PREMIUM NEWSLETTER | ISSUE #39

This week’s newsletter:

◼︎ 1. Editor’s Note – “Comrade Trump Returns to the Palace”
◼︎ 2. What’s New – A closer look at featured stories
◼︎ 3. WeiboWatch List – Online discussions to watch
◼︎ 4. What’s Noteworthy – Hu Xijin is back
◼︎ 6. What’s Popular – New series features story of Xi’s father
◼︎ 7. What’s Memorable – Trump’s 2016 win
◼︎ 8. Weibo Word of the Week – Digital Ibuprofen

Dear Reader,

“Good morning, everyone. A new day with global impact has begun,” Weibo blogger “MLRS270” wrote early Wednesday morning, China time. Weibo, like the rest of the world, has been closely watching how American voters would shape the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election. With half a million followers, MLRS270 claimed that Harris’s victory was already “set in stone.”

Twelve hours later, however, the online discussions looked very different. Trump’s win dominated Weibo trending topics and the hashtag “Trump Officially Declares Victory” (#特朗普正式宣布获胜#) received over 870 million views.

“The upcoming four years are going to be entertaining,” a popular comment said. Posts, videos, and memes on Trump’s win immediately began to surface, not just on Weibo but also on other Chinese social media platforms like WeChat and Xiaohongshu.

The ‘entertainment’ surrounding the American elections had already started earlier. Most noteworthy was the sudden surge in stock value for a Chinese company called Sichuan Wisdom Co. Ltd. (川大智胜). This spike occurred simply because the company’s name sounds like “Trump winning.”

The Chinese name, Chuān Dà Zhì Shèng (川大智胜), belongs to a software company unrelated to Trump. But its name’s first character, Chuān—which in this context refers to Sichuan—is also used in the Chinese transliteration of Trump’s name, leading some to interpret it as “Trump Grand Wisdom Victory.”

For fun, Chinese investors began buying shares. “To support you, I’ve bought some stocks,” one Weibo user from Sichuan wrote, posting an orange heart emoji. The stocks continued to rise when Trump’s actual win became known (#川大智胜午后涨停#).

Chuān Dà Zhì Shèng (川大智胜) stocks going up.

Meanwhile, another company named Haers (哈尔斯 Hāěrsī), which sounds like Harris in Chinese, saw a sudden drop in its stock. That Zhejiang company, which produces vacuum-insulated containers, also got caught up in the elections (#哈尔斯股价大跌#).

Some Chinese economic news channels noted that “external developments” were clearly playing a role in these market fluctuations, and warned people that this kind of short-term, non-logical speculative trading was not recommended. They suggested it would be better to “enjoy the show from the sidelines” (“看个热闹”).

Nevertheless, the momentary fluctuation in ‘Trump’ versus ‘Harris’ stocks did show a general preference for Trump among the Chinese online public.

While the idea of Trump being a more ‘entertaining’ American president than Harris often comes up in Chinese online discussions on the election outcome, there are also more serious discussions about whether Trump’s presidency would be good or bad for China.

Despite what happened in the past, many netizens suggest that Trump, with his pragmatic and business-oriented mindset, will be “more favorable” for China and “better for global stability.” Despite the downsides of protectionist trade policies and high tariffs on China, it is believed that the potential benefits would outweigh them through, for example, improved diplomatic relations and cooperation in tech. Trump’s view of China as an open economic competitor would allow China to respond directly and strategically.

Harris, on the other hand, is viewed less favorably by Chinese social media commenters who believe that China would be seen as a political adversary under her presidency, employing underhanded tactics to contain and undermine China. In their view, she represents the American political elite, which they perceive as engaging in covert power plays worldwide for political gain. Trump’s explicit focus on economic competition is something many find more relatable.

Her perceived “elitism” is also linked to her calls for the need to “stay woke,” a message that hasn’t resonated with many Chinese netizens, who often associate “wokism” with political elites and Western hypocrisy. In contrast, many prefer to support the more practical and relatable “grassroots.”

However, many also believe that for China, it does not matter who won in the end. “In reality, whoever takes office brings new challenges,” a well-known military and current affairs blogger (@后沙月光本尊) wrote. This sentiment was echoed by many others. When Iraqi Weibo blogger Omar (@欧玛omar) suggested that Trump’s return to power would be unfavorable for China due to his “wild schemes against China” and his “crude remarks,” dozens of commenters replied: “It would’ve been the same either way.” “The Democrats are no different.” “China is not afraid.”

A general consensus seems to be that, if it makes no difference to them who’s in the White House, it might as well be someone they find amusing and interesting. In this regard, Trump is the preferred winner for many netizens, who congratulate “the King of Understanding” for his “reemployment.”

Chinese meme: “Trump returns to the palace.”

Trump earned the title “King of Understanding” (dǒngwáng 懂王, also ‘King of Knowing’) on Chinese social media for his often-quoted claims of understanding complex issues better than anyone else (“people are really surprised I understand this stuff”). (Harris, by the way, was nicknamed ‘Sister Haha’ (哈哈姐) or the “King of Laughter” (笑王) for her frequent, distinctive laughter during public appearances.)

Another famous nickname for Trump is “Comrade Jianguo” (建国同志), meaning “Comrade Build-the-Country.” This nickname humorously suggests that Trump’s leadership, which is meant to “make America great again,” inadvertently accelerates China’s rise. Over the years, these playful nicknames have blended mockery with affection, reflecting the humorous perspective many Chinese social media users have toward Trump’s antics.

While Western platforms like Reddit are filled with shock and dread today, Weibo is mostly buzzing with lighthearted banter and optimism. “Looking ahead, keep an eye on sectors like artificial intelligence, autonomous driving, fintech, and Musk-related stocks,” one commenter wrote. “Trump loves Elon. We might even see peace between Russia and Ukraine, or Kim Jong-un watching an NBA game with Trump. And of course, we’d welcome Comrade Jianguo to visit Hainan for some tourism—after all, he loves doing business, and we have free trade.”

When blogger Wu Pei (@吴佩) asked netizens what Trump’s win would realistically mean for them, responses ranged from “crashing stock markets” and “setbacks for EV companies” to “heightened trade frictions.” The only thing people seem to agree on is that it would be best to sit back and watch the spectacle as “Comrade Trump returns to the palace.”

This edition of Weibo Watch was co-curated by Miranda Barnes. Wendy Huang contributed an insightful article on the recent controversies surrounding Chinese livestream stars, and Ruixin Zhang provides a must-read piece on the ongoing crackdown on online smut.

Best,
Manya Koetse
(@manyapan)

What’s New

Forbidden Stories | A recent crackdown on Chinese authors writing erotic webnovels has sparked increased online conversations about the Haitang Literature ‘Flower Market’ subculture, the challenges faced by prominent online smut writers, and the evolving regulations surrounding digital erotica in China. But how serious is the ‘crime’ of writing explicit fiction China today?

Viral Bao’an | This is the video that made a Xiaoxitian (Shanxi) security guard go viral in China. In the popular video, he tells a Douyin vlogger about his raise from 1,700 yuan/month (US$240) to 2,200 yuan ($310), thanks to a tourism boom driven by the popular game Black Myth: Wukong. Shortly after gaining online fame, he shared in another video that he’d been dismissed, looking tired and saying, “They [the superiors] told me not to work anymore. I didn’t say anything wrong, but they don’t want me to continue.” This sparked a wave of outrage online. More about that here 👇.

Livestream Scandals | As livestreaming continues to gain popularity in China, so do the controversies surrounding the industry. Negative headlines involving high-profile livestreamers, as well as aspiring influencers hoping to make it big, frequently dominate Weibo’s trending topics. ‘Wanghong’ used to be a mark of online fame, but now, it’s increasingly tied to controversy and scandal. Read this deep dive ➡️

WeiboWatch List

 
🚫 Forbidden Fashion

A group of foreign fashion designers linked to the brand Fecal Matter were denied entry to Beijing’s Forbidden City on October 15. The group, consisting of American designer Rick Owens, his wife Michèle Lamy, and Fecal Matter members Hannah Rose Dalton and Steven Raj Bhaskaran, made headlines internationally after posting photos on social media of themselves posing outside the Forbidden City. According to their post, security had informed them that they could enter if they removed their makeup and changed into “normal” clothing, a request they declined. While the designers framed the incident as motivation to continue fighting for “greater acceptance and tolerance for difference around the world,” Chinese media and social media users viewed it as a sign of disrespect (#外国游客因着装问题被劝离故宫#).

The Forbidden City issued a statement on the 18th, clarifying that it has no specific dress code for visitors, “as long as it’s not too exaggerated.” A top comment on a Weibo thread about the incident, which received over 100,000 likes, read: “When in Rome, do as the Romans do (客随主便, kè suí zhǔ biàn). If you insist on your freedom to dress as you please, then don’t come to my house!”

 
👻 Halloween Crackdown

The Forbidden City incident wasn’t the only costume-related controversy in China this month. In Shanghai, local police patrolled popular areas to monitor Halloween celebrations. Although there was no nationwide or citywide ban, some videos showed costumed individuals being escorted away by police or forced to remove their outfits. There was a significant police presence on Julu Road and in Zhongshan Park, with the latter even temporarily closed to prevent large gatherings.

Last year, Halloween celebrations in Shanghai caused a frenzy on the Internet. Instead of traditional Halloween themes, young people on Julu Road and beyond brought pop culture memes and social commentary to life through creative costumes. Many outfits were playful, some queer, and others served as social critiques, with costumes depicting surveillance cameras and COVID-19 medical workers. Some even described the event as “China’s very own pride walk.” However, it’s now clear that local authorities are keen to prevent Shanghai’s Halloween festivities from evolving into a larger cultural celebration or protest.

 
📉 Math Competition Outcome

You might remember the story that went viral earlier this year about Jiang Ping (姜萍), the seventeen-year-old vocational school student who reached the top 12 on the finalist list of the Alibaba Global Mathematics Competition, competing against students from elite universities worldwide. Her success story—coming from a humble rural family and excelling in math as a fashion student under the guidance of her teacher Wang Runqiu (王润秋)—initially resonated but was soon questioned. Critics doubted the authenticity of Jiang Ping’s initial score, not only because she wasn’t a math major but also because her score allegedly surpassed her own teacher’s.

Now, the results of the 2024 Alibaba Mathematics Competition, originally set for August, are finally out. Neither Jiang Ping nor her teacher appears on the list. The competition committee released a statement confirming that Wang Runqiu had assisted Jiang Ping in the preliminaries, violating the “no collaboration with others” rule. It’s a disappointing outcome—not only because the competition allowed room for cheating, which Wang and Jiang exploited, but also because Jiang had become an inspirational role model for many math-loving girls from non-elite backgrounds. Now, she has fallen from that pedestal.

 
🔪 Xiaomi SU7 Stabbing Incident

A 23-year-old man from Nantong named Kang, who had just purchased the Tesla competitor Xiaomi SU7, recently became a trending topic on Chinese social media after fatally stabbing a biker enthusiast. Kang, who was part of a motorcycling chat group, shared his new 300,000-yuan ($42,200) Xiaomi SU7 EV in the group, only to be mocked by some members. When the Xiaomi EV owner and bikers later met in person outside a coffee shop popular with bikers, the encounter escalated. Kang pulled out a knife, fatally stabbing one of the group members, then fled in his brand-new car, crashing through a storefront and ramming into motorcycles. A video of the incident went viral online. Kang was arrested shortly afterward.

The incident sparked conversations about how the 23-year-old, a recent university graduate, reached this breaking point. A popular blogger, @黑哥爆料, suggested that Kang’s parents had supported him in buying the costly car, hoping he would work hard and settle down. Lacking the social recognition he had hoped for, the situation with the bikers pushed him to his limits. While Kang bears responsibility for his actions, the blogger suggests that the group could have de-escalated the tension by acknowledging him instead of bullying him. In the end, this incident has devastated multiple lives, including the victim’s, Kang’s, and also Kang’s parents, who now bear the financial and emotional toll of their son’s actions.

 
🍰 Swiss Roll Conversations

“How to divide 8 Swiss rolls?” (8个瑞士卷怎么分?) This question recently became a trending topic on Weibo after a stay-at-home mom shared a video about her experience buying a box of Swiss rolls with eight pieces. Her daughter ate two, her son ate two, and her husband ate two. She assumed the last two pieces were hers, but her husband scolded her, saying she should set a good example by not snacking, and that it was selfish not to save the last pieces for the kids.

The video sparked widespread debate, quickly becoming a symbol for broader issues like gender relations, the division of household labor, and the role of stay-at-home moms. Some feminists expressed outrage over the incident, while others suspected the video was staged to create controversy and attract views. The incident has now drawn so much attention that cyberspace authorities have intervened to investigate whether the Swiss Roll story is genuine. Bon appétit? Let’s see how this unfolds.

What’s Noteworthy

Small news with big impact

For nearly 100 days, since July 27, the well-known social and political commentator Hu Xijin (胡锡进) remained silent on Chinese social media. This was highly unusual for the columnist and former Global Times editor, who typically posts multiple Weibo updates daily, along with regular updates on his X account and video commentaries.

Various foreign media outlets speculated that his silence might be related to his comments about the Third Plenum and Chinese economics, especially regarding China’s shift to treating public and private enterprises equally. Without any official statement, Chinese netizens were left guessing about his whereabouts. Most assumed he had, in some way, taken a ‘wrong’ stance in his commentary on the economy and stock market, or perhaps on politically sensitive topics like the Suzhou stabbing of a Japanese student, which led to his being sidelined for a while.

On October 31, Hu suddenly reappeared on Weibo with a post praising the newly opened Chaobai River Bridge, which connects Beijing to Dachang in Hebei—where Hu owns a home—significantly reducing travel time and making the more affordable Dachang area attractive to people from Beijing. The post received over 9,000 comments and 25,000 likes, with many welcoming back the old journalist. “You’re back!” and “Old Hu, I didn’t see you on Weibo for so long. Although I regularly curse your posts, I missed you,” were among the replies.

Not everyone, however, is thrilled to see his return. Blogger Bad Potato (@一个坏土豆) criticized Hu, claiming that with his frequent posts and shifting views, he likes to jump on trends and gauge public opinion—but is actually not very skilled at it, which allegedly contributes to a toxic online environment. Other bloggers also take issue with Hu’s tendency to contrast himself, or disagree with the stances he makes in new posts.

When Hu wrote about Trump’s win, the top comment read: “Old Trump is back, just like you!”

Hu seems delighted to be back. He hasn’t mentioned his absence but shared a photo from 1978, when he joined the military, reflecting on his journey of growth, learning, and commitment to the country. He has a way of admiring himself—and, occasionally, we don’t mind admiring him too. Welcome back, Hu.

 

What’s Popular

The latest buzz in arts, marketing & pop culture

The TV series Years in the Northwest (西北岁月), premiering on CCTV 1 this week, tells the story of Xi Jinping’s father, longtime PLA leader Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋, 1913-2002). This is the first historical drama to focus on Xi Zhongxun, highlighting his “extraordinary experiences and achievements” during the 25 years he spent in the Shaanxi-Gansu border region from 1927 to 1952.

Xi Zhongxun joined the Communist Party in 1928 and went on to become a prominent revolutionary and political leader. In the northwest’s Shaanxi-Gansu border region, he played a critical role in establishing revolutionary bases. Working alongside notable figures like Peng Dehuai (彭德怀), his efforts were instrumental in consolidating Party influence in the region.

On social media, some viewers of the first episode have shared emotional responses, while others praise popular actor Wu Lei (吴磊, 1999) for his portrayal of the young Xi Zhongxun.

One interesting aspect of the series’ announcement on Weibo is the unusually high number of shares—over 620,500—compared to the relatively low number of comments, suggesting that online discussions surrounding the series are controlled and contained.

 

What’s Memorable

Best reads from the archive

On the morning of November 9, 2016 (Beijing time), the world received news of Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election. In our coverage of Trump’s win at the time, we provided insight into Chinese reactions to America’s unconventional new president. From official Chinese media to Weibo netizens, responses to Trump’s triumph were favorable, critical, humorous, but above all, mixed.

Read more
 

Weibo Word of the Week

The catchword to know

Digital Iboprofen | Our Weibo word of the week is 电子布洛芬 (diànzǐ bùluòfēn), which translates to “Digital Ibuprofen” or “Electronic Ibuprofen.”*

This week, the term came up when fans told Chinese actor and singer Tan Jianci (檀健次) that he is their “digital ibuprofen.” Tan, with a puzzled look, asked what that meant. A fan explained, “It means we feel better when we see you” (or, essentially, “our bodies feel no pain”). Since then, Tan Jianci has become associated with the term “digital ibuprofen.”

Although the phrase resurfaced this week, it has been around for some time, gaining popularity in 2022-2023 among fans of entertainment shows. It refers to content that provides relief from stress or discomfort, much like how ibuprofen alleviates physical pain. For instance, the Hunan TV show Go for Happiness (快乐再出发) is often called “digital ibuprofen.”

Chiikawa is the original ‘digital ibuprofen’. Image via @南岛客厅.

The term saw a surge in popularity alongside the Japanese animated series Chiikawa, which became a viral hit among young people. The anime’s portrayal of its cute character staying optimistic despite life’s stresses earned Chiikawa the nickname “digital ibuprofen,” as fans found comfort in its stories (read more in this story by Sixth Tone).

“Digital ibuprofen” applies to more than just shows—it can be any content, such as videos, memes, or idols, that provides comfort, distraction, and relief to fans.

In the same category, there’s also “digital pickled mustard” or “electronic pickled mustard” (电子榨菜, diànzǐ zhàcài), which refers to a binge-worthy or comforting show.

*The term 电子 (diànzǐ) means “electronic” and is commonly used in modern Chinese terms, much like the English “e-” prefix in ebook (电子书) or email (电子邮件). It’s also used for digital transactions, like digital payments (电子支付) or digital wallets (电子钱包).

Featured image of Tan Jianci’s head inside an ibuprofen pill, on Xiaohongshu via 燋糖栗子.

This is an on-site version of the Weibo Watch newsletter by What’s on Weibo. Missed last week’s newsletter? Find it here. If you are already subscribed to What’s on Weibo but are not yet receiving this newsletter in your inbox, please contact us directly to let us know.

PREMIUM NEWSLETTER | ISSUE #38

Dear Reader,

October 1st marked the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Flags, hearts, balloons—National Day celebrations turned Chinese social media red.

Among the key players in leading the propaganda around National Day was People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China. To commemorate the occasion, People’s Daily published a column titled “Today’s China, Tomorrow’s China” (今天的中国，明天的中国)¹, outlining a clear vision for the future and emphasizing China’s rise under the Party’s leadership.

The article highlighted how hard work and perseverance are crucial to achieving the ‘China Dream,’ with national unity being the driving force behind the country’s continued progress. It also stressed the pivotal role of China’s youth in shaping the future of the nation.

The article was accompanied by four posters, each conveying a specific message:

“Today’s China is a China where dreams are continuously realized” (今天的中国是梦想接连实现的中国)
“Today’s China is a China full of vibrancy and vitality” (今天的中国是充满生机活力的中国)
“Today’s China is a China that carries on the national spirit” (今天的中国是赓续民族精神的中国)
“Today’s China is a China closely connected to the world” (今天的中国是紧密联系世界的中国)

A related hashtag, “75th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” (#新中国成立75周年#), received over 590 million views on Weibo.

But People’s Daily also put out a much simpler message, posting the hashtag: “I Love You, China” (#我爱你中国#).

This hashtag was accompanied by an online poster featuring the Chinese characters for “China.” The characters in the picture are shaped by various symbols representing both traditional and modern China, from lanterns and Tiananmen to rockets and railways. That post was shared over six million times.

The immense popularity of the poster and the “I Love You China” hashtag page, initiated by People’s Daily and garnering over eight billion views through the times, highlights the strength of Party-led propaganda in the social media era.

 
A Major Shift
 

A few days ago, De Balie, a cultural venue in Amsterdam, hosted an event focused on how Chinese state propaganda has evolved, coinciding with the 75th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. As a participant in the discussion, I’ve recently been reflecting on the nature of Chinese propaganda in the digital age.

Propaganda has always been a key element of the Party’s strategy—not just for the past 75 years, but for over a century. Since the founding of the Central Propaganda Department in 1924, three years after the establishment of the Communist Party, propaganda has played a central role in shaping official narratives. China’s propaganda system exerts significant influence over nearly every major medium involved in disseminating information within the country, from news outlets and educational institutions to cultural organizations, artistic circles, and literary institutions.²

China’s rapid digitalization and the rise of social media posed significant challenges for officials in disseminating propaganda, particularly in the early 2010s when there was an explosion of self-media, app culture, and intense celebrity idolization. Amid this cacophony of new media channels, Party propaganda was increasingly overlooked as people’s attention shifted to what they found more engaging, such as movie stars and other celebrities representing new, exciting lifestyles.³

This was not the first ‘disruptive force’ the Party Propaganda Department had to confront. (Side note: Chinese officials, aware of the negative connotations of ‘propaganda’ in English—though it’s a neutral term in Chinese, 宣传—later changed its English name to the ‘Publicity Department.’)

As Stefan Landsberger notes in Chinese Propaganda Posters,⁴ the Party’s well-established system for propaganda and political education faced similar challenges in the 1980s following the Open Door policy. This policy significantly transformed Chinese society, bringing a wave of foreign cultural and lifestyle influences and accelerating the spread of electronic media.

Although the spread of non-official media and information may have disrupted the central messaging dynamics of the Propaganda Department in the 1980s, the growing presence of radio and television sets in people’s homes also allowed Party leaders to shift their focus from propaganda posters to new media as a means of communicating political messages.⁵

A similar shift has occurred over the past seven to eight years when it comes to social media. Initially, propaganda authorities struggled to convey official messages on Weibo and other emerging digital platforms, but in 2017, China’s propaganda system saw a pivotal change in its approach to domestic social media, particularly on Weibo.

Instead of trying to pull young people into traditional Party narratives, it began weaving propaganda directly the fabric of social media itself —blending politics seamlessly into the digital content young audiences were already engaging with.

No three-and-a-half-hour speech, but a three-and-a-half minute video. In 2017, Chinese state media explained China’s new strategies through catchy rap music and trendy graphics. Read more.

2017 was a pivotal year for Chinese propaganda with three major events: the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Summit, the 19th Party Congress, and the APEC Summit. For each occasion, publicity authorities launched distinctive, high-profile campaigns.

The OBOR Summit featured several high-production videos with catchy tunes, often starring foreigners (though some found them awkward). The 19th Party Congress saw a flood of new propaganda videos and initiatives, including a clapping game produced by Tencent that allowed users to applaud Xi Jinping’s speech. Meanwhile, the APEC Summit videos saw a manga-style version of Xi Jinping, portraying him as lovable and approachable.

 
Hashtagification of Propaganda
 

Propaganda departments in China have adapted various strategies over the past few years to make official Party narratives more appealing by adjusting to the fast-paced, fleeting, and trendy nature of China’s social media environment. I’d call this the ‘hashtagification’ of Chinese propaganda—turning political messaging into viral trends by embedding it in hashtags and social media content. These are essentially hashtag-driven narratives that netizens can easily engage with and share.

Within this movement, I see six major strategies of digital propaganda emerging on Weibo and other social apps, such as Douyin, from 2017 to 2024.

📌 1. Old Message, New Media: Revival of Classic Propaganda

The types of posts that People’s Daily shares around National Day and other celebrations often echo classic nationalist messages about unity and national pride. This is part of a broader strategy within China’s social media propaganda, focusing on strong, simple messages that, at their core, are not much different from the political narratives promoted in previous decades. However, these messages are now disseminated through modern channels, using more sophisticated techniques and production methods. These can include online posters, as well as music or high-quality videos (example).

📌 2. Double Agenda: Foreign-Facing Propaganda with Domestic Goal

Although there’s traditionally been a clear distinction between domestic propaganda and waixuan (“external propaganda”), the past few years have seen the rise of a new kind of propaganda. It appears to target an international audience but is actually aimed at bolstering domestic support and reinforcing a positive image of China. Assertive or aggressive videos and posts, supposedly directed at foreign viewers, are often used to stir national pride at home. A good example of this is the Xinhua video series featuring Young Lady Guoshe (国社小姐姐), whose real name is Wang Dier (王迪迩), an anchor for Xinhua who previously worked for CCTV. If you’re unsure what this looks like, check the full clip here.

📌 3. Grassroots ‘Propaganda’ in Official Communication

Over the past few years, particularly during the Covid period, official channels began repurposing satirical online artworks created by independent artists or popular nationalistic influencers as a form of national propaganda. Much of this art was produced by Chinese cartoonists and artists, mocking Western hypocrisy and political leaders. These pieces were then retweeted and widely shared by official Chinese channels, amplifying domestic support and fueling anti-Western sentiment. You can read more about this trend here.

‘Investigate Thoroughly! Except Here’ (‘彻查！除了这儿’) satirical illustration by artist 半桶老阿汤 / Half Can of Old Soup in response to US calls for investigation into the origins of Covid in China while ignoring a possible link with Fort Detrick. This post was shared by the Communist Youth League on social media.

📌 4. Tech-Driven Party Messages

The use of advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, virtual reality, and gamification by Chinese state media serves a dual purpose: reinforcing the Party’s messaging while simultaneously showcasing China’s digital innovation. By integrating technology with propaganda, the Party’s message becomes more engaging and interactive, while also projecting China as a leading tech power. For instance, in recent years, the annual CCTV New Year’s Gala has become a platform to display China’s cutting-edge digital technologies on stage. Online, tech and propaganda are frequently intertwined, such as in the aforementioned clapping game by Tencent. Other examples include virtual newsreaders for state media and the ‘Study Xi app’ (Xuexi Qiangguo), which allows users to earn points for engaging with official Party content. You can read more about these innovations here and here.

📌 5. Pop Culture Propaganda

By ‘Pop Culture Propaganda,’ I refer to the blending of propaganda with pop culture in various ways. One example is the use of Chinese celebrities to promote official Party messages, such as the 2017 campaign for China’s New Era (hashtag: ‘Give A Shout-Out to the New Era‘) or the Social Credit song launched by the Communist Youth League. Another form of this propaganda involves colorful and cute animations and cartoons that primarily appeal to younger generations. These often incorporate Japanese influences, like anime and manga, which are especially popular among Chinese youth, making propaganda more accessible and attractive. Currently, many manga-themed propaganda-style images are circulating, blurring the lines between fan-made content and official productions (as mentioned in point 3!).

Official or not? Official channels sometimes share non-official digital art on their pages, while everyday netizens often post official “pop propaganda” on their own accounts (Images via Weibo).

📌 6. Guerrilla Propaganda: Coordinated, Multi-Front Engagement Across Media & Influencers

A final technique I’ve observed on Chinese social media since 2016-2017 is topic-centered propaganda that is spread simultaneously across multiple platforms. In these campaigns, social media, local authorities, businesses, and influencers collaborate to create a coordinated wave of messaging. A notable example is the 2021 Xinjiang cotton campaign, which followed H&M and the Better Cotton Initiative’s boycott of Xinjiang cotton over alleged human rights abuses. In response, a massive pro-Xinjiang cotton campaign erupted on Weibo, with state media, Baidu, e-commerce platforms, and celebrities uniting to cancel H&M and support Xinjiang-sourced cotton. The campaign was highly effective, with the hashtag “Wo Zhichi Xinjiang Mianhua” (“I Support Xinjiang Cotton” #我支持新疆棉花#) receiving over 8 billion views on Weibo—comparable to the “I Love China” hashtag.

Propaganda posters by People’s Daily at the time of the Xinjiang cotton controversy. The posters say “Xinjiang Mianhua” (Xinjiang cotton) in a similar font to the H&M logo, the “H” and “M” within ‘mianhua‘ being identical to the H&M letters.

What’s particularly interesting about propaganda in China’s social media era is that, unlike previous periods, it’s no longer a one-way street from billboard to pedestrian or from TV screen to viewer. Social media is inherently interactive, and despite the overwhelming presence of official accounts on platforms like Weibo, WeChat, and Douyin, there are still over a billion individual social media users in China who can choose to scroll away, mute, or ignore these messages.

While the line between state media and other accounts is increasingly blurred, state propaganda continues to compete for attention in a dynamic and vibrant online culture.

 
Stefan Landsberger – In Memoriam
 

There is so much more to say about all of this, and it only highlights how multi-faceted and complex the topic of propaganda in China truly is.

No one understood this better than sinologist Prof. Dr. Stefan Landsberger. I was shocked and deeply saddened to hear of his sudden passing this week. Coincidentally, I received the news while working on this newsletter, with his beautiful Chinese Propaganda Posters book open on my lap.

If you’re not familiar with his name, you might have come across his work if you’ve ever read anything about Chinese propaganda. Landsberger was a leading authority on the subject, having spent decades—since the late 1970s—collecting an extensive array of posters and conducting thorough research in the field. His collection grew to become one of the largest private collections of Chinese propaganda posters in the world.

Landsberger was an Associate Professor of Contemporary Chinese History and Society at Leiden University. In that role, he also taught me Chinese Modern History when I was an undergraduate there. He was a dedicated teacher—often critical, which made him intimidating to some students—but deeply appreciated by most for his brutal honesty and his immense passion for Chinese history and modern Sinology.

One memory from 2018 stands out. I was in China as a post-graduate student and took a taxi on a cold and rainy January night in Beijing. During the ride, I struck up a conversation with the driver, who asked me where I was from. When I told him I was Dutch, he proudly shared that he had a Dutch friend—one of his dearest, he said, whom he’d known since the early 1980s. That intrigued me, as I’d never heard anything like that from a Beijing taxi driver before. As we continued talking, he mentioned that his friend was a teacher and then showed me a photo on his phone of them together. I was surprised to see that the man in the picture, smiling warmly beside the taxi driver, was none other than my own teacher Stefan Landsberger.

In a city of 21 million people, I had somehow hailed a cab driven by one of Landsberger’s oldest friends in the city, whom he had known since he was a student in Beijing. I shared this story with Dr. Landsberger later through WeChat—it made him laugh. This chance encounter left a lasting impression on me, not just because of the coincidence, but because it spoke volumes about Landsberger’s enduring love for China and his ability to cultivate deep, lasting friendships. It showed his loyalty, not just to his work and research but to the people and connections he built over decades.

Landsberger will be greatly missed. His contributions to the growing body of work on Chinese propaganda are invaluable. This ever-evolving phenomenon can only be fully understood by examining both its current trends and its historical roots—and Landsberger’s work will forever be foundational in that effort, helping to better understand “Today’s China, Tomorrow’s China.”

My thoughts are with his family and friends during this difficult time.

Best,
Manya Koetse
(@manyapan)

¹ Ren Ping, “今天的中国，明天的中国” [Today’s China, Tomorrow’s China], People’s Daily, September 29, 2024, https://weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309405083853533610297
² David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy,” The China Journal 57 (2007):27-28.
³ See Willy Lam quoted in Yi-Ling Liu, “Chinese Propaganda Faces Stiff Competition from Celebrities,” AP News, October 23, 2017, https://apnews.com/article/1616c60ab01d43caae024d34cb98d532 (accessed October 12, 2024).
⁴ Stefan Landsberger, Chinese Propaganda Posters: From Revolution to Modernization (Amsterdam: The Pepin Press, 2001): 11.
⁵ Landsberger, Chinese Propaganda Posters, 15.

PS: If you’re a loyal reader of Weibo Watch, you might have noticed I’ve been trying out some changes in the newsletters lately to deliver more frequent updates while balancing things on the site. Don’t worry if this edition is missing the hot topics section—it’s not going anywhere! But if there’s anything you’d love to see in the newsletters moving forward, please let me know. Your feedback really helps with planning future editions.

What’s New

Golden Week | China celebrated its National Day Holiday earlier this month. This week-long holiday, also known as the Golden Week, is a popular time for trips, travel, and sightseeing. On Chinese social media, it has become somewhat of a tradition to post about just how busy it is in China’s various sightseeing spots. This is often done by using hashtags including “人人人人[place]人人人人.”

Being Watched | Could it be that someone is watching you while you think you’re all alone in your private hotel room? Without realizing it, some guesthouses or hotels may have hidden cameras secretly recording their guests. This issue has long been a source of concern in China and has recently become a hot topic again. The Chinese Douyin and Weibo blogger @ShadowsDontLie (@影子不会说谎), an ‘anti-fraud’ influencer, has made it his mission to expose hidden cameras in guesthouses. The controversy following his recent discoveries are perhaps just a tip of the iceberg – we’ll follow up on this story soon. Meanwhile, check out the full story here.

For the Clicks |The debate over influencers performing dangerous stunts for clout is ongoing in the West, but it has also recently gained attention in China after another motorcycle influencer was killed in a crash.

China’s Image | On October 10, 2024, De Balie hosted an event discussing how China portrays itself to its citizens and the world, marking the 75th anniversary of the People’s Republic. The panel explored the evolution of Chinese state propaganda, the public’s response, and how the emergence of digital China has reshaped the landscape. Speakers included Ardi Bouwers, Florian Schneider, Qian Huang, and myself (Qian and I appear in the second half). You can watch the full event here.