Chapter Dive
The Anti “Halalification” Crusade of Chinese Netizens
Discussions on the so-called ‘halalification’ of China have flared up after delivery app Meituan introduced separate boxes for its halal food deliveries this week.
Published
9 years agoon
Discussions on the so-called ‘halal-ification’ of China have flared up after delivery app Meituan introduced separate boxes for its halal food deliveries this week. Many netizens see the growing prevalence of halal food in China as a threat to a unified society and say that featuring special services for Muslims is discriminatory against non-Muslims.
The “halal-ification” (清真泛化) of food products in China has been a hot issue on Chinese social media over the past two years. Discussions on the spread of halal food in China broke out again this week when food delivery platform Meituan Takeaway (美团外卖) locally introduced a special halal channel and separate delivery boxes for halal food.
What especially provoked online anger was the line used by Meituan to promote its new services, saying it would “make people eat more safely” (Literally: “Using separate boxes for halal food will put your mind at ease.”)

The image of Meituan’s promotional campaign for halal food that went viral on Chinese media: “Make you eat more assured.”
Many netizens said the measure discriminates against non-Muslims. They called on others to boycott Meituan and to delete the app from their phone. In response, the topic ‘Is Meituan Going Bankrupt?’ (#美团今天倒闭了吗#) received over 3.7 million views on Weibo, with thousands of netizens discussing the issue under various hashtags.
RAISING AWARENESS ABOUT ISLAMIC DIETARY LAW
“China is a secular country ruled by an atheist Party, and firmly boycotts Islamic laws.”
In 2016, halal products were already at the center of debate on Chinese social media when officials called for national standards on halal food (definition here).
A popular Weibo imam called Li Haiyang from Henan wrote a post in March titled “Raising Awareness about Islamic Dietary Law” (“关于清真食品立法的几点认识“), in which he discussed the importance of national standards on halal food in China.
Li Haiyang, who is part of China’s Henan Islam Society (河南省伊斯兰教协会), wrote that all Muslims should follow the classic rules and abide by their beliefs, of which Islamic dietary laws are an important part, and that the PRC cannot discriminate against Muslim ethnic groups by refusing to legally protect Muslim halal food.
At the time, the imam’s post was shared over 500 times and besides much support, it also attracted many comments strongly opposing the imam’s views. A typical comment said: “China is a secular country ruled by an atheist Party, and firmly boycotts Islamic laws!”
Despite backlash, there are multiple accounts on Weibo dedicated to informing people about halal food, such as ‘China Halal Food Web’ (@中国清真食品网 3100+ fans) or ‘Halal Cuisine Web’ (@清真美食网, 3950 fans).
“HALALIFICATION”
“Halalification is not good for national harmony and not conducive to the healthy development of Chinese Islam.”
In Chinese, the word for ‘halal’ is qīngzhēn 清真, which also means ‘Islamic’ and ‘Muslim.’ The two characters the word is composed of (清 and 真) literally mean ‘clean’ and ‘pure.’ The various meanings of the Chinese word for ‘halal’ somewhat complicate discussions on the matter.
In the halal food debate on Chinese social media, the term qīngzhēn fànhuà (清真泛化) is often used – a new term that popped up in Chinese media in 2016. It basically means ‘halal-ification’ or ‘halal generalization,’ but because qīngzhēn also means ‘Islamic,’ it can also imply ‘Islamization.’
And that is precisely what is at the heart of the discussion on the spread of halal food on Chinese social media: those who oppose the spread of halal food in the PRC connect the normalization of Islamic dietary laws to an alleged greater societal shift towards Islam. The spread of ‘Islam’ and ‘halal food’ are practically the same things in these discussions through the concept of qingzhen.
Another issue that plays a role is the idea that ‘qingzhen‘ stands for ‘clean and pure’ food. This distinction between halal and non-halal food implies that while the one is clean food, non-halal food is ‘unclean’ and ‘dirty,’ much to the dismay of many net users. Some people suggest that the name of ‘halal food’ should be changed to ‘Muslim food.’
On Baike, Baidu’s Wikipedia-like platform, the page explaining the term qīngzhēn fànhuà 清真泛化 says: “The term [halalification] originally only referred to the scope of the specific diet of [Muslim] ethnic groups, and has now spread to the domains of family life and even social life beyond diet, including things such as halal water, halal tooth paste, and halal paper towels.”

Advertisement in Ningxia public transport for halal paper towels.
The Baike page explains that halal products are hyped by companies that are merely seeking to gain profits. It also says that halalification is “not good for national harmony” and “not conducive to the healthy development of Chinese Islam.”
Although there are no official government records of how many people practice Islam within the PRC, it is estimated that there currently are around 23 million Muslims in China, which is less than 2% of the total population. According to Pew Research (2011), because China is so populous, its Muslim population is expected to be the 19th largest in the world in 2030.
HALAL WORRIES
“State-financed products should not be religious.”
Most Chinese food ordering apps now have a special halal section; Chinese supermarkets provide a wide range of products labeled as ‘halal’ and there are ample halal restaurants in Chinese cities.
But many people on Chinese social media feel that the spread of halal products is going too far. Legal service app Ilvdo (@律兜) published an article on Weibo this week that mentions that many Chinese consumers might buy halal products such as halal ice cream or milk without even knowing it: “You perhaps drank [halal] water and indirectly funded Islam religion – because the companies that have halal certifications have to pay Islamic organizations for them.”
On Weibo, there are some popular accounts of people opposing the spread and normalization of halal food in China. An account named ‘No Halal’ (@清真发言) has over 143.500 followers. The ‘No Halal Web’ (@非清真食品网) account has nearly 90.000 fans. These accounts regularly post about halal products in Chinese shops and restaurants and link it to the spread of Islam religion in China.
The account ‘No Halal Web’ recently posted a photo taken at a Shanghai restaurant that shows a table with a sign saying “Reserved for Halal Customers Only.”

“Table reserved for Halal customers only.”
The ‘No Halal Web’ account wrote: “This already is Muhammed’s Shanghai.” They later stated: “In the Islam world, the demands of Muslims are not as simple as just wanting a mosque, they want their environment to be Islamic/halal.”
Verified net user ‘Leningrad Defender’ (@列宁格勒保卫者, 254465 fans) posted photos of a segregated ‘halal’ checkout counter at a Jingkelong supermarket in Beijing’s Chaoyang area, wondering “is this even legal”?

‘Halal’ checkout counter at a supermarket in Beijing’s Chaoyang area.
A Weibo user named ‘The Eagle of Great Han Dynasty’ (@大汉之鹰001) posted a photo on July 20 showing a bag of infant nutrition from the China Family Planning Association that also has a ‘halal’ label on it. He writes:
“What is the Family Planning Committee doing? Why is this halal? This is Jilin province, are we all Muslims? What is behind this, can the Committee tell the public? This is financed through the state, the public has the right to know!”

Infant product by the Family Planning Committee that is labeled ‘halal.’
Others also responded to the photo, saying: “State-financed products should not be religious.”
THE MEITUAN INCIDENT
“Only when we as the Chinese people integrate together, can our country be unified as an undivided family.”
Although there is much opposition to the spread and regulation of halal food in China, the halal food industry also provides many business opportunities for companies who are eager to serve the millions of customers wanting to buy halal.
Popular food delivery platform Meituan faced furious backlash this week when it introduced its special halal food services. The so-called ‘Meituan Incident’ (美团事件) became a heated topic of debate on Weibo and Wechat.
One of the key arguments in the debate is not so much an opposition to halal food in itself, but an opposition to a normalization of ‘halal food’ (with the complicating factor that the Chinese qingzhen also means ‘Islamic’ and ‘clean and pure’), which allegedly discriminates against non-Muslims and increases social polarization. Many netizens said that if there are special boxes for food for Muslims, there should also be special boxes for food for Buddhists, Daoists, atheists, etc.
One well-read blog on Weibo said:
“National identity, in the end, is cultural identity (..). What is needed for the long-term stability of a country is integration [of the people] rather than a division [of the people] – let alone isolation. The national law should [therefore] turn ‘halal food 清真食品’ into ‘Muslim special food 穆斯林专用食品.’ This would make sure that Muslims don’t eat anything they shouldn’t eat, and it also liberates those (..) who aren’t religious. The law could confirm that there is a special kind of food designed for Islamic religious people to eat, instead of asking non-religious people to eat it as well. (..) There are more and more atheists. We should no longer distinguish people by saying he is a Daoist, he is Buddhist, that’s a Muslim or a Christian..in the end we shouldn’t even distinguish people as being Han or Zhuang or Miao or Hui or Manchu. Only when we as the Chinese people integrate together, can our country be unified as a harmonious and undivided family.”
The blog, that was viewed over 88.000 times, received much backing from its readers. One person wrote: “As there is now a national resistance against Islamization and religious segregation, how could the Meituan incident not cause anger amongst the people?”
It is not the first time that the separation of facilities/services for Muslims versus non-Muslims triggers online discussions in China. In September last year, the introduction of special “Muslim-only” shower cabins at a Chinese university also provoked anger about alleged “Muslim privilege.”
TRIVIAL MATTER OR SOCIAL SHIFT
“Today it is about separate boxes for food; tomorrow it might be about separate seating areas in restaurants. And what’s next?”
On Thursday, Meituan Takeaway officially responded to the controversy through Sina Weibo, saying that the promotion of halal delivery boxes was a local and unofficial activity by one of its agents in Gansu province. It also said it would strengthen supervision of its agents and their promotional material.
But not all netizens believed Meituan’s explanation. One person said: “I am located in Inner Mongolia, and your Meituan [here] also promotes the two separate delivery boxes.”
Other netizens also posted photos of Meituan’s food delivery rival Eleme also using special “Halal only” delivery boxes.

Image of food delivery box that says “special use for halal food.”
Among all the negative reactions and the resistance against the spread of halal food, there are netizens who praise halal food for being tasty and who do not get what all the fuss is about. A female netizen from Beijing wrote:
“Why are so many brain-dead people opposing Muslims these days? How does Meituan’s separation of halal food hinder you? What do you care if your yogurt is halal? If you don’t want to eat it, don’t eat it. There are plenty of people who will. Use your brain for a bit. Not all Muslims are extremists; just as not all people from the Northeast are criminals.”
But there are many who think Meituan’s separate boxes are no issue to disregard. One young female writer says:
“(..) Under the current national policy of protecting ethnic minorities, Muslims enjoy special privileges in the name of national unity. If this continues for a long time, the inequality inevitably will spread to other domains of society. Today it is about separate boxes for food; tomorrow it might be about separate seating areas in restaurants. And what’s next? Segregated neighborhoods? Trains? Airplanes? It might seem like a trivial matter, but if you ignore this, then those who are privileged now will go on and get greater privileges. The distancing of Muslims will only grow. I’m not saying this to alarm you. It’s self-evident that unequal benefits and the privilege of an ethnic group will eventually create conflicts between the people.”
Amidst all ideological arguments, there are also those who say it is all about the money. In the article published by Ilvdo, the author says about the Meituan incident: “Why do the boxes need to be separated? Because in general, Muslims feel that what we eat is “dirty” … but the product increase cost is shared by all the customers – so not only does it make us feel “dirty”, we also spend more money.”
They later say: “What we want is national unity, not religious solidarity. (..) You have your freedom of religion, which app I use is my freedom. Separate boxes and other special services will ultimately be reflected in the costs, and I do not want to pay religious tax. Luckily I have the freedom to delete this app and stop using it.”
By Manya Koetse
Follow @whatsonweibo
©2017 Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.
Manya Koetse is a sinologist, writer, and public speaker specializing in China’s social trends, digital culture, and online media ecosystems. She founded What’s on Weibo in 2013 and now runs the Eye on Digital China newsletter. Learn more at manyakoetse.com or follow her on X, Instagram, or LinkedIn.
Chapter Dive
Cancel-Proof: The Rise of China’s AI Actors
China’s AI actors are on the rise, and not everyone is buying it. The country’s microdrama industry offers a glimpse of what’s to come for the broader film and TV sector.
Published
2 weeks agoon
April 10, 2026By
Ruixin Zhang
Is this the real life? Is this just fantasy? In the fast-growing world of China’s AI microdramas, even virtual actors can’t escape reality. As production companies turn them into idols, audiences are voicing discomfort, while the future for human actors looks increasingly uncertain.
– By Ruixin Zhang and Manya Koetse
For Chinese audiences, AI in film and television is nothing new. In the fall of 2023, the first fully AI digital performer in a Chinese domestic drama, the character Erzhuang (二壮) in I Am Nobody (异人之下) sparked debate on Chinese social media.
Some fans, due to Erzhuang’s convincing northeastern Chinese dialect and natural expressions, almost couldn’t believe she wasn’t a real actress.

Erzhuang in I Am Nobody (异人之下) in 2023.
But Erzhuang was just the beginning.
In 2024, China Mythology (中国神话) was promoted by state media as China’s first fully AI-produced short drama series.
A year later, In My Heart, You Are One of a Kind (在我心中,你是独一无二) premiered as Hong Kong’s very first AI-generated short drama, a youth campus romance that sparked further discussion about whether AI actors could actually replace human actors.

From the two AI dramas from 2024 and 2025: China Mythology and In My Heart, You Are One of a Kind.
Those discussions were reignited in late March of this year when Shanghai-based production company Yaoke Media (耀客传媒) introduced two newly signed AI actors, Qin Lingyue (秦凌岳) and Lin Xiyan (林汐颜), who’ll be starring in the fantasy short drama Qinling (秦岭).

Qin Lingyue (秦凌岳) and Lin Xiyan (林汐颜)
Unlike earlier AI figures in microdramas, this high-profile ‘signing’ marks a shift: the company plans to develop these characters as independent IPs, much like human actors. In other words, they are to attract fans both through their on-screen performances and their off-screen ‘personalities.’
Soon after, the two AI actors created their own social media accounts on Douyin and Xiaohongshu, and began cultivating a sense of authenticity and ‘liveness’ (活人感).

A real-looking social media profile.
But as these digital performers and real actors become harder to distinguish, audience discomfort is growing, too.
The Rise of AI Microdramas
In China’s microdrama market, AI is already playing a dominant role, with “AI dramas” (AI剧 or AI短剧) standing out as a distinct creative category within the broader industry.
Microdramas, also simply known as short dramas, have been around in China for at least a decade, but have become especially popular in recent years due to their vertical, ultra-short formats, designed for quick mobile viewing and easy ‘binge watching.’ Microdramas typically run for 60 to 100 episodes, but with each episode lasting just one to three minutes, an entire season can be watched in an hour or two.
That format also makes the industry particularly well-suited to AI. It is large, fast-moving, and often operates on limited budgets, with productions turning around quickly. In this environment, using AI-generated effects and AI actors simply makes sense. This is very different from traditional drama production, which typically involves longer timelines, higher budgets, well-known actors, and less room for experimentation.
“AI is no longer just an add-on in China’s drama sector—it is an integral part of the production process”
As a result, AI is no longer just an add-on in China’s short drama sector—it is becoming an integral part of the production process, with digital actors helping to improve efficiency and reduce costs. With the launch of Bytedance’s Seedance 2.0, production costs for AI-generated videos have dropped significantly, further boosting the growth of AI microdramas.
The scale of this shift is already clear: AI microdramas are now often outpacing live-action productions on trending charts. In 2025 alone, one Zhejiang-based production company (刚刚好影视) released 229 AI micro-dramas, generating over 513 million views.
According to Sixth Tone, short dramas featuring AI actors already represented approximately 40% of the top 100 animated short dramas in January 2026.
Turning AI Actors into Real Idols
With AI and microdramas entering a kind of symbiosis, virtual actors are no longer disposable, one-off creations. They are evolving into continuous, persona-driven figures, often designed to resemble real celebrities—much like “fandom-driven actors” (流量演员), whose core function is to monetize fan attachment and sell fantasies rather than just act.
According to Yaoke Media, their plans for Qin Lingyue and Lin Xiyan are similar to those of idol models: they are expected to interact with fans, appear in multiple productions, and eventually become monetizable assets through brand endorsements and image licensing.
This also means they will likely take on the full spectrum of idol labor, including promotional events, fan service, and carefully manufactured on-screen chemistry—sometimes even “queerbaiting” (卖腐). (There’s no perfect English equivalent, but the term refers to deliberately staging romantic interactions between two male characters aimed in particular at a female “danmei” fans or “rotten girls” audiences who like indulging in such fantasies.)
In one AI costume drama, behind-the-scenes clips showed the lead actor and actress “live-streaming” together, answering fan questions, and deliberately hyping up their on-screen chemistry.

“Behind the scenes” livestream screenshots by AI actors.
Such human-coded content is now increasingly becoming an important part of the AI microdrama industry.
Some of these online videos also show the supposed perspective of “fans” and “staff” watching the actors walk around or interacting with them, creating a simulated world that some netizens feel is pushing a sense of “realness,” with comments like: “Please don’t force AI to act so human-like.”
“AI actors featuring in AI dramas that are watched by AI audiences, it’s the perfect closed loop”
For the same AI costume drama, some clips even mimic the perspective of ‘fansite admins’ (站姐)—dedicated fan photographers who typically capture and share candid, off-stage footage of real stars.

In one vlog by a supposed prop assistant, she appears as an overworked but witty crew member, taking viewers around the set, chatting with the leads, buying them coffee, and even stepping in as an extra.

“Behind the scenes” of an AI microdrama.
These glimpses of everyday, behind-the-scenes life all feel oddly real, but everything is AI-generated: the actors, the sets, the audience interactions, the staff, even the paparazzi (see example videos here and here).
For ordinary audiences, it is striking how deeply AI has already penetrated the film & television industry. Beyond criticisms of stiff expressions and rigid aesthetics, many netizens describe the new phenomenon as “uncanny” or “just too real😨.”
With AI actors now realistic enough to pass as human at a glance, but with small details like emotional expression still being off, that gap between being almost human but not quite creates a sense of discomfort among viewers, who dub these AI actors ‘stuffed monsters’ (缝合怪) or ‘stitched-together corpses’ (尸块).
More than the actors, it’s the entire ecosystem around them that makes us believe we’re watching “candid moments” of something that is not even alive. Screenwriter Wang Hailin (汪海林) was sarcastically commented on Weibo: “AI actors featuring in AI dramas that are watched by AI audiences 👍, it’s a perfect closed loop.”
‘Borrowing’ Facial Features
Besides the simulated “aliveness” of digital performers, another controversial issue surrounding the recent rise of China’s AI actors is whether these creations infringe on portrait rights. Since the debut of Qin Lingyue and Lin Xiyan, these AI figures have been criticized for appearing to use facial features from multiple real actors.
As online discussions intensify, more AI actors in microdramas have been found to resemble real celebrities. Fans of beloved Chinese celebrities such as Dilraba Dilmurat (迪丽热巴) and Xiao Zhan (肖战) have taken to Weibo to protest this kind of “face swapping” (AI换脸) and demand protection of their idols’ likenesses.

An “AI face swap” (AI换脸): an AI actor on the left, Xiao Zhan on the right.
Yaoke responded that these images were “derived from massive datasets on the internet” and did not replicate any specific individual’s features.
This only fueled further backlash. To many, the use of “massive data” suggests that anyone, celebrity or ordinary person, could potentially have their image appropriated.
“The vlogger discovered the face swap infringement after a friend recognized his face while watching the AI drama”
In related recent trending news, a Chinese content creator (白菜汉服妆造), who typically wears traditional Chinese clothing in his videos, accused Hongguo (红果短剧), ByteDance’s short drama platform, of using his likeness without authorization to create a greedy villain in the AI-generated drama Taohua Zan (桃花簪).

On the left: greedy villain in the AI-generated drama Taohua Zan. On the right: Chinese content creator (白菜汉服妆造).
The vlogger discovered the face swap infringement after a friend recognized his face while watching the drama. The series was later taken offline.
One problem is that legal frameworks around AI lag behind technological development: by the time victims try to fight back legally, the technology has already moved on, making enforcement almost impossible.
Better Than the Real Thing?
Despite the backlash against the AI-fication of China’s short drama industry, some netizens are more optimistic about its development.
One blogger recently noted that as many people have already formed near friendship-like emotional dependencies on chatbots like ChatGPT—initially seen as cold technological tools—it is entirely possible that audiences will also develop genuine attachment to AI actors.
Current limitations that still make AI actors feel stiff, such as robotic voices or unnatural expressions, will likely diminish as the technology continues to improve.
Some call binging on AI short dramas their “guilty pleasure,” just to watch the AI actors perform. As one Weibo user wrote: “The female characters are just so beautiful—seriously, unbelievably beautiful. And they’re becoming more and more realistic: their facial expressions, especially the way their mouths move, are incredibly precise. Even the makeup looks stylish, and the hair feels very real. I honestly find myself wondering what eyeshadow and mascara they’re using.”
But support for AI performers in China’s drama industry is not limited to guilty pleasures and tech enthusiasts. For some, it also reflects a broader weariness with the perceived lack of quality among human actors.
“If the performances of real actors are already no better than AI, why not use AI actors instead?”
China’s film and television industry’s strong focus on fandom culture and good-looking idols, combined with limited budgets and a lack of formal training, has produced a wave of actors who are widely criticized for poor acting and a lack of professionalism. They are also frequently caught up in controversies, from refusing to memorize lines to relying heavily on green-screen acting.
These criticisms intensified during the 2021 major scandal involving former drama actress Zheng Shuang (郑爽), who had long faced criticism over her acting. A leaked recording at the time revealed she was earning a staggering 2.08 million RMB per day (roughly $320,000 then). Since then, “2.08 million” (208万) has become a derogatory label for fandom-driven actors who get high pays despite low-quality performances.
Amid weak acting and a distorted pay structure, many viewers have been calling for change. A common sentiment is: if their performances are already no better than AI, why not use AI actors, and give real actors a sense of crisis?
From Cancel Culture to AI Actors
But will the use of AI actors actually push the industry to improve human actors, or simply replace them?
Some Chinese industry insiders remain optimistic, arguing that AI can never fully replicate the nuance of human emotion. Among those who have spoken out are A-list actors such as Zhang Ruoyun (张若昀) and Feng Yuanzheng (冯远征), president of the Beijing People’s Art Theatre.
Others, however, are less optimistic.
“China’s “cancel culture” will eventually make AI actors an increasingly attractive bet for industry investors”
Agan Jackie (阿甘Jackie), a streamer working in the film industry, pointed out in a recent podcast that China’s “cancel culture” will eventually make AI actors an increasingly attractive bet for industry investors.
Although there’s “cancel culture” in the Western entertainment industry as well, the moral bar for Chinese celebrities is exceptionally high: anything from tax evasion to littering, simply being rude to fans could destroy an actor’s commercial value. The superstar Fan Bingbing (范冰冰), for example, disappeared from public view after a tax evasion scandal. Even after repaying her debts, she is still effectively banned from mainland productions.
China’s cancel culture is also closely tied to political red lines. One remark or move – intended or not – could end a career overnight. Zhang Zhehan (张哲瀚), an actor who quickly rose to fame a few years ago, vanished from the industry after photos surfaced of him posing near the Japanese Yasukuni Shrine.
For production companies and streaming platforms, such unpredictability creates a high-investment, high-risk environment. “Scandal-proof” AI actors offer a low-risk substitute.
This perhaps also plays a major role in why major streaming platforms such as Tencent and iQiyi are now promoting or encouraging the use of AI actors through AI feature film experiments, with the first fully AI-generated commercial blockbusters expected to be released later this year.
A Glimpse into the Future
At the recent China TV Drama Production Industry Conference, it became clear that the industry is undergoing something of an earthquake, with major changes ahead: while top actors will continue to function as traffic drivers, demand for human actors is expected to decline, and much of the mid- and lower-tier acting segment (such as extras and body doubles, but also voice actors) could largely disappear as it becomes replaceable by AI.
The microdrama industry, already heavily infiltrated by AI, offers a glimpse of the future of the broader TV and film industry when it comes to digital performers.
Microdrama actress Zhou Ye (周野) recently said that her pay has been slashed by 50% since AI-driven microdramas flooded the market, leaving many more actors jobless. For the 140,000 registered extras at Hengdian World Studios, China’s largest filming base, these developments could have far-reaching consequences.
Sometimes, these actors even sign away their fate—quite literally—as some companies now require “AI authorization” clauses as a condition of employment, effectively selling their digital likeness just to get a job. Companies can then create AI actors based on real individuals. Chinese talent management company Yuxiao Media (聿潇传媒) has introduced six such AI actors, directly modeled on real performers.
“The microdrama industry, already heavily infiltrated by AI, offers a glimpse of the future of the broader TV and film industry when it comes to digital performers”
One of these, influencer Han Anran (韩安冉), openly stated during a livestream that she had sold her likeness rights for AI creation. Playing into public criticism of her acting and heavily altered appearance, she said this was the best way to monetize her image. She even wondered that if her AI doppelganger were ever to win an award, whether she or the AI should go on stage to accept it.

Han Anran (韩安冉) on the left and the AI actress modeled after her on the right.
Perhaps nobody likes to see ordinary actors’ livelihoods being taken over by AI. But despite concerns about shrinking job opportunities, China is unlikely to see Hollywood-like strikes, as it lacks unions or organizations comparable to SAG-AFTRA or the AFL-CIO, which focus on labor representation beyond awards and industry guidelines.
For now, the only collective pushback against the full “AI-fication” of the industry comes from Chinese netizens themselves: boycotting platforms and production companies using AI actors, and voting with their views. Ultimately, only when public demand for realness becomes strong enough to threaten profits—or when laws finally catch up—will there be a sense of security for the people behind the screen—the real ones.
By Ruixin Zhang, with editing and additional context by Manya Koetse
©2026 Eye on Digital China/Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.
Chapter Dive
Chinese Postdoc Death Raises Questions as Key Details Remain Missing
About a widely discussed “chilling effect”, the death of Chinese researcher Wang Danhao, and unanswered questions. (April 3 update included)
Published
3 weeks agoon
April 1, 2026
A Chinese postdoc’s reported suicide after questioning by US authorities became a top trending topic in China this week. Despite the widespread attention, key details remain unclear, highlighting broader concerns about the increasingly sensitive position of researchers across the US–China scientific landscape.
On March 27, news about a Chinese postdoctoral researcher based in the United States who allegedly died by suicide a day after being questioned by US law enforcement officials began trending on Chinese social media.
The news came out during the Friday regular press briefing, where a CCTV reporter asked China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Lin Jian (林剑):
🗣️ “We’ve learned [据了解] that recently, a Chinese postdoctoral scholar took their own life a day after being subjected to questioning by US law enforcement personnel. What’s the Foreign Ministry’s comment?”
Spokesperson Lin Jian responded that China is “deeply saddened by the tragedy,” and added that Chinese authorities have formally protested to the US, further commenting:
🗣️”For some time now, the US has been overstretching the concept of “national security” for political purposes, carrying out unwarranted questioning and harassment of Chinese students and scholars, infringing upon the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens, undermining the normal atmosphere of China–US people-to-people exchanges, and creating a serious “chilling effect.””
Lin Jian emphasized that China urges American authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into the case, provide answers to the victim’s family and to China, and stop any “discriminatory law enforcement against Chinese students and scholars in the United States.”

Lin Jian during the March 27 press briefing.
The “chilling effect” referenced by Lin Jian, in Chinese, is hán chán xiàoyìng (寒蝉效应), referring to a climate of fear in which people do not dare to speak out.
While xiàoyìng simply means “effect,” hán chán (寒蝉) literally means “a cicada in cold weather”—a metaphor for a repressive environment, as cicadas fall silent and become inactive in colder temperatures.
From MFA Briefing to Trending Topic
Following the press briefing, major Chinese news outlets like Xinhua and Global Times picked up the news and amplified the MFA statement across both their international and domestic channels, after which it quickly entered the top five “hot search” lists on platforms like Bilibili, Kuaishou, and Baidu. The MFA statement was also covered by Newsweek.
What is particularly noteworthy about how this news entered the online discourse is that it was reported solely through top-down, official channels. Unlike many incidents involving Chinese nationals overseas—particularly in cases of sudden death or personal tragedy—it did not first surface on social media through posts by friends or family members before prompting an official response. Nor were there any identifiable reports from local news or overseas Chinese community platforms that broke the story before the MFA did.
This left many questions about which university this researcher was affiliated with, where the incident occurred, and why the CCTV reporter asked this question on March 27 without any published news reports to go by.
Some have argued the Chinese government deliberately amplified the story to stir anti-American sentiment amid broader US-China tensions — a claim made, without supporting evidence, by the notoriously biased Epoch Times outlet.
🔍 Given the lack of details, Weibo’s own AI chatbot attributed the incident to the death of Li Haoran (李昊然). Li was a postdoctoral researcher at Princeton University who died at home in September 2025. On February 13, 2026, his death was officially ruled a suicide. Since this case predated the current report and has never been linked to law enforcement questioning, this appeared to be a hallucination error by the Weibo chatbot.

Weibo chatbot “hallucinating” and linking the current case to Li Haoran. Screenshot by author, March 27.
At the same time, claims popped up on social media regarding a recent suicide involving a researcher in the Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering (ECE) department at the University of Michigan.
One US-based Xiaohongshu user shared a screenshot of an email sent by University of Michigan staff on March 20 regarding the “sad news of the death of an Assistant Research Scientist (..) who fell from an upper story of the GG Brown building last night.”
The social media post, as well as an entire thread on another US-based Chinese community forum, had vanished by Monday, March 30, returning a “404” message.
The Michigan connection was also indirectly raised by some netizens (such as “Science Futurist” @科学未来人), who referenced earlier cases where Chinese researchers at the University of Michigan were allegedly “arrested, humiliated, and tormented.”
(🔍 Although there have been multiple incidents involving Chinese researchers at the university, this particular commenter referred to postdoctoral fellow Jian Yunqing (简云清), who was arrested by the FBI in June 2025 on charges including conspiracy and smuggling small samples of “toxic biological materials” into the US. This involved a crop-affecting fungus studied by Jian that, while also found in US fields, is illegal to import without a permit and is classified as a hazardous biological pathogen.)
Meanwhile, at the time of writing, few reports have emerged identifying any key details of the current case, and this lack of information surrounding the incident, both on the American and Chinese sides, is especially noteworthy for a case that has been framed as a major incident and a significant development in Sino-American academic exchanges.
The Michigan Connection
On March 31, the Chinese Consulate General in Chicago issued a statement via its WeChat account, responding to media inquiries regarding a Chinese scholar’s suicide following questioning by US law enforcement.
🗣️ The spokesperson confirmed that the case had occurred at a US university within its consular district, reiterating the sentiments expressed by the MFA and again using the term “chilling effect” (寒蝉效应, hán chán xiàoyìng). The statement criticized what it described as the US side’s use of “national security” to carry out unwarranted and politically motivated questioning and harassment of Chinese students and scholars.

Wechat post by Chinese Consulate in Chicago, March 31.
The Hong Kong newspaper Sing Tao Daily then connected the case to the University of Michigan’s ECE department, citing the aforementioned internal email and reporting that a local researcher died after falling from a height on the university’s North Campus.

The G.G. Brown Building, where the incident allegedly happened, when it was still under construction in 2013, photo by Michael Barera via Wikimedia Commons.
The deceased researcher was reportedly an Assistant Research Scientist on the team of Professor Zetian Mi, who specializes in semiconductors, nanomaterials, and optoelectronic technologies.
Professor Mi has been previously honored for his contributions to the growth of wide bandgap semiconductor materials, and leads a top-tier semiconductor research group that has received millions of dollars in funding from the US Department of Defense, published groundbreaking research, and earned prestigious awards in photonics and semiconductor science.
A Researcher at the Intersection of US–China Science
One Assistant Research Scientist previously listed on the official ECE website—who worked in Mi’s lab but has now been removed from the public staff list—is Dr. Wang Danhao (汪丹浩).
Wang’s research focused on next-generation semiconductor materials, including ultra-thin and ferroelectric systems with applications in electronics and photonics. He was previously part of a University of Michigan research team that explained why a new class of ferroelectric semiconductors can sustain opposing electric states without breaking apart—work published in Nature and supported by US funding sources, including the Army Research Office.
Over the years, Wang has built an extensive body of research published in some of the most prestigious scientific journals, including Nature Electronics, Nature Communications, and Science Advances.
More recently, Wang was listed as a co-first author on a study—covered by various industry publications—regarding a neuromorphic vision sensor capable of sensing, storing, and classifying images without external circuits, reportedly achieving over 95% recognition accuracy. The research was led by Professor Sun Haiding’s iGaN lab at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) and funded by Chinese government sources, including the National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Various Chinese sources have described this research as a breakthrough, noting that USTC developed the first optoelectronic diode integrating sensing, memory, and computing in a single device (“中国科大研制出首个具有感存算三合一功能的光电二极管”) (USTC link and news sources here and here).
According to Washtenaw County vital records, Wang Danhao died on March 20, 2026.
On that very same day, the research he contributed to (“A single diode with integrated photosensing, memory and processing for neuromorphic image sensors”) was published in Nature Electronics.
Wang’s profile, spanning research of interest to military and defense institutions, reflects involvement in both US-funded semiconductor projects (including work supported by the Army Research Office & within a DARPA-funded lab), as well as collaboration on Chinese government-funded research with a Chinese state university. This cross-institutional, cross-funded research highlights the increasingly complex and sensitive position of researchers operating across the US–China scientific landscape.
From a Mysterious Case to Serious Concerns
For now, many questions still surround this case, with official reports—from both the American and Chinese sides—likely to follow. At the time of writing, neither US government agencies nor the University of Michigan have publicly responded to the MFA statement or the Chicago consulate statement.
What we do know, and what is supported by prior studies, is that many Chinese researchers feel pressured and unsafe while carrying out academic work in the US, partly due to concerns about government investigations targeting researchers of Chinese origin.
In this recent case, Chinese online responses reflect that sentiment.
In some of the more notable discussions on Zhihu (such as this thread), users comment on the case’s mysterious nature while also linking it to a broader pattern of scrutiny and pressure on Chinese researchers in the United States.
These discussions reference past FBI investigations of Chinese academics under the so-called “China Initiative,” a 2018–2022 program launched by the US Department of Justice to counter espionage and intellectual property theft involving China.
🔍 One case mentioned is the 2024 death of Northwestern University Chinese-American neuroscientist Jane Wu (吴瑛), who died by suicide following years of federal scrutiny over her China-related ties, during which her lab was shut down, and her academic presence was later removed online.
In this context, some commenters also express skepticism about the suicide narrative in the current case. One popular comment stated:
💬 “Former Boeing quality manager and whistleblower John Barnett once publicly stated that if anything were to happen to him, it would not be suicide. On March 9, 2024, he was found dead in his car in a hotel parking lot in Charleston, South Carolina. The official ruling was suicide. He had been scheduled to testify that day, exposing issues related to Boeing’s production quality.”
Another commenter—a graduate of Peking University—argued that the US is no longer seen as a safe destination for Chinese researchers:
💬 “No matter how you look at it, he had already made it to the postdoc level, traveled all the way across the ocean only for things to end like this, it’s so unfortunate. Looking back now, the three years of the pandemic mark a very clear turning point. The “Bald Eagle” (白头鹰 – the US) is no longer an ideal destination for Chinese students, and is gradually no longer an ideal place for academic exchange and research either.”
At the same time, institutional responses are also taking shape.
🗣️ Dr. Nick Geiser, leader of the University of Michigan Postdoctoral Researchers’ Organization (UM-PRO), the union representing 1,500 postdocs, told Eye on Digital China they are currently bargaining with the university.
The union is preparing a proposal on international scholar rights that would ensure foreign postdocs are supported by the university in cases of abrupt funding cuts or warrantless investigations by US federal authorities.
This is a developing story. At the time of writing, there is no official confirmation that Wang Danhao is the individual referenced in this case. Any important updates will be added here as more information becomes available.
UPDATE April 3:
A news report by local news website MLive has come out earlier today, including additional information on this case.
In an April 1 email, Deputy Police Chief and Public Information Officer Melissa Overton stated that the researcher “jumped from the third floor and fell to the second floor inside the atrium in the George G. Brown Building on March 19.” He was later pronounced dead, and police — first called about 11 p.m. on March 19 — are investigating his death as a “possible act of self-harm.”
Paul Corliss, assistant vice president for public affairs and internal communications at the University of Michigan, has also issued a statement in an April 3 email, writing that: “Our priority is to honor the wishes of the family and those affected while adhering to legal requirements and ensuring that any information shared is accurate and non-speculative.”
An earlier internal email, sent out to the Michigan Engineering community on April 1, confirmed the passing of Wang Danhao (Dr. Danhao Wang), and stated that there is an active police investigation going on, with no further information to share.
The statement described him as “a promising and brilliant young mind,” whose research into wide bandgap III-nitride semiconductor materials and devices published in Nature “stands as a landmark, uncovering for the first time the switching and charge compensation mechanisms of emerging ferroelectric nitrides.”
The UM Postdoctoral Researchers Organization, the union that represents postdoctoral researchers, is advising its membership not to speak with federal authorities.
If you or someone you know is struggling, international mental health and crisis support helplines can be found at www.befrienders.org.
By Manya Koetse
(follow on X, LinkedIn, or Instagram)
Note: In Chinese, names are written with the surname first, followed by the given name (e.g. Wang Danhao, Mi Zetian). In English-language contexts, this order is usually reversed (e.g. Dr. Zetian Mi, Dr. Danhao Wang).
©2026 Eye on Digital China/Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.
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Bruce Humes
July 24, 2017 at 1:53 pm
This post on “halalification” is indeed fascinating. It does offer some real insight into what Chinese society is talking about these days.
Reading it, one almost forgets that this is Chinese social media. There are various arguments, pro and con, and the way they are presented, it sounds fairly “balanced,” like something you’d read on Twitter in the West. “Let one hundred flowers bloom,” as Mao Zedong famously said in the 50s — before cracking down on anyone expressing unPC attitudes, and persecuting and even jailing hundreds of thousands of those “blossoms.”
The issue here is that the columnist fails to point out to readers how significant it is that “halalification” is being openly discussed, and not banned, by the authorities. Based on my experience, almost any critical comments related to one of China’s ethnic minorities is highly sensitive and likely to be scrubbed almost immediately.
Therefore, an important yet unexplored story here is: Why are the authorities allowing this topic to be discussed openly? Does this indicate their neutrality regarding this phenomenon? Or are they subtly using social media to critique this contemporary aspect of Muslim culture? And how long will they allow such a sensitive topic to be freely discussed before they — inevitably — begin to censor such entries?
In the future, I look forward to Ms. Koetse alerting readers to such aspects of “media management,” and her efforts to “decode” these signals.
Jie
September 7, 2017 at 10:59 am
According to relevant laws, regulations and policies, “” search results are not shown.
Sorry, the sticker has been deleted
Sorry, you do not have permission to view the content.
Huh.
Do you really understand China?
The other
July 25, 2017 at 12:08 pm
This article demonstrates why Westerners are so wrong in assuming that China is an ethno (Han supremacist) state. They’re actually riffing off a stereotype of East Asians as an extremely racist people, without bothering to learn the facts.
Jane
July 25, 2017 at 6:56 pm
Sigh.. I would never think that a standard halal certificate will make such a ruckus. Moslems only eat halal foods, just like vegetarians only eat non meat foods. Why would it then expand into segregation in other parts of life? Look at Singapore, it’s a secular country but we’d still get to know which food is halal, which isn’t. The PRC government need to do something, so the problem will be solved once and for all. Either it’s allowed to do so, or just ban it nation wide. I really feel like it’s funny how the majority of people who are non Moslems would feel discriminated against; I didn’t know minorities are capable of discriminating against more powerful majorities
Joey
July 26, 2017 at 9:46 pm
Halal food is the only food I trusted in China, especially from street vendors.
Funtik-fuf
July 31, 2017 at 9:53 pm
the problem is not with the food here — it’s with the presenting of it. of course, halal food deserves to be cooked and sold everywhere in this world, same as all the other types of food, but when people start segregating the society then you know something’s very wrong with it. it is totally okay for any diet to have its own cafe, but different tables, delivery boxes and checkout counters are clear evidence of the separation. it seems like people who demand separate tables to eat don’t want to be associated with or be equaled to other people. which is not good.
SpeakTheTruth
August 11, 2017 at 8:53 am
So Chinese people in China can’t even protect the Chinese culture of eating pork?
Always Worried German
September 2, 2017 at 4:32 pm
Ha! The Mohammedans are doing the same thing they started about 10 years ago in Europe. Be very careful, China, or you’ll end up like us.
jixiang
January 7, 2018 at 5:42 pm
“Only when we as the Chinese people integrate together, can our country be unified as an undivided family.”
Right, only when everyone speaks the same, thinks the same and eats the same can China be a happy family.
Sigh.