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Explainer: Answering Five Big Questions on the ‘Study Xi’ App

Manya Koetse

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As the ‘Study Xi’ app, that encourages China’s online population to study Xi Jinping Thought, keeps on dominating China’s top app charts, these are some of the big questions on China’s latest interactive propaganda tool. What’s on Weibo explains.

Since its launch in January of this year, the ‘Study Xi, Strengthen China’ app (Xué Xí Qiáng Guó 学习强国, also ‘Study Xi, Strong Country’)1, that was released by the CCP Central Propaganda Research Center (中央宣传部宣传舆情研究中心), has been making headlines both in and outside of China.

The app, that revolves around studying “Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), is still top ranking on China’s popular app charts: it is the overall second top free app in the Chinese iOS Store, and the number one most popular educational app in Chinese charts at the time of writing.

‘Study Xi’ is a multi-functional educational platform that offers users various ways to study Xi Jinping Thought, Party history, Chinese culture, history, and much more. Once people are registered on the app, they can also access the platform via PC. Every user has a score that will go up depending on how active they are on the app.

An important part of the app is its news feed: the home page features “recommended” reads that all focus on Xi Jinping and the Party. Another major feature is its ‘quiz’ page: every week, there are different quizzes that users can do, relating to all sorts of things, from Party ideology to famous Chinese poems.

For our previous article on the app, we listed some of its functions in the image below. It is much more than a media app alone; it also has a social function, that allows users to connect with friends, message them, call them, and even send them ‘red envelopes’ (money presents).

As its popularity continues, and Weibo discussions on the app continue, we will answer some of the questions you might have about the app in this article.

 

#1 Was the app developed by Alibaba?

 

Ever since its launch, it has been rumored that Alibaba is the company that developed this app. In the app’s descriptions, however, all copyright and credits go to the Central Propaganda Department of the Communist Party that has allegedly started developing this app since November of 2017. Nowhere does it say that Alibaba was involved in its development.

Alibaba’s involvement, however, is in no way a secret: the app’s ‘red envelope’ function is made possible through Alipay, the online payment platform that is owned by Ant Financial Services Group, an affiliate company of the Chinese Alibaba Group. One way for users to verify their identity on the app is also by linking it to their Alipay account.

Users of the app also noted that, upon registering for the app, their old Ding Ding conversations were automatically loaded into their chat history. Others said that upon changing their Ding Ding password, their Study Xi password was automatically also changed. Ding Ding is a multifunctional enterprise messaging app by Alibaba (read here), and many of its functions are also incorporated in the Study Xi app.

“I just discovered Study Xi is based on the Ding Ding app – all conversations I had with a good friend on Ding Ding are also displayed on the Study Xi app,” one of the many Weibo comments on the topic said: “Have other people found out yet that the user information between Study Xi and Ding Ding are interoperating with each other?”

According to a Reuters article from February of this year, sources confirmed that the ‘Study Xi, Strengthen China’ app was indeed developed by a special projects team at Alibaba known as the ‘Y Projects Business Unit’ (Y项目事业部). In 2018, Alibaba also published job positions on its website for this ‘Y Projects Business Unit,’ in which the offered jobs would entail working on an “educational platform.”

 

#2 Is ‘Study Xi’ mandatory?

 

Various English-language media covering the Study Xi app have called it a “mandatory app,” but it is not true that all Chinese mobile phone users are required to download it.

Local training for the Study Xi app, image by @高淳固城街道 (March 14, 2019).

Party members, however, are strongly encouraged to use the app to learn more about Party ideology, new policies, and political theory.

All over the country, there are local Party meetings where Party members are taught how to download and use the app. Local state media Weibo accounts frequently post about these meetings, with some mentioning that they are organized as ordered by “higher authorities” (“按照上级有关要求” or “按照要求”), suggesting that organizing and/or attending these classes and downloading the app is indeed mandatory for Party members.

A ‘Study Xi’ meeting in Debao county in Baise, Guangxi. Image via Xinhua.

Many Chinese (state-owned) companies and schools have also ordered their employees and students to download the app. Some Weibo users write that their school requires them to score a certain number of points per day on the app.

“A lot of people I know now use the ‘Study Xi, Strengthen China’ app, but it’s not the same everywhere, as it is required to score a certain number of points in some places. This work method will even make people dislike good things. Studying should be conscious and voluntary,” one Weibo blogger wrote in March.

“I used to like the app because there’s news on current politics and there are quizzes, but since my work unit requested us to spend 30 minutes per day on it, I started to find it annoying,” one netizen (@超凶的钢丝球) said.

“The leader of my mum’s factory had all the workers download the ‘Study Xi, Strengthen China’ app – this world has gone crazy,” another commenter wrote.

“How can they force us to score 30 points per day?” one Weibo commenter wrote: “I’m happy they canceled the rankings. This should not be mandatory.”

The ‘ranking system’ this netizen refers to, was a function in the app that allowed users to view the scores of other users and friends. In late March, nearly three months after the app was launched, its ranking feature was canceled. This means that users can no longer view other people’s score and ‘compete’ with them. The maximum score per day was also reduced from 66 points to 52 points.

Many people on Weibo expressed that they were happy that the ranking system was canceled since they allegedly suffered from peer pressure to reach a certain score. But there are also those who say they found the ranking system “motivational,” and write they are disappointed their scores are now private. “We can always still share our scores on social media,” one Weibo user suggested.

 

#3 How does the scoring system work?

 

The scoring system of the ‘Study Xi’ app works as follows:

  • Upon registering for the app, you receive 1 point.
  • For every article or essay one reads, you get 1 point (one per article, does not work with articles that have already been viewed before, maximum 6 points per day).
  • For every video you watch you get 1 point (the same video won’t be credited with an extra point if you see it twice, max 6 points per day).
  • The time you spend on the app is also rewarded with points: for every 2 minutes of reading an essay, you get 1 point (max 6 points per day).
  • For every 5 minutes of watching a video, you get 1 point (max 8 points per day).
  • You get 1 point for “subscribing” to a media account, which will then show up in your news feed.
  • If you share two articles with friends, you get 1 point.
  • You get 1 point for every two articles or essays you ‘save’ within the app.
  • If you score 100% on a quiz, you get 10 points.

The app encourages users to ‘Study Xi’ at particular times of the day. The morning 6:00-8:30 timeframe, along with the 12:00-14:00 slot and evening 20:00-22:30 times, are designated as so-called “active time slots” during which users can score double points for their activities. Within these time slots, reading an article would, for example, grant a user 2 points instead of 1.

This signals that, in line with good working morale, people are supposed to look into the app during their morning commute, their lunch break, and before bedtime, and are indirectly discouraged from using it during (office) working hours.

The points that are scored on the app will be valid for two years.

Those who accumulate enough points can exchange them for gifts, such as study books or dictionaries, cinema tickets, or other items, which will then be sent to their home address.

Recently, more places also offer special discounts for people with a high Study Xi score. In those regards, the score system is somewhat similar to Alibaba’s Sesame Credit score, that also allows people with high scores certain benefits.

This month, various scenic spots across China’s Henan province offer people with a score of 1000 or higher free entrance to their sites. Those with 1000 points, for example, get one free entrance ticket to the Zhengzhou Fuxi Mountain scenic spot; those who have 2500 points get five tickets for free.

Another recent example is that ‘Study Xi’ users can now get a discount on tickets for the ballet show Bright Red Star.

 

#4 Is the app the Little Red Book ‘2.0’?

 

Foreign media have described the ‘Study Xi’ app as a “high-tech equivalent of Mao’s Little Red Book,” but to what extent is it really?

There is, of course, no straightforward answer here. The Little Red Book and the ‘Study Xi’ app are very different in many ways. The Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong book was first published in 1964 and fully focused on selected quotations by the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. More than a book, it became a symbol of the Cultural Revolution and was a talisman for many (also see Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History).

The ‘Study Xi’ app is not a singular text and goes much further than Xi alone; it has an online database containing texts and videos from dozens of sources and is a platform that allows users to educate themselves on various topics, from architecture to biology and much more.

But one thing to keep in mind is that both the Little Red Book and the ‘Study Xi’ app are propaganda methods that communicate a strong message through a medium that can be easily placed in many locations, reaching a great number of people. They both revolve around their Communist leaders, turning them into political idols, and literally brings Party ideology within a hand’s reach.

By turning the ‘Study Xi’ platform into an app that people can also show at various places to get free tickets, based on their score, they are also turning the app into something that matters in the public domain.

 

#5 How is the app received by Chinese internet users?

 

Online responses to the app have been somewhat mixed ever since it came out. For the past months, we’ve been consistently checking online responses to the app. “It’s the app that Party members dread, and non-Party members love” is a comment that popped up on Weibo recently, and it seems to cover a general sentiment: many people appreciate the app, but when it is required of them to use it an to score a certain number of points, they start to dread it.

One popular history blogger (@豢龙有道) recently praised the app on Weibo, saying they had previously not thought of downloading it because they are not a Party member, but now discovered the rich educational sources the app offers. That post was shared over 45,000 times.

The hashtag “‘Study Xi, Strengthen China’ is a treasure app” (#学习强国是个宝藏app#) has been viewed over 180 million times on Weibo, with thousands of commenters applauding the app; they mostly seem to praise its many online educational sources, which include MOOC (Massive Open Online Courses‎) on dozens of subjects, and its online ad-free library of movies, TV dramas, and documentaries.

One general sentiment that most people seem to agree on is that the app is “not bad at all” in how it has been developed and the sources it offers.

In this day and age, Chinese internet users can choose from thousands of different media apps, TV channels, newspapers, and magazines. For the Central Propaganda Department to develop a product that is now being used by millions of people across the country who think it is “not bad at all,” is perhaps really not bad at all.

Also read:
* Gamifying Propaganda: Everything You Need to Know about China’s ‘Study Xi’ App
* Here’s Xi the Cartoon – Online Animations Are China’s New ‘Propaganda Posters’
* Top 5 Most Popular Study and Educational Apps in China

By Manya Koetse

1Translation suggested by Helen Wang @helanwanglondon.


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©2019 Whatsonweibo. All rights reserved. Do not reproduce our content without permission – you can contact us at info@whatsonweibo.com.

Manya Koetse is the founder and editor-in-chief of whatsonweibo.com. She is a writer, public speaker, and researcher (Sinologist, MPhil) on social trends, digital developments, and new media in an ever-changing China, with a focus on Chinese society, pop culture, and gender issues. She shares her love for hotpot on hotpotambassador.com. Contact at manya@whatsonweibo.com, or follow on Twitter.

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China Insight

The Story of Li Jun & Liang Liang: How the Challenges of an Ordinary Chinese Couple Captivated China’s Internet

“Liang Liang and Li Jun are just the tip of the iceberg; there are thousands of couples facing similar challenges.”

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Two years after they first started sharing their story on Chinese social media, millions of netizens are engrossed in the struggles of the Chinese young parents Li Jun and Liang Liang, whose journey of starting a family and buying an apartment in the city at a time of economic downturn turned into an emotional rollercoaster.

The struggles faced by an ordinary young Chinese couple have recently become a major topic on Chinese social media.

For some, their story has unfolded like a compelling movie, “starring Li Jun and Liang Liang.” Others think they could be protagonists in a novel, perhaps one written by Victor Hugo or Lao She.

Here, we explain their story thus far and why it has become such a big topic of discussion on Chinese social media.

 

A PROMISING FUTURE

“Among tens and thousands of lights in the city, finally there’s a light that only shines for me.”


 

In 2022, the couple, Zhang Liliang (张艺亮, the husband, also called ‘Liang Liang’) and Dong Lijun (董丽君, the wife, referred to as Li Jun), first became popular on Chinese social media as they shared their journey of buying a property and building a life in Zhengzhou, Henan Province, on their account ‘The Couple Liang Liang & Li Jun’ (亮亮丽君夫妇).

Their first social media post had appeared in November of 2021. In this video, they shared their excitement about buying an apartment and starting their new life as home owners.

They previously put a deposit on an off-planned apartment, eagerly anticipating its delivery in 2024. They regularly updated their progress on Douyin, showcasing their savings efforts and monthly visits to the construction site. “Among tens and thousands of lights in the city, finally there’s a light that only shines for me,” they said (“从此万家灯火,终有一盏只为我而亮”).

The couple took out a mortgage amount of 1.02 million RMB ($143.660) for the Zhengzhou apartment, which had a total floor area of 1,055 sqft / 98 sqm. They made a downpayment of 450k RMB ($63.370), and agreed to a monthly – relatively high-interest rate – payment of 6293 RMB ($886), while also paying the monthly rent for their apartment (1500 RMB/$211). This meant the budget for other expenses was very tight already, since the couple had an approximate monthly combined income of only 9000 RMB ($1267).

They mainly paid for the downpayment with money that Liang Liang had been saving over the past five years, along with monetary gifts from their wedding and some support from their parents. In order to generate some extra income, Liang also became a taxi driver (Didi) at night.

As the couple gained more popularity online, mainly on Douyin and Bilibili, some Chinese media outlets also began taking notice. In July of 2022, Sanlian Life Weekly (三联生活周刊) featured an interview with the couple, bringing their story to the attention of a wider audience.

 

THE SPARK IS GONE

“This is our life now, the life of mortgage slaves.”


 

However, things did not go as planned. Months into the construction process, the developer, Sunac China Holdings Limited (融创中国), encountered financial difficulties. In May of 2022, Sunac made headlines as it didn’t meet its payment obligations on a dollar bond, making it one of the major Chinese property companies failing to fulfill its financial commitments.

Li Jun and Liang went to check on how the construction was going every month, and found that Sunac’s financial woes were causing a standstill in construction. Their apartment was located on the 22nd floor of a 33-story-building, but the construction was suspended from the 13th floor up.

Their daughter was also born during this tumultuous time, in October 2022, adding to the financial strain of rent and mortgage payments without a clear move-in date. “This is our life now, the life of mortgage slaves,” they said in one of their videos.

Adding to their challenges, Li Jun experienced a pay cut, reducing their monthly income by 2000 RMB ($282). With the cut leaving them with insufficient funds for essential expenses, they resorted to using their credit card.

In later Douyin videos, fans noticed how frustrated and disillusioned the couple now looked. Some made comparisons to their earlier videos, concluding that the “spark” they previously had in their eyes was gone.

Li Jun and Liang Liang feared that their house might join the ranks of millions of homes in China categorized as “烂尾楼” (làn wěi lóu), referring to ‘rotting’ unfinished buildings. In such cases, apartments that have been sold are abandoned and are not delivered due to financial struggles or other challenges faced by the developers.

After the pay cut they desperately needed more money to get by. They started doing some e-commerce on Douyin and tried to get the rebate that was promised to them when purchasing their apartment-the initial contract included a 20,000 RMB ($2775) special rebate for buyers, which they qualified for.

But no matter how many times they went back and forth to the sales center, the couple faced rejection and insults when demanding their payment. Desperate, Li Jun and Liang Liang turned to their social media fans and livestream followers to put more pressure on the company, but the staff just shut down the lights, closed the doors, and refused to pay them the money that was promised to them.

 

SILENCED ON SOCIAL MEDIA

“Instead of pursuing justice, I’d rather have a peaceful life.”


 

In November 2023, the story of Li Jun and Liang Liang gained prominence as they shared dramatic details of their struggles to retrieve their money. On November 15, the couple claimed to have been physically assaulted by staff members of the sales center while demanding their money. Liang ended up in the hospital with minor injuries, and Li, attempting to record the incident, had her phone snatched and the livestream was cut off.

The couple later posted a video later explaining what happened, but that video was soon taken down. Strange things kept happening, and people suspected the couple might have been threatened and bribed.

Because two days later, Li Jun and Liang Liang suddenly shared that the police were now involved, stating that “everything was sorted” and that they were content with the solution provided. This claim of police involvement was confirmed on November 19 by local authorities, who announced penalties for those responsible for beating the couple.

Yet, the last video they posted suddenly became unavailable, and their Douyin account was blocked from updating. Additionally, their other social media accounts on Weibo and Bilibili were both banned from posting (@亮亮和丽君夫妇).

Li Jun still had her personal social media account, revealing on November 22 that the couple had chosen to return to their hometown with their daughter. Liang expressed his desire for justice, but Li Jun emphasized, “But now we have our daughter. I’d rather have a peaceful life.” (#亮亮丽君决定离开郑州回老家#)

One of the social media digital artworks dedicated to Li Jun and Liang Liang. By @泥巴-lau

The idea that Li Jun and Liang Liang felt defeated enough to (temporarily) give up their dream of building their life in the city saddened and angered many netizens, and their story went viral.

But through all their trials and tribulations, the story of Li Jun and Liang Liang may not conclude with an unhappy ending after all.

Their Zhengzhou apartment is apparently not destined to remain an ‘unfinished building’ — the government has intervened to ensure the delivery of the building. In November of 2023, news also came out that Sunac had met conditions for a long-awaited debt restructuring deal, reportedly reducing its total debt by $4.5 billion. The construction of the building has resumed.

In late November, the story of Li Jun and Liang took another unexpected turn when a new video surfaced, suggesting that the couple – despite saying they would relocate to their rural hometown – would give it another shot in Zhengzhou by starting their own business.

Many online users found this twist confusing, suspecting that local authorities might have intervened to reshape the couple’s narrative, possibly to ensure a positive outcome in the public eye (#亮亮丽君决定在郑州创业#).

“Perhaps I should become an internet sensation too,” one commenter responded. “Maybe then my unfinished three-room apartment will finally be delivered to me as well.”

 

ORDINARY CHINESE DUPED

“Three years of Covid did not break our spirit; it’s our unfinished property that brought us down.”


 

There are numerous reasons why so many people are invested in the story of Liang Liang and Li Jun. Their journey, documented on social media, deeply resonated with millions who are dealing with similar struggles or are finding it hard to start a life in the city, build a family and pay a mortgage.

Their Douyin videos reflected the emotional rollercoaster of an ordinary Chinese couple facing setbacks despite diligently following the conventional path of education, hard work, marriage, savings, property ownership, and family-building.

Many wondered if their lives would have taken a different turn if they had chosen to ‘lie flat’ or go against the norm. Who is responsible for the fact that, despite their hard work and dedication, their pursuit of the ‘Chinese dream’ seemed unattainable?

Beyond this issue of ordinary families struggling to get by and pay for a mortgage, a central issue in Li Jun and Liang’s story was also the problem with their unfinished apartment.

Concerns about Chinese real estate developers grappling with substantial debts have have consistently dominated headlines in recent years, sparked by the difficulties faced by Evergrande Group and other Chinese property developers, such as Country Garden, Kaisa Group, Fantasia Holdings, Sinic Holdings, Modern Land, and Sunac – the property owner from whom Li and Liang purchased their apartment.

Regular people like Liang Liang and Li Jun are the ones most affected by this ongoing property crisis, often facing severe consequences. For many, this once hopeful young couple, now disillusioned, represents a larger social and economic problem within China’s real estate industry.

“Liang Liang and Li Jun are just the tip of the iceberg; there are thousands of couples facing similar challenges,” one Weibo blogger (@鸿蒙钊哥) wrote.

Another Weibo user wrote: “We all know the story of Liang Liang and Li Jun, and we want to help them because they represent numerous urban residents. Three years of Covid did not break our spirit; it’s our unfinished property that brought us down. So far I did not see official media speaking up for them, is it that they do not know or that they are worth helping? Or, perhaps, they feel ashamed?”

Despite this aspect of Li Jun and Liang’s story, which highlights both the trap of mortgage slavery and the problem of ordinary Chinese duped by the country’s property woes, the young couple has become a subject of public contention. Not everyone agrees with the choices they made.

Some bloggers, such as Lao Liang (老梁不郁闷), argue that their story was exaggerated for clout, and that their apartment actually never qualified as a ‘rotten’ unfinished building (烂尾楼 làn wěi lóu) since construction was only temporarily halted but never really abandoned.

While many express sympathy for the couple, others deem it unwise for them to have purchased an apartment with an already strained monthly budget, let alone to have a child under such uncertain circumstances. Critics suggest the couple lacked a proper life plan, didn’t assess risks, and ended up in this situation through their own fault.

These critics also view the couple’s recent change of plans as evidence that they may have fabricated parts of their story to garner attention and financial support.

However, there are widely different opinions on this issue. Some label these critics as proponents of Social Darwinism (社会达尔文主义), accusing them of being selfish and cold-hearted. They argue that the blame should not be on the couple, striving for a better life, but on the developer who breached the contract and made life so hard for them.

The couple’s chosen path, moving from small towns to study and work in big cities, reflects a common value not only in China but worldwide. They argue that society should appreciate those working hard despite facing challenges and insecurities, instead of condemning them for the bold choices they make.

Those supporting the young couple seemingly also do not care if their story has somehow become entwined with (local) propaganda efforts. As their narrative is now shifting from representing defeated Chinese youth in a complex economic situation to showcasing the strength of Chinese urban workers in a revitalized nation, many people simply wish them the best.

As one commenter writes: “If they want to start a business in Zhengzhou now, let them go for it. They’ve made positive use of the attention they’ve received. They don’t need to live up to the expectations that others have them. All the luck to you!”

By Manya Koetse & Miranda Barnes

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China Insight

Chinese Social Media Reactions to Israel-Hamas War: Pro-Palestinian Sentiments and Anti-Semitic Discourse

Chinese perspectives on the Israel-Palestine conflict are influenced by China’s historical context and perceptions of its role in the world today.

Manya Koetse

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The Israel-Hamas war has been dominating discussions on Weibo recently. Amid the different Chinese responses to what’s happening in Israel and Gaza, recurring trends and narratives highlight how social media reactions and their pro-Palestine stance are connected to China’s own historical context and perceived global role, as well as Chinese anti-Jewish prejudices.

After the Hamas attacks began on October 7, the Israel-Hamas war has been a major topic of discussion on Chinese social media.

Over the past two weeks, a series of critical events have unfolded since Palestinian militant group Hamas fired more than 5,000 rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israel and infiltrated Isreal. The attacks killed a large number of Israeli civilians, including the 260 deaths at the Supernova music festival massacre. As deadly fights continued, the Israeli government formally declared war and retaliated against Hamas.

Israel has since dropped some 6,000 bombs on the Gaza Strip, killing hundreds of Palestians. More than a million people have fled their homes in the Gaza Strip.

On October 17 and 18, various media reported that at least 500 people were killed in a devastating blast hitting the Al-Ahli Arab hospital in Gaza City, a day before US President Biden arrived in Israel for a wartime diplomatic trip, marking a public show of support for Israel.

While Palestinian officials blamed Israel for the hospital blast, Israel asserts it was a rocket launched by an Islamist militant group that caused the explosion. This claim was later backed by American officials, who cited intelligence suggesting that the explosion was indeed caused by an armed Palestinian group.

On Chinese social media sites, various discussions related to the Israel-Hamas war and all the latest developments have attracted a lot of attention. From October 7 to October 19, the Weibo hashtag “Palestian-Israeli Conflict” (#巴以冲突#) received over 2 billion views. One hashtag related to the Gaza hospital explosion received over 320 million views in a day (#加沙地带一医院遭袭数百人死亡#).

Amid all of the hashtags, posts, videos, images, and discussions on Chinese social media, we have identified three prominent trends concerning the Israel-Hamas conflict: growing pro-Palestinian sentiments, a surge in anti-Jewish racism, and an increased focus on China’s role on the world stage and how its calls for peaceful resolutions contrast with U.S. policies.

 
1. Pro-Palestine Sentiments
 

There is a clear trend on Weibo, as well as on other Chinese social platforms like Douyin and even Xiaohongshu, that netizens are demonstrating greater support for the Palestinian side than for Israel.

Some posts (here, here) argue that if the recent attacks on civilians by Hamas militants are labeled as “extreme terrorism,” Israel’s actions against Palestinians over the years should be seen as a form of “mild terrorism.”

This view is repeated by many bloggers and regular netizens all over Chinese social media, where numerous videos depict bombings in Gaza, emphasizing heartbreaking scenes of severely injured children and their grieving parents and siblings.

In Weibo’s ‘hot’ section, which features currently popular posts, it’s evident that there’s a stronger emphasis on images and videos portraying the suffering in Palestine compared to those depicting hardships on the Israeli side.

These distressing videos evoke significant sympathy on Chinese social media, where some commenters suggest that the Hamas movement is becoming more prominent because of the suffering Palestians are enduring (“If my child were killed like that, I would immediately turn into a terrorist as well.”) Others argue that Hamas should be seen as guerrilla fighters rather than terrorists.

The pro-Palestinian sentiments go beyond netizens’ views alone, and are strengthened by Chinese media reports and official positions. The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s initial response to the conflict focused on expressing concerns about the escalating tensions and voicing China’s stance that civilians should be protected and that further deterioration should be prevented.

They reiterated that the fundamental solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the path to peace, according to China, lies in the implementation of the “two-state solution” (两国方案) and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Days later, on October 13, Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Wang Yi stated that the “historical injustice suffered by the Palestinian people” lies at the root of the conflict between Israel and Palestinians, emphasizing the “two-state solution” and the importance of realizing the dream of an independent State of Palestine.

Wang also stated on October 15 that Israel’s bombing campaign had gone “beyond the scope of self-defence” and that it “should stop collective punishment of the people of Gaza.”

One Weibo newsblogger called Creamy Banana (@Creamy蕉, 140k fans) writes:

“What many people do not understand is that when we support Palestine in the Israel-Palestine [conflict], is that we do not support a specific regional political group, that we do not support or oppose a specific racial group, and that we certainly do not support a particular religion. None of that. In this issue, supporting Palestine means supporting justice, supporting the weak, supporting the eggs resisting the high wall, it’s as simple as that.

For instance, during World War II, when Jews were massacred by the Nazis, we sympathized and supported the Jews because they were the weak ones and the victims at that time. Now, Israel is involved in genocide against Palestine, killing civilians, attacking hospitals, and it is the Palestinians who are the weak and the victims. Former victims—the Jews—have now become the perpetrators.

Good people and bad people, justice and evil, they are all relative and ever-changing. This may be the complexity of human nature. There is no absolute goodness, no absolute evil. You can be a victim and a villain hurting others at the same time.”

While the blogger argues that the pro-Palestine sentiment on Chinese social media is unrelated to politics or race, this isn’t exactly accurate. Many Chinese netizens’ support for the Palestinians is closely connected to current geopolitics, America’s pro-Israel stance, existing prejudice towards Jews, and China’s own historical context.

As suggested by Yiyi Chen in “The Basis of China’s Pro-Palestine Stance and the Current Status of Its Implementation” (2013), China leans towards supporting the Arab side because, in the Chinese perspective on the Israel-Palestine conflict, Israel was established by aligning with the Imperial powers of its era. In this context, the Palestians are seen as sufferers of imperialism (p. 216).

This deeply resonates with many Chinese, who, both explicitly and implicitly, associate the current Palestinian issue with China’s historical scars of the “hundred years of national humiliation,” during which China also suffered from imperialism by Western powers and Japan from 1839 to the 1940s.

“The Gaza children shaken and trembling from Israeli bombardments experience scenes similar to what China went through during the War of Resitance against Japan,” one Weibo user wrote: “So don’t say that it has nothing to do with you.”

“We’re helping Palestine, but we’re helping ourselves from 70 years ago,” (“帮的是巴勒斯坦,也是七十几年前的自己”) one commenter (@
姜橙橙_捏唐冽大脸) wrote, receiving over 5500 likes. Others reiterated similar views, writing: “It’s because we endured hardship that we now hold the umbrella for others who are suffering.”

Another reason for the pro-Palestine stance, as detailed by Chen, is rooted in reciprocity. The Chinese tend to support the Palestinians as a way of reciprocating the solidarity shown by Arab countries during the 1960s and 1970s when China was isolated due to Western animosity (p. 216).

Furthermore, and this is particularly evident in the numerous posts and blogs within China’s online media landscape, support for Palestine also stems from opposition to the United States and a lack of trust in Israel due to the close alliance between the U.S. and Israel.

New York Times changing its headline, image posted and reposted on Weibo.

This distrust also extends to American media, which is seen as biased and untrustworthy on Chinese social media platforms. For instance, when the New York Times modified its headlines about the Gaza hospital blast to reflect new information indicating that Israel might not be responsible, many Chinese netizens viewed it as another instance of American media deliberately distorting facts and concealing the truth.

“They did it because of political correctness,” some suggested: “They were afraid to trigger the anger of the Jewish people.”

 
2. Anti-Semitic Sentiments
 

Apart from the general pro-Palestinian views on Weibo, there are also voices on Chinese social media denouncing Hamas and the people who support them. For instance, when a video captured students from New York University (NYU) tearing down posters depicting Israeli children held hostage by Hamas, many commenters condemned their actions and questioned why they didn’t go to Gaza themselves. Others comment general phrases such as, “The Hamas evil must be eradicated” (“消灭哈马斯恶魔”).

But despite some condemnation of Hamas, it is hard to find many strong pro-Israel voices on Weibo these days.1 Notably, the Israeli Embassy in Beijing, which is one of the most popular foreign embassy Weibo accounts with 2.4 million followers, is currently not only shadowbanned on the platform (it does not immediately show up in search results), it has also disabled comments on many of its posts or is showing only a limited number of replies.

The posts that do allow comments do not only show strong anti-Israeli sentiments, denouncing Israel as a state engaged in acts of terror and genocide in Gaza, but they also display instances of anti-Semitic racism.

For instance, when the Israeli Embassy posted about the Kutz family, murdered by Hamas terrorists in their home, some netizens commented: “Auschwitz misses you.”

References to the Holocaust, Hitler, Goebbels, and related topics are also evident in many other posts on Weibo. Some bloggers (@扫天下媒体, over 70,000 fans) write things such as “(..) the Germans have since long seen through the true nature and character of the Jewish people.”

Alongside openly anti-Semitic comments, there are anti-Semitic conspiracy theories circulating on Chinese social media. Some of these theories mention Hollywood actors or American political figures of Jewish descent, hinting that Jews control different parts of America’s political, entertainment, and business sectors.

The ubiquity of anti-Semitic comments in China’s online media sphere may be surprising, especially considering how bilateral relations between China and Israel have blossomed since the 2000s.

Not only did a 2019 Pew Research Center study discover that the Israeli public held a “very favorable” opinion of China, but a 2016 China Radio International feature also sought the views of Chinese people on Jews and Israelis. The responses were generally positive, with many respondents describing Jews and Israelis as “very smart” (Yellinek 2022, 185-192).

There are also those who generally express pity for Jews, considering them “stateless” or “oppressed,” and empathizing with their historical struggles. This is one of the reasons why the Holocaust, and Holocaust studies, have received relatively more attention in China than in other Asian countries (Haime 2020; Timmermans 2016).

In 2010, the animated film A Jewish Girl in Shanghai (犹太女孩在上海) was proudly described as “China’s first homegrown Jewish film” – it was part of a renewed remembrance of shared Jewish-Chinese history (read more). The Shanghai Jewish Refugees Museum was opened in 2007 to commemorate the Jewish refugees who lived in Shanghai during World War II, and the first musical themed around the Jews in Shanghai saw the light at the Shanghai International Arts Festival in 2015, the same year when a renewed Chinese translation of The Diary of Anne Frank was published.

Still from Jewish Girl in Shanghai, China’s first domestic Jewish film.

However, the perception of ‘Jews’ or ‘Jewishness’ in China is multifaceted and often conflicting, as shown by various studies. According to Zhou Xun (2016), Chinese attitudes towards Jews and Jewishness are often a mixture of curiosity and envy, yet Jews are primarily seen as a racialized ‘Other’ who differ significantly from social groups in China. Xun suggests that anti-Semitic language in China is frequently borrowed from Western sources, but that the racialized discourse itself is inherently rooted in Chinese society.

The many popular books that exist about Jews in China, ranging from What’s Behind Jewish Success to 16 Reasons for Jews Getting Wealthy, demonstrate that the authors’ perceptions of Jewishness are often riddled with misunderstandings and stereotypes. These books frequently highlight the perceived success of Jews in business and education to promote values highly cherished by the Chinese (Ross 2016, 25-30).

While many prevailing opinions and stereotypes about Jews in China today revolve around their perceived success, intelligence, and warmheartedness, there are also those who portray them as devious, dominating, and cruel.

The recent surge of anti-Semitism on Chinese social media underscores that ‘Othering’ and stereotyping of Jewish people can focus on their perceived admirable traits in times of flourishing Israel-China relations, but that this praise, exaggerated and rooted in prejudice, can just as swiftly turn into hatred in times of Israel-Palestine conflict escalation.

 
3. Sending Help: China as Responsible World Leader
 

Another key trend within Chinese online discussions about the Israel-Hamas conflict is the focus on China’s role as a geopolitical influencer: many see China as a promoter of global peace that is “mending the world.”

Within this context, the topic of China providing humanitarian assistance to Palestinians gained traction on Weibo recently (#中国政府向巴勒斯坦提供紧急人道主义援助#, #中方向巴方提供紧急人道主义援助#), referring to China’s efforts to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

“We bring emergency relief, others bring bullets,” some commenters wrote.

This ubiquitous narrative of China as a responsible, fair, and peaceful global power, supported by Chinese state media reports, underscores a distinction between American and Chinese influence on the world stage. It implies that the U.S. frequently interferes and provokes conflicts, while China discreetly offers aid and works to reduce tensions.

In this context, reports of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi telling his U.S. counterpart, Anthony Blinken, that the United States should genuinely play a constructive role in the Israel-Hamas war and push for a political solution sparked hundreds of online comments praising China for being a responsible and peaceful leader (#中方呼吁召开巴以冲突国际和会#) .

On October 18, the United States vetoed a UN resolution calling for a humanitarian pause in the Israel-Hamas war, citing Israel’s right to self-defence. China was one of the countries voting in favor of the ‘humanitarian pauses’ resolution.

In response to the American decision to vote against the resolution, China’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Zhang Jun, said: “We cannot help but doubt that some countries do not genuinely wish to resolve the issue” (#联合国巴以问题决议草案遭美一票否决#).

Among the comments are statements like: “This clearly indicates a lack of desire for peace.” “They’re the tumor of the world.” “The U.S. is lacking moral values.”

China as the rabbit in the Chinese webcomic series Year Hare Affair (那年那兔那些事儿).

One popular Weibo reply suggested that “the rabbit is quietly patching up [mending] the world” (“兔子总在默默为世界缝缝补补”). In this context, the ‘rabbit’ is ‘China’, referring the Chinese webcomic Year Hare Affair (那年那兔那些事儿) in which different animals represented different countries.

These phrases about China “mending the world” have been posted numerous times on Chinese social media (also: “世界破破烂烂,兔子缝缝补补”). Some of these posts also include a political cartoon showing Western media solely focusing on a crying baby in Israel while turning their backs to the bodies in Gaza.

Posted on Weibo (@粤港澳小小胖).

Meanwhile, there are also many commenters who simply express their hopes for a swift end to the war. “I hope for peace between Palestine and Israel. War is merciless.”

Some netizens also just share their appreciation for living in China. “We are not living in peaceful times, but at least we’re living in peaceful China.”

By Manya Koetse

1 Given the scope of this article and its time sensitivity, this comment exclusively focuses on online discussions on Weibo on October 16-19, and it does not reflect the period prior to the current Israel-Hamas conflict

References

Chen, Yiyi. 2013. “The Basis of China’s Pro-Palestine Stance and the Current Status of Its Implementation.” Digest of Middle East Studies 22 (2): 215-228.

Haime, Jordyn. 2020. “Chinese Philo-Semitism: Why China Admires the Jewish People.” Student Research Projects. 26. https://scholars.unh.edu/student_research/26

Ross, James R. 2016. “Images of Jews in Contemporary Books, Blogs, and Films”. The Image of Jews in Contemporary China, edited by James R. Ross and Song Lihong, Boston, USA: Academic Studies Press, pp. 24-36.

Timmermans, Glenn. 2016. “Holocaust Studies and Holocaust Education in China”. The Image of Jews in Contemporary China, edited by James R. Ross and Song Lihong, Boston, USA: Academic Studies Press, pp. 185-205.

Xun, Zhou. “Perceiving Jews in Modern China”. The Image of Jews in Contemporary China, edited by James R. Ross and Song Lihong, Boston, USA: Academic Studies Press, pp. 5-23.

Yellinek, Roie. 2022. “China’s Media Strategy Towards Israel.” Israel Affairs 28: 184-198.

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