Xi and Biden’s “Beautiful” Hongqi Moment: National Pride and Shifting Dynamics in Sino-American Relations
The recognition of the decades-old Chinese Hongqi brand by a U.S. president was a promotion-worthy moment for Chinese official channels, resonating with netizens.
After the much anticipated Xi-Biden meeting in California on November 15, one noteworthy detail quickly hit Weibo’s top trending topics, namely Biden’s apparent admiration for Xi Jinping’s Hongqi car. The hashtag “Biden Points at Hongqi Car, Calls it Beautiful” #拜登指着红旗车说beautiful#) had racked up over 300 million views on Weibo by Thursday night.
The short moment happened as Biden accompanied Xi to his car following their meeting. “It’s a beautiful vehicle,” Biden remarked. “It’s a Hongqi car, made in China,” Xi replied. Biden then quickly peek inside before comparing the Hongqi car to his own American Cadillac “beast.”
Biden accompanied Xi to his car following their meeting. "It's a beautiful vehicle," he remarked. "It's a Hongqi car, made in China," Xi replied. This brief moment became top trending on Weibo today, where it received over 270 million views. pic.twitter.com/piyhUlCxr6
On Chinese social media, the Hongqi car compliment was prominently featured and amplified by various official channels, framing it not only as a testament to the friendly relations between the U.S. and China but also as a triumph for Chinese-made brands.
The recognition of this decades-old Chinese brand by a U.S. president (similarly vintage) added an extra layer of significance, making it a noteworthy promotion-worthy moment that resonated with netizens.
Image “Hongqi: Recognition by the President of the United States”, circulating on Weibo.
Hongqi holds special significance in China and serves as a symbol of national pride, being the first car and limousine independently produced by the country in 1958 by FAW Group under the guidance of Chairman Mao Zedong. At the front of the car, you find a red flag, while the emblem on the back features Chinese characters for Red Flag in Mao Zedong’s calligraphy. Hóngqí (红旗) literally translates to ‘red flag.’
In the book Development of a Society on Wheels (2018), the Hongqi car is described as “carrying strong political symbols with a strong socialist flavor” as it stands for the success of China’s socialist system and the country’s self-reliance (p. 187). The car first premiered during the military parade in 1959, which celebrated the tenth anniversary of the People’s Republic of China (Hong 2013, 191).
China’s car industry has come a long way since then. China is now the largest automobile market and its car industry has quadrupled exports in just three years, surpassing Japan as the world leader.
Various Chinese media outlet used the context of Biden’s remarks to hold polls on the popularity of Chinese brand cars among netizens, asking them if they’d rather purchase a foreign car or a domestically produced brand. A majority of respondents indicated a preference for made-in-China brands.
Hongqi making its international debut at the Leipzig Trade Fair (Des Foires Internationales, 1960) (Sina).
But the way this incident is showcased on Chinese social media through official channels goes beyond Chinese national pride of esteemed brands and the success of China’s car industry. It also serves as a means to highlight the positive relations between Xi and Biden, as well as between China and the U.S., without delving too deeply into the political aspects of the meeting itself.
Recently, there has been a noticeable shift in Chinese official narratives regarding Washington and Biden, a change reflected in the top-down management of social media discussions on these topics and the guidelines on what is permitted or restricted. As is always the case with bigger high-level events and meetings involving leader Xi Jinping, there is stringent control and limited space for open online discussions when it comes to political content. But it is evident that the comments that now do make it to the front pages of Weibo or Douyin are primarily positive and supportive—this, despite the overall surge in anti-American sentiments on Chinese social media (also see our other recent article here).
The brief exchange between Biden and Xi about their cars is not merely positive, non-political, and non-sensitive; it also possesses another layer that makes it the ideal moment to highlight. It portrays a moment of changing power dynamics in bilateral relations, with the American president appreciating the Chinese leader’s car as much as he does his own Cadillac. Despite their differences, both are equally powerful and “beautiful.” This narrative precisely mirrors the current discourse about Sino-American relations that is especially visible in China’s online media sphere.
On X, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying (华春莹) dedicated two tweets to the Hongqi moment. One of them showed a picture of the two cars next to eachother at the Filoli estate in Woodside, California, with Hua writing: “🇨🇳Chinese Hongqi and 🇺🇸American Cadillac Beast.”
On Weibo, a few commenters playfully suggested that Biden should consider swapping his Cadillac for a Hongqi. “Hey Old Joe, why not opt for a Hongqi, too?” Others humorously proposed that Biden could become an outstanding new spokesperson for the iconic Chinese car brand.
Meanwhile, the Hongqi brand shared the video of the moment on its own social media page with a caption inspired by a quote from Xi: “Staying true to our original aspiration, living up to expectations” (“不忘初心,不负期待”).
FAW Group Hongqi also posted the moment on their own social media page.
“Times have really changed. Once, it was us [Chinese] who looked in admiration at the towering skyscrapers and bustling cars and traffic in the United States. Now, the whole situation has turned around and it’s America’s turn to admire China’s infrastructure, Chinese manufacturing, and especially the Chinese automotive industry (..) Our current power has earned us equality, respect, and admiration from the U.S. and the West. This reality is a powerful blow to those ‘intellectuals’ in the past who wanted us to kneel down in return for “friendship” with the West. It’s such a happy moment!”
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References
Hong, Song. 2013. “National Patent Regime and Indigenous Innovations in compliance with TRIPS: A Case Study of China.” In: Sunil Mani and Richard R Nelson (eds), TRIPS Compliance, National Patent Regimes and Innovation, 172-222. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Wang, Junxiu. 2018. Development of a Society on Wheels: Understanding the Rise of Automobile-dependency in China Springer Nature Singapore.
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Manya Koetse is the founder and editor-in-chief of whatsonweibo.com. She is a writer, public speaker, and researcher (Sinologist, MPhil) on social trends, digital developments, and new media in an ever-changing China, with a focus on Chinese society, pop culture, and gender issues. She shares her love for hotpot on hotpotambassador.com. Contact at manya@whatsonweibo.com, or follow on Twitter.
The Dutch general elections on Tuesday, 22 November 2022, resulted in a victory for the right-wing Freedom Party (PVV). The party, established in 2006, is led by the 60-year-old Dutch politician Geert Wilders who is known for his outspoken populist rhetoric and anti-establishment sentiments.
On Chinese social media, the Dutch election outcome became a topic discussed by some well-known bloggers.
The PVV secured 37 of the 150 seats in the Second Chamber, making it the largest party by a significant margin, followed by the left-wing Groen Links-PvdA (25 seats), center-right liberal VVD (24), and the brand-new centrist party NSC (20). The remaining seats were distributed among eleven other parties, each claiming between 9 and 1 seat in the Second Chamber.
Wilders’ triumph garnered international attention. As reported in 2017, the PVV’s popularity had been steadily increasing for years, drawing particular notice in Chinese media and other international publications in the wake of Trump’s victory and Brexit.
Dutch politician Wilders, referred to as Wéi’ěrdésī (维尔德斯 or 威尔德斯) in Chinese, became a recurring subject in Chinese media, with his success viewed as a harbinger for other elections across Continental Europe.
Wilders and his PVV are known for their strong anti-Islam stance, Euroskepticism, aspirations to significantly limit immigration, and populist commitment to “put the Dutch first.”
On Weibo, the well-known Chinese political commentator Hu Xijin (@胡锡进) wrote a column about Wilders’ win on November 23. Here’s a translation of Hu’s post:
“It shocked Europe, it shocked the West! The Freedom Party led by Wilders, the ‘Dutch version of Trump,’ received the most votes on Wednesday. His slogans and labels are anti-immigrant, anti-Europe, anti-Islam. The leader of the French extreme right-wing political party Le Pen immediately extended his congratulations through social media.”
“The results of the Dutch elections again show that xenophobic and intolerant political retrogressions are like cancer cells spreading across Europe and the West. However, the far-right line will not become the overwhelming new political choice in the West, as many Western societies are painfully going from side to side. Wilders also proposes that the Netherlands should stop providing weapons to the Ukraine, which goes against the mainstream European line. This is something that should be quite popular among Chinese.”
“It’s not clear yet if Wilders will actually become the premier of the Netherlands. Although his party received the most votes he only took about 37 seats of the 150 seats in the Dutch House of Representatives and will need to form a coalition government. Because it’s an extreme rightwing party, whether or not he will be able to pull allies in is hard to say. If Wilders fails, the Netherlands will not rule out a minority government.”
“Regardless, the victory of the Freedom Party is a heavy blow to Europe. There are concerns that it will become a model, that it will boost the rise of other extreme right-wing parties on the stage. In short, the West is becoming more and more chaotic and is becoming more lost.”
On Weibo, Hu Xijin’s post about Wilders received hundreds of replies, but many netizens did not agree with his stance on the victory of the Dutch right-wing party.
“You don’t represent the Chinese people,” one commenter wrote: “You just represent yourself. Don’t overstep your boundaries.”
“You’re actually so leftist underneath,” another reply said.
“Why did we witness a UK ‘Trump,’ a Brazilian ‘Trump,’ an Argentinian ‘Trump,’ a Dutch ‘Trump’?”
Among the numerous comments below Hu’s post, quite a few expressed sympathy for the populist stance advocated by PVV and Wilders. One popular comment reads, “Anti-immigration, anti-EU, anti-Islamic—sounds about right?” “Europe is waking up.”
Another person commented: “Over the past couple of years, the population of Muslim immigrants in Europe and the United States has been rapidly expanding, bringing about serious social problems when it comes to public security, employment, fertility rates, and religious beliefs etc., which has since long been a source of distress for the local population.”
Apart from Hu’s post, Chinese netizens elsewhere on Weibo have also placed Wilders’ victory in a broader geopolitical context. Blogger Xiaosunchu (@小笋初) writes, “Why did America have Trump? Why did we witness a UK ‘Trump,’ a Brazilian ‘Trump,’ an Argentinian ‘Trump,’ a Dutch ‘Trump,’ and so on – all these non-traditional, anti-establishment ‘crazy’ candidates?”
According to Xiaochunchu, the election of these kinds of political figures is a result of a so-called ‘democratic illusion’ (“民主幻觉”) in the West, in which voters are perpetually disappointed in politicians as they end up getting “a different broth but the same old medicine” (“换汤不换药”): the names may change, but the system does not, leading voters to blame themselves for picking the wrong candidates when, in reality, it’s actually deep-rooted political structures that prevent actual change from happening.
Regardless of whether others agree with Xiaochunchu’s idea that voters’ preference for unconventional political figures is linked to a ‘democratic illusion,’ many do acknowledge that ‘Trump-style’ politics represents a broader political trend that began with the election of Donald Trump in 2016.
Other bloggers called the election of different ‘Trumps’ a “new change in global democratic politics” and even labeled the current international political arena the “Trump era” (“特朗普时代”). “Who’s next?” one Weibo user wonders.
“Let’s wait and see,” other people write, “It might not be easy for him to form a cabinet.”
While the Dutch formation has begun, the world will be watching to see which parties will govern together and whether Wilders might become the next Dutch Prime Minister, and the so-called ‘next Trump.’
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The introduction of a Douyin novel feature, that would enable content creators to impose a fee for accessing their short video content, has sparked discussions across Chinese social media. Although the feature would benefit creators, many Douyin users are skeptical.
News that Chinese social media app Douyin is rolling out a new feature which allows creators to introduce a paywall for their short video content has triggered online discussions in China this week.
The feature, which made headlines on November 16, is presently in the testing phase. A number of influential content creators are now allowed to ‘paywall’ part of their video content.
Douyin is the hugely popular app by Chinese tech giant Bytedance. TikTok is the international version of the Chinese successful short video app, and although they’re often presented as being the same product, Douyin and Tiktok are actually two separate entities.
In addition to variations in content management and general usage, Douyin differs from TikTok in terms of features. Douyin previously experimented with functionalities such as charging users for accessing mini-dramas on the platform or the ability to tip content creators.
The pay-to-view feature on Douyin would require users to pay a certain fee in Douyin coins (抖币) in order to view paywalled content. One Douyin coin is equivalent to 0.1 yuan ($0,014). The platform itself takes 30% of the income as a service charge.
According to China Securities Times or STCN (证券时报网), Douyin insiders said that any short video content meeting Douyin’s requirements could be set as “pay-per-view.”
Creators, who can set their own paywall prices, should reportedly meet three criteria to qualify for the pay-to-view feature: their account cannot have any violation records for a period of 90 days, they should have at least 100,000 followers, and they have to have completed the real-name authentication process.
On Douyin and Weibo, Chinese netizens express various views on the feature. Many people do not think it would be a good idea to charge money for short videos. One video blogger (@小片片说大片) pointed out the existing challenge of persuading netizens to pay for longer videos, let alone expecting them to pay for shorter ones.
“The moment I’d need to pay money for it, I’ll delete the app,” some commenters write.
This statement appears to capture the prevailing sentiment among most internet users regarding a subscription-based Douyin environment. According to a survey conducted by the media platform Pear Video, more than 93% of respondents expressed they would not be willing to pay for short videos.
An online poll by Pear Video showed that the majority of respondents would not be willing to pay for short videos on Douyin.
“This could be a breaking point for Douyin,” one person predicts: “Other platforms could replace it.” There are more people who think it would be the end of Douyin and that other (free) short video platforms might take its place.
Some commenters, however, had their own reasons for supporting a pay-per-view function on the platform, suggesting it would help them solve their Douyin addiction. One commenter remarked, “Fantastic, this might finally help me break free from watching short videos!” Another individual responded, “Perhaps this could serve as a remedy for my procrastination.”
As discussions about the new feature trended, Douyin’s customer service responded, stating that it would eventually be up to content creators whether or not they want to activate the paid feature for their videos, and that it would be up to users whether or not they would be interested in such content – otherwise they can just swipe away.
Another social media user wrote: “There’s only one kind of video I’m willing to pay for, and it’s not on Douyin.”
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