describes ‘self-media’ as a ‘hypermarket’ where publishers will go to extreme measures, such as selling ‘fake news’ for clicks, spreading negative influences and anxiety among the people.
But these discussions are somewhat blurred, as it is not entirely clear what ‘self-media’ actually is in this context. Generally speaking, the term could include any micro-blogger who identifies themselves as ‘self-media’ or ‘we media’ (zimeiti 自媒体). But in the current discussion, it seems to only relate to those publishing accounts that have a certain influence on social media and the (online) media environment, posing a challenge to traditional news outlets.
Some definitions of Chinese ‘we media’ say it is basically is “an umbrella term for self-posted content on social media platforms” (Qin 2016; Jiang & Sun 2017) – this suggests that everyone who is active on WeChat and Weibo or elsewhere is basically in ‘self-media.’
A clearer description is given by Week in China, writing that “zimeiti typically operate as social media accounts run by individuals or as small firms established by a handful of former journalists.”
What makes it different from any other social media account, is that in ‘we-media’ or ‘zimeiti’ “the blogging has been professionalized and that the authors can make a living from it” (WiC 2018). It is a trend that has become especially visible in China’s online environment since 2012-2014.
This highly commercial side of ‘we media’ matters. If a publisher, such as Mimeng, charges advertisers exorbitant amounts of money, they also have to maintain a certain number of readers. They don’t just post as a hobby, it is serious business.
In a highly competitive online media environment, where hundreds of media outlets are fighting over the clicks of China’s online population of over 800 people, clickbait titles have almost become somewhat of a necessity for some of these publishers, with some even resorting to publishing “fake news” to get the attention – and the clicks.
China’s Newsweek Magazine (新闻周刊) calls the situation at hand a “self-media chaos” (自媒体乱象) that poses an “unprecedented challenge” for governing society in the 3.0 era. They call for “healthy development of self-media” and better legislation to control the mushrooming zimeiti, that, despite strong online censorship, are not as tightly controlled as China’s traditional media.
“Nowadays, we have less and less intellectuals, and more and more ‘people selling words.’ The chaos of self-media needs to be controlled,” one commenter on Weibo says (@ZY盒子).
But other people deem that readers themselves should pick what they read instead of authorities regulating it for them: “The important thing is that every reader must have the independence to judge for themselves [what they read]; just let the ‘poisonous chicken soup’ [naturally] lose their market.”
The Mimeng scandal shows that for social media accounts with a large following, one misstep can have huge consequences. This is something that Papi Jiang, a ‘self-media’ personality who became huge in 2015/2016, also experienced; she was reprimanded for disseminating “vulgar language and content” in April of 2016.
Very similar to Mimeng’s statement, Papi also issued an apology at the time, saying she supported the requirement for correction, and that she would attempt to convey “positive power” (正能量) in the future. “As a media personality,” she said, “I will watch my words and my image.” Papi’s CEO also expressed the company’s willingness to produce “healthier contents.” At the time, her videos were temporarily taken offline.
Meanwhile, some people think that the fact that Mimeng will stay silent for the coming two months is not necessarily a bad thing for the publisher: “They can take an extra long Spring Festival holiday.” As for Mimeng’s Weibo ‘holiday’ – that one is likely to be permanent.
-Qin, Amy. 2016. “China’s Viral Idol: Papi Jiang, a Girl Next Door With Attitude.” New York Times, 24 Aug https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/arts/international/chinas-viral-idol-papi-jiang-a-girl-next-door-with-attitude.html [2.6.19].
-Sun, Yanran and Jiang. 2017. “A Study on the Effectiveness of We-Media as a Platform for Intercultural Communication.” In New Media and Chinese Society, Ke Xue & Mingyang Yu (Eds.), 271-284. Singapore: Springer.
-WiC. 2018. “Headline earnings – Zimeiti hunt media profits but they still need to play by the rules.” Week in China, 15 June https://www.weekinchina.com/2018/06/headline-earnings/ [2.6.19].
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